



MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS

EDITED BY
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INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS

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**MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MARATHON CONFERENCE 2010**

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The cover image shows Persian warriors at Ishtar Gate, from before the fourth century BC. Pergamon Museum/Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin.
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MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The chapters in this volume were delivered at a colloquium marking the anniversary of Marathon which was held at the Faculty of Philology, University of Peloponnese, Kalamata 7-10 October 2010.¹ The aim was to assemble a group of researchers to revisit the event from a variety of perspectives and also to celebrate what was on any reckoning a key moment not just in Greek but in European history. Marathon began the rapid upward trajectory which propelled Athens from a moderately important Greek *polis* to a regional power. It formed a seminal element in the sharpening of the Greek sense of ethnic distinctiveness (already underway) which is at the root of the East-West dichotomy and of Greek and subsequent perceptions of the East. And even for those who find historical counterfactuals unhelpful it is difficult to resist the conclusion that European history would have looked different if the Persians had won. The scale and movements of the expeditionary force argue a targeted punitive expedition; but history (including the Persian invasion of 480) shows that punitive expeditions can easily form the basis for conquest.

Marathon is indelibly embedded in the collective European consciousness, to the point where John Stuart Mill (aptly quoted by Peter Rhodes, Peter Krentz, Peter Funke, and Lorna Hardwick in this volume) could observe that ‘the Battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings’. It is, with Salamis, part of the stuff of legend. And so it was for the Greeks. This larger-than-life dimension had established itself long before our first encounter with it. The supernatural motifs and superhuman achievements (like the famous advance at a run) which we find in our earliest account of the battle two generations later in Herodotus, had already become part of the story by the mid-fifth century at the latest, possibly even from the very first. This was perhaps inevitable even without the spin which the Athenians gave the event. The dramatic disproportion in the powers in play and the matching disparity in the casualties of the two sides made for a *peripeteia* with a profound appeal to Greek ways of looking at the world. This, together with the issues in play, gave the battle a lasting impact on material culture, art, and literature from the Painted Stoa in the Agora at Athens in the middle of the fifth century through to the visual arts and poetry of the modern era.

The speakers at the Kalamata conference were invited to examine the battle from divergent but complementary angles, (military-)historical, literary, religious, including receptions ancient and modern. The conference offered, and this book offers, not a coherent narrative but a series of drills, each designed to make sense of an aspect of the battle from the standpoint of a specific discipline or within a different context, textual, material, or

¹ Technically we were a year early; 2011 was the actual 2,500th anniversary (there was no year zero); 2010 still somehow feels right, even if it reflects symbolic rather than mathematical numeracy.

societal. It is not the story, nor even *a* story, of Marathon. And it certainly is not the last word. For the opportunity we are grateful to the Faculty of Philology of the University of Peloponnese at Kalamata for its hospitality and especially to the Chair of the Faculty, Professor Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou, and Dr Eleni Volonaki.

Chris Carey
Mike Edwards

MARATHON: 2,500 YEARS

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THE BATTLE OF MARATHON AND MODERN SCHOLARSHIP¹

P. J. RHODES

So much has been written about the battle of Marathon, from so wide a range of viewpoints, that I was probably not the only contributor to this volume to have thought despairingly that it would be difficult to say anything worthwhile about Marathon which has not been said already by somebody somewhere. In the end that provided me with the subject for my paper, and I should like to look at the wide range of scholarly investigations which has been prompted by the battle of Marathon.

Marathon has inevitably attracted military historians, interested in how the Athenians succeeded in defeating the Persians and what the consequences of their success were. It is worth mentioning one unusual publication, a paper by N. Whatley which was written for a meeting in Oxford in 1920 but not published until 1964, which took Marathon as a test case for asking more generally how, and how far, we can reconstruct what happened in ancient battles, and criticizing some over-confident reconstructions which were prevalent in the early twentieth century.² J. F. Lazenby in a fairly recent book on the Persian Wars has doubted the attribution to the Athenians of clever strategy and tactics, better discipline than the Persians or even the effect of belonging to a free state fighting for its freedom, and prefers to think of a victory won by ‘militiamen through sheer guts and chance’.³ The 2,500th anniversary has already prompted two new books, and there may be more on the way: R. A. Billows, *Marathon: how one battle changed western civilization*,⁴ and P. Krentz (one of the other contributors to this volume), *The battle of Marathon*,⁵ each of them considering both the campaign of 490 and the battle of Marathon and also the wider context. Billows has a new interpretation of the generals’ disagreement, and Krentz puts forward new suggestions as to why, where, and how the actual battle began, which I shall mention below.

Beyond that, I begin with the written sources: overwhelmingly Herodotus, some tantalizing passages in later texts, some intriguing inscriptions. A. W. Gomme notoriously

¹ My thanks to the organizers of the Marathon conference for inviting me to participate, to those who heard this paper and discussed Marathon with me, and to those who were able to point me to the article cited in n. 84 below; also to Prof. Krentz, for giving me his book on Marathon and telling me of other recent books on the battle.

² N. Whatley, ‘On the possibility of reconstructing Marathon and other ancient battles’, *JHS* 84 (1964) 119-39.

³ J. F. Lazenby, *The defence of Greece, 490-479 BC* (Warminster 1993) 75-80.

⁴ R. A. Billows, *Marathon: how one battle changed western civilization* (New York & London 2010).

⁵ P. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven 2010); cf. his chapter in this volume.

began his article on ‘Herodotos and Marathon’⁶ with the sentence, ‘Everyone knows that Herodotos’ narrative of Marathon will not do’ – because Herodotus did not know about warfare; he was not always careful to scrutinize what his informants told him; and there are inconsistencies, over the Persian cavalry, the Athenian generals and polemarch, and the delay before the battle and the ending of that delay, which mean that his narrative cannot be accepted as it stands. Herodotus is more sympathetically regarded now than he was half a century ago, but I think it is undeniable that there are some difficulties in Herodotus’ account of Marathon. At two particular points Gomme invoked later sources to solve a problem; and, while agreement is as far away as ever, I think he was right on both those points. (a) An Athenian decree proposed by Miltiades, to march out from Athens and face the Persians,⁷ is one of a whole series of fifth-century Athenian documents for which we have no fifth-century evidence but which are attested from the fourth century onwards. I am on the side of those who believe them to be not original documents rediscovered in the fourth century but fourth-century reconstructions⁸ – that does not mean baseless inventions, but we cannot tell how much genuine information lies behind them. But I agree with Gomme that the disagreement over whether to fight immediately or to wait, which Herodotus locates at Marathon, makes much better sense as a disagreement in Athens over whether to go and confront the Persians at Marathon or to stay and defend the city.⁹ (b) Herodotus’ account of why after some days the armies’ delay at Marathon ended and the battle was fought, though we should have expected the Athenians to continue waiting until the Spartans arrived to support them, is that the generals were taking it in turn to preside, a day at a time, but although Miltiades’ supporters were willing to yield to him on their days he waited until his own day had come and fought then.¹⁰ An entry in the *Suda*, χωρὶς ἵππεῖς, and a passage in Nepos’ *Miltiades* point to a more credible explanation – that the Persians had re-embarked their cavalry as a first step towards sailing to Phalerum and attacking the city before the Spartans arrived, and the Athenians got to know of that.¹¹

Another question to which Herodotus does not give a sufficient answer is why the Persian forces landed at Marathon, rather than sail to Phalerum, from which they could attack the city of Athens directly. His overt explanation is that that was the most suitable

⁶ A. W. Gomme, ‘Herodotos and Marathon’, *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 77-83 = *More essays in Greek history and literature* (Oxford 1962) 29-37.

⁷ Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1411a9-11; Dem. 19, *Embassy* 303; Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 628E; Paus. 7.15.7.

⁸ The classic exposition of this view is C. Habicht, ‘Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege’, *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1-35.

⁹ Hdt. 6.109. Nep. 1, *Milt.* 4.4-5.2 has Miltiades prevailing in a debate in Athens.

¹⁰ Hdt. 6.110. Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 211-13, accepts χωρὶς ἵππεῖς (below), and suggests that the disagreement occurred when it was known that the Persians were embarking their cavalry, and concerned whether to return and defend the city or to stay at Marathon and seize the opportunity to fight.

¹¹ *Suda* (χ 444) χωρὶς ἵππεῖς (‘the cavalry separate’); Nep. 1, *Milt.* 5.3. Opponents of this solution infer from the surprise at the Athenians’ lack of cavalry which Herodotus attributes to the Persians (6.112.2) that the Persians’ cavalry did take part in the battle; and their cavalry did take part in Nep. 1, *Milt.* 5.3.

area in Attica for cavalry, and that it was close to Eretria.¹² In fact the plain between Phalerum and the city was equally suitable for cavalry. Nearness to Eretria probably counts for something, and we can add that the Persians would have been able to sail quickly from Eretria to Marathon and disembark before the Athenians could send a substantial force to oppose them there; but it is normal to see significance in the statement which Herodotus adds to his overt explanation, that the ex-tyrant Hippias, who was with the Persians, led them to Marathon. Eastern Attica was the Pisistratids' home territory, where Hippias would have the best chance of finding supporters, and Pisistratus had sailed from Eretria to Marathon and advanced on Athens from there when he seized power for the last time c. 546.¹³

I remarked above that Herodotus is more sympathetically regarded now than he was half a century ago. Modern approaches to literature, through such studies as narratology, have made us more aware than our predecessors that an ancient writer can be trying to do various other things in addition to, or indeed instead of, straightforwardly giving the facts. I think this has made us more willing than scholars of earlier generations to accept what the transmitted text says and try to make sense of it, rather than to say dismissively that the text must be corrupt, or else the writer thought he was telling the truth but got it wrong. Sometimes, writers have not been allowed to get it wrong. Just as the great philologists of the past knew what was good Greek, and when the manuscripts gave them something which they could not accept as good Greek they emended the text to produce something more satisfactory, so the great historians of the past knew what the truth must have been, and when the manuscripts gave them something which they could not accept as true they likewise emended the text to produce something more satisfactory. H. B. Rosén in the new Teubner edition of Herodotus has tried to free the text from linguistic 'improvements', D. Asheri was equally anxious to free the text from historical 'improvements', and D. Gilula has given examples from books 8-9 of irresponsible emendations which have remained accepted for too long.¹⁴

I do not think Herodotus' account of Marathon has been distorted by wild emendations, but there have certainly been scholars who went much further than Gomme in thinking that they knew better than Herodotus what had been planned and what had happened. One of the most drastic was J. A. R. Munro, first in a series of articles and later in his treatment of the Persian Wars in the first edition of the *Cambridge ancient history*.¹⁵ In his 1899 article on

¹² Hdt. 6.102.

¹³ Pisistratus leader of the *hyperakrioi*, Hdt. 1.59.3, from Brauron, the later Philaidae, [Plat.] *Hipparch*. 228b; Plut. *Sol.* 10.3; c. 546, Hdt. 1.62.1. Significance of Hippias already in G. Grote, *History of Greece* (London, 'new edition' in 12 volumes 1869/84) IV 260 = ('new edition' in 10 volumes 1888) IV 22-23.

¹⁴ H. B. Rosén, *Herodoti historiae*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1987-97); D. Asheri, *Erodoto: le storie, libro I* (Milan 1988) cxv (not included in D. Asheri *et al.*, *A commentary on Herodotus, books I-IV* [Oxford 2007]); D. Gilula, 'Who was actually buried in the first of the three Spartan graves (Hdt. 9.85.1)? Textual and historical problems', in *Herodotus and his world. Essays from a conference in memory of George Forrest*, ed., P. Derow and R. Parker (Oxford 2003) 73-87.

¹⁵ J. A. R. Munro, 'Some observations on the Persian Wars, 1. The campaign of Marathon', *JHS* 19 (1899) 185-97 (followed by articles on 480 and on 479 in vols. 22 (1902) and 24 (1904)); *Cambridge ancient history* IV (Cambridge 1926) 229-52.

Marathon he supposed that the Persians' reason for landing at Marathon rather than Phalerum was to lure the Athenian army away from the city; half of the Persian force was to stay there and keep the Athenians pinned down, while the other half with Hippias, in collusion with the Alcmaeonids in the city, was to sail round to Phalerum and the city would then be betrayed to it. This relies on Nepos' statement that half of the Persian infantry took part in the battle.¹⁶ Miltiades got to know of the Persian plans and (thanks to χωρὶς ἱππεῖς) he also got to know when the Persians were embarking the half which was to sail round to Phalerum, and he attacked then. Later, in the *Cambridge ancient history*, Munro went far beyond that in departing from what Herodotus says: the Persians divided their forces from the beginning, with Datis landing at Marathon while Artaphernes attacked Eretria; the Athenian army was on its way to support Eretria but turned aside to Marathon when it learned that Datis had landed there; the fall of Eretria left Artaphernes free to sail to Attica, so the Athenians at Marathon then had to attack without waiting for the promised help to arrive from Sparta. In this version Munro did not even accept the standard date for the battle, late summer 490/89,¹⁷ but moved it from the archonship of Phaenippus to late summer 491/90, on the basis of intervals given in some texts between Marathon and other events.¹⁸ As Burn pointed out, not only is that theory suggested by no source, but it is unthinkable that the Athenians would have considered sending their full army outside Attica to support Eretria, thus leaving Athens itself vulnerable to attack.¹⁹

More recently a Norwegian scholar, J. H. Schreiner, has included Marathon among the fifth-century topics on which he has written revisionist studies relying particularly on the later sources.²⁰ He conjures up two battles at Marathon, the first near the Greek camp, in which the Greeks defeated a Persian attack, and the second some days later, when most of the Persians had re-embarked and the Greeks at night attacked and defeated the Persians left on land, after which it was the Athenian navy which prevented the Persians from landing at Phalerum. But it is not satisfactory to put together odd passages from different places and to suppose that they are surviving fragments from a single true account which proves the account of our main fifth-century source to be untrue.

Munro apart, 490/89 has been accepted as the year of the battle, but there has been a problem over the exact date. According to Herodotus, the Athenian runner arrived in Sparta on the ninth day of the month, to be told that the Spartans could not march out until the full moon (which if the calendar was not out of step with the moon would have been

¹⁶ Nep. 1, *Milt.* 4.1, 5.4.

¹⁷ Where relevant I use underlining to indicate the first or second half of an Athenian year.

¹⁸ *CAH* IV (n. 15 above) 232-33, 245, answered by T. J. Cadoux, 'The Athenian archons from Kreon to Hypsichides', *JHS* 68 (1949) 70-123, at 117 n. 253. Phaenippus, e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 22.3.

¹⁹ A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks: the defence of the west, c. 546-478 BC* (London 1962) 238 n. 5. However, this theory is revived by G. Steinhauer, *ὁ Μαραθὼν καὶ τὸ ἀρχαιολογικὸ μνημεῖον / Marathon and the archaeological museum* (Athens 2009, in Greek and English editions) 96-97, 100-01, 111.

²⁰ J. H. Schreiner, 'The battles of 490 BC', *PCPS* 196 = ²16 (1970) 97-112; *Two battles and two bills: Marathon and the Athenian fleet* (Oslo 2004); 'The battle of Phaleron in 490 BC', *SO* 82 (2007) 30-34.

on the fifteenth).²¹ Plutarch in his essay *On the malice of Herodotus* complains that the Spartans frequently did not wait until the full moon (failing to realize that this might be a taboo applying specifically to the celebration of the Carneia, in the second quarter of the month Carneius), and that the battle was fought on 6 Boedromion (the third month of the Athenian year), so that waiting for the full moon ought not to have held the Spartans back.²² The solution commonly adopted is that 6 Boedromion was the date not of the battle but of the subsequent commemoration, chosen because the sixth of the month was sacred to Artemis, and that the battle was actually fought about the middle of the previous month, Metageitnion; Metageitnion is equated with Carneius elsewhere by Plutarch.²³ If the Athenian and Spartan calendars were both in step with the moon – and we have to admit that that may not have been the case – there is a further problem, because in 490 there was a new moon immediately before the summer solstice, which might have been correctly detected and assigned to 491/90 or might have been incorrectly considered to be the first new moon of 490/89. If it was correctly detected, then the full moon of Carneius/Metageitnion should have been in the middle of September, and it is hard to think that so much of the year had already been used up that the battle of Marathon was not fought until then. If that new moon was wrongly considered to have occurred after the solstice, then the full moon of Carneius/Metageitnion, and the battle of Marathon, would have fallen in the middle of August, and that solution is often preferred.²⁴

There is a wider chronological problem concerning the events leading up to the campaign of 490. Herodotus in book 6 continues beyond the Ionian Revolt to Mardonius' campaign of 492 and Darius' ultimatum to Thasos in 491; he then mentions Darius' sending heralds to demand the submission of the Greeks; and that leads to a complex story involving Athens, Sparta, and Aegina; after which he turns to the campaign of 490.²⁵ Most scholars have thought that there are too many events in the story of Athens, Sparta, and Aegina to be accommodated between the summer of 491 and the summer of 490, and often

²¹ Hdt. 6.106.3.

²² Plut. *De Her. Mal.* 861E-862A; also *Cam.* 19.5, *De Glor. Ath.* 349F.

²³ Metageitnion = Carneius, Plut. *Nic.* 28.2.

²⁴ See, e.g., G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* II² (Gotha 1895) 580 n. 3, 596 n. 4; Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (n. 19 above) 240-41 n. 10, 257, both thinking August more likely; D. W. Olson *et al.*, 'The moon and the Marathon', *Sky and Telescope* 108.3 (September 2004) 34-41, reckon that the full moon of Carneius ought to have been that of August. N. G. L. Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle of Marathon', *JHS* 88 (1968) 13-57, at 40-41 = *Studies in Greek history* (Oxford 1973) 170-250 at 216-17, considered 6 Boedromion to be not the date of the celebration after the battle but the date of the vow to Artemis made before the battle (Xen. *An.* 3.2.11-12). Calendars out of step with the moon, and 6 Boedromion the actual date of the battle, e.g. W. K. Pritchett, 'Julian dates and Greek calendars', *CP* 42 (1947) 235-43, at 238, 'Calendars of Athens again', *BCH* 81 (1957) 269-301, at 278-79; and Pritchett also doubted the normal assumption that the full moon must be that of Carneius: in his *Ancient Greek military practices* I (University of California Publications in Classical Studies 7 [1971]) = *The Greek state at war* I (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1974) 116-26. See also Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 180-82, 224.

²⁵ Mardonius in 492, Hdt. 6.43-45; Thasos in 491, 46-48.1; heralds to Greece, 48.1-49.1; Athens, Sparta and Aegina, 49-93; campaign of 490, 94-124.

it has been suggested that many of those events occurred in the early 480s, after the battle of Marathon.²⁶ That is not what the reader of Herodotus would expect, and N. G. L. Hammond defended Herodotus' placing of the story in 491/90, reckoning that all the events could be accommodated with some months to spare.²⁷ I agree with Hammond that what Herodotus narrates before Marathon should have happened before Marathon, but I find it hard to accept that everything happened within a year. A better solution was suggested by Forrest, as a brief aside in an article about another matter, and I have championed it more recently – that when Herodotus mentions Darius' heralds to Greece he is backtracking but fails to make that clear, that Darius' heralds were sent not in 491/90, just before the campaign of 490, but in 493/92, just before Mardonius' campaign of 492.²⁸ This will allow time for the whole sequence of events to be completed before the Marathon campaign.

It will also mean that, whether or not it was hoped that Mardonius would reach central and southern Greece, Darius already had central and southern Greece in his sights – and that I am happy to believe. As Herodotus says in connection with Mardonius' campaign, Eretria and Athens, which had supported the Ionian Revolt, were the *proschēma* for the campaign (as they were clearly the principal targets of the campaign of 490), but Darius wanted to overcome as many as possible of the Greek cities (and his heralds were sent to various cities in the islands and in mainland Greece).²⁹

Modern scholars like numbers, but they often dislike the numbers which they find in ancient texts. For the forces engaged at Marathon Herodotus does not give totals apart from the Persian fleet of 600 triremes, which seems to be his standard figure for a Persian fleet.³⁰ Later sources give the number of soldiers on the Athenian side as 10,000, including or excluding 1,000 from Plataea,³¹ and whatever its basis a total of that order seems credible.

²⁶ E.g. A. Andrewes, 'Athens and Aegina, 510-480', *ABSA* 37 (1936/37) 1-7, placing part of the story after 490, and noting that most previous scholars had placed all of it after 490; T. J. Figueira, 'The chronology of the conflict between Athens and Aegina in Herodotus Bk. 6', *QUCC* 57 = ²28 (1988) 49-89. A. J. Podlecki, 'Athens and Aegina', *Historia* 25 (1976) 396-413, at 396-403, eased the chronological problem in the other direction by suggesting that some of the events which Herodotus mentions here belong to the earlier phase in the conflict.

²⁷ N. G. L. Hammond, 'Studies in Greek chronology of the sixth and fifth centuries BC', *Historia* 4 (1955) 371-411, at 387-88, 406-11 = *Collected studies* I (Amsterdam 1993) 355-95 at 371-72, 390-95; cf. L. H. Jeffery, 'The campaign between Athens and Aegina in the years before Salamis (Herodotus, 6.87-93)', *AJP* 83 (1962) 44-54.

²⁸ W. G. Forrest, 'The tradition of Hippias' expulsion from Athens', *GRBS* 10 (1969) 277-86, at 285, where this is a parallel to the suggestion that at 5.62.2 Herodotus backtracked when mentioning the Alcmaeonids' taking the contract to rebuild the temple of Apollo at Delphi; P. J. Rhodes, 'Herodotean chronology revisited', in *Herodotus and his world*, ed. Derow and Parker (n. 14 above) 58-72, at 61-62.

²⁹ Purpose of Mardonius' campaign, Hdt. 6.44.1; heralds, 6.48.1-49.1.

³⁰ Hdt. 6.95.2; cf. Scythian expedition, 4.87.1, battle of Lade, 6.9.1, and the 1,207 of 480 is just over double that, 7.89-95, 184.1.

³¹ Including the Plataeans, Nep. 1, *Milt.* 5.1; excluding, Just. 2.9.9. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 105-06, thinks that the Athenians could have numbered c. 20,000 and that numbers on the two sides were about even.

On the Persian side the lowest figures are those of Nepos – 500 ships, 200,000 infantry (100,000 engaged in the battle: cf. above) and 10,000 cavalry – but that is far too many, and modern scholars tend to assume c. 20,000.³² Herodotus does give the number of dead: 192 Athenians and 6,400 Persians.³³ The disproportion is credible for a battle in which hoplites were fighting at close quarters against light-armed troops, and 192 is likely to be the actual number of Athenian bodies collected and buried at Marathon, but how was the Persian figure of 6,400 arrived at? Is it significant that 6,400 is exactly $33\frac{1}{3}$ times 192?³⁴ As for the suggestion that the Athenian dead hoplites reappear as the horsemen on the Parthenon frieze,³⁵ I fear that if it had not been made by so eminent a scholar that would never have been taken seriously.

The run to Sparta by Philippides or Phidippides of 140 miles/225 km in two days seems not to have been an exceptional achievement.³⁶ Plato's claim that Sparta's reason for not responding immediately was that it was fighting against the Messenians had some supporters half a century ago, and has still not been entirely abandoned, but the evidence adduced in its support is not compelling, and I think it is much more likely that this was an explanation invented in the fourth century when the religious explanation of the early fifth no longer seemed so credible.³⁷ A second run, from Marathon to Athens after the battle to announce the victory, on which the modern Marathon race has been modelled, appears to have entered the tradition by the fourth century, but it is only Lucian who attributes that also to Philippides.³⁸

³² Nep. 1, *Milt.* 4.1, 5.4. 20,000 maximum, C. Hignett, *Xerxes' invasion of Greece* (Oxford 1963) 59; 24,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 46-47. A survey of modern views: Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 209 (Persian), 211-12 (Athenian).

³³ Hdt. 6.117.1.

³⁴ H. C. Avery, 'The number of Persian dead at Marathon', *Historia* 22 (1973) 757; W. F. Wyatt, Jr., 'Persian dead at Marathon', *Historia* 25 (1976) 483-84. J. Labarbe, *La loi navale de Thémistocle* (Paris 1957) 165-66, suggested that since $6,400 : 300,000 = 192 : 9,000$, the 6,400 was based on assumptions of a Persian army of 300,000 and the same proportion killed on each side. But Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 227, thinks the 6,400 was based on a careful count.

³⁵ J. Boardman, 'The Parthenon frieze – another view', in *Festschrift für Frank Brommer*, ed. U. Höckmann and A. Krug (Mainz 1977) 39-49.

³⁶ Hdt. 6.105-06. See most recently Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 52-53; D. L. Christensen *et al.*, 'Herodotos and *hemerodromoi*: Pheidippides' run from Athens to Sparta in 490 BC from historical and physiological perspectives', *Hermes* 137 (2009) 148-69.

³⁷ Plat. *Leg.* 3.692d, 698d-e: championed by G. Dickins, 'The growth of Spartan policy', *JHS* 32 (1912) 1-42, at 31-32; made fashionable by L. H. Jeffery, 'Comments on some archaic Greek inscriptions', *JHS* 69 (1949) 25-38, at 26-30 no. 4, suggesting an early fifth-century date for M&L 22 (later in her life she favoured later dates for other Spartan inscriptions but did not return to this one); against, e.g., H. T. Wade-Gery, 'The "Rhianos-hypothesis"', in *Ancient society and institutions: studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday*, ed. E. Badian (Oxford 1966) 289-302. P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London 2002) 132-33, professes an open mind; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 109-10, inclines to believe both the religious reason and the alternative.

³⁸ Plut. *De Glor. Ath.* 347C, contrasting the identifications of the runner by Heraclides Ponticus and 'most'; Lucian, *Laps.* 3. See F. J. Frost, 'The dubious origins of the Marathon', *AJAH* 4 (1976) 159-63. See also, on this dedication in particular and on Persian War monuments in general,

The inscriptions, as I have said, are intriguing. One is what is restored as the dedication of Callimachus the polemarch,³⁹ beginning [Καλῖμαχος μ' ἀν]έθηκεν ('Callimachus dedicated me') – but Callimachus was killed in the battle, so he cannot have set up a dedication after it. If the restoration is right, the least difficult explanation is that before the battle he vowed a dedication and after the battle his family set it up in his name; another suggestion is that ll. 1-3 are a Panathenaic dedication by Callimachus, to which ll. 4-5 were added after his death at Marathon. In any case, this dedication reminds us that the story of the battle which we have is Miltiades' story, and if Miltiades had been killed and Callimachus had not we might have had a different story. For Miltiades himself we have to go to Olympia, where the Miltiades who dedicated a helmet to Zeus is generally accepted as the Miltiades of Marathon, though that dedication perhaps belongs to an earlier stage in his career.⁴⁰

Then there is a series of epigrams which commemorate some achievement in the Persian Wars,⁴¹ but which battle or battles – Marathon, or Salamis, or what? This problem was transformed by the discovery of another block of stone from the same monument, in 1987: most recently A. P. Matthaiou has argued that the monument was a cenotaph for the dead of Marathon, set up in Athens as the counterpart of the monument at Marathon, but A. Petrović has claimed that it commemorated the Athenian dead from all the battles of 490 and 480-79.⁴² A new Marathon epigram with part of the casualty list of the tribe Erechtheis has recently been found in the Peloponnese and published, and Petrović discusses that here.⁴³ One other text certainly concerns Marathon but there has been a

C. M. Keesling, 'The Callimachus monument on the Athenian acropolis (CEG 256) and Athenian commemoration of the Persian wars', in *Archaic and classical Greek epigram*, ed. M. Baumbach *et al.* (Cambridge 2010) 100-30.

³⁹ M&L 18 = CEG 256 = IG I³ 784 (see IG I³ for bibliography on this and the other Athenian inscriptions cited). Panathenaic dedication with ll. 4-5 added later, E. B. Harrison, 'The victory of Kallimachos', *GRBS* 12 (1971) 5-24. Restoration as a dedication of Callimachus for the victory at Marathon was doubted altogether by P. Amandry, 'Collection Paul Canellopoulos (I)', *BCH* 95 (1971) 585-626, at 625-26 n. 106. See also, on this dedication in particular and on Persian War monuments in general, C. M. Keesling, 'The Callimachus monument on the Athenian acropolis (CEG 256) and Athenian commemoration of the Persian wars', in *Archaic and classical Greek epigram*, ed. M. Baumbach *et al.* (Cambridge 2010) 100-30.

⁴⁰ Olympia Museum B 2600: E. Kunze, *V Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia* (Berlin 1956) 69-74, *cf.*, e.g., A. and N. Yalouris, *Olympia: the museum and sanctuary* (Athens 1991) 93; the inscription (= IG I³ 1472) reads Μιλτιάδης ἀνέ[θ]ηκεν [: τ]ῷ Δί ('Miltiades' dedicated [it] to Zeus'). The Persian helmet – B 5100; Kunze, *VII Bericht über die Ausgrabungen in Olympia* (Berlin 1961) 129-37; with the inscription (= IG I³ 1467) Διὶ Ἀθηναίοι Μέδον λαβόντες ('the Athenians [dedicated it] to Zeus, having taken it from the Medes') – probably reflects a later occasion.

⁴¹ M&L 26 = CEG 2-3 (without the additional block) = IG I³ 503-04.

⁴² A. P. Matthaiou, 'Ἀθηναίοισι τεταγμένοιισι ἐν τεμένει Ἡρακλέος', *Herodotus and his world*, ed. Derow and Parker (n. 14 above) 190-202, at 194-200; A. Petrović, *Kommentar zu den simonideischen Versinschriften*, *Mnemosyne* Supp. 282 (Leiden and Boston 2007) 158-77, esp. 165-67.

⁴³ G. Spyropoulos, *οἱ στήλες τῶν πεσόντων στὴν μάχη τοῦ Μαραθῶνα ἀπὸ τὴν ἔπαυλη τοῦ Ἡρώδη Ἀττικοῦ στὴν Εὔα Κυνουρίας* (Athens 2009); G. Steinhauer, 'στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἐρεχθίδος',

problem concerning the building with which it is associated: a base adjoining the Athenian treasury at Delphi held Athenian dedications from the battle of Marathon.⁴⁴ Pausanias states that the treasury was built from the spoils of that victory;⁴⁵ several archaeologists have thought that the treasury is older than the base, while others think that Pausanias is right after all.

An interesting contribution to the background of the Marathon campaign has been made by one of the clay tablets from Persepolis, the Persians' equivalent of the Linear B tablets from Mycenaean Greece. Darius notoriously gave high appointments only to Persians, whenever possible men related to himself or to one of the six men who had supported him when he seized power in 522, but there is a notable exception in one of the two commanders of the campaign of 490: Datis the Mede.⁴⁶ We still do not know how Datis managed to rise so high under Darius, but we do now know that this was not his first encounter with the Greek edge of the Persian Empire. The tablet shows him returning to the King after a visit to Sardis, in January/February 494, shortly before the fall of Miletus and the final suppression of the Ionian Revolt. It is possible that he then returned to Asia Minor, and that his attack on Rhodes mentioned in the Lindian Temple Chronicle belongs to 494 and not to 490.⁴⁷

Can we also invoke numismatics? Some time in the early fifth century the designs of Athens' 'owl' coinage were modified by the addition of an olive crown to Athena's helmet and a lunar crescent to the reverse. Some have seen this as a commemoration of Marathon; others have thought of Salamis, but detecting connections between changes in coinage and known historical events is a risky business. The sober Kraay was prepared to envisage only some connection between the modernized coinage and the revived Athens after the Persian Wars.⁴⁸

hópos 17-21 (2004-09) 679-92, *cf.* his *Marathon* (n. 19 above) 122-23. See Petrović in this volume, pp. 53-56.

⁴⁴ M&L 19 = *IG* I³ 1463.

⁴⁵ Paus. 10.11.5. K. W. Arafat stresses that being built from the spoils of a victory need not imply being built in order to celebrate the victory: *cf.* Arafat in this volume, p. 81.

⁴⁶ Hdt. 6.94.2, *etc.*

⁴⁷ The tablet, PF-NN 1809, published and discussed by D. M. Lewis, 'Datis the Mede', *JHS* 100 (1980) 194-95 = *Selected papers in Greek and near eastern history* (Cambridge 1997) 342-44; the tablet is no. 56 in M. Brosius, *The Persian empire from Cyrus II to Artaxerxes I*, *LACTOR* 16 (London 2000) and ch. 6 no. 41 in A. Kuhrt, *The Persian empire* (London 2007). The Lindian Temple Chronicle, *FGrH* 532 §D: already in favour of 494 before Lewis published the tablet, *e.g.* K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*² II.2 (Strassburg 1916) 81-83; Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (n. 19 above) 210-11, 218; in favour of 490, *e.g.* Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 94-95, 209.

⁴⁸ Marathon, J. P. Six, 'Monnaies grecques, inédites et incertaines, xxix', *NC*³ 15 (1895) 172-79, at 176, *cf.*, *e.g.*, C. T. Seltman, *Greek coins* (London² 1955) 91-92; Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (n. 19 above) 255-56; N. Sekunda, *Marathon, 490 BC: the first Persian invasion of Greece* (Oxford 2002) 45; Salamis: implied by H. H. Howorth, 'The initial coinage of Athens, &c.', *NC*³ 13 (1893) 241-46, at 245, *cf.*, *e.g.*, C. G. Starr, *Athenian coinage, 480-449 BC* (Oxford 1970) 3, 12-19; perhaps a general celebration, C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and classical Greek coins* (London 1976) 61-62.

Marathon has provided ample opportunity for topographical investigation and argument.⁴⁹ It is generally accepted that the Persian camp was at the north-east end of the plain and the Athenian camp at the south-west end,⁵⁰ but where exactly was the Athenian camp and where exactly was the battle fought? Presumably neither the camp nor the battle should be located inside the village, but the position of that has been disputed too. The camp was at a sanctuary of Heracles: for that, scholars were divided for a long time between a site near the coast and a site some distance inland, but it has come to seem increasingly certain that the coastal site is right for the Heracleum.⁵¹ An inland site towards Vrana which was thought to be the most likely site for the village is now identified with Probalinthus, and the best site for the village of Marathon now seems to be Plasi, near the coast north-east of the *soros*.⁵² The *soros* where the Athenians were buried is itself near the coast north-east of the Heracleum,⁵³ and it has usually been thought that the battle was fought near there. Pausanias mentions a separate tomb of the Plataeans and slaves, and for a time it was thought that a tomb 1½ miles/2.5 km to the west of the *soros* was this tomb, and that the *soros* and this tomb gave the positions of the Athenians' right and left wings. However, further work has not made that identification certain, though it is still accepted at the Marathon museum, and more probably Pausanias' second tomb was a

⁴⁹ In addition to the works cited for individual points below, see particularly W. K. Pritchett, *Marathon*, University of California Publications in Classical Archaeology 4.2 (Berkeley 1960); J. A. G. van der Veer, 'The battle of Marathon: a topographical survey', *Mnemosyne*⁴ 35 (1982) 290-321. The coastline of the bay of Marathon has undoubtedly moved over the centuries, but it is not clear where the line was in 490: for an up-to-date discussion see Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 114-17, 214-15.

⁵⁰ More specifically, E. Vanderpool, 'A monument to the battle of Marathon', *Hesperia* 35 (1966) 93-106, at 103, suggests that the main camp was on the inland side of the great marsh; cf. Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle' (n. 24 above) 33 with 20 plan 3 = 203-04 with 181 fig. 11; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 105, puts the cavalry's camp there but the infantry on the coastal side of the marsh. On the other hand, Steinhauer, *Marathon* (n. 19 above) 95, thinks that is inappropriate to an attacking force and places the camp near Pausanias' trophy at the west end of the marsh (see below with n. 58).

⁵¹ Hdt. 6.108.1 cf. 116; the coastal site is the find-spot of IG I³ 3 and 1015 bis. See most recently Matthaïou, in *Herodotus and his world*, ed. Derow and Parker (n. 14 above), suggesting that the exit from the plain which the camp guarded formed the 'gates' in front of which the battle was fought according to IG I³ 503/4, *lapis A*, ii; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 118-21, 215. Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) map 5 and 208, still prefers the inland site.

⁵² Inland site: E. Vanderpool, 'The deme of Marathon and the Herakleion', *AJA*² 70 (1966) 319-23; Plasi: W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in ancient Greek topography* II, University of California Publications in Classical Studies 4 (Berkeley 1969) 1-11; S. Marinatos, 'Further discoveries at Marathon', *AAA* 3 (1970) 153-66, at 153-54; cf. J. S. Traill, *Demos and trittys* (Toronto 1986) 147-48; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 121-22.

⁵³ See Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 122-29, 216-17. But even that identification has been doubted, though I think unjustifiably: most recently, by S. N. Koumanoudis, 'Μαράθῳνι', *AAA* 11 (1978) 232-44, at 235-36, cf. *AR* 27 (1980/81) 5-6.

mound seen in the nineteenth century but no longer extant.⁵⁴ A painting in the Stoa Poikile showed fleeing Persians falling into a marsh,⁵⁵ and this will be the 'great marsh' which was in the north-eastern half of the plain until it was drained in the twentieth century; the 'little marsh' at the south-western exit from the plain, also drained in the twentieth century, probably did not exist at the time;⁵⁶ and the *charadra*, the stream from the hills which now crosses the plain, is not mentioned in any account, and presumably then it either did not exist or followed a very different course, or else in late summer it was so dry that it was not a significant obstacle.⁵⁷ E. Vanderpool rediscovered the remains of a monument seen by W. M. Leake and others in the nineteenth century near the Mesosporitissa chapel at the west end of the marsh, about 2 miles/3 km north-east of the *soros*, and reaffirmed Leake's identification of this with the 'trophy of white stone' mentioned by Pausanias.⁵⁸ Sekunda and Krentz both think this rather than the *soros* is the best indication of where the battle was fought.⁵⁹

One other topographical issue needs to be mentioned, the route between Athens and Marathon. Almost everybody has assumed that the natural route then was the route of the main road now, passing between Hymettus and Pentelicon at Pallene and then following the coast northwards to Marathon, a distance of about 25 miles/40 km. Hammond, notorious for his physical prowess, preferred a shorter route through the hills via Cephisia, about 22 miles/35 km;⁶⁰ but for a large body of men the easier route was surely preferable. If the coastal location of the Heracleum is correct, the Athenian camp will have directly covered the exit from the plain to the coastal route, and to reach the beginning of Hammond's route the Persians would have had to pass in front of the Athenian camp.

I turn now to *Sachkritik*, questions about practicalities and what we can believe might actually have happened. I remarked above that I agree with Gomme, that disagreement

⁵⁴ Suggested by Marinatos, 'Further discoveries' (n. 52 above) 164-66; Paus. 1.32.3; see W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek state at war IV* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1985) 126-29; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 129-30, 217, does not definitively reject the identification but thinks it irrelevant to the location of the battle.

⁵⁵ Paus. 1.15.3 cf. 32.7.

⁵⁶ But Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 65-66, cf. 55, is not certain of that; and Sekunda, *Marathon* (n. 48 above) 48, thinks it did exist but would be almost dry by late summer.

⁵⁷ For references see Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 55 with n. 23.

⁵⁸ Vanderpool, 'A monument' (n. 50 above) 93-106; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 130-32; cf. Paus. 1.32.5. Hauptmann Eschenburg found what were probably the bones of Persians near here: *Topographische, archaeologische und militärische Betrachtungen auf dem Schlachtfelde von Marathon* (Berlin 1886: *non vidi*) 10, cf. *Wochenschr. Kl. Phil.* 4 (1887) 152-56 + 182-87, *AA* 1 (1889) 33-39.

⁵⁹ Sekunda, *Marathon* (n. 48 above) 59-64; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 129-33.

⁶⁰ Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle' (n. 24 above) 26, 34, 36-37 = 190, 205, 210; cf. earlier G. B. Grundy, *The great Persian war and its preliminaries* (London 1901) 164-65, 173-74, 186; but in *CAH IV*² (Cambridge 1988) 507, 512, Hammond takes the Athenians to Marathon by both routes and back by the Pallene route. Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 229-30, thinks that after the battle the Athenians will have used both routes. Pisistratus c. 546 had taken the obvious route: Hdt. 1.59.

among the Athenians is more likely to have occurred in Athens, over whether to go to Marathon or stay in the city, than at Marathon, over whether to fight or not. At Marathon the Athenians were waiting for support from Sparta, the Persians were waiting for Hippias to bring about the betrayal of Athens:⁶¹ what needs to be explained (and Herodotus explains only by Miltiades' waiting for his own day) is why the battle was fought when neither of those things had happened, and *χωρίς ἱππεῖς* gives us a way to achieve that explanation.

If, as most people believe, the battle was fought towards the Athenians' end of the plain, then although the Athenians attacked the Persians, the Persians must in some sense have made the first move, advancing towards the Athenian camp,⁶² perhaps to challenge the Athenians to battle as perhaps they had done on previous days also; perhaps to cover the beginning of their re-embarkation. The Athenians decided to fight. According to Herodotus, they weakened their centre in order to make their line as long as the Persians' line, they advanced *δρόμῳ* ('at a run') for 8 stades (rather less than 1 mile/1.5 km), and then, as Miltiades had hoped, while the Persians drove back the weakened centre the wings closed in on them.⁶³ It is often, but not always, thought that the weakened centre was a deliberate trap into which the Persians fell.⁶⁴ The Athenian advance prompts questions about what is physically possible. It has long been suspected that heavily-laden Greek hoplites could not advance at a run for 8 stades.⁶⁵ Grundy wrote of 'the quick step',⁶⁶ and I have once in Britain seen a light infantry fast march, but that was by light infantry, and I do not know over what distance even they could sustain it. Elsewhere *δρόμῳ* does not always mean 'at a run': Thucydides uses it of Brasidas' 'forced march' through Thessaly to the north.⁶⁷ More recent investigations were thought to have confirmed that 8 stades at a run would be impossible for hoplites:⁶⁸ either the 'run' was Grundy's 'quick step' or – the other possibility which Grundy considered and which the recent investigations favoured – the men did not break into a run until they came within range of the Persians' arrows.

However, Krentz in his new book argues the battle was fought further to the north-east, near the trophy and the marsh, so that it was the Athenians who made the first

⁶¹ Hdt. 6.107-09, 121.1.

⁶² Cf. Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 62.

⁶³ Hdt. 6.111-13.

⁶⁴ Most recently Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 214-15, 225. Against that assumption, Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 64, 69-70, 79, with references to scholars who make the assumption; also Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 154, 158.

⁶⁵ But the redoubtable Hammond included the run among the elements in Herodotus' narrative which he considered 'completely unimpeachable': 'The campaign and the battle' (n. 24 above) 28-29 = 194-95.

⁶⁶ Grundy, *The great Persian war* (n. 60 above) 188 with n. *.

⁶⁷ Thuc. 4.78.5: A. W. Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides* III (Oxford 1956) 544-45 *ad loc.*, noted the relevance of this to Marathon.

⁶⁸ W. Donlan and J. Thompson, 'The charge at Marathon: Herodotus, 6.112', *CJ* 71 (1975/76) 339-43; 'The charge at Marathon again', *CW* 72 (1978/79) 419-20.

move. He argues that Miltiades did wait for the day when he held the chief command, that his plan was to attack the Persians' infantry before their cavalry could deploy into the plain (Krentz does not accept *χωρὶς ἵππεις*), and that the hoplites at Marathon were not as heavily armed as has regularly been believed, and could have run 8 stades after all (though he thinks 'jog' a better term than 'run').⁶⁹

According to Herodotus the battle lasted a long time,⁷⁰ yet scholars have sometimes tried to crowd a great deal of further activity into the same day:⁷¹ the Persians collected their Eretrian prisoners from the island of Aegilia where they had deposited them, and sailed round to Phalerum, hoping to reach the city before the Athenian army could return to defend it, but the Athenian army hurried back by land and had already reached Cynosarges, to the south-east of the city, when the Persians arrived. The notorious signal given by means of a shield is said to have been given when the Persians were already on board their ships.⁷² Hammond reckoned that such a signal could not have been given later than about 9 a.m.; so the long battle must have started soon after sunrise about 5.30 a.m., and the Athenian army could have begun its journey between 9 and 10 a.m. and have reached Cynosarges before sunset about 6.30 p.m. (he himself had walked from Athens to Marathon by a particularly arduous route in six hours and then, suitably tired, back in seven hours). He thought the Athenians' march would have taken about eight hours, and the Persians' voyage about nine hours.⁷³ He was splendidly dismissive of early twentieth-century scholars who thought that neither the Persians' voyage nor the Athenians' march could have been accomplished on the day of the battle.⁷⁴ However, it seems that the earlier caution was justified. (a) We do not know where the signaller was positioned (or, of course, what message the signaller was conveying), and in any case

⁶⁹ Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above): location of battle, 129-33 (*cf.* above with n. 59); Miltiades' day, 153 (*cf.* below with n. 84); plan to attack Persian infantry before cavalry could be deployed, 142-43; hoplites' armour and run, 45-50, 143-52.

⁷⁰ Hdt. 6.113.1. In Ar. *Vesp.* 1077-90 the veterans claim to have driven back the barbarians *πρὸς ἑσπέραν* ('until evening'), but that is perhaps not to be taken seriously as evidence. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 156-57, reckons that from the Athenians' advance to their return to camp the battle must have lasted at least six hours.

⁷¹ No text states that the Persians reached Phalerum on the day of the battle; Plut. *Arist.* 5.5 states that the Athenians reached Athens on the day of the battle, but the ambiguous *De Glor. Ath.* 350E may mean that they returned on the day after the battle, Μιλτιάδης μὲν γὰρ ἄρας ἐξ Μαραθῶνα τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ τὴν μάχην συνάψας ἦκεν ἐς ἄστυ μετὰ τῆς στρατιᾶς νικητικῶς ('Miltiades set off for Marathon and after doing battle next day arrived in the city victorious'). In addition to the other studies cited here, J. P. Holoka, 'Marathon and the myth of the same day march', *GRBS* 38 (1997) 329-53, reckons that neither the Athenians nor the Persians could have made their journey on the day of the battle.

⁷² Hdt. 6.115-16. That the shield was used to flash a heliographic signal is not stated by Herodotus but has been widely assumed. Plut. *De Her. Mal.* 862C-863A doubted the authenticity of the signal.

⁷³ Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle' (n. 24 above) 36-37 = 209-11, *cf.* 43 = 220-21; *cf.* the timings of Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 227-30, who assumes that the first Persian ships set sail at daybreak, before the battle.

⁷⁴ Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle' (n. 24 above) 43 n. 126 = 221 n. 1.

even some kind of flashing signal could have been given at any time during the hours of daylight.⁷⁵ (b) Conditions are not likely to have been ideal both for the first half of the Persians' voyage, southwards to Sunium, and for the second half, north-westwards to Phalerum; the voyage could well have taken as long as 30-45 hours.⁷⁶ The battle need not have been begun and ended early in the morning, and, however well informed the Persians may or may not have been, the Athenians ought to have known that the Persians could not reach Phalerum on the day of the battle.

There are also political questions of various kinds which arise in connection with the battle of Marathon. Among recent writers R. Osborne is not much interested in military history, but he had to include the Persian Wars (albeit very briefly) in his book on archaic Greece, *Greece in the making*.⁷⁷ He does say that 'Marathon was crucial militarily for the whole of Greece', but he continues, 'but this should not overshadow its massive political importance at Athens and at Sparta'. Of the Persian Wars in general he says, 'We can have little confidence that we can satisfactorily answer any of the questions which the Greeks themselves answered. Too much was invested in antiquity in answering the question of how the Greeks beat the Persians for us to be able to disembed truth from partial tradition. What we can do is to exploit the tensions between competing traditions, and by doing so throw light on the nature of city-state politics in these years, and hence on the classical legacy left by the war'.

The traditional commander of the Athenian army was the polemarch, one of the nine archons, though *stratēgoi* ('generals') may have been appointed *ad hoc* for some particular campaigns.⁷⁸ Ten annual generals, one from each tribe, were instituted by Cleisthenes in 508/07 and first appointed in 501/00.⁷⁹ The battle of Marathon was an exceptional occasion, with a large enemy force invading Attica and the whole Athenian army going out to confront the enemy. All ten generals and the polemarch went with the army: what was their standing relative to one another?

Even later, when the principle of one general per tribe was modified, the ten generals were theoretically equal, with the unique exception of 407/06, when all our sources agree that Alcibiades was made supreme commander.⁸⁰ *Ath. Pol.* in reporting the institution of the ten generals adds 'the polemarch was the *hēgemōn* of the whole army' (22.2: τῆς δὲ ἀπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμὼν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος). In Herodotus' account of Marathon the

⁷⁵ A. T. Hodge and L. A. Losada, 'The time of the shield signal at Marathon', *AJA* 74 (1970) 31-36. Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 72-73, and Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 228, doubt whether there was a signal at all; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 161-63, 222-23, accepts that there was some signal and discusses reinterpretations.

⁷⁶ A. T. Hodge, 'Marathon to Phaleron', *JHS* 95 (1975) 169-71, 'Marathon: the Persians' voyage', *TAPA* 105 (1975) 155-73.

⁷⁷ R. Osborne, *Greece in the making, 1200-479 BC* (London ²2009): on Marathon and its aftermath, 311-16; quotations from 313, 312.

⁷⁸ Generals: e.g. Pisistratus against Megara: Hdt. 1.59.4.

⁷⁹ *Ath. Pol.* 22.2 (with ἔτει πέμπτῳ emended to ἔτει ὀγδόῳ).

⁸⁰ Equality of generals, K. J. Dover, 'δέκατος αὐτός', *JHS* 80 (1960) 61-77 = *The Greeks and their legacy*, Collected papers 2 (Oxford 1988), 159-80. Alcibiades in 407/06, Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20; Diod. Sic. 13.69.1-3; Plut. *Alc.* 33.2-3.

generals are clearly the effective commanders of the army: they sent the runner to Sparta, they led the army out to Marathon, they disagreed about what to do after arriving at Marathon.⁸¹ To resolve that disagreement Miltiades brought in Callimachus the polemarch, who had an eleventh vote (ἦν γὰρ ἐνδέκατος ψηφιδόφορος), for in the past (τὸ παλαιὸν) the Athenians made the polemarch an equal voter (ὁμόψηφος) with the generals, and with his support Miltiades obtained the decision to fight.⁸² I have mentioned above Herodotus' claim that the generals presided in turn, a day at a time, and those who agreed with Miltiades offered to yield to him but he awaited his own day to attack.⁸³ I do not think that is the right explanation of why the battle was fought when it was, but I can believe that on this occasion the generals did agree to preside in turn in that way.⁸⁴ In the battle Callimachus the polemarch was in the commander's position on the right wing, 'for that was then the *nomos* for the Athenians'.⁸⁵

I noted above that the story of Marathon which we have is Miltiades' story, and that Callimachus' story might well have been different. But Herodotus gives a detailed, consistent, and credible account, which I think is correctly expounded by Hammond as modified by Badian.⁸⁶ The ten generals were from their institution not commanders of their tribal regiments subordinate to the polemarch but the effective commanders of the army. At the time of Marathon the polemarch remained titular commander-in-chief, he had an equal vote with the generals (Herodotus' τὸ παλαιὸν refers to that time, not to some earlier time), and in the battle he occupied the traditional commander's position on the right wing (and this will be what *Ath. Pol.* means by ἡγεμὼν); but after Marathon the polemarch is never found with the army again. Herodotus has Callimachus appointed by lot, whereas in *Ath. Pol.* the archons were elected until κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων was reintroduced in 487/86, and Pausanias has Callimachus elected.⁸⁷ Either Herodotus has carelessly misapplied later practice or at the time of Marathon the nine archons as a body were elected but which of them was to take which post was decided by lot.

Another political question which arises in connection with Marathon concerns the shield signal. Herodotus reports that the Alcmaeonids were considered to be responsible for it, and later he returns to the subject, arguing that the Alcmaeonids cannot have been responsible, because they were conspicuously hostile to the tyranny and so could not have

⁸¹ Hdt. 6.105.1, 106.1; 103.1; 109.1.

⁸² Hdt. 6.109-10.

⁸³ Hdt. 6.110.

⁸⁴ Daily rotation is implied by the accounts of Arginusae and Aegospotami in Diod. Sic. 13.97.6, 106.1. W. G. Forrest was willing to accept that explanation: 'Motivation in Herodotus: the case of the Ionian Revolt', *International History Review* 1 (1979) 311-22, at 321; cf. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 153.

⁸⁵ Hdt. 6.111.1.

⁸⁶ Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle' (n. 24 above) 48-50 cf. 45 = 229-33 cf. 223-24, 'Strategia and hegemonia in fifth-century Athens', *CQ* 19 (1969) 111-44 at 119-23, revised as 'Problems of command in fifth-century Athens', in *Studies* (n. 24 above) 346-94 at 358-64; E. Badian, 'Archons and strategoi', *Antichthon* 5 (1971) 1-34, at 21-27.

⁸⁷ Hdt. 6.109.2; *Ath. Pol.* 22.5; Paus. 1.15.3.

wanted a Persian victory and the reinstatement of Hippias. A shield signal certainly was given, but Herodotus cannot say who was responsible.⁸⁸ However, Herodotus' argument is not enough to absolve the Alcmaeonids. His own narrative shows that in Pisistratus' rise to power there was one stage in which Megacles the Alcmaeonid cooperated with him, until Pisistratus refused to father a child by Megacles' daughter.⁸⁹ Although Herodotus seems to have thought that the Alcmaeonids were in exile continuously from Pisistratus' final seizure of power to the expulsion of Hippias,⁹⁰ a fragment of the inscribed archon list has shown that Cleisthenes was archon in 525/24.⁹¹ The Alcmaeonids were not opposed to the Pisistratid tyranny throughout its existence. When the institution of ostracism began to be used in the 480s, the first three victims were Hipparchus son of Charmus, probably a grandson of Hippias; Megacles the Alcmaeonid; and what *Ath. Pol.* calls another 'friend of the tyrants'.⁹² Other men voted against in the 480s include two further Alcmaeonids, Hippocrates and Callixenus, and one of the *ostraka* against Callixenus calls him [πρ]οδότες ('traitor').⁹³ It seems that, whatever Cleisthenes' intentions may have been when instituting ostracism, the first use of it was to attack men with Pisistratid and Alcmaeonid connections after Marathon. The Alcmaeonids may not have been collaborating with the Persians, but the suspicion that they were collaborating was not something produced later but contemporary, and that shows that they were at any rate not so conspicuously anti-Persian in 490 as to make the suspicion untenable. A. Ruberto in a recent article has placed this in context as one of a number of indications that in the late sixth and early fifth centuries some Athenians on some occasions were willing to come to terms with the Persians.⁹⁴

Yet another political question concerns the rival claims of Marathon and Salamis as Athens' two great achievements against the Persians. In the 470s the two most prominent Athenians were Cimon, the son of Miltiades, and Themistocles, the man responsible for Athens' enlarged navy and for the victory at Salamis in 480. Cimon and Themistocles were rivals in various respects, and the rivalry ended with Themistocles first ostracized and then fleeing as an exile to the Persians, and Cimon remaining predominant until the end of the 460s. It seems likely that one aspect of their rivalry was pressing the claims of Marathon, Miltiades, and the hoplites, and Salamis, Themistocles, and the navy. Aeschylus' *Persians* was produced in 473/72, when Themistocles was under attack, and its *choregos* was Pericles, who became Cimon's principal opponent later. The play can be read on various levels, and I do not think one reading should be adopted to the exclusion

⁸⁸ Hdt. 6.115, 121-24.

⁸⁹ Hdt. 1.60.2-61.2, cf. *Ath. Pol.* 14.4-15.1.

⁹⁰ Hdt. 1.64.4, 5.62.2.

⁹¹ M&L 6. c. 3 = *IG* I³ 1031.18.

⁹² *Ath. Pol.* 22.4-6.

⁹³ Hippocrates, *Agora* 25, 50-61, S. Brenne, *Ostrakismos und Prominenz in Athen*, *Tyche* Supp. 3 (Vienna 2001) 166-67 no. 105; Callixenus, *Agora* 25, 66-88, [πρ]οδότες, 88 no. 589, Brenne, *Ostrakismos und Prominenz* 186-88 no. 124.

⁹⁴ A. Ruberto, 'Il *demos*, gli aristocratici e i Persiani: il rapporto con la Persia nella politica ateniese dal 507 al 479 a.C.', *Historia* 59 (2010) 1-25.

of the others; but this play focuses on Salamis and the message to Xerxes which brought the battle about, though without mentioning Themistocles by name. One possible reading of it which has been championed is to see it as a contribution to that debate, advancing the claims of Salamis and Themistocles against those of Marathon and Miltiades.⁹⁵

In the comedies of Aristophanes warlike old men are veterans of Marathon;⁹⁶ and legends were soon attached to the Marathon campaign. Already in Herodotus we read that the Athenian runner had an encounter with Pan in the mountains of Arcadia, and that in the battle an Athenian called Epizelus was blinded by an apparition of a mighty warrior, who killed the man positioned beside him.⁹⁷ An epiphany of Theseus during the battle was included in the painting in the Stoa Poikile; and, centuries later, Pausanias recorded that, and also wrote of the sound of horses whinnying and men fighting which could still be heard at night, of the troughs from which Artaphernes' horses had drunk, and the marks of his tent on the rocks, and of the hero Echelus who had appeared and had killed many of the barbarians with a ploughshare.⁹⁸

As for the Persians, we know that after this setback at the north-western corner of their empire in 490 they returned with much larger forces in 480-79, and that after a further setback then they never invaded Europe again, though the Greeks surely expected them to do so. Apart from that, we have a Persian response to Salamis conjured up by Aeschylus in his *Persae* in 472, but it was left to writers of the Second Sophistic to imagine the Persians' response to Marathon. Dio Chrysostom suggested that they represented Marathon as an accidental sequel, involving not more than twenty ships, to their successful campaign against Naxos and Eretria, and Aelius Theon of Alexandria gave as an example of *prosopopoiia* what Datis would say to the King after Marathon (but did not suggest what that might be).⁹⁹ The twentieth-century British poet Robert Graves also imagined a Persian response to Marathon:

Truth-loving Persians do not dwell upon
The trivial skirmish fought near Marathon.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ See, for instance, W. G. Forrest, 'Themistokles and Argos', *CQ* 10 (1960) 221-41, at 236; A. J. Podlecki, *Aeschylus and Athenian politics* (Ann Arbor 1966) 9-17; J. A. Davison, 'Aeschylus and Athenian politics, 472-456 BC', in *Ancient society and institutions*, ed. Badian (n. 37 above) 93-107, at 101-03; E. M. Hall, *Aeschylus, Persians* (Warminster 1996) 11-12; A. H. Sommerstein, 'The theatre audience, the *demos* and the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus', in *Greek tragedy and the historian*, ed. C. B. R. Pelling (Oxford 1997) 63-79, at 73. For doubts see Pelling, 'Aeschylus' *Persae* and history', in *Greek tragedy and the historian* 1-19, at 9-12.

⁹⁶ Ar. *Ach.* 181, etc. For Marathon in comedy see Carey and Papadodima in this volume.

⁹⁷ Pan, Hdt. 6.105-06.1; Epizelus, 117.2-3. For the legends cf. Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (n. 3 above) 80.

⁹⁸ Paus. 1.15.3, 32.4, 7, 5.

⁹⁹ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 11. *Trojan* 148 (with an account of 480 in §149); Theon, *Progymnasmata* 8 (115.19-20 Spengel). I was alerted to these texts by the paper of E. L. Bowie in this volume.

¹⁰⁰ R. Graves, 'The Persian version', in his *Collected poems 1975* (London 1975) 146 (apparently written in the mid-1940s). The remainder of the poem seems to deal with the events of 480 but to misdate them to 490: see *Appendix*.

That look at the subsequent reception in antiquity of the Athenian victory at Marathon leads me to my last topic, reception, which has become a fashionable area within classical scholarship in recent decades. And, of course, the reception of Marathon, in antiquity and subsequently, is the overall theme of this volume. A recent book on *Cultural responses to the Persian wars*, of which I was one of the editors, includes a chapter by T. Rood, with the title (taken from E. S. Creasy's book, cited below) 'From Marathon to Waterloo'.¹⁰¹ In it he points out that 'If ... the eighteenth century was the age of Thermopylae, then the nineteenth century was, if not quite the age of Marathon, at least the era in which Marathon overtook its main competitor in the battle of the battles'.¹⁰² Elizabeth Barrett <Browning>, when about thirteen years old, wrote an epic poem of 1,462 lines on *The battle of Marathon* (whose embellishments include the killing of Hippias by Aristides in the battle).¹⁰³ Byron was inspired by Marathon – for instance:

The mountains look on Marathon –
And Marathon looks on the Sea;
And musing there an hour alone,
I dream'd that Greece might still be free.

B. R. Haydon in 1829 painted 'The death of Eucles' (one of the names given to the man who ran back to Athens with the news of the victory), and Robert Browning in 1879 wrote a poem on 'Pheidippides', following Lucian in attributing both runs to him. J. S. Mill, reviewing the first volumes of Grote's *History of Greece*, began by proclaiming that 'the Battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings [the defeat of the English by the Normans under William the Conqueror in 1066]'. E. S. Creasy took Marathon as the first of his *Fifteen decisive battles of the world, from Marathon to Waterloo*.¹⁰⁴ And I am sure there is scope for much more study of the understanding and use of Marathon in the modern world.

At the time, most immediately, the battle of Marathon was a success for the Athenians, which stimulated their growing confidence. That success prompted a further and greater Persian invasion of Greece ten years later, when, although the Greeks' first attempts to halt the Persians' advance were unsuccessful, in the end the Greeks were successful again, with consequences for the next hundred and fifty years with which we are familiar.

¹⁰¹ T. Rood, 'From Marathon to Waterloo', in *Cultural responses to the Persian wars*, ed. E. E. Bridges, E. M. Hall, and P. J. Rhodes (Oxford 2007) 267-97.

¹⁰² Rood, 'From Marathon to Waterloo' (n. 101 above) 268.

¹⁰³ E. Barrett <Browning> (b. 1806), *The battle of Marathon* (dedication dated 1819; London 1820; reprinted with an Introduction by H. B. Forman, London 1891; included, e.g., in E. B. Browning, *The poetical works*, ed. F. G. Kenyon (London 1904) 1-24). Hippias killed by Aristides: Il. 1411-23.

¹⁰⁴ Byron, *Don Juan* 3.86.3.1-4; Haydon, see Rood, 'From Marathon to Waterloo' (n. 101 above) 268-71; R. Browning, 'Pheidippides', e.g., in *The works* (London 1912) IX.221-28; J. S. Mill, *Edinburgh Review* 84 (1846) 343-77, at 343 (unsigned) = *Essays on philosophy and the classics*, Collected works 11 (Toronto and London 1978) 273-305, at 273; E. S. Creasy, *The fifteen decisive battles of the world, from Marathon to Waterloo* (London 1851) ('From Marathon to Waterloo' became so familiar an expression that it was used by Major-General Stanley in W. S. Gilbert, *The pirates of Penzance*).

Billows and Krentz both end their books by asking ‘What if’ things had turned out differently.¹⁰⁵ Marathon, as it did turn out, became an important element in the stories which the Greeks in general, and the Athenians in particular, told about themselves, and several of the papers in this volume discuss aspects of that. We should note that the Athenians’ story about Marathon was regarded by Theopompus as one instance of how the Athenians cheated the Greeks.¹⁰⁶

So, while of course it was important as a battle in which the Athenians and the Plataeans defeated the Persians, Marathon has not been limited to military historians in its appeal. It has prompted questions about the written sources, both literary and epigraphic, about chronology, about archaeology and topography, about practicalities, about Athenian politics, and recently about the reception of Marathon in Greece subsequently and in modern times. It is thus an episode of major importance for people with various kinds of interests in Greece. Marathon prompted a very fruitful conference and volume.

Appendix

ROBERT GRAVES, ‘The Persian version’

Truth-loving Persians do not dwell upon
 The trivial skirmish fought near Marathon.
 As for the Greek theatrical tradition
 Which represents that summer’s expedition
 Not as a mere reconnaissance in force
 By three brigades of foot and one of horse
 (Their left flank covered by some obsolete
 Light craft detached from the main Persian fleet)
 But as a grandiose, ill-starred attempt
 To conquer Greece – they treat it with contempt;
 And only incidentally refute
 Major Greek claims, by stressing what repute
 The Persian Monarch and the Persian nation
 Won by this salutary demonstration:
 Despite a strong defence and adverse weather
 All arms combined magnificently together.

¹⁰⁵ Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 255-61; Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 5 above) 172-75.

¹⁰⁶ Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 153.

HERODOTUS' MARATHON

CHRISTOPHER PELLING

I

It is late afternoon on the day of the battle. The result is no longer in doubt; most of the killing has already happened, and attention now turns to the harrying of the fleeing Persians:

Νικῶντες δὲ τὸ μὲν τετραμμένον τῶν βαρβάρων φεύγειν ἔων, τοῖσι δὲ τὸ μέσον ῥήξασι αὐτῶν συναγαγόντες τὰ κέρεια ἀμώτερα ἐμάχοντο, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. φεύγουσι δὲ τοῖσι Πέρσησι εἶποντο κόπτοντες, ἐς δ' ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπικόμενοι πῦρ τε αἵτεον καὶ ἐπελαμβάνοντο τῶν νεῶν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πόνῳ ὁ πολέμαρχος Καλλίμαχος διαφθείρεται, ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἀγαθός, ἀπὸ δ' ἔθανε τῶν στρατηγῶν Στησίλεως ὁ Θρασύλεω· τοῦτο δὲ Κυνέγειρος ὁ Εὐφορίωνος ἐνθαῦτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενος τῶν ἀφλάστων νεός, τὴν χεῖρα ἀποκοπεῖς πελέκει πίπτει, τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναίων πολλοί τε καὶ ὀνομαστοί.

Here again they [the Athenians, or perhaps the Athenians and Plataeans] were triumphant, chasing the routed enemy, and cutting them down until they came to the sea, and men were calling for fire and taking hold of the ships. It was in this phase of the struggle that the War Archon Callimachus was killed, fighting bravely [lit. having become, or having behaved as, a good man], and also Stesilaus, the son of Thrasylaus, one of the generals; Cynegirus, too, the son of Euphorion, had his hand cut off with an axe as he was getting hold of a ship's stern, and so lost his life, together with many other well-known Athenians. (Herodotus 6.113-14, trans. de Sélincourt)

And the heroic death of Cynegirus, the brother of Aeschylus, duly became a famous *exemplum* for later writers.

There is no reason to doubt that something like this happened. There must surely have been fierce fighting by the ships; seven of them were captured (115.1), and given the expanse of beach that the fleet will have been covering and the time it must have taken to get men on board – probably horses too, though that is disputed – we would assume that the Athenians were not going just to wave the Persians off and wish them a nice voyage home. We know from Pausanias (1.15.3) that the fighting by the ships was one of the themes of the Marathon painting in the Stoa Poikile; if it is right to think that the Brescia sarcophagus is based on the Stoa painting,¹ then we can see Cynegirus there with his hand

¹ Thus E. Vanderpool, 'A monument to the battle of Marathon', *Hesp.* 35 (1966) 93-106 at 105, accepted by E. B. Harrison, 'The south frieze of the Nike temple and the Marathon painting in the Painted Stoa', *AJArch* 76 (1972) 353-78, at 359 and 365-66, and by many since. Pliny, *NH* 35.57, Luc. *Jup. Trag.* 32, and Aelian *NA* 7.38 confirm that the painting included Cynegirus, and the extravagant phrase of Himerius 59 (10).2, 'and the other man grasping and sinking the Persian fleet' (τὸν δὲ ἄλλον διὰ χειρῶν τὸν Περσῶν στόλον βαπτίζοντα), confirms that someone, presumably Cynegirus, was shown in action by the ships.

gripping the stern, and a Persian lifting the axe ready to strike. This was already part of the story when Herodotus came to it.

The way he treats it is still interesting. For one thing, there is the speed with which he describes the fighting – much quicker than the narratives of Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea. In the two short sentences before this extract the Greek centre has just done badly, the wings have done well, and the pincer has closed on the Persian centre as it pushes ahead; that is all. To judge from what we hear of the Stoa Poikile, the main slaughter came in an interim phase, when the Greeks pushed the Persians back into a marsh – the marsh that is so much discussed in the topographical literature² – and the Persians fell over one another as they stumbled in (Paus. 1.15.3, 32.7); nothing of that here, despite the opportunity to prefigure an element of the battles ten years later,³ in this case the lethal turmoil in the waters of Salamis as the non-swimming Persians met their end (8.89.2). Why?

One of the reasons might be a muted hint of what is on its way to becoming an important theme, earth and water, land and sea: the earth and water that Darius has demanded, and that so many states have already given⁴ (including, at least at first, the Athenians themselves at 5.73.1-2),⁵ the earth and water that the Spartans have told the Persian heralds to get from the well into which they had been thrown (7.133.1); the land and sea that Artabanus will say are Xerxes' greatest enemies (7.49.1); the land that Xerxes will turn into sea at Mount Athos and the sea that he will turn into land at the Hellespont; the land and sea that will eventually conspire together to wreck so much of the Persian

² For the topographical significance of the marsh for a reconstruction of the battle see Rhodes in this volume. On the marsh in the Stoa Poikile, Vanderpool, 'Monument' (n. 1 above) 105-06; Harrison, 'The south frieze' (n. 1 above) 365; and now P. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven and London 2010) 114-17, 158-59 (thinking that Pausanias confused marsh and sea, as already argued by V. Massara, 'Herodotos' account of the battle of Marathon and the picture in the Stoa Poikile', *AC* 47 [1978] 458-75, at 471-73). Topographical discussions: see esp. W. K. Pritchett, 'Marathon', *Univ. Cal. Publ. Class. Ant.* 4.2 (1960) 137-75, at 152-56; A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (2nd edn 1984; 1st edn was 1962) 245 and 251; N. G. L. Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle of Marathon', *JHS* 88 (1968) 13-57, at 18-24; J. A. G. van der Veer, 'The battle of Marathon: a topographical survey', *Mnem.* 35 (1982) 290-321 at 297-98 and 306; J. A. S. Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon', *Hist.* 42 (1993) 279-307, at 291-93 and 302; J. F. Lazenby, *The defence of Greece* (Warminster 1993) 65 and 70-72.

³ Just as other touches prefigure both Thermopylae and Salamis: below, pp. 29, 32, 34.

⁴ 6.48.2-49.1, 94.1; cf. the Persian demands ten years later (7.32), to which once again many agreed (7.131-32, 8.46.4, cf. 7.163.2). Notice too the μή at 6.94.1, Darius' wish to καταστρέφεσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος τοὺς μὴ δόντας αὐτῷ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ. Stein remarked that οὐ would be 'richtiger', but the μή correctly conveys 'whichever Greek states shall not have given earth and water'. They have a choice, and many exercised it in favour of submission.

⁵ Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 2 above) 42-43, interestingly suggests that the Athenian submission was never in fact repudiated, and it was this that prompted the Corinthian reluctance to fight Athens in (?)506 (5.75.1). S. West, 'A diplomatic fiasco: the first Athenian embassy to Sardis (Hdt. 5, 73)', *RhM* 154 (2011), 9-21, prefers to think that the Athenian ambassadors only said that their city *would* give earth and water, and the actual gift of the physical emblems would only have been made once they, together with Persian representatives, had returned to Athens; in that case the real submission would never have been made.

fleet on the shore of Euboea (7.188-93).⁶ That will be when the sea throws the ships upon the land; here the land throws the Persians back upon the sea. That has more emblematic force than any marsh could convey.

Still, there must be more to it than that. Let us work from a small detail, the way the Greek fighters 'called for fire'. That too links with the earth and water theme: 'Darius had demanded earth and water.... Instead the Greeks give him fire'.⁷ But where would that fire come from? It is a long way from the Greek camp. A. R. Burn once conjured up a picture of camp-followers running behind the battle with braziers;⁸ that is not very plausible. Nor is there any mention of fire in our descriptions of the Stoa Poikile, nor is anything visible in the Brescia sarcophagus. No; that fire comes, not from the Greek camp, but from the *Iliad*: from the end of Book 15, when Hector is leading the charge upon the Greek ships:

Ἔκτωρ δὲ πρύμνηθεν ἐπεὶ λάβεν οὐχὶ μεθίει,
ἄφλαστον μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχων, Τρωσὶν δὲ κέλευεν·
"οἴσετε πῦρ, ἅμα δ' αὐτοὶ ἀολλέες ὄρνυτ' ἀϋτὴν ..."

Hektor would not let go of the ship where he had grasped it at the stern, gripping the poop-end in his hands, and he called out to the Trojans: 'Bring fire, and raise the war-cry all together ...' (*Iliad* 15.716-8, trans. Hammond)

And there the fire would presumably be brought from the Trojan camp-fires in the plain, so memorably blazing at the end of Book 8 (553-65). There are no marshes in the *Iliad*, but a clear-cut topography of city, plain, and sea, and that is what we are also given here.

Nor is it just the fire that evokes the *Iliad*, nor even that thoroughly Homeric word κόπτω for 'to smite'. Hector too grasps a ship just as the Greeks do now (notice the repeated ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι in Herodotus);⁹ Hector too will not let go, just as Cynegirus will not let go.¹⁰ And what both Hector and Cynegirus grasp is the ἄφλαστον, or several of them in Herodotus' odd plural. That is a very rare word indeed, translated by LSJ as 'curved poop of the ship' and by Janko as 'a carved stern-post':¹¹ something similar is again visible on the Brescia sarcophagus. Outside these two passages the word only crops up in passages that are surely evoking the *Iliad*,¹² just as this must be. And this, of course,

⁶ Cf. C. B. R. Pelling, 'Thucydides' Archidamus and Herodotus' Artabanus', in *Georgica. Greek studies in honour of George Cawkwell*, ed. M. A. Flower and M. Toher, *BICS Supp.* 58 (London 1991) 120-42, at 136-38.

⁷ H. Y. McCulloch, 'Herodotus, Marathon, and Athens', *SO* 57 (1982) 35-55, at 44.

⁸ A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1962) 250.

⁹ This is weakened unduly in Waterfield's translation, 'began to take over the ships'.

¹⁰ Contrast A. D. Fitton Brown, 'Notes on Herodotus and Thucydides', *Hermes* 86 (1958) 379-82, at 379, who misses this 'keeping a firm grasp' point of the present tense. The sense he finds is 'that Cynegirus had his hand cut off while engaged in seizing the sterns (cf. ἐπελαμβάνοντο τῶν νεῶν above); we may surmise that he was the leading spirit and looking round to see how the others were getting on.'

¹¹ R. Janko, *The Iliad: a commentary* iv (Cambridge 1992) 306.

¹² Apollonius Rhodius 1.1089 and Lycophron, *Alexandra* 26 and 295. Its etymology was evidently unclear too, though φλάω was readily taken as a metathesis or corruption of θλάω. It ought to mean

is not just any old passage in the *Iliad*: it is the crucial moment of both poem and war, the height of Hector's achievement – and yet the act that also begins the movement that will bring Achilles back to the fighting, sealing Hector's own death and the fate of Troy. So in the *Iliad* it is glory, but glory that presages disaster and annihilation.

II

Marathon, then, this most heroic of battles, is described with appropriate epic resonance. This has been noticed, of course; Stein pointed out the specific allusion to οἷσετε πῶρ, and later commentators too talk about a 'Homeric ring' (Scott), or 'Homeric overtones', (Evans) or 'the coloring lent by epic language' (McCulloch),¹³ though the oddity of this 'fire' is not normally spelt out. It was spelt out back in 1969 in a brief note by J. R. Grant,¹⁴ but Grant grumpily summed up the implications as 'Herodotus, it would seem, is adding bits of Homeric colour, and, in so doing, practising automatic writing at its purest, with a consequent loss of historical accuracy'. 'Automatic writing at its purest'? I think we can be more generous than that.

It may be important here that Herodotus is already 'in dialogue' with previous versions of Marathon, possibly indeed including that of the Stoa Poikile (though that would be familiar only to Athenians and a few others); we can sometimes sense that the dialogue was quite pointed, for instance in the recurrent stress he gives to the role of the Plataeans. They are given a whole excursive chapter at 108, and then he emphasizes the solemn prayer that the Athenians now give in their five-year festivals for prosperity for 'the Athenians and Plataeans' (111.2); there is a corresponding stress on the role of the Plataeans in the fighting (111.1–2, 113.1). That may well carry a pointed hint forward to the events of 431 and 427, culminating in the destruction of Plataea at Spartan hands: after all, Herodotus has just gone out of his way to introduce that contemporary Peloponnesian War perspective with those remarks on the evils that awaited Greece during the next three generations, 'some coming from the Persians, some from the leading states themselves as they battled for supremacy' (6.98.2). If so, the implication may not be so simple as a

'uncrushable', suggesting that the poops were somehow strengthened. This may be right, though it does not look as if any ancient writer thought of that. A favourite guess in the *Etymologica* was that it was euphemistic, an *a contrario* formation because they were so easily crushable or broken off: that does not sound very plausible. Polemon 2.13 simply has Cynegirus grasping τοῦ ἀκροστολίου, 'the terminal ornament' (LSJ), *i.e.*, the figurehead at the prow or the stern-post at the rear; Paulus Silentiarius *Anth. Gr.* 16.118 has γαμψοῖο κορύμβου ('the curved upper point' of prow or stern, *cf. Iliad* 9.241). (The two passages are quoted in the useful collection of testimonia at Harrison, 'The south frieze' (n. 1 above) 374–75.) Both are presumably interpretations of ἄφλαστον, though it was also possible to distinguish the ἀκροστόλιον or κορύμβον at the prow from the ἄφλαστον at the stern (Eust. iii.790.11–14, *Etym. Magn.* pp. 53 and 177 K., *Etym. Gud.* k 351). The word was clearly a pedant's delight.

¹³ L. Scott, *Historical commentary on Herodotus Book 6* (*Mnem. Supp.* 268, 2005) 391; Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon' (n. 2 above) 287, *cf.* 293, 'the Homeric struggle at the ships'; McCulloch, 'Herodotus, Marathon, and Athens' (n. 7 above) 44. So also now Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 2 above) 158: like the use of κόπτω, the call for fire 'lends an epic quality to the narrative'.

¹⁴ J. R. Grant, 'ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος', *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 264–68, at 264.

contrast with the good faith shown between Athens and Plataea in recent events and the bad faith of Sparta towards Plataea back then.¹⁵ Athens did not cover herself in glory in the 427 sequence either, and any Herodotean recrimination over these modern events may be more broadly aimed. More certainly, the passage also corrects the recurrent Athenian boast that 'alone of the Greeks' we took on the Persians in 490 as the champion of freedom. That is a staple of oratory, as other papers in this volume bring out;¹⁶ we find it in the Athenians' speech in Thucydides (1.73.4); we find it already in the tendentious Athenian speech in Herodotus himself, 9.27.5.¹⁷ The 'legend' of Marathon is already forming within Herodotus' own pages: within eleven years it has already become rhetorically exemplary, and rhetorically misrepresented.¹⁸

The Stoa Poikile, we happen to be told, did not suppress the Plataeans (Paus. 1.15.3), nor even in some moods did all Athenian orators: the Stoa made sure that the Plataeans were recognizable by their Boeotian headgear, or so says Apollodorus, the deliverer of the speech *Against Neaera*, intent in that rhetorical context on playing up rather than down the ancestral debt of the Athenians to Plataea ([Dem.] 59.94). What the Stoa was also already doing, surely, was to intimate that elevation of the Marathon campaign to 'heroic' status: not just heroic in a loose, 'their finest hour' sort of sense, but in the sharper way of representing it as a counterpart of the heroic deeds of Homer and beyond. That was why Marathon could take its place in the Stoa alongside depictions of the Amazonomachy and the Trojan War; that too was why the Stoa could include in the Marathon panel the local hero, Theseus, Athena, and Heracles (Paus. 1.15.3). Nor was it just the Stoa Poikile, nor just Marathon: the 'new Simonides' – by now not so new as all that – shows a very elaborate linkage of the Plataea campaign to the Homeric world, with all that material on Achilles.¹⁹ With Marathon, we can once again see that 'Homerization' forming in Herodotus' own pages, with the Athenians moving swiftly in their 9.27 speech from the Heracleidae, the Seven against Thebes, the Amazons – the stuff of funeral orations, of course – to Marathon itself.

¹⁵ As D. Hennig thought, 'Herodot. 6, 198: Athen und Plataiai', *Chiron* 22 (1992) 13-24. The 'back then' was presumably in 519 BCE, for that seems to be the context to which Herodotus is referring back at 6.108: on this see Hornblower on Thuc. 3.68.5.

¹⁶ Cf. also K. R. Walters, "'We fought alone at Marathon': historical falsification in the Attic funeral oration', *RhM* 124 (1981) 206-11.

¹⁷ And, for that matter, in what Xerxes says at 7.10b.2, but that is more understandable. It is the Athenians that loom largest in his mind.

¹⁸ Cf. N. Whatley, 'On the possibility of reconstructing Marathon and other ancient battles', *JHS* 84 (1964) 119-39, at 131: 'The importance of Marathon seems in many ways to have been exaggerated by most ancient writers except Herodotus, and even Herodotus shares in the exaggeration in Book ix, chapter 27.' But at 9.27 Herodotus may well be wryly exposing the Athenians' exaggeration, not sharing in it. 'Many patriotic citizens of Athens must have read the Herodotean account of Marathon without pleasure': Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon' (n. 2 above) 307, cf. 279-81.

¹⁹ 'Simonides proposes to do for the Persian War what Homer did for the Trojan War', P. J. Parsons, "'These fragments we have shored against our ruin'", in *The new Simonides*, ed. D. Boedeker and D. Sider (Oxford 2001) 55-64, at 57; interesting comments also in that volume by I. Rutherford (38), D. Obbink (71-72), D. Boedeker (124-26 and 153-63), P. J. Shaw (165, 180-01), J. S. Clay (182-84), and A. Barchiesi (257).

So: was Grant right, and is this just old hat, ‘automatic writing at its purest’, with Herodotus’ Homerizing just a clichéd reflex as he does what others have been doing for fifty years already? I argued a few years ago that Herodotus’ relation to Homer could be more thoughtful, not just a matter of ‘colouring’ or ‘flourishes’ but an exploration of how far values and events and achievements had changed, how and how far the ‘epic’ or the ‘heroic’ could still be achieved in the world of the *polis*.²⁰ I did not say much about Marathon in that paper, but if there was anything in that argument it would be odd if Marathon of all battles did not fit. I think it does: here too we can see ways in which the narrative develops themes which look both backwards and forwards, backwards to Homer and forwards to the more disquieting events of Herodotus’ own day. This is the stuff of legend and of glory, yes; the finest hour, yes; but it plays against a world where so much had changed, and was changing still.

III

Let us start with the speech of Miltiades to Callimachus. The generals are split, and the vote of the polemarch becomes crucial; Miltiades is trying to win Callimachus to his side. There are all sorts of historical issues there that cannot be discussed here,²¹ not least the question what exactly the disagreement was about: if Miltiades was urging that they should fight straight away, then it is odd that they waited for several days; if the other side was arguing that they should not, then they must have known that they might have to, if the Persians tried to force their way past them on one of the possible routes towards Athens. One naturally wonders if the disagreement was really about ‘whether or not to wait for the Spartans, that is if we possibly can’. But Herodotus simplifies it to a sharp ‘to fight or not to fight’ question.

Ἐν σοὶ νῦν, Καλλιμάχε, ἐστὶ ἢ καταδουλώσαι Ἀθήνας ἢ ἐλευθέρας ποιήσαντα μνημόσυνον λυέσθαι ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον οἷον οὐδὲ Ἀρμόδιός τε καὶ Ἀριστογείτων λείπουσι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ, ἐξ οὗ ἐγένοντο Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς κίνδυνον ἤκουσι μέγιστον, καὶ ἦν μὲν γε ὑποκύνωσι τοῖσι Μήδοις, δέδοκται τὰ πείσονται παραδεδομένοι Ἰππῆϊ· ἦν δὲ περιγένηται αὕτη ἡ πόλις, οἷα τέ ἐστι πρώτη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολιῶν γενέσθαι. κῶς ὦν δὴ ταῦτα οἶά τέ ἐστι γενέσθαι, καὶ κῶς ἐς σέ τοι τούτων ἀνήκει τῶν πρηγμάτων τὸ κῆρος ἔχειν, νῦν ἔρχομαι φράσω. ἡμέων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐόντων δέκα δῖχα γίνονται αἱ γνώμαι, τῶν μὲν κελευόντων συμβαλεῖν, τῶν δὲ οὐ συμβαλεῖν. ἦν μὲν νῦν μὴ συμβάλωμεν, ἔλπομαι τινα στάσιν μεγάλην διασεῖσιν ἐμπεσοῦσαν τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονήματα ὥστε μηδίσαι· ἦν δὲ συμβάλωμεν πρὶν τι καὶ σαθρὸν Ἀθηναίων μετεξετέροις ἐγγενέσθαι, θεῶν τὰ ἴσα νεμόντων οἷοί τέ εἰμεν περιγενέσθαι τῇ συμβολῇ. ταῦτα ὦν πάντα ἐς σέ νῦν τείνει καὶ ἐκ σέο ἡρτῆται· ἦν γὰρ σὺ γνώμη τῇ ἐμῇ προσθῇ, ἔστι τοι πατρίς τε ἐλευθήρη καὶ πόλις πρώτη τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι· ἦν δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀποσπευδόντων τὴν συμβολὴν ἔλῃ, ὑπάρξει τοι τῶν ἐγὼ κατέλεξα ἀγαθῶν τὰ ἐναντία.

²⁰ ‘Herodotus and Homer’, in *Epic interactions*, ed. M. J. Clarke, B. G. F. Currie, and R. O. A. M. Lyne (Oxford 2006) 75-104.

²¹ Including the constitutional position of the polemarch and how *stratēgoi* were elected. See Rhodes pp. 16-17 above.

'It is now in your hands, Callimachus,' he said, 'either to enslave Athens, or to make her free and to leave behind you for all future generations a memory more glorious than even Harmodius and Aristogeiton left. Never in our history have we Athenians been in such peril as now. If we submit to the Persians, Hippias will be restored to power – and there is little doubt what misery must then ensue: but if we fight and win, then this city of ours may well grow to pre-eminence amongst all the cities of Greece. If you ask me how this can be, and how the decision rests with you, I will tell you: we commanders are ten in number, and we are not agreed upon what action to take; half of us are for a battle, half against it. If we refuse to fight, I have little doubt that the result will be bitter dissension; our purpose will be shaken, and we shall submit to Persia. But if we fight before the rot can show itself in any of us, then, if God gives us fair play, we can not only fight but win. Yours is the decision; all hangs upon you; vote on my side, and our country will be free – yes, and the first city of Greece. But if you support those who have voted against fighting, that happiness will be denied you – you will get the opposite.' (Herodotus 6.109.3-6, trans. de Sélincourt)

And Callimachus is won over, and votes for Miltiades.

The first words recall those of Dionysius of Miletus earlier in the book, with their specific Homeric echo:

ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα, ἄνδρες Ἴωνες, ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι
ἢ δούλοισι, καὶ τούτοις ὡς δρηπέτησι.

Matters are now on a razor's edge for us, men of Ionia, whether to be free or slave, and runaway slaves at that. (6.11.2)

And that had not ended well. It looks forward too, to the very similar Ἐν σοὶ ... beginning of Themistocles to Eurybiades before Salamis:²² 'It is now in your hands to save Greece, if you do what I say ...' (8.60a) – again represented as a 'to fight or not to fight' decision, so the one battle presages the other. The phrasing may in its turn be echoed on the Persian side at 8.118.3, when the storm-tossed Xerxes calls upon his noble ship-board companions: 'It is now in your hands – my safety'. And they all dutifully jump overboard. That is what Persian kingship is like; this is what Greek decision-making is like, with a sequence of life-and-death decisions, or rather something that matters more than life-and-death (which is what the original Homeric 'razor's edge' model was about), for this is about freedom or slavery. The sad fate of the first of those sequences, with the collapse of the Ionian Revolt because the participants were not willing to show the proper resolve, only goes to underline what is at stake each time, and how at Marathon and at Salamis, too, things could so easily have gone differently.

'To leave behind you for all future generations a memory more glorious than even Harmodius and Aristogeiton left ...': a 'memory', or rather a 'memorial', μνημόσυον, an equivalent of the material memorials that were going to be dotted around the plain of

²² As Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon' (n. 2 above) 284, observed.

Marathon in some profusion.²³ That echoes Herodotus' proem, with its project of preserving the κλέος of the great doings of the past and preventing them from being 'wiped out' by time – ἐξίτηλα, with its figuring of a parallel with a monumental inscription that becomes 'faded' or 'eroded'. There will be further echoes of the proem before Thermopylae: the great κλέος that awaits Leonidas if he fights, so that the εὐδαιμονίη of Sparta would not be 'wiped out' (ἐξαλείφω, 7.220.2).²⁴ This is what Herodotus' work is *for*, as the proem makes clear, preserving the memory of deeds like this. And that is a very Homeric thought too, the everlasting κλέος – ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα ἀνθρώπων βίον here – for which heroes are fighting, to become (as Helen puts it, *Il.* 6.357-58) the objects of song for future generations. That was the κλέος that Homer's song would itself give, and now Herodotus' prose preserves the memory for which his heroes contend.

The other thing for which they are fighting is freedom. We could all write the sort of freedom-rhetoric that we would here *expect* Miltiades to be using, at least now that the decision has been streamlined into the simple to-fight-or-not-to-fight antithesis. We have become used to the inspiring power of freedom since Book 5, with the importance of their newly-won ἰσχυροτή in inspiring the Athenians now that they are all 'fighting for themselves' rather than for their tyrant masters (5.78),²⁵ Dionysius of Phocaea had then produced a stirring negative equivalent when he spoke of the horror of being treated like runaway slaves (6.11). To modern tastes it is jarring that Miltiades now dwells so much on Athenian *power*: 'this city of ours may well grow to pre-eminence amongst all the cities of Greece ... our country will be free – yes, and the first city of Greece'; but probably that is just a matter of our modern sensibilities. We should just accept that freedom implied a continuum of self-assertion, as one first cast off the limitations on one's own freedom imposed by an external master and then went on to dominate others and limit *their* freedom – a blurring, to use the favourite modern distinction, from 'freedom from' into 'freedom to'. That continuum is already seen in 5.78, with the Athenians no better than their neighbours under the tyranny but becoming μακρῶ πρώτοι as soon as they are free. But the phrasing certainly gives a heavy hint of what is going to come next, after the *Histories* have finished – that process by which Athens will indeed become a domineering city in those 'battles for the supremacy' of 6.98.2 (above, p. 26), perhaps even become the new Persia and the 'tyrant city' of Thucydides' rhetoric, though hints of that are louder as the last few books unfold.

The more immediate reasons for fighting are interesting too. There are no fine words in funeral-speech vein about Athens as the champions of Greece who set an example to others; none about the confidence to be had in autochthons fighting for their own land; no

²³ And also of Callimachus' monument on the Acropolis (*IG* i³ 784 = *ML* 18 = Fornara 49). There μν[έμεν, μν[ῆμα *uel sim.* are read, when other restorations differ, by B. B. Shefton, 'The dedication of Callimachus (*IG* I² 609)', *BSA* 45 (1950) 145-64, at 153-58, by E. B. Harrison, 'The victory of Kallimachos', *GRBS* 12 (1971) 5-24, at 19, and by O. Hansen, 'The memorial of Kallimachus reconsidered', *Hermes* 96 (1988) 482-83.

²⁴ Pelling, 'Herodotus and Homer' (n. 20 above) 95.

²⁵ That passage is echoed too in the narrative of the Ionian Revolt: for all the unsatisfactory nature of the Ionian resistance there, at least the Chians conspicuously do *not* 'play the coward' (ἐθελοκακέειν, 6.15.1), just as the Athenians stopped their cowardice (ἐθελοκακέειν) at 5.78.

expression of trust that the gods are on their side (as there will be at 8.143.2): θεῶν τὰ ἴσα νεμόντων, that is all – the gods dispensing things equally. Even that has an air of the conditional about it, as in de Sélincourt's translation, 'if God gives us fair play'. There may well be gods around,²⁶ but that is not the way Miltiades is thinking or talking. There is no 'we will never surrender': that sort of finest-hour rhetoric too is left for the end of Book 8, where its interpretation is anything but straightforward. The argument now is simply that there is too great a risk of *stasis*, and that any sort of delay may shake the Athenian resolve so that they may Medize. 'Something rotten' may set in, something σαθρόν, and Stein, How and Wells, and Nenci may be right in sensing nautical jargon here for this rotting 'ship of state'.²⁷ The argument makes sense.²⁸ After all, we have seen enough states already decide that there could be worse things in the world than accepting Persian domination, and indeed those worse things had just been made very clear indeed, with the burning and enslavement of Eretria. When so many other states were Medizing, why should Athens not put up with a restored Hippias, especially as he was already pretty long in whatever teeth he had left? We should not forget that Herodotus himself described the decision of Ionian cities *not* to Medize as ἀγνωμοσύνη at 6.10, a word which commentators and translators dance around,²⁹ but we cannot get away from it: when so many states were going over, a refusal to Medize was *folly* – glorious, wonderful folly.

IV

Still, the argument is not very glorious, even if the upshot is. It is certainly a different world from that of the *Iliad*. There is no hint here of the fine words of Odysseus at *Iliad*

²⁶ As in the epiphany of Pan to Pheidippides (105.2-3) and the further hint of an epiphany with the monstrous figure who looms over Epizelus (117); and it is surely not coincidence that the action moves from one sacred area of Heracles to another (108.1, 116.1). Then Datis' mysterious dream at Myconos (118) suggests some *Iliad*-like wrath of Apollo, despite all the ostentatious propriety of ch. 97. For the role of the divine at Marathon see further Gartzziou-Tati in this volume.

²⁷ Stein also commented on the immediately preceding ἐμπροσθεν: 'wie ein Wogenschwall auf ein Schiff', comparing 3.81.2.

²⁸ What may *not* make sense is, in that case, the delay of several days in joining battle: if there was a danger of a failure of resolve, the best thing would be to fight it out straight away. Cf. Whatley, 'On the possibility of reconstructing Marathon and other ancient battles' (n. 18 above) 136-37: perhaps Whatley's own well-informed comments, beginning 'I can only reply that there has been delay before half the battles in history...', are enough. This problem is evidently affected by the bigger question whether it was Miltiades' rather than the Persians' decision that brought on the battle when it did. For the delay see further Rhodes p. 4 above.

²⁹ How and Wells talk of 'obstinacy', Waterfield has 'remained committed to their chosen course', de Sélincourt 'all of them firmly refused', Nenci 'stoltezza', Shuckburgh 'obstinate defiance', Rawlinson 'staunch', Godley 'stubborn'. Scott, *Historical commentary* (n. 13 above) now approves Mandilaras' 'categorically rejected'. Legrand's 'manque de jugement' is better; so is Stein's remark on 5.83.1, 'ἀγνωμοσύνη bezeichnet den Mangel an ruhiger, besonnener Überlegung ...'. Such an acknowledgement of folly does not prevent Herodotus from applauding those who stayed firm during the fighting (14-15): this simply shows his capacity to adopt multiple perspectives when actions or events are morally complex, as in his remark that Aristagoras 'ought not to have spoken the truth' to Cleomenes at 5.50.3.

11.407-10, for instance, though admittedly that is not the only attitude to flight-or-fight in the *Iliad*; there is certainly nothing so uplifting as Sarpedon's classic speech at *Iliad* 12.310-27. But it introduces a theme that is going to be strong in the next two books. Remember why Athens is the saviour of Greece at 7.139: no beacon-of-freedom rhetoric on the city as an inspiration to others, and it is nothing – perhaps pointedly – to do with what they did in 490. They just did not run away or Medize in 480 when so many other cities did. Remember too what weighs with Themistocles before Salamis: not the tactical arguments for fighting in the narrows – that is what he says in open council, because he cannot be frank in the presence of representatives of the other cities. But the way Mnesiphilus convinced Themistocles, and in his turn Themistocles convinced Eurybiades, was by stressing that if they withdrew to the Peloponnese too many of those other cities would 'run away', διαδρήσονται (8.60.1, cf. 8.57). The famous δρόμῳ advance of the Greeks at Marathon – 'running' into battle (6.112.2)³⁰ – is so close to presaging a very different sort of 'running' later on. It could so easily have happened that way, and everyone knew it; this could indeed have been the *Iliad* over again, with the height of glory and the firing of the ships starting the movement that led to total disaster. What eventually persuaded the Greeks to fight at Salamis was Themistocles' threat that the Athenians would sail away to Siris and leave the rest of the Greeks to their fate (8.62.2); what persuaded Xerxes to fight was Sicinnus' message (8.75.2), which in its blend of truth and falsity had the news that the Greeks were thinking of running away (δρησμόν) and that Themistocles was really on the Persian side. All these claims were effective precisely because they were wholly plausible.

So we are left with a final paradox of freedom, as Herodotus presents it. The positive aspects, that inspirational aspect that was initially so stressed at 5.78, are not forgotten; perhaps indeed they are taken for granted.³¹ But there are also negative aspects to that individualism, with everyone acting for themselves in the way that 5.78 proclaimed. There is the perpetual danger that states may be torn apart by *stasis* as everyone pursues their own interests and vendettas, and that the self-interest of particular cities may fragment an alliance. The biggest paradox is that, at these crucial moments, it is the worst aspects of freedom, not the best, that prove the key to Greece's triumph: it is the fear of Miltiades that *stasis* may overtake them that drives Athens to fight and win at Marathon; it is the fear of Themistocles that the alliance may break up that brings on the battle of Salamis; it is the inter-city factionalism and self-interested scheming that had in the past led Sparta to tell Plataea to turn to Athens (108.3) and would later generate the war between Athens and Aegina that proved the 'salvation of Greece' (7.144.1).

So downsides of freedom turn out to have very definite upsides; but downsides they remain, and the hints of the future suggest how the glories of 490 and 480 could turn very

³⁰ On which see now esp. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 2 above) 143-52, with thought-provoking modern parallels.

³¹ We are going to hear enough of those positive aspects, too, in the next few books, strikingly often in Spartan mouths. There are the fine words of Demaratus to Xerxes at 7.101-04, even if more of his emphasis there falls on νόμος than on freedom; then the Spartan ambassadors tell the uncomprehending Persians that if they knew freedom the way that the Greeks know freedom, they would fight for it not just with staves but with axes (7.135.3).

sour. Perhaps the very name of Plataea suggested as much, as I mentioned earlier,³² if one thought beyond 479 and down to 427 and that 'battling for the supremacy' (p. 26); in any case, the emphasis there on the Sparta-Thebes-Athens triangle would not have suggested any happy-ever-after feeling of Greek harmony. Nor would the jealousies and factionalism that we can already see in Athens, as we note that the real θῶμα Herodotus finds in the Alcmaeonid sequence (6.121.1) – another echo of the proem – is not that a treacherous shield should have been raised, but that people should have thought it to be the doing of the Alcmaeonids. Even with the Alcmaeonids themselves, a close reading of the next few chapters also makes us understand why people did suspect them, even if they were wrong: the shifting and enigmatic texture of their relations with the Peisistratids belies the easy initial statement that they were simply tyrant-haters throughout.³³ Suspicions were natural; the great men of Athens really could get above themselves, in ways that carry that tinge of tyranny. Miltiades' fate at the end of the book underlines the point, and the deft insertion of the reference to Pericles' birth makes sure that the later perspective is not forgotten here either (131). Pericles would be a 'lion', indeed, with all the ambivalence that that figure suggests.

This, then, is the world of the *polis*, so very different from the *Iliad*; and the very modern day, the time of the Pentekontaetia and the Peloponnesian War, was different again, with more of the downside and not much upside. Yet heroism *was* still possible, and the events of Marathon proved it – but heroism with a difference. It was now a matter of finding counterparts, not unlike the way that a little later in the book Miltiades' promise of 'a place where they would easily find gold in abundance' (χώραν τοιαύτην δὴ τινα ... ὅθεν χρυσὸν εὐπετέως ἄφθονον οἴσονται: 132) is a latter-day counterpart of the tale of Alcmaeon that has preceded (125); not unlike, indeed, the way that the contests for Agariste's hand (128-29) can be seen as a more modern counterpart of the chariot-racing contest won by Pelops for the hand of Hippodamia, this time with a clash between father and potential son-in-law that is lighter and less threatening.³⁴ Winning eternal fame has changed, too, and is not a matter of heroic monomachies any more.³⁵ The modern heroism

³² Above, pp. 26-27.

³³ Cf. J. L. Moles in *Brill's companion to Herodotus*, ed. E. J. Bakker, I. J. F. de Jong, and H. van Wees (Leiden 2002) 40-42 and now esp. E. Baragwanath, *Motivation and narrative in Herodotus* (Oxford 2008) 28-32. Those shifting relations are already clear at 102.2-3, and cf. esp. 61.60-61. For Alcmaeonid collaboration with the tyranny cf. Rhodes pp. 17-18 above.

³⁴ Mentions of the Olympic games cluster around this context (122.1, 126.2, 127.3), and Olympic victories ran in Miltiades' family too (36.1, 103): Pelops, so closely associated with Olympia and the games, might easily come to mind. L. Bertelli, 'Hecataeus: from genealogy to historiography', in *The historian's craft in the age of Herodotus*, ed. N. Luraghi (Oxford 2001) 67-94, at 75, prefers to see a link with the competition among Helen's suitors (Hes. *Catalogue of women* frgs. 200-204 MW), suggesting that oral tradition had developed the myth as 'a reflection of another famous wedding, that of Agariste at Sicyon' (6.128-29); but there too it may be better to see it the other way round, with Herodotus offering a modern counterpart of the mythical story. The suitors of the *Odyssey* are also not too far away.

³⁵ Notice that the previous sequence does have a monomachy (92.3) between an Aeginetan *stratēgos* and a series of Athenians; that has a feeling of already belonging in the past. The future belongs to

requires instead an acknowledgement of the realities of the world, with all its jealousies and tensions and treacheries, and the insight and the rhetoric to exploit those in a style of leadership that offered something new.

Courage, of course, mattered too, with a readiness to face death and accept it for one's city, not just for eternal fame; this was something that was already true in Hector's Troy. The modern good death is described in ways that are all the more moving for their simplicity, again perhaps with a hint of monumental memorials. Callimachus died 'having behaved as a good man' (ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἀγαθός: 114); Epizelus is blinded when similarly 'behaving as a good man' (ἄνδρα γινόμενον ἀγαθόν: 117.2).³⁶ The Athenians fought ἀξίως λόγου (112.2), just as the Spartans would at Thermopylae (7.211.3) – worthy of note, worthy of being talked about, worthy of Herodotus' own λόγος as it grants them that eternal, epic memorial, and worthy of being talked about still, two and a half millennia later.

the naval exchange that immediately follows (93), with the Aeginetans for the moment the skilful ones.

³⁶ Such ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός locutions are particularly frequent when people show themselves 'good men' in fighting, and often dying, *for freedom*: Stein lists also 5.2.1, 6.14.1, 7.224.1 (Leonidas), 9.17.4, and 9.75.1 (but also 7.53.1 on the Persian side).

MARATHON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE HOPLITE PHALANX

PETER KRENTZ

Introduction

Marathon has inspired great sound bites. ‘There is no battle in ancient or modern times more deserving of applause for its military conduct’, proclaimed George Finlay in 1839, ‘none more worthy of admiration for its immediate results on society, or more beneficial in its permanent influence on the fate of mankind’.¹ John Stuart Mill pronounced that ‘The Battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings. If the issue of that day had been different, the Britons and Saxons might still have been wandering in the woods’.² For J. F. C. Fuller, Marathon was ‘the birth-cry of Europe’.³ In 2010, Richard Billows published *Marathon: how one battle changed western civilization*.⁴ Even so, I want to argue that in one limited sense Marathon was even more important than scholars have recognized: at Marathon a Greek army first fought as a ‘hoplite phalanx’ in the sense in which we use the phrase today.

The phrase ‘hoplite phalanx’ is more common today than it was in the classical Greek world. The word ὁπλίτης (hoplite), which derives from ὅπλα (military equipment), first occurs in the first quarter of the fifth century BC as an adjective in Pindar (*Isthm.* 1.23) and Aeschylus (*Sept.* 467, 717). In the second half of the century, ‘hoplite’ becomes common as a noun, first in Herodotus, then in Thucydides, Aristophanes, Euripides, and inscriptions.⁵ The word φάλαγξ (phalanx), which apparently derives from a root meaning ‘log’, appears about twenty times in Homer’s *Iliad*, meaning a battle-line or a section of an army. With a single exception, Homer uses the word in the plural.⁶ Other archaic poets, perhaps echoing Homer, also use the plural: Tyrtaios speaks of the good warrior who

¹ G. Finlay, ‘On the battle of Marathon’, *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature of the United Kingdom* 3 (1839) 363-95, at 392.

² J. S. Mill, ‘Review of G. Grote, *History of Greece I-II*’, *Edinburgh Review* 84 (1846) 343. The first sentence is sometimes misquoted as referring to British rather than English history. As someone pointed out at the Marathon conference, this famous quotation takes on a slightly different nuance when one remembers that Mill was a Scot.

³ J. F. C. Fuller, *A military history of the western world* (New York 1987) 25.

⁴ R. A. Billows, *Marathon: how one battle changed western civilization* (New York 2010). There has of course been a backlash against such big claims, neatly exemplified by Robert Graves’ clever little poem ‘The Persian Version’, which begins ‘Truth-loving Persians do not dwell upon / The trivial skirmish fought near Marathon’ (*The complete poems in one volume*, ed. B. Graves and D. Ward [Manchester 2000] 407).

⁵ J. F. Lazenby and D. Whitehead, ‘The myth of the hoplite’s hoplon’, *CQ* 46 (1996) 27-33, at 32.

⁶ The exception appears in Homer, *Iliad* 6.6.

‘turns to flight the enemy’s rugged phalanges’,⁷ and Mimnermos of the warrior who broke ‘the massed phalanges of the Lydian horsemen’.⁸ Since the word ‘phalanx’ does not appear in a military context in Herodotus or Thucydides, I can understand why Hans Droysen once recommended restricting the use of ‘phalanx’ to infantry armed with the Macedonian sarissa.⁹ He probably had in mind Diodoros’ description of Philip II’s institution of the Macedonian phalanx (16.3.2):

ἐπενόησε δὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς φάλαγγος πυκνότητα καὶ κατασκευήν, μιμησάμενος τὸν ἐν Τροίᾳ τῶν ἡρώων συνασπισμόν, καὶ πρῶτος συνεστήσατο τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα.

He devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx, imitating the close order of the heroes at Troy, and he first established the Macedonian phalanx.

But the phrase ‘ἡ φάλαγξ τῶν ὀπλιτῶν’ (‘the phalanx of hoplites’) does occur in Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.5.27), so strictly-speaking Droysen’s suggestion cannot stand.¹⁰ The Greeks knew the phalanx before Philip II.

Today the phrase ‘hoplite phalanx’ refers to a formation of uniformly equipped foot soldiers, a formation that arranged men in rows and columns (or ranks and files) and excluded light-armed troops such as archers, slingers, and javelin-throwers. When did this formation first appear? It had certainly become standard by the time of the Peloponnesian War. ‘πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκατέρων οἳ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο’, Thucydides says in his paradigmatic description of the battle of Syracuse in 415, ‘καὶ τροπὰς οἷας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν’ (6.69.2: ‘The stone-throwers, slingers, and archers of either army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by one another, as might be expected between light troops’). Here the light troops fight separately from the main hoplite formation. Following the inconclusive skirmishing of the light troops, the seers sacrificed and the trumpeters blew, and only then did the hoplites move forward.

But how far back does the hoplite phalanx go? The sixth century, as suggested by van Wees in his revisionist 2004 book *Greek warfare: myths and realities*? The seventh century, as most scholars have thought for almost a hundred years? The eighth century, as argued by Adam Schwartz in his 2009 book *Reinstating the hoplite*? Or even earlier, as historians thought a hundred and fifty years ago?

The history of the question

I know of only one ancient story about the origin of the phalanx. Polyainos credits Pan (*Stratagems* 1.2):

Διονύσου στρατηγὸς ἦν Παν· οὗτος πρῶτος τάξιν εὗρεν, φάλαγγα ὠνόμασε, κέρας ἔταξε δεξιὸν καὶ λαίον. ταύτη τοι ἄρα κερασφόρον τὸν Πᾶνα δημιουργοῦσιν.

⁷ F 12 ll. 21-22: δυσμενέων ἀνδρῶν ἔτρεψε φάλαγγας τρηχείας.

⁸ F 13 l. 3: Λυδῶν ἱππομάχων πυκινὰς ... φάλαγγας.

⁹ H. Droysen, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen* (Freiburg i.B. 1889) 171 n. 3.

¹⁰ See also Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.23, ‘ὀπλιτῶν φάλαγγα’ (‘phalanx of hoplites’).

Dionysos' general Pan first discovered formation, called it a phalanx, and formed right and left wings. For this reason artists represent Pan as having horns.

So far as I know, no modern historian has placed any confidence in this anecdote.

In the 1830s, which is as far back as I have traced the discussion, Karl Otfried Müller argued that the Dorians introduced the hoplite phalanx. 'Since it appears', he wrote, 'that Homer describes the mode of combat in use among the ancient Achaeans, the method of fighting with lines of heavy armed men, drawn up in close and regular order, must have been introduced into Peloponnesus by Dorians; amongst whom Tyrtæus describes it as established.'¹¹ In 1852 Wilhelm Rüstow and Hermann Köchly also credited the Dorians with the close-order phalanx,¹² citing Polyainos' anecdote about the Herakleidai Prokles and Temenos using pipers to help their hoplites advance in rhythm in an unbreakable formation (1.10). But then George Grote objected that the correctness of this view 'cannot be determined ... we have no historical knowledge of any military practice in Peloponnesus anterior to the hoplites with close ranks and protended spears'.¹³

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Dorians had dropped out of the discussion. Adolf Bauer thought the Spartans had a trained mass formation by the time of the Messenian Wars in the eighth and seventh centuries.¹⁴ He suggested that they taught the other Greeks to fight in a phalanx. Hans Delbrück took both points, quipping that 'in this context the piper is nothing other than the tactical formation,' and specifying as evidence for the Messenian Wars a comment made by the traveller Pausanias.¹⁵ According to Pausanias, it was traditional for the Lakedaimonians not to pursue too quickly, because they preferred to maintain their formation than to kill anyone running away (4.8.11). Edouard Meyer also credited the Spartans with developing the first phalanx of hoplites. He cited Tyrtaios, the poet who wrote during the Second Messenian War in the seventh century. Meyer recognized that Tyrtaios did not yet describe an exclusive phalanx, but he emphasized Tyrtaios' importance as a composer of marching songs. 'Where it is important to march and fight in close order', he affirmed, 'the best general is a musician'.¹⁶

When I compare what these nineteenth-century scholars had to say with the arguments of more recent writers, what strikes me is that the earlier scholars did not connect changes in equipment with changes in formation. A bronze helmet, body armour, shinguards, and shield made up the basic set of equipment in the Mycenaean and Dark Age worlds, as well

¹¹ K. O. Müller, *The history and antiquities of the Doric race*, trans. G. C. Lewis and H. Tufnell, 2nd edn. (London 1839) 85.

¹² W. Rüstow and H. A. T. Köchly, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens: von der ältesten Zeit bis auf Pyrrhos* (Aarau 1852) 30.

¹³ G. Grote, *A history of Greece; from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great*, 12 vols (London 1869-70) II (1869) 462-63.

¹⁴ I. von Müller and A. Bauer, *Die griechischen Privat- und Kriegsaltertümer* (Munich 1893) 301.

¹⁵ H. Delbrück, *History of the art of war within the framework of political history*, 3 vols, trans. Walter J. Renfroe (Westport, Conn. 1975) I.58, a translation of the third German edition of 1920.

¹⁶ E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, II, *Geschichte des Abendlandes bis auf die Perserkriege* (Stuttgart 1893) 559.

as in Archaic and Classical Greece.¹⁷ No one described the new double-handed hoplite shield, the round shield with a central armband (porpax) as well as a handgrip near the rim, as suitable only for a close-order formation. Why not? According to the conventional wisdom of Rüstow and Köchly, the porpax shield weighed only half as much as the great oval shield that preceded it (6-7.5 kg compared with 14-15 kg).¹⁸ No wonder that no one was talking about how unwieldy the porpax shield was.

Credit for introducing that notion goes to Wolfgang Helbig, who connected the porpax shield and the phalanx formation. In 1909 he suggested in a page or two that the phalanx developed gradually. Only after the development of the close-order formation had made considerable progress did Greeks adopt the porpax shield, which Helbig pronounced suitable only for fighting in close ranks.¹⁹ Two years later, he developed this view in his long article 'Über die Einführungszeit der geschlossenen Phalanx'.²⁰ Helbig looked not to late sources such as Pausanias and Polyainos, but to Archaic poets. He found the hoplite phalanx in some passages of Homer, which he dismissed as interpolations (*Il.* 13.126-35, 15.211-17). He stressed Archilochos fr.3:

οὐ τοι πόλλ' ἐπὶ τόξα τανύσσεται οὐδὲ θαμειαί
 σφενδόναί, εἴτ' ἂν δὴ μῶλον Ἄρης συνάγῃ
 ἐν πεδίῳ· ξιφέων δὲ πολύστονον ἔσσεται ἔργον·
 ταύτης γὰρ κείνοι δαίμονές εἰσι μάχης
 δεσπότηι Εὐβοίης δουρικλυτοί.

Not many bows will bend or slings whirl,
 when Ares' collision shakes
 the plain, but swords will have painful employment;
 for the masters of hand-to-hand combat
 are there, the spear-famed lords of Euboia. (Trans. Mulroy)

He combined these lines with Strabo 10.1.12, where Strabo cites an inscription he saw in the sanctuary of Artemis at Amarynthos (in the territory of Eretria) to support his point that the Euboian cities Chalkis and Eretria agreed to conditions in their fight over the Lelantine plain. According to Strabo, the inscription said that they agreed 'μη̐ χρη̐σθαι τηλεβόλοις' ('not to use long-distance weapons'). Helbig concluded that Euboian hoplites fought in an exclusive phalanx during the Lelantine War, which he dated to the middle of the seventh century.

¹⁷ As Johannes Kromayer wrote in 1928, 'The change in equipment between Mycenaean and "Ionic" is not the most important motive for the change to the closed phalanx. The differences are not that great compared to the light-armed' (J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer* (Munich 1928) 21). V. D. Hanson makes the same point in *The other Greeks: the family farm and the agrarian roots of western civilization*, 2nd edn. (Berkeley 1999) 222.

¹⁸ Rüstow and Köchly, *Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens* (n. 12 above) 16-17.

¹⁹ W. Helbig, *Ein homerischer Rundschild mit eine Bügel*, *JÖAI* 12 (Vienna 1909) 66-67.

²⁰ W. Helbig, 'Über die Einführungszeit der geschlossenen Phalanx.' *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse* (Munich 1911) 3-41.

Like Meyer, Helbig recognized that Tyrtaios, whom he put in the second half of the seventh century, did not describe an exclusive phalanx. So Helbig argued that the Euboians, not the Spartans, first distinguished between hoplites and light-armed and excluded the latter from the phalanx. As further evidence that Euboians were more advanced than the Peloponnesians at one point, Helbig cited an amusing poem quoted in the Palatine Anthology (*Anth. Pal.* 14.73):

Γαίης μὲν πάσης τὸ Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος ἄμεινον,
 Ἴπποι Θεσσαλικάι, Λακεδαιμόνιαί τε γυναῖκες,
 ἄνδρες δ' οἱ πίνουσιν ὕδωρ καλῆς Ἀρεθούσης.
 Ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ τῶν εἰσὶν ἀμείνονες οἱ τὸ μεσηγῷ
 Τίρυνθος ναίουσι καὶ Ἀρκαδίας πολυμήλου
 Ἀργεῖοι λινοθώρηκες, κέντρα πτολέμοιο.
 Ὑμεῖς δ' ὦ Μεγαρεῖς οὐδὲ τρίτοι οὐδὲ τέταρτοι
 οὐδὲ δωδεκατοῖοι, οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

The best of all land is the Pelasgian plain,
 Best are the horses of Thessaly, the women of Sparta,
 And the men who drink the water of beautiful Arethousa.
 But better still than these are the men who live between
 Tiryns and Arkadia of the many sheep,
 The linen-corsleted Argives, the goads of war.
 But you, Megarians, are neither third nor fourth
 Nor twelfth, nor of any place or account at all.

‘The men who drink the water of beautiful Arethousa’ are the men of Chalkis, as Strabo notes in his comment on these lines (10.1.14). Their preeminence must be early, at a time when Sparta could be praised for its women rather than its warriors, so before the sixth century.

Helbig concluded that there was a longish period of development lasting until the sixth century. He cited the Chigi *olpe*, which was then dated to the early sixth or even fifth century, as the earliest definite depiction of a hoplite phalanx. Though he called this depiction ‘inadequate’, pointing especially to the problem of too little space between the opposing front lines of hoplites who have not yet thrown the first of their two spears, he did think that the piper on the Chigi vase proves a close-order formation advancing in step. More than thirty years earlier, back in 1879, Helbig had suggested that Protocorinthian pottery was in fact produced in Chalkis, so the Protocorinthian Chigi *olpe* fit his theory that the hoplite phalanx originated on the island of Euboea.²¹

Helbig’s particular positions have not stood up well. A few scholars – F. E. Adcock, John Boardman, and Walter Donlan – have followed his basic thesis that the Chalkidians first developed the exclusive phalanx,²² but most have rejected his reading of Archilochos and the

²¹ W. Helbig, *Die Italiker in der Poebene* (Leipzig 1879) 85-86.

²² F. E. Adcock in *The Cambridge ancient history*, ed. J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, M. P. Charlesworth, N. H. Baynes, and C. T. Seltman, 12 vols (Cambridge 1923-39) III (1923) 695; J. Boardman, ‘Early Euboean pottery and history’, *ABSA* 52 (1957) 1-29, at 27-29; W. Donlan, ‘Archilochus, Strabo and the Lelantine war’, *TAPhA* 101 (1970) 131-42.

authenticity of the inscription seen by Strabo.²³ Only a dozen years after Helbig's article, Knud Friis Johansen established the basic chronology for Protocorinthian pottery, pushing the date of the Chigi *olpe* back to about 640.²⁴ Six years after that, Martin Nilsson jumped on the earlier date for the vase and stated firmly that 'The Chigi vase gives the lower boundary; hoplite tactics were fully enacted in the second half of the seventh century'.²⁵ And only three years later, the famous *olpe* lost its connection to Chalkis when Humfry Payne's *Necrocorinthia: a study of Corinthian art in the archaic period* showed that Adolf Furtwängler's guess was correct: Protocorinthian pottery came from Corinth, not Chalkis.²⁶ Rare indeed is the living scholar who argues that the hoplite phalanx first appeared on Euboia.

Yet many distinguished scholars – A. W. Gomme, H. L. Lorimer, Antony Andrewes, Marcel Detienne, Paul Cartledge, Victor Davis Hanson – have accepted Helbig's innovative claim that the porpax shield would only work in a close-order formation, so that once Greeks had that shield, they had the hoplite phalanx.²⁷ These scholars tend to take this idea as a given, rather than a conclusion that needs a supporting argument. They disagree about whether the phalanx or the shield came first, and they credit different Greek *poleis* with being first in the field: Lorimer and Cartledge favour Corinth and Athens, Andrewes Argos, Detienne Sparta. But they all date the invention of the exclusive phalanx to the first quarter of the seventh century.

Other scholars, starting with Johannes Kromayer, continuing with Rolf Nierhaus, and running through Antony Snodgrass and P. A. L. Greenhalgh to Hans van Wees, Peter Krentz, Everett L. Wheeler, and Louis Rawlings, have argued that the porpax shield could have been used in a mixed fight, so that the exclusion of light-armed men from the phalanges need not have happened for some time after the introduction of the porpax shield – perhaps not for decades or even for centuries.²⁸

²³ See, for example, E. L. Wheeler, 'Ephorus and the prohibition of missiles', *TAPA* 117 (1987) 157-82.

²⁴ K. Friis Johansen, *Les vases sicyoniens; étude archéologique* (Paris 1923). The later date survived in some quarters until at least 1938 (F. Lammert, 'Phalanx', *Real-Encyclopedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* 19.2 [1938] 1628).

²⁵ M. P. Nilsson, 'Die Hoplitentaktik und das Staatswesen', *Klio* 22 (1929) 240-49, at 240.

²⁶ H. Payne, *Necrocorinthia: a study of Corinthian art in the archaic period*. Oxford 1931.

²⁷ A. W. Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols (Oxford 1945-56) I (1945) 10; H. L. Lorimer, 'The hoplite phalanx', *ABSA* 42 (1947) 76-138, at 128; A. Andrewes, *The Greek tyrants* (London 1956) 31-42; M. Detienne, 'La phalange: problèmes et controverses', in *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, ed. J.-P. Vernant (Paris 1968) 119-42, at 140; P. A. Cartledge, 'Hoplites and heroes: Sparta's contribution to the technique of ancient warfare', *JHS* 97 (1977) 11-27, and 'The birth of the hoplite: Sparta's contribution to early Greek military organization', in *Spartan reflections* (Berkeley 2001) 153-66; Hanson, *The other Greeks* (n. 17 above) 222-42.

²⁸ J. Kromayer in Kromayer and Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung* (n. 17 above) 21; R. Nierhaus, 'Eine frühgriechische Kampfform', *JDAI* 53 (1938) 90-113; A. Snodgrass, 'The hoplite reform and history', *JHS* 84 (1965) 110-22, and 'The "hoplite reform" revisited', *DHA* 19 (1993) 47-61; P. A. L. Greenhalgh, *Early Greek warfare: horsemen and chariots in the Homeric and archaic ages* (Cambridge 1973) 69-75; H. van Wees, 'The development of the hoplite phalanx: iconography and reality in the seventh century', in *War and violence in classical Greece*, ed. H. van Wees (London 2000) 125-66, and *Greek warfare: myths and realities* (London 2004) 166-83; P. Krentz, 'Fighting by

Now, in *Reinstating the hoplite*, Adam Schwartz has joined the ranks of the first group and pushed the argument to its logical conclusion, maintaining that the hoplite phalanx originated in the eighth century.²⁹ Schwartz devotes much of his book to showing once again that the Archaic evidence, both material and literary, is ambiguous and difficult to interpret. On so much we can probably all agree. What has Schwartz added that is new?

I find one highly suggestive new approach in his book. Schwartz compares hoplites to Danish riot-control police. For some thirty years, starting in the 1970s, they also used a double-handled shield. Though the modern Plexiglas shields weighed less than 3 kg each, police found them 'suitable only for defensive fighting: policemen would typically form a line, advance to the combat zone and keep their position. They would ... stand so close that the edges of their shields actually touched ... It seems unlikely', Schwartz concludes, 'that hoplites in bronze armor would have been able to do what larger, fit and trained policemen cannot or at least deem hopeless; namely to fight individually as *monomachiai*, wielding their *three times heavier* shields with ease against attacks from all corners'.³⁰

The analogy to Greek warfare has obvious problems. For instance, the police deployed in a single line, not in multiple ranks, and they were trying to control or contain their opponents, not to kill them. But what I find revealing is Schwartz's report on how the Danish riot control forces operated offensively:

The stationary shield line might under certain circumstances be supported by hastily summoned plain-clothes policemen, who would be equipped merely with modified standard shields. The modified shield is identical to the normal type, but is simply sawn off just above the middle, so that a little less than half the shield remains, just enough that the grips are still attached. Much like a buckler or targe, this much lighter shield can be swung around with relative ease; and unlike the large shield the adapted version could therefore be used offensively, combined with little or no body armour to ensure crucial mobility. These policemen, cowering behind the wall of shields held by the front line in full combat gear, would then be able to dart forward and close with rioters who had ventured too close to the defensive police line.³¹

So we must imagine that the solid wall of riot police was not always solid, but flexible and permeable enough to permit these mobile troops to do their darting forward. This

the rules: the invention of the hoplite *agôn*', *Hesperia* 71 (2002) 23-39; E. L. Wheeler, 'Battle: (A) land battles', in *The Cambridge history of Greek and Roman warfare*, ed. P. A. G. Sabin, H. van Wees, and M. Whitby, 2 vols (Cambridge 2007) I.195-202; L. Rawlings, *The ancient Greeks at war* (Manchester 2007) 54-59.

²⁹ A. Schwartz, *Reinstating the hoplite: arms, armour and phalanx fighting in archaic and classical Greece* (Stuttgart 2009).

³⁰ Schwartz, *Reinstating the hoplite* (n. 27 above) 54. Here Schwartz is arguing against a position no one holds: No one maintains that the porpax shield was suitable for fighting 'with ease against attacks from all corners'.

³¹ Schwartz, *Reinstating the hoplite* (n. 27 above) 54.

description reminds me of Tyrtaios' advice to light-armed fighters at the end of fragment 11 (lines 35-38), after he has addressed the heavy-armed warriors at length:

ὕμεῖς δ', ὦ γυμνήτες, ὕπ' ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
πτώσσοντες μεγάλοις βάλλετε χερμαδίοις
δούρασί τε ξεστοῖσιν ἀκοντίζοντες ἐς αὐτοῦς
τοῖσι πανόπλοισι πλησίον ἰστάμενοι.

You unarmed fighters, crouching here and there under a shield,
throw large rocks
and hurl smooth javelins at them,
standing near the soldiers in full armour.

In short, I would draw a rather different conclusion from the analogy to Danish riot-control police. I can agree with Schwartz that the porpax shield was better suited to fighting in phalanges than to fighting individual duels, but the protection needed by a warrior armed with this shield, protection on the sides or even from the rear, could be provided by a light-armed fighter as well as by another man with a porpax shield. Depending on the nature of the threat, a light-armed fighter might provide *better* coverage than someone more weighed down.

No matter how the fighting went once it started, leaders might have organized all their men (or all their horses) into phalanges for getting to the killing zone. The old argument that a piper proves hoplites and only hoplites marching in step seems to me invalid. Why would a man need to be carrying a porpax shield in order to sing a *paean*? Everyone might have enjoyed group singing to the accompaniment of a pipe as a way to keep courage up.

If light-armed fighters did fight in early phalanges, when were they excluded?

Johannes Kromayer once said that we first see the close-order phalanx of heavy-armed warriors with the Spartans and at Marathon.³² I do not entirely understand his reasoning about Sparta – he seems to think that the Spartans had an exclusive phalanx at the time of the Messenian Wars, but he is not clear about why he thinks so – but I think I do understand why he mentioned Marathon. Herodotus says that at Marathon (6.112.2):

οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι ὀρέοντες δρόμῳ ἐπιόντας παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς δεξόμενοι, μανίην τε τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ἐπέφερον καὶ πάγχυ ὀλεθρίην, ὀρέοντες αὐτοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τούτους δρόμῳ ἐπειγομένους, οὔτε ἵππου ὑπαρχούσης σφι οὔτε τοξευμάτων.

The Persians saw them charging at a run and prepared to receive the charge, thinking that the Athenians were completely crazy, seeing how few they were and how they were charging at a run without their cavalry or archers.

This passage ought to mean that the Athenians usually did have horsemen and archers. So it indicates a change.³³ I believe that at Marathon, for the first time, the Athenians equipped all

³² Kromayer and Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung* (n. 17 above) 22.

³³ Either Herodotus was imagining the Persian perspective based upon what he knew about the Athenian military forces, or he had a source for what the Persians were thinking. Either way, my point stands, since the former tyrant Hippias, who was with the Persians, would have informed them about the Athenian military. The Athenians had cavalry and archers, but did not use them as such at

their available men as hoplites as best they could and charged ‘ἅθροον’ (Hdt. 6.112.3: ‘all together’, not necessarily ‘in close order’ as LSJ would have it).³⁴ The plan worked.

Eleven years later, at Plataia, the Spartans on the right faced the Persians, while the Athenians on the left faced the Boiotians. Herodotus has the Spartan king Pausanias offer to switch wings with the Athenians, since the Athenians know how the Persians fight from their experience at Marathon (9.46.2-3). The Spartans and Athenians switch, but so do the Persians and Boiotians. Then the Greeks returned to their original positions, and so did their opponents. This curious story may reflect the Spartans’ awareness that the Athenians had done something different at Marathon, something that the Spartans were not doing.

In the fighting at Plataia, Herodotus says, each of the 5,000 Lakedaimonians had seven helots posted with him (9.28.2, 29.1), each equipped for war but not as a hoplite (9.29.2). Peter Hunt has suggested that the Spartans stationed their 5,000 hoplites in the front row and supported them with seven rows of light-armed helots.³⁵ If that is correct – and it is a very tempting suggestion – then the Spartans were not yet fighting in an exclusive hoplite phalanx.

Herodotus’ account of the famous stand at Thermopylai the previous year suggests that the Spartans had a mixed force there too. Herodotus almost ignores the helots who were present, singling out only the one who ran disgracefully away after leading Eurýtos, who was suffering from an eye infection, to the fighting (7.229.1). But Herodotus does note that the 4,000 Greek corpses included helots (8.25.1-2). Presumably helots accompanied the Spartiates as they did at Plataia, equipped to fight but not as hoplites. And Herodotus describes the Spartans fighting more flexibly than we usually think of a hoplite phalanx doing, as they repeatedly turned their backs and pretended to flee, luring the Persians into rushing forward, only to turn around and kill large numbers (7.211.3).³⁶

I would argue, then, that the first exclusive phalanx fought at Marathon. And I cannot resist pointing out – though I would not argue this suggestion seriously – that the story of

Marathon. All Athenians who fought at Marathon fought as hoplites, though they were probably not all equally well equipped.

³⁴ Recent books on Marathon agree that the Persians had no more than 25,000 infantry: G. Steinhauer, *Marathon and the archaeological museum* (Athens 2009) 93; R. A. Billows, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 199; P. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven 2010) 91-92. The Athenians ought to have had at least as many men as they did at Plataia, 8,000 hoplites and 8,000 light-armed (Hdt. 9.28.6-29.2). I am suggesting that at Marathon they armed the light-armed as hoplites, recognizing that some hoplites had more equipment than others.

³⁵ P. Hunt, ‘Helots at the battle of Plataea,’ *Historia* 46 (1997) 129-44.

³⁶ Each Spartiate hoplite might have had seven helots at Thermopylai as well as at Plataia. In 7.202 Herodotus lists the Peloponnesian contingents that went to Thermopylai. They amount to 3,100 in total. But in 7.228 he quotes an inscription, erected on the spot, saying that 4,000 Peloponnesians fought there. Perhaps a reference to 900 *perioikoi*, Lakedaimonians but not Spartiates, has fallen out of the text. If so, and a total of 1200 Lakedaimonians died with the 700 Thespians (7.222), the only way to get to Herodotus’ total of 4,000 dead (8.25.1-2) is to assume that the others were helots, as Herodotus in fact says. That would make 2,100 helots, or seven for each of the 300 Spartiates.

Marathon may have supplied the seed for the idea that Pan, who famously helped the Athenians win, actually *invented* the phalanx.³⁷

³⁷ It is interesting (but no more) that a story implying people learned phalanx fighting from ants is also connected to Athens: according to a scholiast on Nikandros' *Theriaka*, a 'Zenodoteian' named Theophilos said that there were two siblings in Attika; the male was named Phalanx, the female Arachne. Phalanx learned about fighting in armour from Athena, while Arachne learned about weaving. When they had intercourse with each other, they became hated by the goddess, turned into spiders, and were devoured by their own children (A. Crugnola, *Scholia in Nicandri Theriaka* [Milan 1971] 12a: ὁ δὲ Ζηνοδότειος Θεόφιλος ἱστορεῖ ὡς ἄρα ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ δύο ἀδελφοί, Φάλαγξ μὲν ἄρσιν, θήλεια δὲ Ἀράχνη τοῦνομα. καὶ ὁ μὲν Φάλαγξ ἔμαθε παρὰ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὰ περὶ τὴν ὀπλομαχίαν, ἡ δὲ Ἀράχνη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἱστοποιάν· μιγέντας δὲ ἀλλήλοις στνηθῆναι ὑπὸ τῆς θεοῦ καὶ μεταβληθῆναι εἰς ἔρπετά, ἃ δὴ καὶ συμβαίνει ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τέκνων κατεσθίεσθαι).

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON IN PRE-HERODOTEAN SOURCES: ON MARATHON VERSE-INSRIPTIONS (*IG I*³ 503/504; *SEG LVI* 430)¹

ANDREJ PETROVIC

Verse-inscriptions count among the most prominent and immediate historiographical media the young Athenian democracy (or, more precisely, *isokratia* or *isēgoria*)² adopted to commemorate significant events, both intra-political and inter-political: from around 510 BC onwards the city of Athens started transforming her public civic and sacred spaces alike into exhibition spaces showcasing inscribed memoranda of constitutional creed and mementos of challenges conquered.³ A literate mid-fifth-century BC visitor to the city could have learned relatively effortlessly a fair amount about her recent history during a stroll along the Panathenaic way, starting from the Dipylon gate, over the Kerameikos, cutting diagonally across the Agora, and ending the walk on the Acropolis. On the way, this enthusiast for the city's history could have learned from verse-inscriptions alone about the constitutional change of 510-508 BC from Kritias and Antenor's monument to the tyrant slayers, about the external threats Athens had to face shortly thereafter in battles against the Boeotians and Chalkidians from the quadriga set up at the entrance to Acropolis, and about prominent generals and their courage during the Persian Wars. Around the Metroon he could have seen recently fashioned herms as well,

¹ I am very grateful to the organizers of the Marathon conference and to Chris Carey for their invitation and generous hospitality, as well as to the audience for many helpful suggestions and comments. Ewen Bowie very kindly allowed me to see two drafts of his paper 'Marathon in fifth-century epigram' and generously shared with me his inspiring views on both texts I focus on in this paper. I am very grateful to Peter J. Rhodes with whom I had the privilege of discussing a number of issues concerning these texts. I am also very grateful to Annette Harder who very generously shared with me her observations concerning the forthcoming publication of an inscription containing a Thessalian heroic catalogue in hexameters (on this see below), and for allowing me to see the photos and a transcription of this fascinating new text. I thank Nikolaos Papazarkadas for informing me of Spyropoulos' 2009 report of the text, and Angelos Chaniotis for alerting me to Steinhauer's 2009 publication. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Cathy Keesling as well, who has pointed out to me the parallel for the inscriptional style of the casualty list in *SEG LVI* 430 in her 2003 publication and is finishing a paper on this topic. The abbreviations of the epigraphic corpora follow *SEG*.

² K. Raaflaub, 'Equalities and inequalities in Athenian democracy', in *Demokratia. A conversation on democracies, ancient and modern*, ed. J. Ober and C. Hedrick (New Jersey 1997) 139-74 (144).

³ See W. Gauer, *Weihgeschenke aus den Perserkriegen* (Tübingen 1968); T. Hölscher, *Öffentliche Räume in frühen griechischen Städten* (Heidelberg 1998).

commemorating the battle of Eion and praising Athens' generals in epic language laden with Homeric reminiscences.⁴

Verse-inscriptions were used also to memorialize international conflicts. All of the major battles of the Persian Wars were the subject of such commemoration,⁵ and interestingly enough the practice was not limited to Athens – a number of Greek city-states developed commemorative practices that included setting up monuments accompanied by verse-inscriptions in their city centres and/or on battlefields. To list but a few: the Spartans and Peloponnesians famously commemorated their dead at Thermopylae with epigrams, as did the Corinthians their fallen at Salamis, as did even the citizens of the small city of Opous for their soldiers fallen alongside Spartans.⁶ Yet, the origins of epigrammatic historiography in the sense of commemoration of the war-dead – adopted from early on by cities big and small, Doric and Ionic alike – predate the Persian Wars by more than half a century. Recent finds in particular make it clear that epigrams were used in the commemorative setting of *polyandria* as early as the mid-sixth century BC: in the late eighties, Andreou published an intriguing text from Ambrakia, consisting of an epigram of at least 10 verses (five elegiac disticha) and listing *nominatim* at least four Ambrakiots who have fallen in a battle, thus providing a sort of versified catalogue of heroism.⁷

For ancient historians, therefore, verse-inscriptions represent a very valuable source for study of *poleis'* early fifth-century self-definition and self-representation: in these texts we recognize seldom available historiographic material which provides us with communities' immediate reactions to their past and what purports to encapsulate a shared and communal view of the events experienced. In a way, early epigrammatic historiography can be viewed as one of the most powerful media and disseminators of public ideology, transporters of what Hans Joachim Gehrke has appropriately labelled '*intentionale Geschichte*' ('intentional history').⁸ In this sense, I shall offer some

⁴ Tyrant killers: *CEG* 430 with *CEG* II, p. 304; Athenian battle against the Boeotians and Chalkidians: *CEG* 179; Eion: Aeschines 3.183-85. Whereas some of *CEG* 430 and *CEG* 179 were destroyed during the Persian destruction of Athens, it is a majority view that both were replaced with new inscriptions by the mid-fifth century BC (if not earlier).

⁵ On epigrams on the Persian Wars, see F. Jacoby, 'Some Athenian epigrams from the Persian Wars' *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 157-211; C. Higbie, 'Epigrams on the Persian Wars: monuments, memory, and politics', in *Archaic and classical Greek epigram*, ed. M. Baumbach, A. Petrovic, and I. Petrovic (Cambridge 2010) 183-201.

⁶ Spartans and Peloponnesians at Thermopylae: Hdt. 7.228; Corinthians at Salamis: *IG* I³ 1143 with Plut. *Mg. Hdt.* 39.870E; citizens of Opous at Thermopylae: Strabo 9.4.2.

⁷ See *SEG* XLI 540.

⁸ On epigram and history, see J. W. Day, 'Epigrams and history: the Athenian tyrannicides, a case in point', in *The Greek historians. Literature and history*, ed. M. H. Jameson (Stanford 1985) 25-46; M. Ebbot, 'The list of the war dead in Aeschylus' "Persians"', *HSCPh* 100 (2000) 83-96; A. J. Podlecki, 'The political significance of the Athenian "tyrannicide"-cult', *Historia* 15 (1966) 129-41; L. Prandi, 'I caduti delle guerre persiane. (Morti per la città o morti per la Grecia?)', in '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*'. *La morte in combattimento nell'antichità*, ed. M. Sordi (Milano 1990) 47-68; A. Petrovic, 'True lies of Athenian public epigrams: rituals, half truths and propaganda in the aftermath of the Persian Wars', in *Archaic and classical Greek epigram*, ed. Baumbach, Petrovic, and Petrovic (n. 5 above) 202-15. Gehrke developed in detail his concept of

observations on recently found verse-inscriptions commemorating the battle of Marathon and investigate these texts as media of commemoration. The aim of this paper is, then, to take a look at the way in which some of the earliest surviving historiographical accounts construct the memory of the battle and to place these accounts, as far as is possible, within the dominant political discourse in which they emerged, by which they were shaped, or to which they possibly reacted directly.

By the time of the battle of Marathon, commemorative epigrams will have been perceived as a relatively well-established and conventional historiographic medium – as was most certainly the case for Herodotus, who quoted no less than eight verse-inscriptions in his *Histories*, although in a sense oddly he does not mention the inscriptions from the *Soros*.⁹ When one takes a look at the extant epigrams commemorating the battle of Marathon, their number certainly confirms this notion of their well-established status as a historiographical medium – more than half a dozen epigrams from the fifth century alone have been associated with the battle, more or less persuasively.¹⁰ Of these, two merit particular attention, both because they were not composed for individuals but for groups of fallen warriors, and because they survive on stones which were, as far as we can tell, first inscribed in the 480s and 470s, and *ipso facto* belong to the earliest available appraisal of the glorious *aristeiai* of the Athenian warriors. In what follows, I shall first very briefly reassess *IG I³ 503/504* (in my opinion still misleadingly labelled ‘Marathon’ epigrams from the Athenian *agora*), and then move on to discuss a very intriguing new inscription, a commemorative epigram for the fallen of the tribe Erechtheis, found in the villa of Herodes Atticus in Eva/Loukou in the Peloponnese and recently fully published and discussed by Georgios Steinhauer.¹¹ In this context, I shall very tentatively suggest a possible political context in which this text was produced, and try to define its significance within the contemporary political and religious discourses of its day.

Marathon verse-inscriptions

a) *IG I³ 503/504*

Of all the verse-inscriptions traditionally connected with the battle of Marathon, the fragments of *IG I³ 503/504* have provoked the most scholarly debate, to the extent that

‘Intentionale Geschichte’ in his seminal 2003 article which pays special attention to Marathon as an Athenian foundational myth. See H. J. Gehrke, ‘Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man intentionale Geschichte? Marathon und Troja als fundierende Mythen’, in *Gründungsmythen, Genealogien, Memorialzeichen. Beiträge zur institutionellen Konstruktion von Kontinuität*, ed. G. Melville and K.-S. Rehberg (Köln 2003) 21-36.

⁹ See A. Petrovic, ‘Inscribed epigram in pre-Hellenistic literary sources’, in *The Brill companion to Hellenistic epigram*, ed. P. Bing and S. J. Bruss (Leiden 2007) 49-68.

¹⁰ See E. Bowie, ‘Marathon in fifth-century epigram’, in *Μαραθών: η μάχη και ο αρχαίος Δήμος / Marathon: the battle and the ancient deme*, ed. K. Buraselis and K. Meidani (Athens 2010) 203-19; L. Kowerski, *Simonides on the Persian Wars: a study of the elegiac verses of the new Simonides* (New York 2005) appendix I, for a list of epigrams dealing with the Persian Wars.

¹¹ See *SEG LI 425* and now G. Steinhauer, ‘Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἐρεχθίδος’, *Horos* 17-21 (2004-09) 679-92.

this text became a subject of an entire PhD and prompted Felix Jacoby in the 1940s to state in half-desperation: ‘I almost regret that I have decided on discussing them’.¹²

Seventy-odd years later, some things have changed. The most notable recent development was that Angelos Matthaiou has conclusively (in my view) shown that what was thought to be a fragment of the fourth-century BC copy of the memorial almost certainly does not belong to the monument at all.¹³ The number of suggestions concerning the battle (or the battles), however, to which these verse-inscriptions might pertain, remains vast.¹⁴ I reproduce my edition of the text:¹⁵

- A) ἀνδρῶν τῶνδ’ ἀρετῇ[ς ____ 8 ____ λάμπει κλέο]ς αἰεὶ
 [____ 9 ____]ν[.]ρ.[____ 17 ____]
 ἔσχον γὰρ πεζοὶ τε [____ 14-16 ____]ν
 Ἑλλά[δα μ]ῇ πᾶσαν δούλιο[ν ἡμαρ ἰδεῖν].
- β) ἦν ἄρα τοῖσζ’ ἀδάμ[αντος ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ,]. ὅτ’ αἰχμὴν
 στήσαν πρόσθε πυλῶν ἀν[____ 16-18? ____]
 ἀγχιάλων πρήσαι ρ[____ 18 ____]ο
 ἄστν βία Περσῶν κλιναμένω[ν ____ 10-12 ____]
- γ) [____ πε]ζοὶ τε καὶ [≡ - ∪]
 [____]
 [____]ο νήσω
 [____]βαλῶν.
- δ) ἔρκους γὰρ προπάροιθεγ [____]
 ..Ε [____]μεν Παλλάδος ἵπο[____]
 οὐθαρ δ’ ἀπείρου πορτιτρόφου ἄκρον ἔχοντες
 τοῖσιν πανθαλῆς ὄλβος ἐπιστρέ[φεται].

¹² The bibliography on these fragments is overwhelming; for an overview, see A. Petrovic, *Kommentar zu den simondeischen Versinschriften* (Leiden 2007) 158-60; J. J. Finni, *Concerning the text and sense of Athenian distichs associated with the Persian Wars* (Diss. Brown 1989); Jacoby, ‘Some Athenian epigrams’ (n. 5 above) 161.

¹³ A. P. Matthaiou, ‘Ἀθηναίοισι τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένει Ἡρακλέος (Hdt. 6.108.1)’, in *Herodotus and his world: essays from a conference in memory of George Forrest*, ed. P. Derow and R. Parker (Oxford 2003) 190-202, at 151, has convincingly argued that Agora I 4256, which has been taken to be a copy of ep. A, actually comes from a different (possibly private) monument: ‘κατὰ ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἐξῆς ἢ ἐπιγραφή Ag I 4256 δὲν πρέπει νὰ θεωρῆται ἀντίγραφο τοῦ μνημείου τῶν Περσικῶν πολέμων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰδιωτικοῦ χαρακτήρος μνημείου, ἵσως ἐπιτύμβιον ...’.

¹⁴ See Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 160-65, for an overview of suggestions, and C. Keesling, ‘The Kallimachos monument on the Athenian Acropolis (CEG 256) and Athenian commemoration of the Persian Wars’, in *Archaic and classical Greek epigram*, ed. Baumbach, Petrovic, and Petrovic (n. 5 above) 100-30, at 117-18.

¹⁵ Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 158-77.

The text of the verse-inscriptions belongs to a monument which, according to the latest reconstructions, was inscribed on three elements (*lapides a, b, c*) of a fairly long joined base (which consisted of at least four elements),¹⁶ and which carried at least three free-standing *stelae*.¹⁷ Only the base of the monument has survived: texts A) and β) were inscribed on one stone (*lapis a*); text γ) was inscribed on *lapis b*; and text δ) on *lapis c*.¹⁸ The fragments of the base were found scattered throughout the city: parts of *lapis a* were discovered in the nineteenth and early twentieth century by Rhankabes in Plaka, and Oliver in the Agora respectively.¹⁹ In the 1980s, Angelos Matthaiou managed ingeniously to recognize that *lapis b*) belongs to the same monument, and to identify *lapis c*) with epigram delta in the storage of the third Ephorate in Athens as belonging to the same monument. The original find spot of *lapis c*) was Plataion Street, where the block was reused.²⁰

The three stones (*lapides a, b* and *c*) are inscribed with the four surviving textual segments A), β), γ) and δ) in two horizontal bands.²¹ Epigram A) was inscribed on the smoothed out top of the base, while β), γ), and δ) belong to a somewhat less smooth central field. The text on the monument was inscribed by at least three hands, but all of it seems to have been inscribed at more or less the same time. The date is (relatively) uncontroversial: the letter forms suggest the period of the 470s,²² and this dating is further corroborated by the type of the monument and the attested epigraphic habit.²³ Almost all the scholars who have discussed this monument take 475 as the *terminus ante quem*.²⁴ Hence, the monument belongs chronologically to the very period in which the Greeks

¹⁶ A. P. Matthaiou, 'Νέος λίθος του μνημείου με τα επιγράμματα για τους Περσικούς πολέμους', *Horos* 6 (1988) 118-22, and 'Αθηναίοισι τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένει Ἡρακλέος (Hdt. 6.108.1)' (n. 13 above).

¹⁷ For a detailed reconstruction of the monument see Matthaiou, 'Αθηναίοισι τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένει Ἡρακλέος (Hdt. 6.108.1)' (n. 13 above), and see discussion in Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 158-65.

¹⁸ For a drawing of the arrangement of the texts, see B. D. Meritt, 'Epigrams from the battle of Marathon', in *The Aegean and the Near East: studies presented to Hetty Goldman* (New York 1956) 256-80, fig. 1.

¹⁹ For the history of the reconstruction of the monument, see P. Amandry, 'Sur les "épigrammes de Marathon"', in *Theoria. Festschrift für W. H. Schuchhardt*, ed. F. Eckstein (Baden-Baden 1960) 1-8, and Lewis ad *IG* I³ 503/504. For drawings of the monument, see Matthaiou, 'Νέος λίθος' (n. 16 above) 121-22, with nos. 17 and 18.

²⁰ *SEG* LI 44; A. R. Rhankabes, *Antiquités helléniques ou répertoire d'inscriptions et d'autres antiquités*, vol. II (Athènes 1855) 597, nr. 784b; H. Oliver, 'Selected Greek inscriptions', *Hesperia* 2 (1933) 480-513.

²¹ I use the term 'textual segments' here purposefully, as the number of actual epigrams is an issue that needs to be discussed; on this, see below.

²² See Jacoby, 'Some Athenian epigrams' (n. 5 above) 164 with notes 24 and 26; J. P. Barron, 'All for Salamis', in *Owls to Athens. Essays on classical subjects presented to Sir Kenneth Dover*, ed. E. M. Craik (Oxford 1990) 133-41, at 139; Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 164.

²³ Matthaiou, 'Νέος λίθος' (n. 16 above) 118-20.

²⁴ D. L. Page, *Further Greek epigrams* (Cambridge 1981, = *FGE*) 220, relies on the lettering for a date in 480/479.

started populating their cities and public spaces with commemorative texts and had begun shaping their view of the Persian Wars as a completed whole.²⁵

This is what we can say with more or less confidence about the historical context of this memorial and its date; everything else is open to interpretation. The question which battle or battles this memorial is commemorating has sprouted extraordinarily lively discussions. The fragmentary state of the text provides a limited number of clues, but most scholars have tended to argue that the monument either commemorates Salamis (*cf.* νήσω, γ) 3) or several battles from the Persian Wars at the same time. Based on ἔρκους γὰρ προπάροιθεν from δ) 1, Angelos Matthaiou has recently reinforced the argument that the entire monument is dedicated to the fallen in the battle of Marathon.²⁶ The question remains, however, to what extent we can take the references to physical locations from a fragmentary text as a reliable foundation for identification: so, for instance, the notorious ‘Gates’ from the lines ὅτ’ αἰχμὴν / στήσαν πρόσθε πυλῶν may just as easily be part of a metaphor,²⁷ and if we take the pointers in the text (too) seriously, then we are looking for a battle that involved foot soldiers (mentioned twice) fighting with spears in front of Gates, probably in the vicinity of the sea and on an island (?) alongside cavalry (?), and who are supposed to be dead, but nevertheless receive οὐθαρ δ’ ἀπείρου πορτιτρόφου ἄκρον.²⁸ That said, an issue requiring an explanation, should one attempt a synthetic interpretation of the texts as relating to a single battle, is the fact that not one, but two deictics were employed in the fragments. This fact implies the existence of several lists of the fallen: ἀνδρῶν τῶνδ’ in A) 1 and ἦν ἄρα τοῖσδ’ in β) 1 presumably relate to the names of the war-dead inscribed on the three free-standing *stelae* (at least). I am not aware of a *polyandrion* accompanied by a commemorative epigram²⁹ that would use *two* deictics for one and the same group of the fallen (even if we do know that one deictic is indeed used in epigrams which accompany more than one group of the fallen):³⁰ what these deictics

²⁵ On the development of Athenian commemorative practices after Marathon, see K.-J. Hölkeskamp, ‘Marathon. Vom Monument zum Mythos’, in *Gab es das griechische Wunder? Griechenland zwischen dem Ende des 6. und der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, ed. D. Papenfuß and V. M. Strocka (Mainz 2001) 329-53. For monuments to the Persian War dead and their dates, see Hölcher, *Öffentliche Räume* (n. 3 above) 91-95.

²⁶ Matthaiou takes πανθαλὲς ὄλβος as a reference to the deceased, and therefore the monument ought to be a *polyandrion* in the city. He corroborates his view with a parallel from an unpublished ephebic decree from 176/75 BC, which contains a reference to a *polyandrion* in the city; for a different interpretation of the phrase, see Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 174-76; Bowie, ‘Marathon in fifth-century epigram’ (n. 10 above).

²⁷ See Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 171-72.

²⁸ See the insightful observations of Bowie, ‘Marathon in fifth-century epigram’ (n. 10 above): ‘Although I reject Matthaiou’s contention that the last line of poem δ demonstrates the commemorated to be dead, the monument’s location in or near the δημόσιον σῆμα shows that it is epitaphic (albeit cenotaphic)’.

²⁹ For a list of commemorative epigrams including some that are certainly non-inscriptional, see W. Peek, *Griechische Versinschriften* (Berlin 1955, = *GVI*) *Staatsbegräbnis*, as well as Peek, *Griechische Grabgedichte* (Darmstadt 1960) 45-57. *GVI* 20 is not an exception to the above rule on deictics, as the first one is supplemented (and unconvincingly so).

³⁰ Particularly interesting in this respect is ML 48, where one epigram with one deictic (l. 45) is

point towards (no pun intended) is that either we are dealing with more than one *battle* or, in the light of the new epigram from Loukou (see below), we have to maintain the possibility that the monument commemorates more than one *social group* within the civic division.³¹

Furthermore, how many *epigrams* are we actually dealing with? The number of actual poems might be of some importance for the discussion of the identification of the battle. Two deictics certainly imply that at least two separate epigrams ought to be recognized, and judging from γὰρ in δ) 1, which links it closely to the narrative of γ), it seems obvious that not every stone or inscribed field hosted a complete epigram: even though it is a pity that the beginning of epigram γ) is missing, it is obvious that we are not dealing with four (or more) epigrams, but with three (at the very most). Therefore, an Athenian *Siegesallee* as already suggested by Weber and Wilhelm in the late nineteenth century (*i.e.* a series of epigrams dedicated to individual battles rather than as a complex dedicated to a single battle only),³² possibly of cenotaphic character,³³ still seems to me the likeliest solution and referring to this text as a monument from the Persian Wars remains, perhaps, the most reasonable practice. All the more so, as there is still nothing resembling a consensus about any one of the epigrams and its ascription to a battle. Epigram A) appears to have commemorated all the Athenian dead of the Persian Wars: this seems to me to be the case both because of its position on the monument and because of its layout.³⁴ It is inscribed above the others and is, apparently, very general (note the mention of foot soldiers and sailors, the claim to have saved all Greece is there as well, *etc.*). For epigram β), most scholars will assume the battle of Marathon, but some have suggested also Salamis (with Psytalleia), Salamis with Plataia, Plataia and the slaves at Marathon, and Phaleron after Marathon.³⁵ Interestingly enough, there is least disagreement about epigram γ), as almost all scholars accept Salamis, clearly guided by the reading of νῆσφι in line 3. The publication of the new fragment, text fragment δ), which, with two full lines extant, is the best preserved of them all, has greatly influenced the way we thought about the monument. Here, however, we encounter some unexpected difficulties. In the last two

meant to accompany casualty lists of the Athenians fallen in the Chersonese (Il. 1-3), at Byzantium (Il. 49-51), and 'in the other wars'. See also *FGE* Sim. XVI. On the lists, see D. W. Bradeen, 'Athenian casualty lists', *Hesperia* 33 (1964) 16-62 and 'The Athenian casualty lists of 464 BC', *Hesperia* 36 (1967) 321-28. See also C. W. Clairmont, *Patrios nomos. Public burial in Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.*, vols I-II. (Oxford 1983) 46-50; Ebbot, 'The list of the war dead' (n. 8 above) 91.

³¹ Is it possible that IG I³ 503/504 was also organized by tribal division, like the *Soros* monument (see below)? If so, why do we find Doric influences? Or is it perhaps fathomable that some of the epigrams were concerned with citizen groups, whereas δ) commemorated fallen metics who, to a significant extent, came from Doric speaking cities and territories? On the origin of metics in early classical Athens, see G. Nemeth, 'Metics in Athens', *Acta Ant. Hung.* 41 (2001) 331-48.

³² See the discussion on the history of the idea in Jacoby, 'Some Athenian epigrams' (n. 5 above) 175-87.

³³ Bowie, 'Marathon in fifth-century epigram' (n. 10 above).

³⁴ See Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) 158-77.

³⁵ For an overview, see Petrovic, *Kommentar* (n. 12 above) *ibid.*

lines of text δ) there are recognizable northwestern Greek elements, such as ἄπειρος in line 3, as well as the adjective πορτίτροφος. Both of these are best placed outside Attica and are somewhat dissonant when compared with the dialect of the preceding passages – this ought to raise a number of questions concerning the nature of the monument in general. What are these features doing here? If *lapis c* belongs to the memorial and epigram δ) is hence to be taken as part of the preceding epigram γ) – which may or may not be the case, given that we are lacking text fragments B, Γ and Δ – the reading of the form νήσω instead of νάσω in γ) causes even more of a headache.

Based on πορτίτροφος³⁶ I have elsewhere suggested Mykale as one of possible contexts for δ): this tentative proposition is based on the fact that δ) shows distinct non Attic-Ionic elements which require some sort of an explanation within the historical context. Hence, if the series of epigrams is concerned with individual battles and if epigram β), which opens up the sequence on the middle band of the base, is concerned with Marathon, it would be fitting for the series to end – if it is indeed ending on this block – with verses concerning Mykale, a battle in which the Spartan Leotychidas led the Greeks and Xanthippos was in charge of the Athenian troops.³⁷ This would make dialect forms somewhat more explicable as a tribute to the Spartan contribution to the jointly fought victory. Another plausible suggestion is Ewen Bowie's proposal that the text might be reflecting the Athenians' wish to commemorate Sicilian assistance to the Athenian navy at Salamis.³⁸ Be that as it may, the form of the monument, as well as its epigrams, seems to suggest that more than just one battle was commemorated by it.

As a memorial, these verse-inscriptions are particularly remarkable, since the monument counts among the earliest commemorations of the Persian Wars and seems to perceive and represent the series of individual battles as one *completed* whole, unified in their presence on the monument as well as by means of focalizations: A) opens up, in a way like programmatic epigrams of a much later period, with the general and all-encompassing theme of virtue in testing times, before sharpening the focus on individual battles in the epigram(s) of the lower band. Similarly, the motif of salvation from slavery (A) 4: Ἐλλά[δα μὴ πᾶσαν δούλιο[ν ἦμαρ ἰδεῖν]) seems to have been underpinned by the depiction of a series of *aristeiai* on individual battlefields, ending with a reminder of a worthy award for the blood they had shed: fertile farming and pastoral lands have been protected and blessed prosperity of every kind is secured for the living.

Unlike many commemorative epigrams of a later period, this series is, as far as we can tell, distinctly sober and emotionally subdued: there is no word of brilliant youth perished or of the warriors' souls sacrificed, or of any other comparable motif. Instead, we find the

³⁶ See Bacch. 4.14, where the adjective is used of Metapontum, and *H. Ap.* 21, where no precise geographical location can be determined.

³⁷ Hdt. 8.131.2-3, 9.90.1 and 9.114.2.

³⁸ Bowie, 'Marathon in fifth-century epigram' (n. 10 above): 'That in our inscribed verse οὐθαρ δ' ἀπείρου πορτιτρόφου ἄκρον might also refer to south Italy, famous in poetry for its agricultural wealth since Archilochus fr. 22 West, must be given serious consideration. Rhegion, Locri and Croton. As we know from Herodotus (8.47) only one Greek ship from the West fought at Salamis, that of the Pythian victor Phayllos of Croton. I suggest that lines 3-4 of poem δ refer to Phayllos and his trireme, and that they therefore refer to Salamis and not Marathon'.

fallen warriors addressed as men (ἄνδρες) and as foot soldiers (πεζοί), *not* boys (παῖδες) or youths (κοῦροι), while Greek freedom from slavery is portrayed as a sufficient memorial to their virtue.

b) *SEG LVI 430*

Particularly noteworthy is the portrayal of the battle and of the *Marathonomachoi* in the new epigram found in the villa of Herodes Atticus in the Peloponnese (Eva/Loukou). An orthogonal slab of white Pentelic marble with a Lesbian *cymation* (preserved dimensions are h. 0.68 x w. 0.558-0.57 x d. 0.265/0.285, with the bottom part of the *stèle* apparently cut off) is inscribed with a text consisting of three elements (from top to bottom: tribal heading, an epigram, and a casualty list). The stone was found by Theodoros Spyropoulos reused in a palaeochristian oven,³⁹ and was subsequently, after a number of scholarly and media reports,⁴⁰ published in a preliminary fashion by Giorgos Spyropoulos in 2009.⁴¹ A full edition, with a commentary, drawing, and four photos, was published by Georgios Steinhauer in the latest edition of *Horos*, and was briefly discussed and translated into English in a more popular publication.⁴²

I print Steinhauer's text:

	Ἑ	ρ	ε	χ	θ	ε	ῖ	[ς]
	Φῆμις ἄρ' ἡος κιχ[άν]<ει> αἰεὶ εὐφαδὲς ἡέσσχατα γαί[ες]							
	τὸνδ' ἄνδρὸν ἀρετὴν πεύσεται ἡος ἔθανον							
4	[μ]αρνάμενοι Μέδοισι καὶ ἐσστεφάνοσαν Ἀθήνας							
	[π]αυρότεροι πολλῶν δεχσάμενοι πόλεμον							
	Δρακοντίδες							
	Ἀντιφῶν							
8	Ἀφσέφες							
	Χσένον							
	Γλαυκιάδες							
	Τιμόχσενος							
12	Θέογνις							
	Διόδορος							
	Εὐχσίας							

³⁹ See Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 679 with n. 1.

⁴⁰ *SEG LV 413*; *SEG LVI 430*.

⁴¹ The brochure of G. T. Spyropoulos, *Οἱ στήλες τῶν πεσόντων στη μάχη του Μαραθῶνα* (Athens 2009), contains a number of photos which show the stone's face covered with a plastic foil, on which a transcription of the recognized letters is written out, so that original cuttings are not readable anymore (with the exception of the photo of the stone on the cover of his booklet). A number of reasonably readable photos were published in Greek newspapers; the photos in Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above), are the most reliable of the ones so far accessible.

⁴² Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) and *Marathon and the Archaeological Museum* (Athens 2009) 121-22.

	Εὐφρονιάδες
16	Εὐκτέμον
	Καλλίας
	Ἀραιθίδες
	Ἀντίας
20	Τόλμης
	Θοκυδίδες
	Δῖος
	Ἀμυνόμαχος
24	Λεπτίνες
	Αἰσχροῖος
	Πέρον
	Φαι[δ]ρίας
	[- - - - -]

Steinhauer has persuasively argued that the stone is an authentic early fifth-century inscription and ought not to be seen as a copy from a later period.⁴³ Steinhauer's dating (in my opinion irrefutable) is based on arguments relating to the morphology of the stone itself (both concerning the type of the monument and the form of *kymation*), on the letter forms and interpunction, all of which conform to our expectations for a text of an early fifth-century inscription. Furthermore, he has strengthened his proposed date by pointing out the dittographic spellings (ἡέσσχατα; ἐσσετεφάνοσαν) as an important indicator of the stone's date.⁴⁴

The inscription is of exceptional importance for several reasons. Firstly, with this text we note the earliest casualty list (outside poetic catalogues, such as the one from the Ambrakian epigram),⁴⁵ and a list which predates the next one by almost three decades.⁴⁶

⁴³ This view was occasionally expressed orally; to my knowledge, the latest scholar to suggest this was Patricia Butz at the meeting of the American epigraphic association held in San Antonio in January 2011. The reason why some scholars have pondered on the possibility of a later date are the morphological features of the casualty list. The names on the list are arranged in a fairly idiosyncratic way (see Steinhauer's photos and drawing, with *SEG* LV 413 and LVI 430, where the list is compared with isodomic ashlar masonry): the names are inscribed one per line, with odd lines in stoichedon arrangement, whereas the letters of the names in even lines are also arranged in the stoichedon style, but all the even lines are indented by the space of (roughly) half a letter, when compared with the odd lines (Steinhauer suggests that this is what the term *plinthedon* might be taken to denote). Whereas some scholars think of this as an indicator of a later date or a singular feature, it is neither: Cathy Keesling has observed this phenomenon also for *IG* I³ 394 (*CEG* 179), dated not long after 507/506. See C. Keesling, 'Rereading the Acropolis dedications', in *Lettered Attica. A day of Attic epigraphy*, ed. D. Jordan and J. Traill (Toronto 2003) 41-54, *per e.-litt.* and forthcoming).

⁴⁴ For dittography and dating of inscriptions, see F. Graf and S. Iles Johnston, *Ritual texts for the afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic gold tablets* (London and New York 2007) ch. 1; Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἐρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 684-85.

⁴⁵ *SEG* XLI 540 and above, p. 46.

The list consists mostly of attested Athenian personal names which were inscribed in a fairly marked manner, and perhaps with a reason so – it is tempting to imagine that the list of the fallen played some role in the commemorative competitions organized at Marathon.⁴⁷ Secondly, this stone seems to have belonged to the monument Pausanias reports seeing at the *Soros*.⁴⁸ In all likelihood it was one (the first to the left, as it were)⁴⁹ in the series of ten joined stones commemorating the 192 fallen Athenians, and listing 22 names of the fallen of the tribe of Erechtheis, a tribe whose soldiers probably formed the front line in the Marathon battle.⁵⁰ Since we know that the Athenian army marched in the firmly established Cleisthenic tribal order, it is tempting to imagine the ten *stelae* displayed in the same fashion: Erechtheis – Aigeis – Pandionis – Leontis – Akamantis – Oineis – Kekropis – Hipponthotis – Aiantis – Antiochis.⁵¹ At some point in the second century AD, Herodes Atticus, himself by birth from Marathon, had the *stelae* transported to his villa in Loukou, along with further monuments from Marathon, and used them in

⁴⁶ See Bradeen, 'Athenian casualty lists' (n. 30 above) for the earliest ones and on *IG I³ 1144*; on poetic renderings/reflexes of the casualty lists in tragedy, see Ebbot, 'The list of the war dead' (n. 8 above) esp. 85-90.

⁴⁷ I have argued elsewhere that some of the later commemorative practices included competitions with disciplines such as 'old' and 'new catalogues', consisting of recitals of the names of the fallen warriors. See A. Petrovic, 'Epigrammatic contests, poeti vaganti, and local history', in *Wandering poets in ancient Greek culture: travel, locality and pan-Hellenism*, ed. R. Hunter and I. Rutherford (Cambridge 2009) 195-216. To the evidence adduced there, I would like to add that the Dutch excavators at New Halos in Thessaly have unearthed an inscription (A. Harder, R. Reinders, and E. van der Vliet, 'A genealogical inscription from Halos', *forthcoming*) coming from the late fifth or early fourth century which corresponds to our expectations concerning the old catalogue. The preserved part of this inscription contains 24 dactylic hexameters listing more than 45 names, all of them in the accusative and some of them clearly recognizable as local heroes celebrated in Thessaly. It might be a source of this kind that allowed Herodotus to state that he had learned the names of all 300 fallen Spartans by heart (Hdt. 7.224).

⁴⁸ Paus. 1.32.3: δῆμός ἐστι Μαραθῶν ἴσον τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέχων καὶ Καρύστου τῆς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ· ταύτῃ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἔσχον οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ μάχῃ τε ἐκρατήθησαν καὶ τινες ὡς ἀνήγοντο ἀπώλεσαν τῶν νεῶν. τάφος δὲ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ Ἀθηναίων ἐστίν, ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ στήλαι τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἀποθανόντων κατὰ φυλὰς ἐκάστων ἔχουσιν, καὶ ἕτερος Πλαταιέσσι Βοιωτῶν καὶ δούλοις· ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δούλοι τότε πρῶτον. Trans. W. H. S. Jones: 'There is a parish called Marathon, equally distant from Athens and Carystus in Euboea. It was at this point in Attica that the foreigners landed, were defeated in battle, and lost some of their vessels as they were putting off from the land. On the plain is the grave of the Athenians, and upon it are slabs giving the names of the killed according to their tribes; and there is another grave for the Boeotian Plataeans and for the slaves, for slaves fought then for the first time by the side of their masters'. On the archaeological context, see S. E. Alcock, *Archaeologies of the Greek past: landscape, monuments, and memories* (Cambridge 2002) 78-79, with further literature in n. 74.

⁴⁹ See Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 688 with illustration n. 3 and the reconstruction of the ταφικὸς περίβολος.

⁵⁰ See discussion in P. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven and London 2010) 221.

⁵¹ On the tribal order see W. K. Pritchett, *Marathon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1960) 147-49, with older literature.

the villa's decoration.⁵² Finally, this find has some bearing on the way we have been thinking thus far about the number of epigrams adorning monuments for the *Marathonomachoi*: the view that only a rather limited number of verse-inscriptions may be associated with Marathon memorials needs to be revised.⁵³ For now we can say with some confidence that the *polyandrion* alone in all likelihood consisted of at least ten inscribed *stelae* (one per tribe). If each of the nine remaining *stelae* carried two distichs as well, which seems an inevitable corollary,⁵⁴ we would be dealing with a total of 40 verses (an observation which is, perhaps, of some importance also for study of historical elegy).⁵⁵ Effectively, we are looking at the opening epigram of what was the longest known series of verse-inscriptions in the fifth century, a predecessor of epigrammatic book collections of later days, and a collection documenting the demonstration of Athenian *aretē* in stone.⁵⁶

Let us take a look at the epigram itself, as it is noteworthy in a number of ways.

Φῆμις ἄρ' | ἥος κιχ[άν]<ει> αἰεὶ εὐφαδὲς ἡέσσχατα γαί[ες]
 τὸνδ' ἄνδρῶν ἀρετὴν πύσεται ἥος ἕθανον
 4 [μ]αρνάμενοι Μέδοισι καὶ ἐσστεφάνοσαν Ἀθένας
 [π]αυρότεροι πολλῶν δεχσάμενοι πόλεμον.

While the second elegiac couplet is transparent in terms of its meaning ('they crowned the city of Athens, having fought against the Medes, / being few in number, they took up the war against many'), the first couplet is everything but transparent. As I have not seen the stone myself, nor have I had a chance to see high resolution photographs of the first line

⁵² Spyropoulos, *Οἱ στήλες των πεσόντων στη μάχη του Μαραθώνα* (n. 41 above), reflects on whether Herodes Atticus had the memorial transported in the context of his numerous artistic commissions following the death of his lover Polydeukes; see especially Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἐρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 688-89. A summary of older literature on the Loukou estate of Herodes Atticus may be found in W. K. Pritchett, *Studies in ancient topography* 6 (Berkeley 1989) 84-90.

⁵³ I refrain from listing the older scholarship on the topic, as it now appears irrelevant; some of the issues may be found in *FGE* XX a-b. According to such interpretations, one epigram was customarily associated with the *Soros*, a further one with a 'city-memorial' (typically identified as the *Marathonomachoi* memorial on the Agora); and occasionally a third epigram might be admitted as authentic, which was then thought of as sympotic.

⁵⁴ As a matter of fact, Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἐρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 686-87 with image 5, thinks that two fragments (Mus. Astros inv. nos. 586 and 587) found in the excavation area prove conclusively that other *stelae* were inscribed as well; the fragments consist of 1-3 letters.

⁵⁵ It remains open whether or not these poems related to each other and thus could be perceived as forming a whole. It is certainly tempting to imagine one such series preceding the Eion epigrams (Aeschines 3.183-85).

⁵⁶ Essentially, the publication of the stone from Loukou opens up the possibility that many of the epigrams which we have previously discarded as spurious may actually have belonged to the complex of the memorial. The most obvious candidate for resuscitation is the one quoted by Lycurgus (1.109): 'Ελλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι χρυσοφόρων Μήδων ἐστόρεσαν δόναμν. Page might well have been right all along: *FGE* 229, 'I continue, therefore, to believe that the epigram quoted by Lycurgus, and his particular version of it, is a copy of an inscription posted beside the casualty-lists on the *Soros* at Marathon in 490 BC'.

(or any other photos save for those published by Steinhauer, Spyropoulos, and the Greek media), I assume that the reading of the first line is correct. In what follows, I rely fully on Steinhauer's careful and judicious edition.

The first line is metrically awkward – the quantities appear simply too long, and next to impossible to force into hexameter: the third foot of this hexameter, <ει> αἰεῖ, can be pressed into the dactylic scheme only with the greatest of difficulties; the same is true of the fourth foot, εὐφαδς. The metrical problems are not much relieved even if one discards the supplemented <ει>, and reads NEI for AIEI, as appears feasible from Steinhauer's drawing: Φέμις ἄρ' ἥος κιχ[ά]νει εὐφαδς ἡέσχατα γαί[ε]ς.⁵⁷ Steinhauer also remarks that the reading of the adjective εὐφαδής is problematic,⁵⁸ not only does the drawing show a kappa shaped cutting in place of E, but Steinhauer says that in its place one can recognize two vertical strokes.⁵⁹

The epigram is translated by the editor as follows: 'The fame that reaches the ends of the bright earth will carry the news of the virtue of these men, how they died and how they brought glory to Athens, fighting against Medes, few against many'.⁶⁰ The Greek translation moves along similar lines: 'Ἡ φήμη, καθὼς πάντα φθάνει (πετώντας) στὰ πέρατα τῆς φωτεινῆς γῆς / θὰ πληροφορηθεῖ γιὰ τὴν ἀρετὴ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πῶς (γενναῖα) πέθαναν (ὡς ἔθανον) / πολεμῶντας τοὺς Μήδους, καὶ (πῶς) δόξασαν τὴν Ἀθήνα / πολὺ λιγότεροι (αὐτοὶ), ἀντιμετωπίζοντες στὴ μάχη πολλοὺς'.⁶¹ There are several difficulties with the translations of the first distich. The first word of the epigram, φέμις, rather surprising as it is,⁶² could, perhaps be taken to mean 'fame' without too much stretching,⁶³ but ἥος cannot be taken as a demonstrative pronoun relating to feminine φέμις. Even more pronounced is the meaning imposed on the verb πυνθάνομαι. πεύσεται, third person singular future, cannot be extended so far as to mean 'carry'. The modern Greek πληροφορηθεῖ is closer, but then a more precise translation of φέμις is needed and requires more hermeneutic work: what could Φέμις denote, so as to be capable of 'learning the virtue of these men here', and what kind of Φέμις can reach ἔσχατα γαῖας? Let us render φήμις in its most elementary meaning as 'utterance', some sort of utterance will recognize (understand, learn by hearing) the virtue of these men here. And this it will

⁵⁷ See Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 681: 'Ἡ προτεινομένη ἀνάγνωση κιχ[άν]<ει> αἰεῖ, (γρ. 11-19), ἡ ὁποία βασίστηκε στὰ ἀναγνωριζόμενα KIX (11-13) καὶ AIEI (γρ. 16-19), παρουσιάζει τόσο σοβαρὲς δυσκολίες, ὥστε νὰ ἀποτελεῖ πραγματικὴ cruxem'.

⁵⁸ The adjective was thus far a *hapax legomenon*, attested in Nonnos, *D.* 8.111 relating to stars.

⁵⁹ Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 681.

⁶⁰ Steinhauer, *Marathon and the Archaeological Museum* (n. 42 above) 122.

⁶¹ Steinhauer, 'Στήλη πεσόντων τῆς Ἑρεχθίδος' (n. 11 above) 681.

⁶² No other epigram I am aware of opens with this word. The first thing that came to mind is that the epigram belongs to the φημί-type; the question of how adequate (or indeed, at all possible) something like φημί γάρ or φημί καί would be will have to be put aside.

⁶³ *LSJ* note this meaning for φημή (s.v.), of which φήμις is a poetic form, and list *Hdt.* 1.31 as a parallel. The common meanings of φήμις, however, are 'speech; reputation; common opinion or judgement expressed in talk; gossip'; the meaning 'fame' is not registered. Cf. *LSJ* s.v. φήμις.

do, as (taking hoc as ὅς, ‘as’, introducing an adverbial clause in the indicative)⁶⁴ it reaches (‘always’ or not – with or without αἰεί) the ends of the world.

However, before we continue with exegetical work, we need to ask ourselves when exactly was this monument set up? Memorials for the battle of Marathon were being set up for generations after the battle, but most of the surviving ones are dated to the post-Plataea period.⁶⁵ Likewise, most of the casualty lists and monuments for the fallen in the Persian Wars date from the same time.⁶⁶ The epitymbic memorial discussed above (IG I³ 503/504) was apparently set up between 480 and 475; the letter-forms of SEG LVI 430, fickle guide as they can be, do resemble quite closely the letter forms of IG I³ 503/504 (cf. letters Α, Γ, Θ, Λ, Μ, Ν, Π, Ρ, Σ, Υ), with the exception of Χ which consists of a vertical and a horizontal stroke in SEG LVI 430.⁶⁷ It seems to me very likely that the monument was inscribed either towards the end of the 480s or, perhaps, since the stone does not seem to have been affected by the Persian destruction of Attica in 480/79, between 480-75.

At any rate, if either of these two proposed dates is correct, then, the epigram ought to be read in a highly charged political context. It is difficult to imagine that any Athenian of the late 480s or post Plataea could have read or heard the words Φέμις and ἡέσχατα γαί[ε]ς, especially in the context of a memorial for the fallen in the Persian Wars, without thinking of the ominous oracle delivered to the Athenians by Delphi at some point in the second half of the 480s.⁶⁸ Φήμη, from which the poetic form Φέμις is derived, is of course very well attested in the fifth century BC as a noun denoting oracular utterance (both true and false), utterances discerned by *prophētai*,⁶⁹ and was underway (if not more) towards divine personification already by Hesiod’s day.⁷⁰ The Delphic prophecy, delivered to the Athenians in the late 480s, at the dawn of Xerxes’ invasion, is reported by Herodotus as follows:⁷¹

⁶⁴ Cf. LSJ, s.v. ὅς Α II.

⁶⁵ Gauer, *Weihgeschenke* (n. 3 above) 21-44; M. C. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the fifth century BC: a study in cultural receptivity* (Cambridge 2004) 30-32.

⁶⁶ See Hölscher, *Öffentliche Räume* (n. 3 above) 91-95.

⁶⁷ As far as one can judge from Steinhauer’s photos and drawing for SEG LVI 430; for IG I³ 503/504 I have looked at squeezes published by the Center for Epigraphical and Palaeographical Studies of Ohio State University (permanent link: <http://hdl.handle.net/2374.OX/245>). Another difference is in the use of a tricolon in IG I³ 503/504. For Χ written as + in 500-480 Attica, see also L. H. Jeffery, *The local scripts of archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961, ²1991) 78.44.

⁶⁸ For discussion of the oracle, its date, and the political context, see H. Bowden, *Classical Athens and the Delphic oracle: divination and democracy* (Cambridge 2005) 101-05.

⁶⁹ For personification of PHEME, see R. Parker, *Athenian religion* (Oxford 1997) 233-37; E. Stafford, *Worshipping virtues. Personification and the divine in the Greek world* (London 2000) 10-11. See LSJ, s.v. and S. Trach. 1149-50 with Plat. *Timaeus* 72a-b and V. Rossi, *Filostrato. Eroico* (Venezia 1997) 193.

⁷⁰ Cf. Hes. *Works and Days* 764 and Stafford, *Worshipping virtues* (n. 69 above) 10-11.

⁷¹ Hdt. 7.140.

ὦ μέλει, τί κάθησθε; λιπὼν φεῦγ' ἔσχατα γαίης / δώματα καὶ πόλιος τροχοειδέος
 ἄκρα κάρηνα. / οὔτε γὰρ ἡ κεφαλὴ μένει ἔμπεδον οὔτε τὸ σῶμα, / οὔτε πόδες νέατοι
 οὔτ' ὦν χεῖρες, οὔτε τι μέσσης / λείπεται, ἀλλ' ἄζηλα πέλει· κατὰ γάρ μιν ἐρείπει /
 πῦρ τε καὶ ὄξυς Ἄρης, Συριηγενὲς ἄρμα διώκων. / πολλὰ δὲ κάλλ' ἀπολεῖ
 πυργώματα κοῦ τὸ σὸν οἶον, / πολλοὺς δ' ἀθανάτων νηοὺς μαλερῶ πυρὶ δώσει, / οἷ
 που νῦν ἰδρῶτι ῥεούμενοι ἐστήκασι, / δείματι παλλόμενοι, κατὰ δ' ἀκροτάτοις
 ὀρόφοισι / αἶμα μέλαν κέχυται, προῖδὸν κακότητος ἀνάγκας. / ἀλλ' ἴτον ἐξ ἀδύτοιο,
 κακοῖς δ' ἐπικίδνατε θυμόν.

Wretches, why do you linger here? Rather flee from your houses and city, / Flee to
 the ends of the earth from the circle embattled of Athens! / The head will not remain
 in its place, nor in the body, / Nor the feet beneath, nor the hands, nor the parts
 between; / But all is ruined, for fire and the headlong god of war speeding in a Syrian
 chariot will bring you low. / Many a fortress too, not yours alone, will he shatter; /
 Many a shrine of the gods will he give to the flame for devouring; / Sweating for fear
 they stand, and quaking for dread of the enemy, / Running with gore are their roofs,
 foreseeing the stress of their sorrow; / Therefore I bid you depart from the sanctuary.
 / Have courage to lighten your evil. (Trans. A. D. Godley)

The response of the Athenian *theopropoi*, as reported by Herodotus, was to demand another prophecy, since they refused to return to Athens with the one they had just received. The second φήμη was almost as pessimistic as the first one, still insisting on the Athenians not taking up the fight against the Persians and advising them to depart from Attica in advance of the battle:⁷²

οὐ δύναται Παλλὰς Δί' Ὀλύμπιον ἐξιλάσασθαι / λισσομένη πολλοῖσι λόγοις καὶ
 μήτιδι πυκνῇ. / σοὶ δὲ τόδ' αἴτις ἔπος ἐρέω ἀδάμαντι πελάσσας. / τῶν ἄλλων γὰρ
 ἀλίσκομένων ὅσα Κέκροπος οὔρος / ἐντὸς ἔχει κευθμών τε Κιθαιρῶνος ζαθέοιο, /
 τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς / μόνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ
 τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει. / μηδὲ σύ γ' ἵπποσύνην τε μένειν καὶ πεζὸν ἰόντα / πολλὸν ἀπ'
 ἡπείρου στρατὸν ἥσυχος, ἀλλ' ὑποχωρεῖν / νῶτον ἐπιστρέψας· ἔτι τοι ποτε κἀντίος
 ἔσση. / ὦ θεῖη Σαλαμῖς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν / ἣ που σκιδναμένης
 Δημήτερος ἢ συνιούσης.

Vainly does Pallas strive to appease great Zeus of Olympus; / Words of entreaty are
 vain, and so too cunning counsels of wisdom. / Nevertheless I will speak to you again
 of strength adamant. All will be taken and lost that the sacred border of Cecrops /
 Holds in keeping today, and the dales divine of Cithaeron; / Yet a wood-built wall
 will by Zeus all-seeing be granted / To the Triton-born, a stronghold for you and your
 children. / Await not the host of horse and foot coming from Asia, / Nor be still, but
 turn your back and withdraw from the foe. / Truly a day will come when you will
 meet him face to face. / Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women's sons /
 When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in. (Trans. A. D. Godley)

⁷² Hdt. 7.141.

Looking back at the text from Loukou with these oracles in mind, it is difficult to escape the impression that it ought to be read as part of this very discourse: what the epigram stresses is not the splendid victory the Athenians have won, or the defeat of the enemy, but rather the fact that the Athenian army has remained in place at Marathon, and that it has taken up the battle even though the Athenians were outnumbered (l. 3 [μ]αρνάμενοι Μέδοισι; l. 4: π[α]υρότεροι πολλῶν δεχσάμενοι πόλεμον). Both of these formulations, new and innovative at this point, will become standard references in commemorative epigrams in the decades following the battle of Marathon, having become standard models of commemorative praise of the fallen.⁷³

It seems to me, therefore, that with this verse-inscription we find a jab against a ‘medizing’ oracle,⁷⁴ an early attestation of oracular criticism, a phenomenon which will become more prominently represented in later decades of the fifth century. This might, perhaps, be evident already in the fact that the oracle is referred to as φήμις, rather than by the much less ambiguous and much more pious term χρησμός (which is both metrically possible and attested in fifth-century BC poetry).⁷⁵ Furthermore, such interpretation of the epigram fits well with the historical context. In spite of the still gloomy message of the second received oracle, the Athenians decided to interpret it as a positive one. In this sense, Andrew Ford astutely observed that Themistocles’ exegesis of the oracle based on the phrase ὃ θεῖη Σαλαμίς as an indicator of the forthcoming Persian – not Greek – perdition, is to be seen as an early case of oracular criticism.⁷⁶ Correspondingly, the formulation ἔσχατα γαῖας (‘the ends of the earth’), mentioned in the first line of the new epigram, represents an elegant inversion of the first oracular message they received: instead of the Athenians who were prompted to leave their homes and seek refuge, it is the oracular voice that will learn the virtue of the *Marathonomachoi* who stood their ground and fought against the Medes, as it reaches the edges of the earth.

In the light of the discussion above, I would suggest the following translation of the epigram:

The divine utterance, as it reaches the ends of the glowing earth, will learn the virtue of these men here, because [taking ὥς in l. 2 as a causal conjunction with verbs of learning]⁷⁷ they have died fighting the Medes and have crowned Athens, having taken on the battle being very few against the many.

⁷³ For μάρναμαι, see CEG 135.2, 458/57 BC; CEG 142.2 Akarnania, 475-50 BC; CEG 658.2 Arcadia, 352 BC; 740.2 Pamphylia, 300 BC; CEG 6ii.2 Attica, ca. 449-09 BC; CEG 82.2 Attica, ca. 450-25 BC; CEG 155.2, Paros, ca. 476/75 BC. On the topic of few against many, see M. Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai: Zwei Perserschlachten als "lieux de mémoire" im antiken Griechenland* (Göttingen 2006) 128-31.

⁷⁴ See H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic oracle*, vols I-II (Oxford 1956) I.141-79.

⁷⁵ Cf., e.g., Pi. P. 4.60; A. Pr. 662.

⁷⁶ A. Ford, *The origins of criticism: literary culture and poetic theory in classical Greece* (Princeton 2008) 83-84.

⁷⁷ See LSJ, s.v. IV.1, ‘with Substantive Clauses, with verbs of learning, saying, etc., that, expressing a fact, γνωτὸν ..., ὥς ἦδον Τρώεσσιν ὀλέθρου πείρατ’ ἐφήπται II. 7.402’.

This text, then, does not reduce the portrayal of the *Marathonomachoi* to its immediate historical context, but rather it includes also the aftermath and the dominant political discourse of the time of its naissance. In this text we find the process of heroization of the *Marathonomachoi* rather far advanced – the men of Erechtheis fought and won not just against the Persians, but also against the powers of divine prophecy, putting on marvelous display the limitless powers of human agency when confronted with divine predetermination. All things considered, and judging from the later reception of the modes of praise first attested in this epigram, such as is apparent from later widespread use of the motifs of heroic struggle ([μ]αρνάμενοι), transference of agonal language into the language of praise for the fallen (ἐσσεφάνοσαν Ἀθένας), victory against the odds ([π]αυρότεροι πολλῶν), and the ‘ἵNo pasarán!’ *topos* (δεχσάμενοι πόλεμον), with the publication of this epigram we have found one of the archetypal portrayals of the *Marathonomachoi* and the model of heroic praise upon which all later epitymbic commemorations would be measured.

Postscript:

Since submission of my manuscript in summer 2011, a number of important publications on both inscriptions appeared, and I regret that I am not able to discuss these in detail in the body of my paper. Here, I can only briefly acknowledge some of the points and direct readers toward relevant publications. The casualty list from Loukou, as the text of the inscription itself (SEG LVI 430), continues to attract significant attention:

W. Ameling’s article (*ZPE* 176, 2011, 10-23) argues for an early date of SEG LVI 430, and provides many valuable observations on the casualty list;

C. Keesling’s forthcoming paper (my n. 1 and 43) has been published in the meantime (*ZPE* 180, 2012, 139-48) and dates the stele in the decade 490-480 or 480-470;

G. Proietti shared her paper with me in advance of the publication (now published in *ZPE* 185, 2013, 24-30) in which she argues, based on stylistic criteria and on what is perceived by her as formulaic elements, for a later date for the text of the epigram (4th c. BC or later); while in many ways insightful, I remain unconvinced by the proposition of a later date or of a later forgery because of methodological difficulties associated with use of stylistic criteria in dating.

G. Proietti also discussed IG I3 503/4, making an interesting case against inclusion of lapis B (Peek fragment) as constitutive element of the monument.

An exhaustive and careful treatment of the Loukou inscription has been offered by M. Tentori Montalto (*ZPE* 185, 2013, 31-52) who studied the stone itself and has produced a squeeze (now in BBAW archive). He offers a diplomatic reading Φ Ε Μ Ι Σ Α Ι Η Ο Σ Δ. Κ Ι Χ Σ Α Ι Ε Ι Η Υ Φ Α Ο Σ Ι Τ Ε Σ Σ Χ Α Τ Α Γ Α Ι Ε Σ and takes Φ Ε Μ Ι Σ Α Ι as Φέμισαι (‘seconda persona singolare dell’imperativo medio’ of aorist φημίζω) but still assumes a sizable *locus corruptus* in the first line. Tentori-Montalto offers also a fresh perspective on the lay-out of the casualty list, and supports an early date (but leaves it open how early: p. 48 ‘Non è possibile stabilire, però, se il πολυανδρεῖον di Maratona sia stato eretto subito dopo la battaglia oppure dopo le Guerre Persiane, più o meno contemporaneamente all’altro monumento in memoria dei Maratonomachi nel Demosion Sema di Atene’).

THE PERSIAN WARS AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN ATHENS

V. L. KONSTANTINOPOULOS

The victory of Athens at Marathon¹ at the beginning of September 490 BC had immense importance for the establishment of Athens as a ruling force in the Greek world. The decisiveness of the Athenians, amplified by a deep commitment to the cause of Greek freedom from Persian domination and by their superior tactical skill, constituted in retrospect a landmark in the salvation of Greece and the beginning of what was to become a new collective security system that was founded after the end of the Persian Wars under the title of the First Athenian or Delian League. The purpose of that League, namely the liberation of the Greek cities from Persian control, after the successful naval and land operations of Kimon, son of Miltiades, was in essence fulfilled when the defeated Persians were obliged:

- a) to give Greek cities and islands from Imbros to Cyprus their freedom;
- b) to retreat to a distance of three days' march from the Ionian shores; and
- c) not to conduct any naval activity in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

Consequently, the Mediterranean became *de iure* a Greek and, still more, Athenian sea (in a move which prefigured the Roman concept of a *mare nostrum*).

That critically important pact between East and West, the so-called 'Peace of Callias', was concluded in 449 BC. The terms of the pact are known to us from Diodorus (12.4); it appears to be alluded to at Herodotus 7.151 but astonishingly is completely ignored by Thucydides, although it is implied in some passages (II 62.2 and VIII 56.4).² After 449 BC the Athenians, without any external threats, were free to consolidate their naval dominance under the leadership of Pericles, thus changing the fundamental basis of the Delian League. In this period, the underlying rivalry with the Spartans was intensified and a state of cold war was established.

The Periclean policy justified its imperial outlook on the basis of the Athenians' crucial role in the battle of Marathon and the naval battle of Salamis. Arguments justifying Athenian claims to dominance were promoted in *epitaphioi*, which were not a

¹ See in general *The Cambridge ancient history* vol. IV (Cambridge 1988) 506-17.

² See further *The Cambridge ancient history* vol. V (Cambridge 1992) 121-27. The existence of the Peace of Callias has been disputed since the fourth century and remains a hotly contested topic. The literature is vast; see in particular D. Stockton, 'The peace of Callias', *Historia* 8 (1959) 61-79; A. J. Holladay, 'The détente of Callias?', *Historia* 35 (1986) 503-07; E. Badian, 'The peace of Callias', *JHS* 107 (1987) 1-39; S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides* vol. 1 (Oxford 1991) 179-81; G. L. Cawkwell, 'The peace between Athens and Persia', *Phoenix* 51 (1997) 115-30; P. J. Rhodes, *A history of the classical Greek world, 478-323 BC* (Oxford 2006) 47-48.

simple ornament of the burial ceremony but helped to reinforce the collective identity of existing Athenian citizens and inculcated the general guidelines of patriotic ideology by which future generations of citizens were shaped. The speech of the Athenian ambassadors in Sparta (432 BC) that Thucydides gives us is a typical specimen of this patriotic ideology (1.73.4).³

φάμεν γὰρ Μαραθῶνι μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ ...

Therefore, we argue that we alone fought the barbarians ...

This μόνοι ('alone') constitutes an indirect accusation against Sparta, whose help the Athenians requested to face the Persians. That the Spartans did not send help on the grounds of the celebration of the Karneia, despite the fact that, *stricto sensu*, this was an important moment for their city, left the Athenians to their fate but at the same time left them to resist alone and begin the creation of an historic role (in every sense) as saviours of Greece. Therefore, the Athenians rightfully claimed that they alone, namely without the help of the Spartans, fought the Persians, whose mere name (at least according to Herodotus) had scared the Greeks until then (Hdt. 6.112.3: τέως δὲ τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι καὶ τὸ οὐνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκούσαι). The fact that the word μόνοι is aimed here against Sparta is strongly supported by the presence of the 1000 Plataean soldiers, who fought the Persians bravely but whose presence is ignored in μόνοι.⁴ However, it was the Spartans whose help Athens needed, since they were the mightiest land power in Greece, and it was the Spartans whose support the Athenians especially sought.

This official argument of the Athenian patriotic ideology is adopted by Lysias in his *Epitaphios* (2.20):⁵

μόνοι γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας τῶν βαρβάρων διεκινδύνευσαν.

Therefore, we alone risked our lives fighting against tens of thousands of barbarians defending the whole of Greece.

If Lysias adopted this opinion due to his own commitment to the democracy and his family's attested association with Pericles, the conservative circles of Athens, which included Plato

³ See further J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian imperialism* (Oxford 1963); C. Mossé, *Périclès, L'inventeur de la démocratie* (Paris 2005) 48ff.

⁴ For μόνοι see also Markantonatos, Volonaki, Xanthaki Karamanou, and in this volume pp. 75, 170, 176, 215.

⁵ See further S. Usher, *Greek oratory. Tradition and originality* (Oxford 1999) 350; J. Walz, *Der lysianische Epitaphios*, Phil. Suppl 29.4 (Leipzig 1936). On the problem of authenticity, see J. Kłowski, *Zur Echtheitsfrage des lysianischen Epitaphios* (Hamburg 1959); on the style see Usher *ibid.*; R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus*, 2 vols (London 1876, Greek trans. Athens 2008) 1.57-96; for comments see S. C. Todd, *A commentary on Lysias, speeches 1-11* (Oxford 2007) 210-74.

and Isocrates and which from Kimon's era promoted friendship and alliance with the Spartans, took a different view of the facts. According to Plato (*Mx.* 240c):⁶

οὐτ' Ἐρετριεῦσιν ἐβοήθησεν Ἑλλήνων οὐδεὶς οὔτε Ἀθηναίοις πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων· οὗτοι δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀφίκοντο.

None of the Greeks assisted the Eretrians or the Athenians except the Spartans; they arrived the next day.

The effect of this is to diminish the Athenian claim to have been alone, since the Spartans sent help, which arrived on the day after the battle. Therefore, in his version it seems that they delayed only one day and not ten, as was the case. The important thing here is that the Spartans sent prompt help to the Athenians. Furthermore, according to Isocrates (*Panegyricus* 60):⁷

οἱ δὲ [the Spartans] οὐκ ἔφθασαν πυθόμενοι τὸν περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν πόλεμον καὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀμελήσαντες ἦκον ἡμῖν ἀμυνοῦντες, τοσαύτην ποιησάμενοι σπουδὴν, ὅσῃν περ ἂν τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας πορθουμένης.

Just when the Spartans were informed of the war in Attica, they set aside all their other obligations and came to help us, so fast, as if it was their country that was besieged.

That is, the Spartans abandoned everything and sent help, as though it was their city under siege, immediately they learned of the Persians' disembarking in Attica. But notice again, the fact that the Spartans were slow to help and arrived ten days later is not mentioned at all.

The difference in political beliefs, then, had a profound effect on historical perspective. The same situation may be observed even more intensely in the case of the naval battle of Salamis. More precisely, the Athenian ambassadors in Thucydides continuing their speech contend that (1.74.1):

τρία τὰ ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμὸν τε νεῶν πλείστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην· ναὺς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγω ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχοντα, δὲ αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα.

We offered three things that proved to be very useful in this fight, namely the greatest number of ships and a very wise general and an untiring eagerness to fight: more specifically, slightly less than two thirds of the whole number of ships in the sea battle, Themistocles as the general, who was the main advocate of a sea battle in a small area of sea that indisputably saved the situation.

⁶ See further R. Thurow, *Der platonische Epitaphios* (Tübingen 1968); Usher, *Greek oratory* (n. 5 above) 351-52.

⁷ See E. Buchner, *Der Panegyricus des Isokrates*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 2 (Wiesbaden 1958); Usher, *Greek oratory* (n. 5 above) 298-301, 320-21, 350.

That is to say that the Athenians offered the greatest number of ships, one very skilled general, namely Themistocles, whose strategic plan helped defeat the Persians, and their presence, which was of decisive importance at the naval battle of Salamis.⁸ That these points do not originate with Thucydides but were actually used by the Athenian ambassadors is proved by 1.18.1-2,⁹ where Thucydides' own version of the Persian Wars lacks such pro-Athenian elements. On the contrary, he states that both the Athenians and the Spartans defeated the Persians. In relation to the battle of Marathon, Thucydides merely mentions that the battle happened between the Persians and the Athenians (1.18.1), without writing that the victory of the Athenians saved Greece and without stressing that they fought alone against the Persians (κοινῇ ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον).

However, the early origin of the patriotic arguments of the Athenian ambassadors is proved by Herodotus, who gives his opinion that the Athenians saved Greece, noting that it is one that can cause envy, but is true nonetheless (7.139).¹⁰

νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἂν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι
τῶληθέος.

If someone states now that the Athenians became the saviours of Greece, he would tell the truth.

Moreover, Herodotus' narrative (8.44-48) confirms the triple argument of the Athenians, first that the Athenians offered the greatest number of ships, namely 180 of the total fleet of 378 ships. With regard to Themistocles' plan, Herodotus (8.57ff.) mentions that he convinced the Spartans to change the initial plan of defence, which entailed that the sea battle should be fought not in the narrow space of Salamis but on the open sea where, as Themistocles observed, the Persian fleet with the greater number of ships could circle the Greeks and defeat them. Furthermore, Herodotus writes that Themistocles used his subordinate Siccinus to drive the Persians into the narrow space of Salamis and make the allies give battle there. Therefore, historically, there is no doubt that the Athenians with Themistocles were the main contributors to the victory in Salamis. Naturally, Athenian foreign policy at the time of Pericles used these arguments to amplify Athens' claim to a ruling position and educate the citizens with the patriotic ideology that is depicted in the funeral orations.

The same arguments for the dominant role that the Athenians played at the naval battle of Salamis are found in Lysias' *Epitaphios* (2.42):

⁸ Cf. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides* vol. 1 (n. 2 above) 119. On the numbers of ships at Salamis, see Hdt. 8.43-48, with A. M. Bowie, *Herodotus. Histories book VIII* (Cambridge 2007) *ad loc.*; C. Carey *et al.*, 'Fragments of Hyperides' *Against Diondas* from the Archimedes palimpsest', *ZPE* 165 (2008) 1-19, at 16.

⁹ For the possibility that those words are a piece of a funeral oration and, more specifically, for the fallen of the Samian war see V. L. Konstantinopoulos, 'Thuk. I 73,2-74,3. Beitrag zur Forschung der attischen Leichenreden', *Plato* 50 (1998) 190-212. For the ideological content of the funeral orations see also in this article 207ff.

¹⁰ See W. W. How and J. Wells, *A commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1912) at 7.139, that the opinion belongs to Herodotus. This is contradicted by what the Athenian ambassadors say at Thuc. 1.73.4, which proves that those words belonged to the argumentation of Periclean foreign policy.

πλείστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐκείνοι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας συνεβάλοντο, στρατηγὸν μὲν Θεμιστοκλέα ἱκανώτατον εἶπεν καὶ γνῶναι καὶ πράξαι, ναῦς δὲ πλείους τῶν ἄλλων συμμαχῶν, ἄνδρας δ' ἐμπειροτάτους.

They contributed the most and the best for the freedom of the Greeks, that is to say the general Themistocles, who was very skilled in talking, in comprehending things and in doing, more ships than the other allies, and men with great naval abilities.

In contrast, the help that the Spartans gave at Salamis was represented by the Athenians an act of selfishness, the purpose of which was to protect the Spartans themselves. That is stressed by the Athenian embassy in Thucydides (1.74.3):

ἐπειδὴ ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡμῶν τὸ πλεον, ἐβοηθήσατε ...

You assisted because you were worried about yourselves more than you were about us ...

Here the Spartans' help is disregarded and underestimated. The Athenian envoys also emphasized the strategic plan of Themistocles, which involved the Greeks fighting the Persians on sea and not on land, as the Spartans proposed, who planned to raise successive walls in Isthmus. The fact that those walls were useless, since the Persians had overwhelming numerical superiority at sea and could disembark an army from there and surround the Peloponnesian defensive position, was stressed by the Athenians from very early on to emphasize the argument that the victory at Salamis was an Athenian achievement. Just as Herodotus (7.139) and the Athenian embassy (Thuc. 1.73.4), so do Lysias (2.44) and Isocrates (4.98) highlight the self-serving attitude of the Spartans, who wanted the Isthmus to be the battlefield to preserve their own safety. Moreover, they stress the selflessness of the Athenians, who abandoned their houses to fight for the freedom of all Greeks. Therefore, according to Lysias (2.46) the Athenians were considered by all worthy to become rulers of Greece (ἡξιώθησαν ὑπὸ πάντων ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος).

The Athenian confrontation with Sparta was not restricted to Athens' foreign policy but had an impact on its internal policy as well, since the conservative elite circles disliked democracy and sea power alike, as one may see in the Pseudo-Xenophontean *Athenian Constitution*. Therefore, the battle of Marathon and the sea battle of Salamis were inevitably drawn into ideological conflicts between the democrats and the oligarchs. The former believed that the naval battle of Salamis was more important than the battle of Marathon, owing to the fact that after their defeat at Salamis, the Persians retreated. Consequently, it became obvious that the salvation of Greece was owed to the ships, which were manned by the poorer citizens (Thuc. 1.73.5):

τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν· νικηθεὶς γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶν ... κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν ... σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο.

The greatest proof was given by them [the Persians]; because when they were defeated in the sea battle ... they retreated quickly with the greatest part of their army ... it became obvious that the salvation of Greece was owed to the ships.

Plato, however, renders greater honours to the Marathon-fighters than those who fought at Salamis (*Mx.* 241a):

τὰ μὲν ἀριστεῖα τῷ λόγῳ ἐκείνοις ἀναθετέον, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τοῖς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχήσασι ...

The first prize must be given to them with our speech, while the second prize must be given to those who fought in Salamis ...

The ideological substrate of this judgment is revealed by *Laws* 707a-c:¹¹

... καὶ τὰς μὲν (*sc.* περὶ τὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι γενομένην καὶ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς) βελτίους τοὺς Ἕλληνας ποιῆσαι, τὰς δὲ (*sc.* τὴν περὶ Σαλαμῖνα καὶ Ἀρτεμίσιον) οὐ βελτίους.

... and the land battles (namely in Marathon and in Plataea) made the Greeks better, while the others (namely in Salamis and Artemision) made the Greeks worse.

It is mentioned there that the soldier is more stable and braver than the mariner, because the latter, when the enemies attack, will not die staying in his position but leaves shamelessly (706c). Furthermore, a sea victory is owed to many and the mariner is not distinguished, as is the soldier in battle. Due to these facts, the battle of Marathon is of greater importance in social and ethical terms than the naval battle of Salamis and made the Greeks better, while the sea battles made them worse.

This underestimation of the poor that manned the ships had already started by the second quarter of the fifth century BC, when the politician Ephialtes with Pericles stripped the Areopagus of power and gave it to the popular *Ekklesia*. From then, elitist hostility to the *dēmos* was amplified, as one can see in Pseudo-Xenophon's *Athenian Constitution*.¹² The fact that even the high moments of Athenian history could be evaluated in different ways is the downside of the intense political confrontation which Moses Finley has identified as essential to democracy.¹³ Subsequent ages, with the benefit of distance, have tended to see the two together as part of the larger legend of Athens as (in Herodotus' words) the saviours of Greece and as symbols of a nation which sees any sacrifice for freedom as the *κάλλιστος ἔρανος* ('the best contribution').

¹¹ See T. L. Pangle, *The Laws of Plato* (Chicago 1980) 375ff.

¹² See further, e.g., J. Ober, *Mass and elite in democratic Athens: rhetoric, ideology, and the power of the people* (Princeton 1989).

¹³ M. I. Finley, 'The Athenian demagogues', *Past and Present* 21 (1962) 3-24.

THE SILENCE OF THUCYDIDES: THE BATTLE OF MARATHON AND ATHENIAN PRIDE ¹

ANDREAS MARKANTONATOS

It is an undeniable fact that the battle of Marathon is a major landmark in Athenian history,² a remarkable display of courage, military prowess, and strategic planning, recognized as a model for younger generations to emulate.³ It was therefore no surprise that this remarkable episode of the first phase of the Persian Wars rapidly came to be seen as the epitome of Athenian bravery, as well as a symbol and a prefiguration of Athenian hegemony, embodying the hopes and ambitions of the people of Athens. What is more, the then still fledgling radical democracy discovered in the land battle of Marathon a most popular morality tale, showing the Athenians fighting fearlessly for justice against impious oppressors. Democracy's eager embrace of the Marathon triumph and, more widely, of the honourable campaigns of 490-78 BC is a clear indication of how the

¹ I would like to thank most warmly the participants of the Marathon conference for their constructive criticism and in particular Professors Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou and Christopher Carey for their advice and encouragement. It should be noted that the text of Thucydides used in this paper is the OCT (H. S. Jones and J. E. Powell, *Thucydidis Historiae*, 2 vols [Oxford 1942 with numerous reprints]). Richard Crawley's translation of Thucydides is reproduced throughout this essay (*The complete writings of Thucydides: the Peloponnesian War*, ed. J. H. Finley, Jr. [New York 1951]).

² Given the worldwide celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the battle of Marathon, the relevant bibliography has grown considerably. In Greece alone, there have been no fewer than five specialized publications commemorating the land battle at Marathon: G. Steinhauer, *Ο Μαραθών και το Αρχαιολογικό Μουσείο* (Athens 2009) (for a useful abridged version, see G. Steinhauer, *Μαραθώνας: Η Μάχη που σημάδεψε την ιστορία* [Athens 2010]); K. Bourazelis and K. Meidani, ed., *Μαραθών: Η Μάχη και ο αρχαίος δήμος* (Athens 2010); F. Frangos, *Χωρίς Ιππείς: η μάχη του Μαραθώνα (490 π.Χ.) 2.500 χρόνια* (Athens 2010); K. Meidani, V. Lazou, and K. Kartalis, ed., *Η μάχη του Μαραθώνα* (Athens 2010); S. Merkouris, ed., *Δημοκρατία και η μάχη του Μαραθώνα. Ζάππειον Μέγαρον, 23-31 Οκτωβρίου 2010* (Athens 2010). For detailed discussions of the battle and related issues, see principally J. F. Lazenby, *The mountains look at Marathon: the defence of Greece 490-479 BC* (Warminster 1993); A. Lloyd, *Marathon: the crucial battle that created western democracy* (London 2005); R. A. Billows, *Marathon: the battle that changed western civilization* (New York 2010); P. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven 2010). Cf. also, e.g., N. G. L. Hammond, 'The campaign and battle of Marathon', *JHS* 88 (1968) 13-57; N. G. L. Hammond, *A history of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford 1986³) 212-18; R. Osborne, *Greece in the making, 1200-479 BC* (London and New York 1996) 328-33.

³ For the role of Marathon as a paradigm in subsequent Athenian literature, see the chapters of Karamanou, Xanthaki-Karamanou, Volonaki, Papododima, and Carey in this volume.

Athenian *polis* created and reinforced her reputation as a civilizing city always ready to wage the war of justice against *hubris*. It is a commonplace of current scholarship that the telling and retelling of the glorious history of the Persian Wars in song and story played a direct role in the gradual shaping of the Athenian image of Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries BC – that is, the progressive formation of an Athenian identity through the constant recital of great exemplary deeds illustrating the city's unique moral sense in pursuing the justified claims of the weak, as well as in repelling the uncivilized forces of the East from Greece.⁴

There is, however, another underlying aspect to the inextricable connection between the Persian Wars and Athenian ideology that we need to address here. Not only did the victorious Marathon campaign, together with such milestones as the land battles of Thermopylae and Plataea and the sea battles of Salamis and Artemisium, end Persian efforts to conquer Greece, but it also staved off the threat to democracy posed by the dispossessed tyrant of Athens, Hippias, who had joined the Persian side in the hope of being restored to power. It is thus fair to say that the battle of Marathon marked a watershed in the Greco-Persian Wars, showing the Greeks that the Persian might is far from unbeatable, especially when matched against the vast superiority of the Greek hoplite army over the Persian infantry, and on a purely Athenian level strengthened the democratic regime by averting the social turmoil and the political chaos that a Persian-backed tyranny would otherwise have created.⁵ From this moment onwards the elimination of Persian influence over the Hellenic world became a rallying cry for Athenian democracy.

In this paper I shall discuss how Thucydides responds to the battle of Marathon, suggesting that he gives some broad hints that there is indeed an indissoluble link between the defeat of the Persians at Marathon and the Athenian constitution, though in Book 1 he appears to dismiss the battle of Marathon as not being part of the Persian Wars proper in an effort to emphasize the significance of the Peloponnesian War. This extraordinary event of the Persian Wars would have a special place in the context of Athenian democratic ideology as it took shape in fourth-century oratory, especially in funeral speeches in honour of the war dead. The eulogy of Marathon as a *topos* of Athenian bravery is one of the standard characteristics of fourth-century encomiastic rhetoric: the popular idea of a purely Athenian victory over the wicked Asiatic invaders, together with

⁴ On Athenian imperial ideology and Athenian self-presentation, see N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens: the funeral oration in the classical city*, trans. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, MA and London 1986) esp. 132-71; A. L. Boegehold and A. C. Scafuro, ed., *Athenian identity and civic ideology* (Baltimore and London 1994); S. Mills, *Theseus, tragedy and the Athenian empire* (Oxford 1997) 43-86. On the impact of the Persian Wars on fifth-century Athens and beyond, see recently E. Bridges, E. Hall, and P. J. Rhodes, ed., *Cultural responses to the Persian wars: antiquity to the third millennium* (Oxford 2007).

⁵ This does not at all mean that the Marathon triumph caused the slow demise of factional politics in Athens, as can be seen from the sad story of Miltiades, the hero *par excellence* of the Marathon campaign. Not long after the Persian defeat at the bay of Marathon, Miltiades evoked a hostile response from his political opponents for his audacious expeditionary plan to lay siege to the city of Paros. In fact, all his efforts to capture Paros ended in failure, and his enemies made sure that he died in disgrace upon his return to Athens (Hdt. 6.132-6). See also the sobering comments in Osborne, *Greece in the making* (n. 2 above) 330-32.

the notion of a distinctly democratic accomplishment of great moment setting the pattern for other Greeks to follow, takes centre stage in epideictic speeches.⁶ But it is my basic contention here that, while the ideology can be seen at its most explicit in the fourth century, and despite the almost total loss of fifth-century oratory, certain allusions to Marathon in Thucydides allow us to see the presence of this ideology already in the fifth century. Despite his agonistic dismissal of Marathon and *ta Mêdika*, Thucydides indirectly acknowledges the significance of the battle. Much as he wishes to throw the glory of the Marathon battle into the shade for his own rhetorical purposes, as well as making light of other decisive Greek victories against powerful foreign invaders, he cannot suppress its vital role in the formation of Athenian self-identity. Without wishing to stretch a point, I shall argue that, taken together, his fleeting references to the battle of Marathon (no more than seven in total) have all the essential ingredients of an Athenian tale of democratic goals achieved in the face of extreme danger. Apparently, by the time of Thucydides, the triumphant Marathon campaign had come to be seen as both a truly memorable occasion of endurance and resilience demonstrated by the Athenian fighting forces on the battlefield, and a further proof of democracy's ability to design military and political strategies to defend the rights of the Athenian citizens against dynastic aggressors.

In the *Archaeology*, Thucydides alludes to those celebrated national champions, the Marathon-fighters (Μαραθωνομάχοι) familiar to us from comedy, who came to be seen as a powerful symbol of the Golden Age of Athens, thereby offering a rare insight into Athenian social mores and expectations, as well as hinting at the intimate relationship between the Marathon triumph and Athenian self-perception. In fact, before referring directly to the battle of Marathon in Book 1, he recounts how the Athenians, first among all Greeks, adopted a more comfortable way of life having abandoned the rather uncivilized fashion of wearing arms (1.6.3-4):

Ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀναιμένη τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἀβροδίαιτον οὐ πολλὸς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοὺς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν ἅφ' οὗ καὶ Ἰόνων τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κατὰ τὸ συγγενὲς ἐπὶ πολλὴ αὕτη ἢ σκευὴ κατέσχευε. μετρίᾳ δ' αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρώτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαται μάλιστα κατέστησαν.

The Athenians were the first to lay aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life; indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred, and long prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary a modest style of dressing, more in conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of the common people.

⁶ See principally Loraux, *The invention of Athens* (n. 4 above) 155-71, with the relevant ancient sources. On rhetoric and Athenian democracy, see H. Yunis, *Taming democracy: models of political rhetoric in classical Athens* (Ithaca, NY 1996); V. Wohl, 'Rhetoric of the Athenian citizen', in E. Gunderson, ed., *The Cambridge companion to ancient rhetoric* (Cambridge 2009) 162-77.

Contrary to widespread practice, the aristocratic older men of Athens, typically identified with the brave men of the days of Marathon, those *Μαραθωνομάχοι*, wore linen tunics and fastened a knot of their hair with golden grasshopper brooches.⁷ Nevertheless, fashions and trends come and go as much as societies change. In the days of the empire, the wealthy elders assumed a less flamboyant style of dressing more along the lines of the stricter Spartan dress code. In his *Knights* (1321-34) and *Clouds* (984-86), Aristophanes provides abundant evidence of the close relation between the traditional dressing code and the Marathon-fighters, in contexts of praise for the old system of education which bred strong, honest, and righteous citizens.⁸ In particular, in *Knights* 1329-34 the Sausage-seller welcomes the magically rejuvenated Demos, and the Chorus of Athenian cavalrymen echo his enthusiasm, invoking the glory of Marathon as a symbol of collective moral responsibility:

Χο. ὦ τὰι λιπαραὶ καὶ ἰοστέφανοι καὶ ἀριζήλωτοι Ἀθηναί,
 δείξατε τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε
 μόναρχον.
 Αλ. ὅδ' ἐκεῖνος ὅρῳ τεττιγοφόρας, ἀρχαίῳ σχήματι
 λαμπρός,
 οὐ χοιρινῶν ὄζων ἀλλὰ σπονδῶν, σμύρνῃ κατάλειπτος.
 Χο. χαῖρ', ὦ βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων· καὶ σοὶ ξυγχαίρομεν
 ἡμεῖς.
 τῆς γὰρ πόλεως ἄξια πράττεις καὶ τοῦ 'ν Μαραθῶνι
 τροπαίου. (ed. N. G. Wilson)

Chorus-leader: Athens the gleaming, the violet-crowned, the all-envied, show us the monarch of Greece and of this land.

Sausage-seller: Behold the man, wearing a golden cicada, resplendent in antique costume, smelling not of mussel-shells but of peace-libations, and anointed with myrrh.

Chorus-leader: All hail, sovereign of the Greeks; we rejoice with you; for your bliss is worthy of the city and of the trophy at Marathon. (trans. A. H. Sommerstein)

The context makes explicit that the Chorus-leader sees in the purified Demos a true representative of the old spirit of Marathon; the splendid attire, together with the golden cicada worn as a hair ornament, is a distinct sign of those days of yore, when ancestral law reigned supreme and the city of Athens held sway over much of Greece, which is seen here as no more than her due in view of her instrumental role in bringing about an end to the

⁷ See also A. W. Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides, volume I. Introduction and commentary on Book I* (Oxford 1945) 100-03; S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides, Volume I. Books I-III* (Oxford 1991) 25-27.

⁸ See A. H. Sommerstein, *The comedies of Aristophanes, vol. 2: Knights* (Warminster 1997²) 1325 and 1331, and *The comedies of Aristophanes, vol. 3: Clouds* (Oxford 2007⁴) 984, with relevant bibliography. Cf. also D. E. O'Regan, *Rhetoric, comedy, and the violence of language in Aristophanes' Clouds* (New York and Oxford 1992) esp. 89-105; A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: myth, ritual and comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 58-59, 201; D. M. MacDowell, *Aristophanes and Athens: an introduction to the plays* (Oxford 1995) 80-149.

bitter conflict between Greeks and barbarians. The linkage between the time-honoured lustrous dress and the political heritage of the Marathon triumph is further reinforced by the profuse praise for Aristides and Miltiades, the victor of Marathon (l. 1325).⁹ We can therefore safely draw the conclusion that not unlike Thucydides Aristophanes is sensible of the fact that the generation which emerged triumphant from the Marathon battle not only set an example to future generations of Athenians, but earned Athens the right to rule. In fact, Thucydides stresses the importance of a more relaxed way of living, pointing out that with the new dress style the rich Athenian elders made a complete break with unsophisticated conventions and piratical methods. It could be argued that he presents this comfortable lifestyle in the best possible light, regarding this sea-change in societal attitudes as bringing progress and civilization in a world plagued by incessant wars and conflicts. Similarly, Aristophanes wishes to bring the simplicities of an old way of life to bear upon reshaping the fiendishly complex present. In a time of ferocious political tensions in Athens his plays argue of the fact that the gentility and refinement of the Marathon-fighters would never have allowed the city to descend into a terrifying spiral of violence.

The oblique references to the glory days of the Athenian past are soon to be followed by express mentions of the Marathon battle. This time, however, the splendour surrounding the Persian Wars provides a mere foil for the fierce intensity of the intra-Hellenic violence of the military confrontation between Athens and Sparta. More specifically, in the first Book of his *History* (1.23.1), Thucydides argues that the Peloponnesian War far surpassed all other armed conflicts in destructive power:

τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν, καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως δυοῖν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πεζομαχίαιν ταχεῖαν τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν. τοῦτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μῆκος τε μέγα προύβη, παθήματά τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οἷα οὐχ ἕτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ.

The Persian War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was prolonged to an immense length, and long as it was, it was short without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas.

To the uninitiated it certainly comes as a surprise to hear that the two Persian invasions of Greece were decided by merely four battles; and it is even more surprising to realize that in his account of early times Thucydides excludes the battle of Marathon from the list of decisive collisions between Greeks and barbarians as an isolated incident, giving instead more focus to the second phase of the Greco-Persian Wars, when the son of Darius and new ruler of Persia, Xerxes, led his innumerable host into Greece ten years after the humiliating defeat of the Persian army at the bay of Marathon. We have already noted that Thucydides makes much of the Peloponnesian War to the point of arguing emphatically, in what looks like a pointed response to Herodotus (7.20-21), that what came before in Greek history, even if that was the legendary Persian Wars, bears no comparison to the far more ferocious and violent conflict between Athens and Sparta.¹⁰ There is a difference of

⁹ See also Sommerstein, *Knights* (n. 8 above) 1325.

¹⁰ Perhaps the irreconcilable accounts of an earthquake at Delos in Herodotus (6.98.1-3) and Thucydides (2.8.3) are a further proof of the latter's tendency to play down the Persian Wars and

opinion as to the validity of his conclusion; it is nonetheless important not to overlook that his approach to human history can be at times far too realistic for those romantic readers who are highly susceptible to ‘David against Goliath’ tales of glory. A. W. Gomme is right to suggest that ‘Thucydides is concerned with war as a *κίνησις*, a destructive agency, and in that sense... for Greece the Persian war ended with the expulsion of the invaders’,¹¹ whereas, we may add, the repercussions of the internecine struggles for power and dominance between the Athenians and the Spartans continued to reverberate through the Greek world for years on end.

Although Thucydides appears to be dismissive of the Marathon campaign in his brief narrative of early Greek history, he nonetheless refers to it directly before he makes, as noted above, what some critics have felt as too sweeping a statement about the priority of the Peloponnesian War over other Greek military triumphs.¹² It is particularly interesting to note that here the Marathon battle is closely linked with the deposition of the tyrants in Athens and the rest of Greece with the help of the Lacedaemonians. According to Thucydides (1.18.1-2), soon after the tyrants’ removal from power, the Athenians confronted the Persians at Marathon:

μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον καὶ ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη Μήδων πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐγένετο. δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει μετ’ αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁ βάρβαρος τῷ μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἦλθεν.

Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas.

More importantly, Thucydides readily acknowledges a strong connection between the defeat of the Persians at the bay of Marathon and the Athenian army. It is at this juncture that he stresses a favourite narrative theme – the battle of Marathon as a purely Athenian victory. The Athenian infantry repulsed the Persian attack in the wake of major political reforms in the Greek city-states. Though Thucydides is not explicit about the democratic dimension of the Athenian accomplishment at Marathon, he implicitly alludes to it by emphasizing the benefits accruing from the deposition of tyrannical rulers in Greece and elsewhere.¹³ He praises Sparta for enjoying unbroken freedom from tyranny, having obtained good laws at a very early period. It may be rightly said that at Marathon Athens

especially the Marathon battle. According to Thucydides, the island of Delos was shaken by an earthquake for the first time in the living memory of the Greeks a little before the Peloponnesian War, whereas Herodotus says that before the battle of Marathon Delos experienced a seismic shock for the first and last time ever, adding significantly that this earthquake was a divine warning for the Greeks signalling the misfortunes that were in store for them in the coming years. Cf. also A. W. Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides, the ten years’ war, volume II. Books II-III* (Oxford 1956) *ad loc.*; Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides, volume I* (n. 7 above) 245-46.

¹¹ Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides, volume I* (n. 7 above) 151.

¹² See Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides, volume I* (n. 7 above) 62-64, with further bibliography.

¹³ In this Thucydides agrees with Herodotus’ judgement on the importance to Athens of the removal of the tyrants (5.78).

herself, unburdened by the onus of old dynastic families, fought the good fight of freedom from both Persian despotism and tyrannical rule.

The collective Athenian pride in the battle of Marathon is also evidenced elsewhere in Thucydides. In the first book of his *History* there is a direct reference to the instrumental role of Athens in the success of the Marathon campaign. This time it is not the historian who makes mention of the Marathon triumph in connection with the city of Athens; the Athenians themselves take pride in their victory over the Persian invaders at the bay of Marathon (1.73.4), warning against attacking courageous and determined opponents who proved themselves capable of adjusting to the gravest emergency:

ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἔνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἷαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται. φαμέν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ καὶ ὅτε τὸ ὕστερον ἦλθεν, οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς πανδημεὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξυνναυμαχήσαι, ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων ἂν ὄντων πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλοις ἐπιβοηθεῖν.

However, the story shall be told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against, and to show, if you are so ill-advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for self-defence impossible.

The occasion is an extremely important one: Athenian envoys are in Sparta making every effort to persuade the Lacedaemonians to resist the clamorous voices of their allies demanding the destruction of Athens. In their passionate speech they invoke the Persian Wars, placing special emphasis on their share in the solid results of this brutal clash between Greeks and barbarians. Naturally, the battle of Marathon takes pride of place in their short narrative, which serves, among other things, as a further proof of the emergence of the new genre of encomiastic oratory in the fifth century BC.¹⁴ The Athenian ambassadors assert that ‘Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ’ (‘at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed’), failing to notice the active part played by the Plataeans in the fighting.¹⁵ Aside from the slight exaggeration, probably called for by the high urgency of the situation, the Marathon triumph is credited to the Athenians alone; and, as a matter of fact, in the Plataean Debate in Book 3 the Plataeans themselves are at pains to under-emphasize their participation in the Marathon campaign and draw attention instead to the fact that although they are an inland people they became inextricably involved in the sea battle at Artemisium. Simon Hornblower is justified in thinking that in contrast to the

¹⁴ On epideictic oratory, see recently J. Hesk, ‘Types of oratory’, in *The Cambridge companion to ancient rhetoric*, ed. Gunderson (n. 6 above) 156-61.

¹⁵ See also W. C. West III, ‘Saviors of Greece’, *GRBS* 11 (1970) 271-82; K. R. Walters, “‘We fought alone at Marathon’: historical falsification in the Attic funeral oration”, *RhM* 124 (1981) 204-11.

battle of Plataea the Marathon campaign was indissolubly linked with Athens, as well as rightly suggesting that ‘the Athenian associations of Artemisium were perhaps less inescapable’ for the Spartans to take offence if the Plataeans appeal to a sea battle in which, as is widely known, the 127 Athenian ships were partly manned by Plataean fighters despite their ignorance of nautical matters (Herodotus 8.1.1).¹⁶

The theme of Marathon as a military triumph of democratic Athens is once more evoked in the context of the Funeral Oration of Pericles in Book 2. Before the commencement of the speech, Thucydides notes that the Athenians bury their dead in the state tomb except for those who fell at Marathon. The reference here is particularly striking, since Pericles is about to pass over the deeds of the ancestors in his Funeral Oration (2.34.4):

τιθέασιν οὖν ἐς τὸ δημόσιον σῆμα, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προαστείου τῆς πόλεως, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ θάπτουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων, πλὴν γε τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι ἐκείνων δὲ διαπρεπὴ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν.

The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the most beautiful suburb of the city, in which those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valour were interred on the spot where they fell.

Given that the men who fell at Salamis and Plataea were also given burial where they were slain, the question of Thucydides’ reference to the Marathon dead is still hotly debated by scholars.¹⁷ Nevertheless, we do not have to assume that Thucydides is ignorant of the burial sites of those who fell at Salamis and Plataea.¹⁸ The Marathon tomb had already become a powerful symbol for Athens and especially for Athenian democracy, bearing eloquent witness to what might be achieved through unity and self-belief. In that September of 490 BC, the victory at Marathon endowed the young Athenian democracy with a faith in her destiny that was to endure for almost a century – this is a generally acknowledged fact, and Thucydides invokes a powerful symbol of Athenian courage and determination at a time of intense national alert.

It is therefore only natural that in Book 6, in what is his last express mention of Marathon (6.59.4), Thucydides once more relates the battle to the fall of tyranny in Athens, turning full circle to the story of the expulsion of the Pisistratids from Athens (1.18.1). Moreover, it is significant that the story of Hippias is re-narrated in the context of the sacrilege of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms – a very turbulent period, that is, during which political rivalries led to renewed factional conflict within the Athenian democracy. In actual fact, according to Thucydides’ account, after the assassination of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, Hippias reigned for three more years, and then in 510 BC was deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the banished

¹⁶ Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides, volume I* (n. 7 above) 448.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides, volume II* (n. 10 above) 34.1; Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides, volume I* (n. 7 above) 294.

¹⁸ Cf. also M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the beginnings of the Athenian democracy* (Oxford 1969) 175.

Alcmaeonidae and went to King Darius, from whose court he headed out twenty years later and came with the Persians to Marathon in the autumn of 490 BC.¹⁹

To sum up then. Unlike the fourth-century orators who were lavish in their praise for Marathon, Thucydides is relatively silent about the glory of the Marathon campaign. But in his restrained way he is nonetheless generous in crediting the victory solely to the Athenian spear, never failing to allude to what was truly at stake in that battle: the freedom of Greece from Persian autocracy and the freedom of Athens from tyrannical oppression.

¹⁹ See also A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A historical commentary on Thucydides, volume IV. Books V 25-VIII* (Oxford 1970) *ad loc.*

MARATHON IN ART¹

K. W. ARAFAT

To the ancient visitor approaching the Acropolis, a message of victory was sent loud and clear by the parapet on three sides of the temple of Athena Nike. Dated *c.* 425-20, it consisted of metre-high sculpted panels of the highest quality, featuring figures of winged victories enhanced by paint and bronze attachments shining in the sun.² The meaning was clear: Victory, Victory, Victory. Here the message is generic, but it has long been advocated that specific battles are shown on the slightly earlier frieze: the south was identified as Marathon by Evelyn Harrison, who also saw the north as representing Plataea.³ I shall not discuss these identifications further here, but I note a comment of Olga Palagia's, that if a frieze shows Greeks against Persians, it must be a historic event.⁴ However, apart from problems arising from its state of preservation, I wonder if, so long after the events, the Nike frieze is generic, standing for the Persian wars as a whole, rather than one or more specific battles.

Mythological scenes in sculpture and on vases are commonly interpreted as referring allegorically to real conflict, usually the Persian wars. The *locus classicus* is the Parthenon *metopes*, showing Troy, the Amazonomachy, gigantomachy, and centauiromachy, which are commonly seen not only as representations of civilization triumphing over barbarity, but also as metaphors for Greeks triumphing over Persians. But there are problems: for example, the Amazons of the west *metopes* are not certainly Amazons as none is provably

¹ I am very grateful to Professor Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou, Dr Eleni Volonaki, and their colleagues for the immaculate organization and warm hospitality which marked the conference at the University of the Peloponnese in October 2010, which spawned this publication. References to the text of Pausanias are from the Teubner edition of M. H. Rocha-Pereira (2nd edn., Leipzig 1989-90). Translations are from J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's description of Greece* (London 1898) vol. 1, with minor adjustments.

² R. Carpenter, *The sculpture of the Nike temple parapet* (Cambridge, Mass. 1929). P. Schultz, 'The date of the Nike temple parapet', *AJA* 106 (2002) 294-95, argues that it had been started before 421.

³ E. B. Harrison, 'The south frieze of the Nike temple and the Marathon painting in the Painted Stoa', *AJA* 76 (1972) 353-78, esp. 353-54, 'A new fragment from the north frieze of the Nike temple', *AJA* 76 (1972) 195-97. Recently, the identification of Marathon is supported by A. Stewart, *Classical Greece and the birth of western art* (Cambridge 2008) 196-97, but not that of Plataea. Similarly, Elizabeth Pemberton, 'The east and west friezes of the temple of Athena Nike', *AJA* 76 (1972) 303-10, saw the west frieze as the battle between Athenians and Corinthians at Megara in 458.

⁴ O. Palagia, 'Interpretations of two Athenian friezes: the temple on the Ilissos and the temple of Athena Nike', in *Periklean Athens and its legacy. Problems and perspectives*, ed. J. M. Barringer and J. M. Hurwit (Austin 2005) 177-92, at 184.

female, although this is probably just an accident of survival. Secondly, all these scenes had been used previously without any apparent Persian overtones; and thirdly, if these scenes are relevant to the Persian wars, are they relevant wherever they appear? What of Olympia, for example, where Lapiths and centaurs are the theme of the west pediment? Olympia has no particular link to the Persian wars, and the use of the Elean version of the centauromachy shows that the story reflects local interest if not local pride.⁵ Interpreting the centaurs as metaphors for the Persians on one building but not another would seem to be unjustifiably selective, a means of reaching a foregone conclusion. Similarly, the gigantomachy had been common since the second quarter of the sixth century and continued to be so throughout the archaic and classical periods.⁶ By what logic do we pick out a few selected gigantomachy scenes – for example, the east *metopes* of the Parthenon or the interior of the Parthenos shield – and link them to contemporary military or political events?

I shall return to iconographic trends on pottery later, but still on the Parthenon, the genius behind it, and the whole building programme, was, we are told, Pericles (Plut. *Pericles* 12-13). But he was associated not with Marathon, but with Salamis – he was the *choregos*, or sponsor, of Aeschylus' *Persians* after all – and with Mycale, the battle at which his father, Xanthippus, fought; indeed Xanthippus' participation at Mycale was commemorated by a statue of him on the Acropolis (Paus. 1.25.1).

The clearest physical manifestation of Pericles' interest in commemorating the Persian wars was his Odeion,⁷ a uniquely striking monument on the south slope of the Acropolis, linked by Pausanias (1.20.4) and other sources (Plut. *Pericles* 13.6; Vitruvius 5.9.1) to the Persian wars. Plutarch and Pausanias say it imitated Xerxes' tent, or σκηνή, a word which also brings to mind the backdrop used for staging plays in the theatre, appropriately for the *choregos* of the *Persians*. One recurrent theme in *Persians* is *hybris*, exemplified by the one monument which Pausanias cites as resulting from *hybris*, in this case that of the Persians. The setting is Rhamnous, a coastal site about ten kilometres from Marathon, where there was a sanctuary of Nemesis 'who of all deities is most inexorable to the proud. It appears that the barbarians who landed at Marathon incurred the wrath of this goddess; for, lightly deeming it an easy task to capture Athens, they brought with them Parian marble wherewith to make a trophy, as if the victory were already won. Of this very marble Pheidias wrought an image of Nemesis' (1.33.2-3). Of the thirteen ancient sources for this statue, only three, all epigrams from the Greek Anthology, refer to the Persians and the same story of *hybris* as Pausanias; the rest are more concerned with the sculptor, named as either Pheidias or Agoracritus of Paros.⁸ The story not only illustrates the *hybris* of the Persians and its consequences, but also that it was memorialized conspicuously by a, and perhaps *the*, leading sculptor of the day. Most significantly, it was a permanent reminder of the victory at Marathon.

⁵ H. Westervelt, 'Herakles at Olympia: the sculptural program of the temple of Zeus', in *Structure, image, ornament. Architectural sculpture in the Greek world*, ed. P. Schultz and R. von der Hoff (Oxford 2009) 133-53.

⁶ K. W. Arafat, *Classical Zeus. A study in art and literature* (Oxford 1990) 11-29.

⁷ M. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the fifth century BC: a study in cultural receptivity* (Cambridge 1997) 218-42.

⁸ M. Muller-Dufeu, ed., *La sculpture grecque. Sources littéraires et épigraphiques* (Paris 2002) 355-61.

This is true also of a far larger, and more conspicuously placed, statue: 'a bronze image of Athena made from the spoils of the Medes who landed at Marathon. It is a work of Pheidias. The battle of the Lapiths with the centaurs [is depicted] on her shield.... The head of the spear and the crest of the helmet of this Athena are visible to mariners sailing from Sunium to Athens' (1.28.2, also referred to at 9.4.1). That Sunium is over 40 miles from Athens suggests the size that Pausanias is trying to convey. Of the eleven ancient sources for this statue, referred to by some as the Athena Promachus, only four mention the Persian wars, and only one, apart from Pausanias, refers to Marathon specifically.⁹ If Pausanias' sources were ambivalent, he may well have favoured a link with Marathon as appropriate for a colossal statue of Athena.

Salamis does not feature anywhere near as prominently as Marathon in Classical art, but there is one particularly intriguing reference in Pausanias' account of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, where he saw in the cella a painting of 'Greece and Salamis holding in her hand the figure-head of a ship' (5.11.5). The painting was one of several he details on the barriers which kept visitors at a distance from the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus by Pheidias. He says the paintings are by Panainus, 'a brother of Pheidias, and the painting of the battle of Marathon in the Painted Stoa at Athens is by him' (5.11.6). I will return to the Painted Stoa later. It is striking that Salamis should be chosen for depiction at Olympia: maybe it was intended as a complement to the painting of Marathon in Athens, or because the statue of Zeus was created by an Athenian artist, Pheidias, and the personification of Salamis was painted by his brother. Perhaps the linking of these two victories by an Athenian artist suggests they were seen as the two most Athenian victories. Whatever the thinking behind it, the painting takes the unusual form of a personification of Salamis, rather than a depiction of the battle itself as is the case with the Marathon painting. Furthermore, Salamis is depicted next to a personification of Greece, and placed in front of a uniquely large and elaborate statue of Zeus inside the finest temple of its day within a sanctuary of particular resonance to all Greece. In contrast, the Marathon painting is narrative within a secular building in a market-place.

Returning to Athens, I make two further points on the Parthenon: first, on the pre-Periclean Parthenon, which was started after Marathon and destroyed by the Persians in 479. We have no evidence of what it celebrated, if indeed it celebrated anything beyond the city goddess which is, after all, sufficient. It is probable that it was built from the spoils of Marathon, but that does not mean that it celebrated Marathon, that it bore imagery related to Marathon, directly or allegorically. Nonetheless, let us suppose that the pre-Periclean Parthenon celebrated Marathon and was intended to bear architectural sculpture making this clear in some way. How would the Athenians feel when they returned to the Acropolis after the destruction of 479 to find the temple celebrating Marathon destroyed? What would that have said to them about Marathon? That it was a failure? Surely not. But that, if a success, it was a temporary success. And I wonder how perceptions of Marathon changed between the time of the pre-Periclean Parthenon and the Periclean Parthenon. I think of the First World War, seen at the time as 'the Great War', 'the

⁹ Sources: Muller-Dufeu, *La sculpture* (n. 8 above) 289-91, nos. 804-14. Three sources give the name of the statue as Promachus. The inscription on blocks believed to be from the Promachus has been restored to read 'the Athenians dedicated [the statue] from the Persian wars'.

war to end all wars’, until 20 years later there was a second one, and the first was seen more clearly as a failure. The lack of direct representation on the Parthenon of Marathon, or of any battle of Greeks and Persians, contrasts strikingly with the contemporary paintings in the Painted Stoa. That may be due to one being sacred and one secular, but it owes more, I think, to one being inspired by Pericles and the other by Cimon. I do not, though, think that the lack of reference on the Parthenon to Marathon specifically – unless one adheres to John Boardman’s theory that the frieze depicts the heroized dead of Marathon¹⁰ – is surprising: permanent success was achieved at Salamis and Plataea, Mycale and Eurymedon. Is that why Aeschylus celebrates Salamis in the *Persians* and, to a lesser extent, Plataea, rather than Marathon, even though his tombstone singles out his participation at Marathon? Is that why Salamis is personified on Pheidias’ Zeus rather than Marathon?

I have mentioned Pericles several times, and the suggestion that he shied away from celebrating Marathon, preferring instead to emphasize Salamis. It may well be that the main reason for this was the association of Marathon with Cimon, son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, and arch-opponent of Pericles who succeeded in having Cimon ostracized in 461. Here two works of Pheidias are relevant: first, the so-called Athena Promachos, mentioned earlier, which was built from the spoils of Marathon, at least according to Pausanias (1.28.2; cf. 9.4.1) and one other of the eleven sources.¹¹ That does not mean, though, that it celebrated Marathon. I make this point because it is often overlooked: for example, Claire Davison says ‘According to Pausanias, [the Athena Promachos] was set up by the Athenians to commemorate Marathon’.¹² I re-iterate that Pausanias does not say this, but simply that it was funded by spoils from Marathon.

In contrast, Pheidias’ group of bronze statues at Delphi is the only monument we know of which clearly celebrated Marathon as well as being funded by spoils from it. It showed Athena, Apollo, Miltiades, seven Athenian eponymous heroes (appropriately, as the Delphic oracle had chosen them), and three other figures, including Theseus (Paus. 10.10.1-2). I wonder if Pheidias, architect and sculptor to Pericles, was consciously promoting the supreme achievement of Cimon’s father on neutral territory at a safe distance from Athens. The depiction of Miltiades in this statue-group is discussed below. Still at Delphi, Pausanias tells us that the Athenian treasury was funded from the spoils of Marathon. This has been debated at length, mainly on the grounds of the compatibility, or otherwise, of the style of the architectural sculptures.¹³ Claire Davison has recently revived the suggestion that the freestanding base now placed in front of the Athenian treasury, which refers to a dedication from the first-fruits of Marathon, in fact originally

¹⁰ J. Boardman, ‘The Parthenon frieze – another view’, in *Festschrift für Frank Brommer*, ed. U. Höckmann and A. Krug (Mainz 1977) 39-49, with responses by e.g. A. Delivorrias, *Η ζωοφόρος του Παρθενώνα* (Athens 2005) 43; I. Jenkins, *The Parthenon frieze* (London 1994) 26; J. Neils, *The Parthenon frieze* (Cambridge 2001) 180-81.

¹¹ Schol. Dem.. *Androtion* 13.597, Muller-Dufeu, *La sculpture* (n. 8 above) 289, no.809.

¹² C. C. Davison, *Pheidias: the sculptures & ancient sources* (London 2009) vol. 1, 280.

¹³ E.g. R. von der Hoff, ‘Herakles, Theseus and the Athenian treasury at Delphi’, in *Structure, image, ornament*, ed. Schultz and von der Hoff (n. 5 above) 96-104; E. B. Harrison, *The Athenian agora XI. Archaic and archaistic sculpture* (Princeton 1965) 9-11 (Athenian Treasury); F. Cooper, ‘Reconstruction of the Athenian treasury at Delphi in the fourth century BC’, *AJA* 94 (1990) 317-18.

belonged to the eponymous heroes group and was subsequently moved to its current location by the Athenian treasury.¹⁴ It is relevant that all Pausanias' references to treasuries at Delphi are to the reason for their construction: military victory in the cases of those of Athens, Thebes, Syracuse, and possibly Cnidus, the latter three from civil rather than Persian wars; a divine request for a tithe from the gold mines in the case of Siphnus; devotion to the god for Potidaea; no reason is given for the Corinthian. In no case is there a suggestion that anything other than an inscription, or the simple fact of their construction, indicated celebration of a military victory. None of them, as far as we know, has iconography directly reflecting the war that led to its creation.

Since I have referred to the Athenian treasury inscription, I mention what Pausanias (10.13.5) calls the Corinthian treasury and Herodotus (1.14) the treasury of Cypselus: Plutarch (*Mor.* 400D-E) tells us that the dedicatory inscription on the treasury was changed after the tyranny, at the request of the people, to name the Corinthians rather than the tyrant. We should, therefore, bear in mind that inscriptions on, or in front of, treasuries could change. So, too, could those on freestanding statues: a very relevant example of that is found in Pausanias (1.18.3), who refers to a statue of Miltiades in the Prytaneum at Athens, saying that his name had been changed into that of 'a Roman'. This is readily paralleled: the statue next to it, of Themistocles, had become 'a Thracian', while at the Argive Heraeum, Pausanias says 'they say that the statue which the inscription declares to be the emperor Augustus is really Orestes' (2.17.3). What is intriguing here is how Pausanias recognized Miltiades despite his inscription having been erased. This suggests that the image of Miltiades was still very familiar in the second century AD, and constituted an integral part of his prominence for Pausanias.¹⁵ This image may have been derived from his appearance on Pheidias' Marathon monument at Delphi, or conceivably even his depiction on the Painted Stoa.

To return to the Athenian treasury, as noted, even if it were funded from Marathon, that does not mean that it *celebrated* Marathon, that the *metopes* with Heracles, Theseus, and the Amazons had a particular reference to Marathon – true, we are told that Theseus had appeared at the battle in support of the Athenians, and Heracles was first recognized as a god by the people of Marathon; and, as Herodotus observes, the Athenian army encamped in the sanctuary of Heracles at Marathon before the battle and subsequently, on returning to Athens to forestall a Persian landing, encamped in another sanctuary of Heracles, at Cynosarges (Hdt. 6.108, 116). But these do not seem to me reasons to interpret the specific Theseus and Heracles depictions on the Athenian treasury differently from the very great number of Theseus and Heracles depictions in Greek art of the time, both sculptural and ceramic.¹⁶

The Athenian treasury was prominently placed in the sanctuary, on the sacred way just below the temple of Apollo, and, if the treasury sends out a message of Athenian victory

¹⁴ Davison, *Pheidias* (n. 12 above) 307-08.

¹⁵ The detail of Pausanias' description of the Painted Stoa indicates that he saw inscriptions, although he does not mention them. In his comparable description of the Cnidian Lesche at Delphi, he does refer to inscriptions (e.g. 10.25.3-5, 31.9).

¹⁶ Von der Hoff, 'Athenian treasury' (n. 13 above) 100, concludes that there is 'no meaningful relationship' between the *metopes* and the Persian wars.

over the Persians, that message was, according to Pausanias, reinforced by the attachment to the architrave of the temple of Apollo of golden shields, some of which he says were dedicated from Marathon (10.19.4), placed at the front of the temple for maximum visibility. These must be votive shields commemorating the battle. Herbert Parke showed that the original shields were replaced after the fire of 373, removed in 340, and replaced again long afterwards with a dedication which simply read ‘the Athenians from the Medes’.¹⁷

While such displays of shields on architraves are readily paralleled – for example, Mummius put gilded shields on the temple of Zeus at Olympia (Paus. 5.10.5) – they changed over time as old shields were taken down and new ones put up, as is clear from the east architrave of the Parthenon, where the round weathering from shields is clearly incompatible with the figure of eight Persian shields Alexander captured at the battle of the Granicus in 334 and displayed there (Arrian, *Anab.* 1.17). What chance, then, that Pausanias actually saw, or could tell if he saw, shields from Marathon? More likely he, or his *exegetes*, was attracted by the lustre of the name of Marathon and embellished the simple dedicatory inscription ‘the Athenians from the Medes’, and took it to refer to Marathon. That in itself, though, says much about the significance of Marathon even in Pausanias’ time.

We may, therefore, be able to detach both the Athenian treasury and the shields on the Apollo temple from the list of monuments celebrating Marathon.

What of the Athenian stoa built against the retaining wall of the temple of Apollo which Pausanias says commemorates an Athenian victory over the Peloponnesians and their allies in 429 (10.11.6)? Traditionally, it has been believed that Pausanias is mistaken and that the stoa was built to display spoils taken from the Persians in the 470s at Mycale and Sestus, when the Athenians captured the cables of Xerxes’ bridge across the Hellespont.¹⁸ But it has also been cogently argued that it in fact was built in the 450s and housed spoils taken from Greek opponents.¹⁹ I do not think this issue will be definitively resolved any more than the date of the Athenian treasury will be, but I mention that if the treasury were indeed a Marathon celebration, and if the shields above the stoa on the temple architrave also commemorated Marathon, then we should at least leave open the possibility that the stoa also celebrated Marathon, perhaps in conjunction with other victories over the Persians.

One further piece of evidence from Delphi is relevant, namely Pheidias’ Marathon group of bronze statues mentioned above. It was made from a tithe of the spoils of the battle, as Pausanias tells us twice, giving as his source an inscription (10.10.1-2). What is perhaps most striking is the juxtaposition of the mortal and the immortal, of Miltiades, commander at Marathon, with gods and heroes, within half a century of the battle of Marathon, when it was still a living memory. Pausanias gives some sense of how Miltiades was regarded, at least in the second-century AD: ‘by defeating the barbarians who landed at Marathon and checking the advance of the Persian host, [Miltiades] was the first benefactor of the whole Greek people’ (8.52.1). A further indication that Miltiades’ reputation was high in Pausanias’ day is that the rhetorician and benefactor Herodes

¹⁷ H. W. Parke, ‘Delphica’, *Hermathena* 53 (1939) 59-78, at 71-78.

¹⁸ J. Walsh, ‘The date of the Athenian stoa at Delphi’, *AJA* 90 (1986) 319-36, gives references at 320 n.1.

¹⁹ Walsh, ‘Stoa’ (n. 18 above) 326-29, discusses Pausanias’ evidence.

Atticus, a younger contemporary of his, claimed direct descent from Miltiades.²⁰ This sense of the primacy of Miltiades in turn indicates the seminal position of the Persian wars, and the battle of Marathon specifically, in Greek perceptions of their own history. It is, therefore, not surprising that there should be a statue of Miltiades at Delphi. There was also one at Athens (1.18.3), albeit with altered inscription as noted.

What is more surprising is that Miltiades' statue should be placed in the same group as statues of gods and Athenian heroes. But two further passages of Pausanias give further insight into Miltiades' status: at Olympia, he says of the Sicyonian treasury 'Here are also deposited other notable things: the sword of Pelops with a golden hilt; the horn of Amalthea, made of ivory, an offering of Miltiades, son of Cimon' (6.19.6), and he gives the inscription which is his evidence. As in the statue-group at Delphi, Miltiades is juxtaposed with a hero, in this case the eponymous hero of the Peloponnese. His offering is appropriately legendary: the horn of the goat Amalthea which was used as a drinking-horn for the baby Zeus. The second passage is in Pausanias' discussion of the battle of Thermopylae, where he makes a specific parallel between Achilles and Miltiades, saying that few wars 'owed their brightest glory to the valour of a single arm, as the Trojan war was ennobled by Achilles, and the battle of Marathon by Miltiades' (3.4.7). I shall return to Miltiades below in the discussion of the Painted Stoa.

It is perhaps surprising that Pausanias only cites one temple as having been built in Athens from the spoils of Marathon, although such spoils are repeatedly cited as providing the means to commemorate and celebrate the victory. He tells us the temple's location (the Agora) and its attribution (Eucleia, or Good Fame), saying nothing of its style, size, architecture, or any sculptural decoration (1.14.5). But this brief mention prompts the sentiment that 'I surmise that [Marathon] is the victory of which the Athenians were proudest'. Clearly, the temple's claim to fame in his view was that it was built from the spoils of Marathon and thereby enhanced by association with the most Athenian of victories.

A second temple Pausanias says was built from the spoils of Marathon poses more difficulties, however: that of Athena Areia ('Warlike Athena') at Plataea (9.4.1-2). Plutarch (*Aristides* 20.3), on the other hand, says the temple was built or re-built (there is a textual problem)²¹ from the spoils of Plataea, and not Marathon. This is more logical for a temple at Plataea, but we cannot know for certain. What is intriguing, though, is that two near-contemporary sources should attribute the temple to different battles, suggesting that what counted for most was the broad association with Persian war glory. Although nothing in Plutarch's narrative proves he visited Plataea, he must surely have done so, as he was a Boeotian, and he tells us that the graves of Greek warriors killed at Plataea were washed annually in his day (*Aristides* 21.5), which he most probably knew from first-hand experience. Pausanias also visited Plataea, and it is a fair assumption that the locals told him of the association with Marathon. The matter is not clarified by the statue Pausanias saw inside the temple, of Arimnestus, who commanded the Plataeans at both battles. It might seem strange that Pausanias' informants, the local inhabitants, would not claim association with the battle of Plataea, but the only people who fought with the Athenians

²⁰ Philostr. *Vitae Sophistarum*. On Pausanias' account of Herodes, K. W. Arafat, *Pausanias' Greece. Ancient artists and Roman rulers* (Cambridge 1996) 195-201.

²¹ Miller, *Athens and Persia* (n. 7 above) 3.

at Marathon were the Plataeans, and Marathon may have had even greater resonance for the Plataeans in terms of their perception by other Greeks, if Pausanias is right that ‘before the battle which the Athenians fought at Marathon, the Plataeans had no title to fame’ (9.1.3). Either way, therefore, the story reflects glory upon the Plataeans.

As to the temple itself, Pausanias describes the cult-statue: ‘The image is of wood gilded, but the face, hands, and feet are of Pentelic marble. In size it falls little short of the bronze image on the Acropolis, which the Athenians also dedicated from the spoils of the battle of Marathon. It was Pheidias who made the image of Athena for the Plataeans as well as for the Athenians’. The parallel with the Athena Promachos, the most striking outdoor statue on the Acropolis of Athens, reinforces the links already mentioned between the Athenians and the Plataeans. Of the interior of the temple, Plutarch (who says nothing of the cult-statue) simply tells us that it had ‘frescoes, which continue in perfect condition to the present day’ (*Aristides* 20.3). Pausanias, characteristically, describes these paintings in more detail: ‘one of them, by Polygnotus, represents Odysseus after he has killed the wooers; the other, by Onasias, depicts the former expedition of the Argives, under Adrastus, against Thebes. These paintings are on the walls of the fore-temple’ (9.4.2).

Turning to the Painted Stoa in the Agora of Athens, the paintings of Marathon, Amazons, Troy, and Oinoe are described by Pausanias (1.15.1-3)²² in a passage which is one of the most discussed of all sources for ancient art.²³ The stoa was not, as far as we know, funded by the spoils of Marathon, perhaps because it seems to have been Cimon’s project, so it had a personal agenda rather than a state agenda as temples and treasuries had, specifically, the glorification of Miltiades. On the paintings, executed around the mid-fifth century and therefore about contemporary with the Delphi Marathon group, Miltiades is depicted, as at Delphi, alongside the goddess Athena and the hero Theseus, founder of modern Athens.²⁴ In Athens, though, he is also shown alongside Callimachus, a fellow-commander at Marathon, Heracles, whom the people of Marathon were the first to regard as a god, according to Pausanias (1.15.3, 32.4), and the hero Echelolus. The latter is mentioned again by Pausanias (as Echelolus) in his description of the battlefield of Marathon: ‘they say that in the battle there was present a man of rustic aspect and dress, who slaughtered many of the barbarians with a plough, and vanished after the fight. When the Athenians inquired of the god, the only answer he vouchsafed was to bid them honour the hero Echelolus’ (1.32.5). Similarly, Herodotus tells us of Epizelus, an Athenian soldier in the battle of Marathon, who ‘was fighting bravely when he suddenly lost the sight of both eyes, though nothing had touched him anywhere ... he was opposed by a man of great stature in heavy armour, whose beard overshadowed his shield; but the

²² The sources for the Painted Stoa are gathered in R. E. Wycherley, *The Athenian agora III. Literary and epigraphical testimonia* (Princeton 1957) 31-47.

²³ E.g. three articles in *Periklean Athens*, ed. Barringer and Hurwit (n. 4 above): J. Boardman, ‘Composition and content on classical murals and vases’, 63-72; M. D. Stansbury-O’Donnell, ‘The painting program in the Stoa Poikile’, 73-88; D. Castriota, ‘Feminizing the barbarian and barbarizing the feminine: Amazons, Trojans, and Persians in the Stoa Poikile’, 89-102. Also, A. Sommerstein, ‘Argive Oinoe, Athenian *epikouroi* and the Stoa Poikile’, in *Greek art in view*, ed. S. Keay and S. Moser (Oxford 2004) 138-47.

²⁴ Plut. *Theseus* 35 refers to an apparition of Theseus at Marathon.

phantom passed him by, and killed the man at his side' (6.117). Aelian, writing later in the same century as Pausanias, tells us (*Varia Historia* 7.38) that Epizelus was depicted in the Painted Stoa, although Pausanias himself does not mention him.

Another hero mentioned by Pausanias in connection with the Persian wars, and specifically the defence of Delphi, is Phylacus, whose precinct is said to be by the temple of Athena Pronoea (Forethought) at Delphi (10.8.7).²⁵ Pausanias may have seen the precinct of Phylacus for himself, or may have depended on the account of Herodotus (8.38-39), who gives the same location, but he adds the detail that Phylacus, and Autinous, another local hero who fought the Persians with him, were 'two gigantic hoplites – taller than ever a man was – pursuing them and cutting them down'. Phylacus also appears against the Gauls in 279 (10.23.3), during an account of the battle in which Pausanias includes supernatural signs, including ghosts of four heroes.²⁶

The element of the supernatural evident in the appearances of Echetus and Epizelus at Marathon is manifest also in the support of the local god of Marathon: 'Philippides said that Pan met him about Mount Parthenius, and told him that he wishes the Athenians well and would come to Marathon to fight for them' (1.28.4). Pausanias tells us that manifestations of the supernatural at the battlefield of Marathon persisted until his day: 'Here every night you may hear horses neighing and men fighting' (1.32.4). Nor was this confined to Marathon: at Salamis, 'It is said that while the Athenians were engaged in the sea-fight with the Medes a serpent appeared among the ships, and the god announced to the Athenians that this serpent was the hero Cychreus' (1.36.1). No wonder the 'Athenians tell in song how gods fought on their side at Marathon and Salamis' (8.10.5).

The preceding discussion indicates the context in which Miltiades effectively achieved the status of hero and was sufficiently raised above ordinary mortals to be depicted in paint and bronze alongside gods and heroes at Athens and Delphi. One explanation for his special treatment is obvious: his son was Cimon, the leader of Athens in the generation after the Persian wars, the man who finally saw off the Persian threat in the 460s, and brought the bones of Theseus, the founder of Athens, back from Scyrus, as Pausanias tells us (1.17.6), noting that the Athenians dedicated a σηκός to Theseus to house the bones following Marathon.

Cimon probably commissioned the Painted Stoa, originally named the Peisianactaeion after Peisianax, his brother-in-law. The urge to promote his father's image seems to have been irresistible to Cimon. But Pausanias indicates another reason for this elevation of Miltiades: in his description of the area of Marathon (1.32.3-7), he says 'the people of Marathon worship the men who fell in the battle, naming them heroes'. As a survivor, Miltiades would not come into this category, but as a victorious general he would have been a prime candidate for elevation to hero-by-association, and the clearest manifestations of that are his portraits at Delphi and Athens.

The Painted Stoa is strikingly different from other monuments we know of – and perhaps unique – since it actually depicts the battle of Marathon. It shows clearly,

²⁵ N. Bookidis, 'The priest's house in the Marmaria at Delphi', *BCH* 107 (1983) 149-55.

²⁶ On Pausanias' account of the Gauls, K. W. Arafat, 'Pausanias the traveller: digressions on the wonders of nature and of foreign lands', *Euphrosyne* 27 (1999) 237-48, at 241-42, citing also Paus. 8.10.9.

therefore, that the Athenians could show historical events in art if they wanted to. Why, then, did they not on the Parthenon? Is it that a different convention applied to sacred buildings, such as the Parthenon, and secular, such as the Painted Stoa? Perhaps, but, if so, that convention had been done away with by the time of the temple of Athena Nike, which shows on its sculpted frieze Greeks fighting Persians, whether generically or, as often argued, in a specific battle. But that dates from only about ten years after the end of work on the Parthenon, and it is unlikely that conventions changed so quickly. Again, what of painted pottery which, like sculpture, does not show historical events, bar a very few exceptions? We could argue that it is essentially private art, and so does not celebrate public, communal, successes like sculpture. But different ways of reasoning for different art-forms seems to me an unsatisfactory and very un-Greek solution.

Pausanias' description of the Painted Stoa shows a parallel between the Amazons and the Persians, but not an equivalence: if Amazons stood for the Persians, there would be no need to depict the Persians as well. Pausanias' references to continuity from what we would see as mythical wars to historical ones are in historical contexts, not artistic ones. If he saw allegories, he did not tell his readers. Here I return to pottery. In response to my scepticism about whether Amazonomachies and similar scenes on pots do reflect the Persian wars, it may well be pointed out that many scholars have cited a rise in such depictions in the second quarter of the fifth century. However, a different picture emerges from the most recent, and continuing, study of iconographic trends in vase-painting, namely that of the Archivio Ceramografico of Catania University. In presenting the work of the Archive, Filippo and Innocenza Giudice discuss what they call the 'iconographic fortune' of many scenes, including the great fight scenes such as the Amazonomachy, gigantomachy, and centauiromachy.²⁷

I have already mentioned the consistent popularity of the gigantomachy according to my own study of the Attic red-figured vases, and I add here that the level of representations from 490-80 is slightly less than in 520-500, and that, while there is a peak of 18 c. 480-70, there is already a falling-off between 470 and 460 with 16 and a near-standstill after that until 420.²⁸ The numbers we are dealing with are not high, though, and make apparently dramatic statistical changes as likely as they are misleading. In addition, the imprecision of chronology means that dating to decades is hazardous.²⁹ Similarly, looking at the charts of the Catania archive for the 'great mythical fights',³⁰ it seems not only that there is quite a rise in the period before 500 (as in my study of the gigantomachy), and certainly before 490, but also a very sharp falling-off in all four cases from the first quarter of the fifth century to the second quarter. If that is so, it seems painters became bored with all four subjects within a very few years of the invasion of Athens. Finally, this pattern – peak 500-475, sharp fall 475-50 – is followed by these categories used by the Catania archive: 'deities', Dionysian scenes, Heracles

²⁷ F. Giudice and I. Giudice, 'Seeing the image: constructing a data-base of the imagery on Attic pottery from 635 to 300 BC', in *Athenian potters and painters volume II*, ed. J. H. Oakley and O. Palagia (Oxford and Oakville 2009) 48-62, at 48.

²⁸ Arafat, *Classical Zeus* (n. 6 above) 183-87.

²⁹ E.g. M. Robertson, *The art of vase-painting in classical Athens* (Cambridge 1992) 41.

³⁰ Giudice and Giudice, *Image* (n. 27 above) 58 (quote), 53 fig.6 (tables).

(intriguingly), heroes and various myths, the Trojan cycle, Amazons, giants, ‘exotic subjects’, ‘military life’ (although, perhaps tellingly, ‘funerary scenes’ show a distinct increase), chariots, hunting and fishing, *komos*, ‘erotic scenes’, and the symposium. In other words, there is a very widespread falling-off in the second quarter of the fifth century. This may suggest that painted pottery production was badly affected by the Persian wars – after all, one would expect the city’s luxury industries to fail in the immediate aftermath of the destruction. Or it may suggest that, if the Persian invasion had an effect on iconography, as opposed to production as a whole, it was a pretty widespread and indiscriminate effect.

I conclude with the Vivenzio *hydria*, a well-known Athenian red-figured vase by the Kleophrades Painter,³¹ which shows an Iliupersis often seen as an allegory for the conflict of the Greeks with the Persians and specifically the destruction of Athens.³² However, this requires a precise date very late in the painter’s career, and it seems to me that, if it refers to anything other than simply Troy, it more likely recalls the sack of Miletus in 494, as Pollitt suggested.³³ Resistance (the most striking feature of the vase) was greater there than in evacuated Athens, and Herodotus (6.22) tells us that the play, ‘The Fall of Miletus’, which so moved Athenian audiences was written by a Milesian, Phrynichus. It is a reminder that the Persian Wars began with the Ionian Revolt, not with the invasion of Attica. And, in turn, that Marathon was one of many stages on the road to Greek victory.

³¹ Naples, Museo Archeologico Nazionale 2422. J. Boardman, *Athenian red figure vases. The archaic period* (London 1975) fig. 135.

³² E.g. J. Boardman, ‘The Kleophrades Painter at Troy’, *Antike Kunst* 19 (1976) 3-18, at 15.

³³ J. J. Pollitt, ‘Early classical Greek art in a Platonic universe’, in *Greek art. Archaic into classical*, ed. C. G. Boulter (Leiden 1985) 96-111, at 103.

GODS, HEROES, AND THE BATTLE OF MARATHON

ARIADNE GARTZIOU-TATTI

The miraculous victory of the Greeks at Marathon is reflected in many narratives which relate the role of the gods and heroes before, during, and after the battle. In a sense, it is still unclear who the actual winners of the battle were: was it the Athenians or the gods and the heroes who helped them?

In this paper I shall attempt an analysis of the contexts in which these narratives were incorporated. I wish to examine why and how these stories were used, in order to express certain aspects of the way in which the Greeks perceived their spectacular victory against the Persians. I am forced to confine myself to evidence as viewed from the Athenian perspective only: on the one hand, we have no information for the Persian viewpoint, except only for what happened after their defeat (Hdt. 6.118);¹ on the other, the Spartan assistance arrived too late, since the Lacedaimonians, who were celebrating the Karneia, could not leave Sparta until after the festival was over (Hdt. 6.118).² As regards the participation of the Plataeans, here too our knowledge is limited: it is said that a certain Arimnestus was in command of the Plataeans (Paus. 9.4.2).³

I shall focus on the following points. First, the gods who are involved in the whole operation. Here one should take due note of the role of Artemis, Pan, Demeter, Nemesis, and Athena. The main question is why the, so to speak, great deities are not prominent in the Marathon narrative, for example Athena, to whom honours are paid only after the battle. This is rather unusual, given that the gods mentioned in the battle of Plataea are Zeus Eleutherios and Athena Areia,⁴ and at Salamis Zeus Tropaieus,⁵ Athena,⁶ Ares, and Apollo

¹ J. D. Mikalson, *Herodotus and religion in the Persian Wars* (Chapel Hill 2003) 36.

² The Spartans did not participate in military operations during the Karneia, see Hdt. 7.206 and Thuc. 5.43.2. Also, they frequently cancelled campaigns for religious reasons (Hdt. 9.11.102). See J. A. Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle of Marathon', *Historia* 43 (1993) 297-307 = *The beginnings of history: Herodotus and the Persian Wars* (Campbellville 2006) 161-200 (cf. 167 n. 20). For the festival of the Karneia see S. Scullion, 'Festivals', in D. Ogden, ed., *A companion to Greek religion* (Oxford 2007) 190-203, at 193ff.

³ See W. C. West III, *Greek public monuments of the Persian Wars* (Diss. Chapel Hill 1965) 73. The statue of Arimnestus was situated near the statue of Athena Areia.

⁴ For Zeus Eleutherios (Plut. *Arist.* 21, *De Hdt. malig.* 42), see West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 33; D. Boedeker, 'Paths to heroization at Plataea', in *The new Simonides: contexts of praise and desire*, ed. D. Boedeker and D. Sider (Oxford 2001) 148-63, at 151ff.; A. J. Spawforth, 'Symbol of unity? The Persian-Wars tradition in the Roman empire', in *Greek historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower (Oxford 1994) 233-47, at 235-36; M. Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai: Zwei Perserschlachten als 'lieux de mémoire' im antiken Griechenland* (Göttingen 2006) 239 n. 51 and 271ff. as a panhellenic cult; M. Valdés Guía, *El nacimiento de la autoctonia ateniense: cultos, mitos*

(through the Delphic oracle). Moreover, even the expression Herodotus uses, θεῶν τὰ ἴσα νεμόντων ('if the gods are impartial': 6.109.5), towards both Greeks and Persians,⁷ points to a certain neutrality on the part of the gods. Second, the role of the heroes who in various ways and under different circumstances claim for themselves a leading role in the victory of the Greek army. For now, I shall mention only Heracles, Theseus, Marathon, and Echetlus. Third, the cult practices that emerged as a result of the battle, and were subsequently granted an autonomous status, e.g. the oath and tomb-cults or the hero-cults of the dead soldiers.

The aforementioned groups do not all form part of the same framework; each is relevant to a different aspect or to a different moment of the battle. Therefore, I shall focus on the religious and mythological outlook that made the Athenians choose these particular gods or heroes, and try to interpret their presence in the literary and artistic tradition. My starting point is the view that cult practices, mythological views, and historical facts, even where they all refer to the same event, each express in a special way a different facet of the same phenomenon. It is precisely this distinctive fact that compels us to trace the particular meanings that emerge from the presence of certain divine and heroic figures. Further, we have to study them both independently and in relation to one another, in the light of their interplay and their association.

A. The gods

1. Artemis

Let us start with Artemis and Pan, since their crucial role merits a closer examination. The first question one has to ask is the following: do these two deities operate independently, or is there a deeper bond between them? And if so, how do they interfere in war activities? The surviving evidence concerning the two deities is both rich and interesting.

Although it is known that the Spartans used to sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera before battle,⁸ in his description of the sacrificial ceremony at Marathon Herodotus does not

civicos y sociedad de la Atenas del s. VI a.C. (Madrid 2008) 179ff. For the cult of Athena Areia (from the spoils of the battle of Marathon, Paus. 9.4.1-2), see West, *Greek public monuments* no. 24a, 70ff.; E. D. Francis, *Image and idea in fifth-century Greece: art and literature in the Persian Wars* (London and New York 1990) 73ff.; D. Castriota, *Myth, ethos, and actuality: official art in fifth-century B.C. Athens* (Madison, Wis. 1992) 63ff.; E. B. Harrison, 'Pheidias', in *Personal styles in Greek sculpture*, ed. O. Palagia and J. J. Pollit, *YCS* 30 (Cambridge 1996) 16-55, at 34ff. For offerings to the gods after the Persian Wars in general, see West, *Greek public monuments*; D. Boedeker, 'The view from Eleusis. Demeter in the Persian Wars', in *Cultural responses to the Persian Wars: antiquity to the third millennium*, ed. E. Bridges, E. Hall, and P. J. Rhodes (Oxford 2007) 65-82, at 65ff.

⁵ R. Parker, *Polytheism and society at Athens* (Oxford 2006) 400 n. 49.

⁶ According to Plutarch (*Them.* 12.1) Athena appeared before the battle of Salamis. See also n. 79 below.

⁷ T. Harrison, *Divinity and history: the religion of Herodotus* (Oxford 2000) 170.

⁸ Plut. *Lyc.* 22.2; Xen *Hell.* 4.2.20, *Lac.* 13.8. See M. Jameson, 'Sacrifice before battle', in *Hoplites*, ed. V. D. Hanson (London 1993) 197-227; J.-P. Vernant, 'Artémis et le sacrifice préliminaire du combat', *REG* 101 (1988) 223-39 [= F. I. Zeitlin, ed., *Mortals and immortals: collected essays Jean-Pierre Vernant* (Princeton 1991) 244-57, at 250ff.].

mention Artemis but the twelve gods.⁹ However, according to Xenophon, before the battle of Marathon the Athenians promised to sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera one goat for every dead Persian (Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.11-12, 9.32.9). After the battle, because of the large number of the dead, they decided to institute an annual sacrifice of five hundred goats to the same goddess. One could argue that Xenophon's testimony, in which he exhorts the Greek soldiers to be brave against the Persians, just as their ancestors had been,¹⁰ is of little worth, being evidently of a much later date.¹¹ However, both the testimony of Aristophanes about a sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera (*Knights* 658ff.)¹² and evidence from Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 58.1), who states that one of the duties of the polemarch was to make the sacrifice to Artemis Agrotera (ὁ δὲ Πολέμαρχος θύει μὲν θυσίας τὴν τε Ἀρτέμιδι Ἀγροτέρῃ καὶ τῷ Ἐνυαλίῳ), show that the goddess was worshipped with sacrificial ceremonies.

Indeed, a closer reading of the evidence regarding the cult practices taking place at the shrine of the goddess at Agrai suggests 'a martial aspect'. Hellenistic inscriptions attest to the fact that the Athenian ephebes began their military service at this place.¹³ Moreover, in the fourth century the sacrifices were performed by the polemarch who conducted the festivals to Artemis and Enyalios (Ar. *Ath. Pol.* 58.1).¹⁴ Inscriptions of the same date also indicate that processions of ephebes marched towards the πολυάνδρειον of Marathon,¹⁵

⁹ Hdt. 6.108; see also 6.111.2, 112.1.

¹⁰ The Ilissus temple (Paus. 1.19.6) was completed around 430-20 BC. See J. Mejer, 'Artemis in Athens', in *From Artemis to Diana: the goddess of man and beast*, ed. T. Fisher-Hansen and B. Poulsen, *Acta Hyperborea* 12 (Copenhagen 2009) 61-78, at 64ff.; A. Pautasso, 'Agrai, Artemide ed il tempio dell'Ilisso. Un problema da riconsiderare', *Atti della Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Rendiconti Classici di Scienze morale storiche e filologiche* 13.4 (2002) 773-820, states that the Ilissos temple (430-20) cannot be identified with the temple of Artemis Agrotera. The festival is known for the great procession of five hundred goats, taking place on 6 Boedromion. According to Plutarch (*De Hdt. mal.* 26 = *Moralia* 862C), the procession to Agrai was a festival of thanksgiving for the victory (χαριστήρια τῆς νίκης ἑορτάζοντες). See P. Ellinger, 'Artémis, Pan, Marathon. Mythe, polythéisme et événement historique', in *Myth and symbol I: symbolic phenomena in ancient Greek culture*, ed. S. des Bouvrie (Bergen 2002) 313-32, at 315ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 55ff.

¹¹ According to A. Purvis, *Singular dedications: founders and innovators of private cults in classical Greece* (New York and London 2003) 76ff., Xenophon, under the influence of Eastern (Lydian) views, has assimilated Ephesian Artemis with Artemis Agrotera. A second explanation can be based on Mark Munn's hypothesis that the sacrifice is a compensation for the murder of the priests of Ephesian Artemis, who had demanded earth and water from the Greeks in 491. See M. Munn, *The mother of the gods, Athens, and the tyranny of Asia: a study of sovereignty in ancient religion* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 2006) 262ff.

¹² *Knights* 658ff. (see also Schol. Ar. *Eq.* 657); Ael. *Var. Hist.* 2.25. See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 22, 65ff.

¹³ Procession under arms: *IG II²* 1006 ll. 8-9, 58, 1008 l. 7, 1001 l. 7, 1028 l. 8, 1029 l. 6, 1030 ll. 5-6, 1040 ll. 5-6. See C. Pélékides, *Histoire de l'éphébie attique: des origines à 31 avant J.-C.*, École Française d'Athènes, travaux et Mémoires 13 (Paris 1962) 219ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 54ff.

¹⁴ Dem. *Ol.* 3.31; Pollux 8.21 (s.v. Ἐνυάλιος).

¹⁵ *IG II²* 1011 ll. 26-27, 69-70. See G. Ecroth, *The sacrificial rituals of Greek hero-cults in the archaic to the early Hellenistic periods*, *Kernos Suppl.* 12 (Liège 2002) 75ff.

where they offered (ἐναγίζειν) sacrifice and wreaths honouring among others the tyrannicides.¹⁶

In other words, the preparation of the ephebes for war is located in the area between the sanctuary of Artemis at Agrai and Marathon: both are places of particular significance for the Athenians due to the ephebic ceremonies and the war activities. Artemis is, of course, known as the goddess of ephebeia *par excellence*, being the deity responsible for preparing young boys and girls to come of age. The same applies to the Marathon area, where both Theseus¹⁷ and Heracles excelled during their youth. The invocation of Heracles in the oath of the Athenian ephebes,¹⁸ as well as the celebrations at Heraclea, for example at Cynosarges (Paus. 1.19.3),¹⁹ prove the connection of the territory of Marathon with ephebic cult practices. But the association of Artemis with Marathon and war activities extends beyond the two aspects of the goddess mentioned so far, that is, pre-battle sacrifice and ephebic practice. To appreciate fully the extent of her engagement in military operations it is crucial to assess the following issues as well: the *time*, the *place*, and the *manner* in which her intervention takes place.

First, with regard to the time and manner of the divine intervention, Pausanias (7.26.13) notes that at Aigeira in Achaia her worship was associated with the use of the trick of the lit torches (the people of Aigeira gathered all the goats of their country and tied torches to their horns in their attack against the Sicyonians to frighten them).²⁰ There are also the well-known cases of Artemis Aristoboule and Artemis Phosphoros: the former's epithet commemorates the bright moonshine that preceded the battle of Salamis (Plut. *Them.* 22.2) and assisted the Greeks;²¹ the latter helped the democratic forces

¹⁶ S. P. Morris, *Daidalos and the origins of Greek art* (Princeton 1982) 298ff., for analogies between the fall of the tyrants and freedom from Persia. See also B. M. Lavelle, *The sorrow and the pity: a prolegomenon to a history of Athens under the Peisistratids, c. 560-510 B.C.*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 80 (Stuttgart 1993) 50ff. On offering (ἐναγίζειν) sacrifices to the tyrannicides, see Ecroth, *The sacrificial rituals* (n. 15 above) 170ff.

¹⁷ The people of Marathon dedicated a statue of the bull on the Acropolis (Paus. 1.27.10, set up not before 480/79 BC). See S. A. Shapiro, 'The Marathonian bull on the Athenian Akropolis', *AJA* 92 (1988) 373-82. For the bull of Marathon (Plut. *Thes.* 14; Apollod. *Epit.* 1.5; Paus. 1.27.10), a feat that is also depicted on the metope of the Athenian Treasury at Delphi, see Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 342ff.; N. Strawczynski, 'Artémis et Thésée sur le skyphos du peintre de Brygos (Louvre G 195)', *Revue archéologique* 35.3 (2003) 3-24; C. Servadei, *La figura di Theseus nella ceramica attica: iconografia e iconologia del mito nell'Atene arcaica e classica* (Bologna 2005) 67ff.

¹⁸ See M. N. Tod, *A selection of Greek historical inscriptions II* (Oxford 1948) 303-06, no. 224 I. 19.

¹⁹ See S. Woodford, 'Cults of Heracles in Attica', in *Studies presented to George M. A. Hanfmann*, ed. D. G. Mitten, J. G. Pedley, and J. A. Scott (Mainz 1971) 211-25, at 214ff.; S. C. Humphreys, *The strangeness of the gods: historical perspectives on the interpretation of Athenian religion* (Oxford 2004) 166 n. 89; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 37 and n. 42. For Heracles' role see below.

²⁰ Plut. *Them.* 22.2. See P. Ellinger, *La légende nationale phocidienne. Artémis, les situations extrêmes et le récit de la guerre d'anéantissement*, *École Française d'Athènes, BCH Suppl.* 27 (Rome and Paris 1993) 222-24.

²¹ Hdt. 8.77 Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσάορον, Plut. *Glor. Athen.* 7.349ff., *Lys.* 15.1. The goddess was offered a flat cake ringed with torches on 16 Mounichion, and the ephebes honored her with procession and

returning from Phyle.²² In all these cases Artemis does not fight, she guides and rescues. Thus for her friends, she becomes a 'saviour'; for her enemies she is disastrous.²³

This peculiar epiphany of the goddess, accompanied by flash and light at the turning point of the battle can be compared with the events at the battle of Marathon,²⁴ where the light game is evident. Let us not forget the reply of the Spartans to the Athenian bid for help, namely that they could not leave their city until the moon was full, and the story of Epizelus who lost his sight after seeing a giant hoplite.²⁵ The depiction of the moon on the left of the owl's head on silver four-drachma coins minted after the battle of Marathon is of particular importance for the larger picture, as it points to the help of Artemis.²⁶ It is still unknown, of course, whether the delay of the Persian cavalry in engaging in the battle was due to the lateness of the moonset. This tradition, according to Hammond, is related to the role of Artemis-moon in immobilizing the Persian cavalry.²⁷

One can also trace an analogy between the type of space which falls under the protection of Artemis and the topography of Marathon. Artemis offers protection in particularly dangerous areas, for example Artemis Mounichia, who oversees the entrance of the harbours of Athens. Given this function of the goddess, it is not unreasonable to see a correspondence between boundary areas and the land of Marathon.

sacrifice (Athen. 14.645a-b, Pollux 6.75). See Vernant, 'Artémis' (n. 8 above) 248 n. 19; Α. Παλιοκρασσῶ, *Τὸ ἱερὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος Μουνιχίας*. Βιβλιοθήκη τῆς ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας 115 (Athens 1991) 35ff.; R. Garland, *Introducing new gods: the politics of Athenian religion* (Ithaca 1992) 72; S. Cole Guettel, *Landscapes, gender, and ritual space: the ancient Greek experience* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 2004) 190 n. 82; Strawczynski, 'Artémis et Thésée' (n. 17 above) 14ff.

²² Diod. Sic. 14.32.3. See P. Borgeaud, *Recherches sur le dieu Pan* (Rome 1979) 147-49; Vernant, 'Artémis' (n. 8 above) 248ff.; Ellinger, *La légende* (n. 20 above) 229ff.; Cole Guettel, *Landscapes* (n. 21 above) 190ff. According to Humphreys, *The strangeness of the gods* (n. 19 above) 91 n. 35 (*IG II²* 1299, third century) the epithet Agrotera is restored as the cult name of Artemis at Phyle. On the role of Artemis Phosphoros in military expeditions, see A. Zografou, 'Les phôosphoroi et la tholos d'Athènes', in *Nommer les dieux: théonymes, épithètes, épiklèses dans l'antiquité*, ed. N. Belayche, P. Brulé, G. Freyburger, Y. Lehmann, L. Permot, and F. Prost (Rennes 2005) 531-42, at 539ff. For the common presence of Pan and Artemis at Phyle, see n. 63 below.

²³ On the role of Artemis as Soteira (saviour), see L. R. Farnell, *The cults of the Greek states*, II (Oxford 1806) 576, 585; I. Solima, 'Era, Artemide e Afrodite in Magna Grecia e in Grecia. Dee armate o dee beliche?', *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome* 110.1 (1998) 381-417, at 392ff.; Mikalson, *Herodotus and religion* (n. 1 above) 195; R. Parker, *Athenian religion. A history* (Oxford 1996) 155 n. 10. A statue of Artemis the Saviour (Paus. 1.44.2, 4) was dedicated by the Megarians for their victory against Mardonios; some of Mardonios' soldiers during the night mistook the path due to Artemis' intervention, and thus the next day they were massacred by the hoplites of Megara. See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 82, 187.

²⁴ For Artemis' epiphanies, see Cole Guettel, *Landscapes* (n. 21 above) 189 esp. n. 75.

²⁵ Hdt. 6.117; Plut. *Moralia* 305C. For the painting programme of the Stoa Poikile, see below n. 89.

²⁶ See B. Petrakos, *Marathon*, The Archeological Society at Athens Library, no. 155 (Athens 1996) 25ff.

²⁷ See N. G. L. Hammond, 'The campaign and the battle of Marathon', *JHS* 88 (1968) 13-57, at 40ff., who relates the moon to the worship of Artemis at the shrine at Agrai.

But it is not only Artemis who operates in the area. The Persians perished at the marshy borderline of Marathon between land and sea (Paus 1.15.3-4, 1.32.7),²⁸ where the presence of Pan is also very strong, as is the presence of the spring Makaria (Makaria being the daughter of Heracles who helped the Athenians (Paus. 1.32.6)).²⁹ In this very area the local forces are, not surprisingly, the powerful guardians and protectors of their land. One of them is Marathon, a foreigner who gave his name to a part of Attica. According to the tradition, an oracle foretold that his death would guarantee the victory of the Tyndaridai (they were claiming their sister Helen from Theseus, Plut. *Th.* 32.5).³⁰ In addition to this hero from Corinth, the *Titanis* earth (the white ground, which points to a context of autochthony),³¹ we could mention here one more protector of the land of Marathon, namely Echetlus. According to Pausanias (1.32.5, 1.15.3-4, Stoa Poikile),³² Echtleus killed many of the barbarians with a plough and disappeared after the battle (subsequently the Delphians ordered the honouring of Echetlus as a god). Pausanias' presentation of this rustic figure underscores the deep connection between the heroes of Marathon and the wild as well as the cultivated land of their country.³³ Indeed, within the context of autochthony, even the hero Theseus appears to have risen from the ground, presenting himself to the hoplites at Marathon.³⁴ The hypothesis that the gap from which he rose is the chasm of Oenoe³⁵ makes the connection with Marathon even stronger.³⁶ In other words, both the local heroes and the rest of the elements which constitute the cultic 'map' of Marathon testify to the powerful presence of local divinities and heroes which guard and protect the vital boundaries of the Marathon territory.³⁷

²⁸ Plat. *Mx.* 240c. See Ellinger, *La légende* (n. 20 above) 58ff.

²⁹ For the position of the spring Makaria, see Π. Θέμελης, 'Μαραθών: τα πρόσφατα αρχαιολογικά εύρηματα σε σχέση με τη μάχη', *ΑΔ* 29 (1974) 226-44, at 229; differently, Δ. Φωτίου, *Μαραθώνας* (Rhodes 2008).

³⁰ E. Kearns, *The heroes of Attica*, *BICS* Suppl. 57 (London 1989) 45, 183; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 53ff.

³¹ Ellinger, *La légende* (n. 20 above) 99.

³² See the discussion of Arafat in this volume.

³³ Philost. *Lives of the Sophists* 553: ... ἔστι δὲ ἥρωος γεωργός (probably confusing Echtleus with Marathon). See M. H. Jameson, 'The Hero Echetlaeus', *TAPA* 82 (1951) 49-61; J. G. Szilágyi, s.v. Echetlos, *LIMC* III.1 (1986) 677ff.; R. S. Bloch, s.v. Echetlos, *NP* III (1997) 868; Parker, *Polytheism* (n. 5 above) 197; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 50ff.

³⁴ Plut. *Thes.* 35; Paus. 1.15.3. On Theseus and the theme of autochthony, see Strawczynski, 'Artémis et Thésée' (n. 17 above) 13 n. 47. On the role of Theseus in the battle of Marathon, see below.

³⁵ D. Damaskos, s.v. Oinoe I, *LIMC* VII.1 (1994) 18-19 and below n. 91.

³⁶ J. Boardman, 'Herakles, Theseus and Amazons', in *The eye of Greece: studies in the art of Athens*, ed. D. Kurtz and B. Spaker (Cambridge 1982) 1-28.

³⁷ A similar picture emerges with regard to the Greek resistance at sea. Boreas is dominant there, the north wind who damaged the Persian fleet at Mt Athos (Hdt. 7.189; Paus. 1.19.5). He too has a sanctuary at Ilissos, see West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 51, 146; Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 71ff.; Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 322. Furthermore, the mythical Salaminian king Kychreus, in the form of a snake (Paus. 1.36.10), as well as a feminine figure (Hdt.

The local heroes, then, forcefully protect the land of Marathon against the ferocity of the enemies, thus turning the area into an inhospitable and inimical field for the invaders. This piece of land is akin to the *eschatiai*, that is, the borderline area which belongs to Artemis' domain. Thus, to answer our initial question regarding the involvement of Artemis in the war, I think it is now evident that the function of the goddess involves her being present in dangerous war affairs as well as helping the defendants under difficult weather and territorial conditions. The darkness, the bad weather, the night attack, the light of the torches, the goats-device, the terrifying environment which scares the enemies and makes them unable to resist,³⁸ all these elements bring out the special participation of Artemis in battles which do not fit into ordinary hoplite war. They also reveal the participation of Artemis particularly in battles in which the defendants find themselves in critical circumstances. It is the kind of situation which Ellinger calls 'wars of total annihilation', *i.e.* a situation in which the survival of the whole community is at stake.³⁹

The overcoming of obstacles and successful resistance against ferocity, in conjunction with the need to keep the men in constant readiness for war, made the cult of Artemis prominent. Thus, Artemis became an indispensable part of Athenian religion. With the foundation of her shrine at Agrai and the establishment of sacrifices, which take the form of a democratic institution δημοθοινία (a public feast), Artemis becomes a protecting power both of the security of Athens and of the constant readiness of the ephebes to face any danger or threat. This function of hers is stressed in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, in the hymn about the help of Artemis during the Persian wars: the play ends with a prayer to Artemis Agrotera (1262-72).⁴⁰ The full acceptance of Artemis into the heart of the Athenian life is shown by the foundation after the battle of Marathon of a temple to Artemis Eukleia (Fair Fame, Paus. 1.14.5)⁴¹ from the spoils of Marathon.

8. 840) are both reputed to have appeared at the battle of Salamis. See F. Graf, 'Trick or treat? On collective epiphanies in antiquity', *ICS* 29 (2004) 111-30, at 115ff.

³⁸ For Artemis' landscapes, see Ellinger, 'Artémis' (n. 10 above) 141ff.; Cole Guettel, *Landscapes* (n. 21 above) 180ff.; Parker, *Polytheism* (n. 5 above) 401.

³⁹ Ellinger, *La légende* (n. 20 above) 334ff.

⁴⁰ Ellinger, 'Artémis' (n. 10 above) 326ff. We do not know when this view was established. Still, there is a significant testimony by Bacchylides (*Ode* 11.37-43) about the foundation by the Greeks who fought at Troy of a cult of Artemis Agrotera at Metapontion in Southern Italy (where there is a statue of Artemis Promachos). See Solima, 'Era, Artemide e Afrodite' (n. 23 above) 400ff.

⁴¹ West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 15, 48ff.; L. Kahil, Eukleia, *s.v.* LIMC II.1 (1984) 677; A. Kossatz-Deissmann, *s.v.* Eukleia, LIMC IV.1 (1998) 48-51; R. Bolch, *s.v.* Eukleia, NP IV (1998) 235ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 59ff. At the Agora, which is also described as Eukleia (Pind. fr. 75), one also finds the temple of Artemis Aristoboule founded by Themistocles. See Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 75; Ellinger, 'Artémis' (n. 10 above) 325ff. There is evidence for Eukleia's cult at Plataea as well (Paus. 1.14.5, 9.17.1-2), along with that of Zeus Eleythereus (Plut. *Arist.* 20.6-8). See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 85; Parker, *Polytheism* (n. 5 above) 400ff. Eukleia is also known at Thebes (Paus. 9.7.1-2) and at Corinth (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2). On abstract notions such as *eukleia*, *eunomia*, and *peitho*, see M. Tiverios, 'Bild und Geschichte', in *An archaeology of representation: ancient Greek vase-painting and contemporary methodologies*, ed. D. Yatromanolakis (Athens 2009) 192 n. 103.

In other words, the goddess of boundaries finds her own place in the city-cult, as a permanent, two-fold ‘sign’: on the one hand, as a reminder of the glory the Athenians won by facing the ferocious invasion, on the other, as a sign of the continuous readiness of the prospective warriors (ephebes) against any danger or threat. From this standpoint it is, I think, worthwhile investigating the role and participation of Pan in the Athenian resistance.

2. Pan

According to Herodotus (6.105.2-3), the Athenians sent Pheidippides to Sparta to ask for military aid. During the journey, he met Pan in Tegea. The god promised his help, but also asked Pheidippides why he was neglected by the Athenians (Paus. 1.28.4-5). After that the Athenians established a sacred cave at the Acropolis, as well as annual sacrifices and a torch-race.⁴²

What is crucial for my discussion is the role of Pan in the battle of Marathon, or in other words the reason why Herodotus chose an aetiological narrative in order to explain the presence of this god at the heart of the Athenian cult life, the Acropolis, after the victory of the Athenians against the Persians.⁴³ Pan indeed became part of the Marathon legend as an ally of the Athenians⁴⁴ and this is evident from both an anonymous epigram (AP 16.259: πέτρης ἐκ Παρίης με πάλιν κατὰ Παλλάδος ἄκρην/στήσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Πάνα τροπαιοφόρον),⁴⁵ and a statue offering by Miltiades in recognition of Pan’s help against the Medes (AP 16.232: τὸν τραγόπουν ἐμὲ Πάνα, τὸν Ἀρκάδα, τὸν κατὰ Μήδων/τὸν μετ’ Ἀθηναίων, στήσατο Μιλτιάδης). We should also keep in mind his contribution, however insignificant, to the battle of Salamis, where the Greeks defeated Xerxes’ fleet near Psytaleia, the island sacred to Pan (Aesch. *Persai* 447ff.).⁴⁶

⁴² See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 16, 49ff.; Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 195ff.; Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 48ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 38ff. Regardless of whether there had already been some sort of worship of Pan in Attica (Paus. 1.32.7; the cave was located in 1958 by T. I. Papademetriou, ‘Μαραθῶν Σπήλαιον Πανός’, in *Τὸ Ἔργον τῆς Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας* 1958, 15-22), the shrine seems to have been established on the Acropolis not long after the battle of Marathon, see Parker, *Religion* (n. 23 above) 163ff., 164 n. 38.

⁴³ For Pan’s caves at Oenoe and Vari, see West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 16, 49ff.; Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 235ff.; Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 60ff.; Parker, *Religion* (n. 23 above) 164 n. 38; E. Lupu, ‘The sacred law from the cave of Pan at Marathon (SEG XXXVI 267)’, *ZPE* 137 (2001) 119-24; G. Schörner and H. R. Goette, *Die Pan-Groote von Vari, with Epigraphical Commentary* by Klaus Hallof, *Schriften zur historischen Landeskunde Griechenlands* 1 (Mainz 2004); Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 40ff.

⁴⁴ Paus. 1.28.4, 8.54.6, etc.

⁴⁵ Boedeker, ‘Paths’ (n. 4 above) 222 n. 141. Probably wrongly attributed to Simonides but of the early fifth century, see S. Hornblower, ‘Epic and epiphanies. Herodotus and the “New Simonides”’, in *The new Simonides*, ed. Boedeker and Sider (n. 4 above) 135-47, at 144.

⁴⁶ Soph. *Ajax* 695 ἀλίπλαγκτε; Suda s.v. ἀλίπλαγκτος. See Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 44ff. On analogies with Boreas (n. 37 above), see Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 322ff.

Many interpretations have already been offered on the subject, and the presence of Pan is often connected with panic and fear.⁴⁷ One can identify two additional domains of this peculiar god. On the one hand, his role is to cause panic in the enemies, as P. Borgeaud has also shown. The French scholar attaches great significance to the god's attribute as a creator of disorder in the enemy camp after the battle.⁴⁸ This hypothesis could be reinforced, first, by the epigrams mentioned above, second, by the testimony of Polemon the sophist, according to whom a Persian ship was pursued by Pan,⁴⁹ and finally by the painting in the Stoa Poikile as described by Pausanias (1.53.3), where the figure of Pan was presented along with gods like Athena and heroes like Heracles and Theseus. These attributes of the god signify his power to terrify the enemies, that is, to affect the Other, the opponent.

One could also add the pictorial evidence regarding the presence of the god in general: he is presented as fighting against monsters and struggling against brutality,⁵⁰ often with features resembling those of an ephebe.⁵¹ Consequently, the god's realm expands and thus partly appropriates Artemis' domain, as is the case with attributes like resistance to ferocity-savagery, protection of boundaries, and preparation of young men for war. This picture is also confirmed by the ephebic dedications in the cave of the god at Oenoe, according to an inscription dating from 61-60 BC.⁵² Even the torch races established in Pan's honour constitute an ephebic ceremony,⁵³ which is a field familiar to Artemis, as is also the night light that scares the enemies.⁵⁴

On the other hand, the incorporation of Pan in the Marathon narrative is also related to the way in which this new god affects the Athenians, for whom the presence of Pan is propitious (Hdt. 6.105). His presence in the cultic practice of Attica, and Athens in

⁴⁷ See Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 147; Hornblower, 'Epic epiphanies' (n. 45 above) 144ff., esp. 144 n. 38, states that battle panic was associated with Pan by a fourth-century bronze plaque (about 359 BC). Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 42; S. Tsitsirides, 'Über die Panik', in *Beiträge zu den Fragmenten des Klearchos von Soloi* (Berlin and New York 2010) 110-21; N. Richer, 'Personified abstractions in Laconia: suggestions on the origins of Phobos' in *Personification in the Greek world: from antiquity to Byzantium*, ed. E. Stafford and J. Herrin, Centre for Hellenic Studies, Publications 7 (Hampshire 2004) 111-22, at 116ff., argues that the cult of Fear (Phobos), son of Ares, which had been known in Sparta already since the sixth century, may have influenced Pheidippides.

⁴⁸ Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 200ff.

⁴⁹ Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 52 n. 3.

⁵⁰ C. Pouzadoux, 'La dualité du dieu bouc: les epiphanies de Pan à la chasse et à la guerre dans la céramique apulienne (seconde moitié du IV^e siècle av. J.-C.)', *Anthropozoologica* 33-34 (2001) 11-21, at 12ff.

⁵¹ Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 45ff.

⁵² Lupu, 'The sacred law from the cave of Pan at Marathon' (n. 43 above); Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 46 n. 75.

⁵³ Humphreys, *The strangeness of the gods* (n. 19 above) 114ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 45 n. 73; Zografou, 'Les phôsphoroi' (n. 22 above). Plutarch (*Arist.* 11) names Aktaion (and Pan) among the deities to whom the Athenians made sacrifice in 479 before the battle of Plataea.

⁵⁴ Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 229ff.

particular, may be related to the historical circumstances of the time, more specifically to a pro-Arcadian policy on the part of Athens.⁵⁵ The epiphany of Pan to Pheidippides (Hdt. 6.105: περιπίπτει; Paus. 8.54.5: φανῆναι), which has been identified (*Suda* s.v. Ἰππίας)⁵⁶ with the shadow that appeared to Epizelus, may also be related to the image of the Athenian warriors, who were the first to use the running attack in battle (Hdt. 6.112.1).⁵⁷ Such a common practice seems to account for the fact that the image of the running warriors became a symbol of Athenian victory.⁵⁸

Therefore, the complex domain of the Arcadian god justifies his incorporation in the heart of the Athenian religion.⁵⁹ By a decision of the Athenian assembly, the god of nature is incorporated into the world of a city which, like Arcadia (Hdt. 8.73), prided itself on the autochthony of its people.⁶⁰ The god becomes a symbol of the victory against the barbarians. His settlement on the sacred rock of the Acropolis signifies the end of the war and the goods of peace and reconciliation (Arist. *Lysistrata* 910-913, Eur. *Ion* 491ff.).⁶¹ One should also point to the special connection between Pan, the territory of Marathon, and the marshy area (Paus. 1.15.3, 1.32.7), close to which Pan's cave lies.⁶²

It is now evident that the two divinities (Artemis and Pan) operate in common and mutually complementary fields: boundaries, rites of passage, ephebes, and the difficulties, in general, faced by defenders at war. Thus, they were selected as the paradigms *par excellence* to express the courage of the Athenians, who faced on their own the most serious threat yet against Greek civilization. The parallel action of those two divine forces that causes confusion in the opponent (keep in mind that Artemis at Agrai is worshipped together with Enyalios) is evident in their common presence against the oligarchs at Phyle

⁵⁵ See the discussion of Mastrapas in this volume.

⁵⁶ For Pan's epiphanies, see Graf, 'Trick or treat?' (n. 37 above) 115ff.; Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 47ff.; Hornblower, 'Epic epiphanies' (n. 45 above). Epizelus is depicted near Pan in the painting of the Stoa Poikile, see n. 25 above and E. B. Harrison, 'The south frieze of the Nike temple and the Marathon painting in the Painted Stoa', *AJA* 16 (1972) 353-58, at 367ff.

⁵⁷ On the distance that the messenger had to cover and on the *dromos* of the Athenians, see Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 52ff.; D. L. Christensen *et al.*, 'Herodotos and Hemerodromoi: Phidippides' run from Athens to Sparta in 490 B.C., from historical and physiological perspectives', *Hermes* 137 (2009) 148-69; P. Krenz, 'A cup by Douris and the battle of Marathon', in *New perspectives on ancient warfare*, ed. G. G. Fagan and M. Trundle (Leiden 2010) 183-204, at 187ff.

⁵⁸ Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 302ff.

⁵⁹ Pan was worshipped in Arcadia at least from the sixth century, see M. Jost, *Sanctuaires et cultes d'Arcadie*, École Française d'Athènes, Études péloponnésienes 9 (Paris 1985) 456-76.

⁶⁰ Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 195ff.; Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 62; N. Loraux, 'Un arcadien à Athènes', in *Né de la terre: mythe et politique à Athènes* (Paris 1996) 64-74.

⁶¹ Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 233. Those attributes of Pan are supported by epigraphical evidence: *SEG* I.248, 60 (see Borgeaud, *Recherches* 198); Pouzadoux, 'La dualité du dieu bouc' (n. 50 above) 17ff.

⁶² See n. 43 above.

in 403 BC. There, the army of the Thirty Tyrants was overtaken by panic when a heavy snowstorm fell out of a clear sky at midday.⁶³

3. *Demeter*

In addition to the aforementioned divinities protecting boundaries, we can mention Demeter and Kore, if we are to trust the sophist Polemon's testimony about their presence in the Marathonian corpus (A35, B41).⁶⁴ The pair of Demeter and Kore (who were also worshipped in the Marathonian *Tetrapolis*),⁶⁵ often appear as guardians of the land, as evidenced by their presence in Greek prayers at Plataea along with Pan, Zeus, Hera, and others (Plut. *Arist.* 11.3).⁶⁶

Along with the deities whose care is to protect the defenders and to cause panic among the enemy, the Athenians came up with another god with reference to the arrogance and insolence (*hybris*) of those enemies.

4. *Nemesis*

The new temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous was built c. 430-20, a few miles away from Marathon.⁶⁷ Once again, the connection of the battlefield with the defeat of the barbarians and their insolent behaviour (*hybris*) is revealing.⁶⁸ On the base of the marble statue of Nemesis (made of Persian marble, which was commissioned by the Attic *dēmos* of Rhamnous to Pheidias, Paus. 1.33.2-3), the brothers of Oenoe are mentioned (Paus. 1.33.8). The graphic representation on the base of the statue is unknown, and various reconstructions have been proposed. Nevertheless, it is clear that the myth of Nemesis, of Helen, and of Tyndareos and his children can be seen as part of a number of allegories

⁶³ Borgeaud, *Recherches* (n. 22 above) 148; Ellinger, *La légende* (n. 20 above) 228; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) n. 71.

⁶⁴ Harrison, 'The south frieze of the Nike temple' (n. 56 above) 366ff., states that Polemon could have seen the painting when he visited Athens in AD 131. See also Boedeker, 'The view' (n. 4 above) 72ff.

⁶⁵ *IG II²* 1358.

⁶⁶ Boedeker, 'The view' (n. 4 above) 74ff.

⁶⁷ The ancient sanctuary may have suffered damage during the Persian invasion of 490 and the new temple was built around 430. See B. Ch. Petrakou, *Ὁ δῆμος τοῦ Ραμνοῦντος. Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρευνῶν (1813-1998)*, Βιβλιοθήκη τῆς ἐν Ἀθῆναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας ἄρ. 181 (Athens 1999) 87-303; M. M. Miles, 'A reconstruction of the temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous', *Hesperia* 58.2 (1989) 131-246; K. D. Shapiro Lapatin, 'A family gathering in Rhamnous? Who is who on the Nemesis base', *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 107-19; E. J. Stafford, 'Nemesis, hybris and violence', in *La violence dans les mondes Grec et Romain: actes du colloque international, Paris, 2-4 mai 2002*, ed. J.-M. Bertrand (Paris 2005) 195-212, at 198ff.; A. Kosmopoulos, *The iconography of sculptural statue bases in the archaic and classical periods* (Wisconsin 2002) 131ff., 244ff. with further references to secondary literature; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 191ff.

⁶⁸ Stafford, 'Nemesis' (n. 67 above) 200ff.

that concern the disputes between Greeks and Persians, Greeks and Trojans.⁶⁹ The myth may also point to the local tradition regarding the abduction of Helen and the invasion of the Tyndaridae into Attica, and the role Theseus played in the story (Hdt. 9.73).⁷⁰ The allusion to the Greek victory at Marathon is reinforced by Pausanias' claim that the head of the statue was decorated with a crown of deer and small images of Nikai.

The representation in its entirety is of particular significance, considering that the Nike-theme had become part of the conceptual framework about Marathon right after the victory of the Athenians. This is evident from the fact that although Callimachus died on the battlefield, according to the tradition it was Callimachus himself who dedicated the statue of Nike on the Acropolis.⁷¹ Moreover, it is possible that ephebes wearing victory wreaths took part in torch-races at Nemesis already in the fourth century,⁷² while the image of the deer is reminiscent of Artemis (and Agamemnon's insult).⁷³ These elements make up a graphic representation which contains a number of allusions and covers a wide spectrum of meanings that evoke the domains of Artemis and Pan.

Apart from those forces, which each in their own way reinforced the courage and resolution of the defenders, one further category comes to the fore: forces that express the gratitude the Athenians felt for those who helped them in their great struggle.

5. Athena

The Persian defeat at Marathon and the subsequent destruction of the shrines by Xerxes led the Athenians to vow not to rebuild their temples, as a memorial of the Persian impiety.⁷⁴ However, as time went by, impressive works were produced that gave expression not only to the Athenians' feelings of superiority but also to their feelings of gratitude toward those who

⁶⁹ For a synopsis of the various views, see Kosmopoulos, *The iconography* (n. 67 above) 131ff.

⁷⁰ On the invasion of the Tyndaridae into Attica, see A. M. Biraschi, 'L'altro Teseo: mito, storia, politica e storiografia nel V secolo', *Atene e Roma* 48 (2003) 49-62, at 52ff. On the abduction of Helen, see M. Fell, 'Kimon und die Gebeine des Theseus', *Klio* 86 (2004) 16-54, at 26ff. On the local character of the mythological material in the representation of the base, see Petrakou, *Ὁ δῆμος τοῦ Παμνοῦντος* (n. 67 above) 258ff.

⁷¹ *IG I² 609* may be dated after the victory. See A. E. Raubitschek, 'Two monuments erected after the victory of Marathon', *AJA* 44 (1940) 53-59; West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 12, 22ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 72ff.; C. M. Keesling, 'The Callimachus monument on the Athenian Acropolis (*CEG* 256) and Athenian commemoration of the Persian War', in *Archaic and classical epigram*, ed. M. Baumbach, A. Petrovic, and I. Petrovic (Cambridge 2010) 100-30, claims that it is a monument for the death of Callimachus in battle. He also makes a reference to the *kyrekeion* of the statue decorated with the head of Pan (122). A fragment of what was possibly a statue of Nike may have decorated the Ionic capital of the trophy of Marathon, see G. Steinhauer, *Ἡ Μάχη του Μαραθώνα: ιστορία και θρόλος*, Ἴδρυμα της Βουλῆς των Ελλήνων (Athens 2010) 155.

⁷² O. Palagia and D. M. Lewis, 'The ephebes of Erechtheis, 333/2 B.C. and their dedication', *ABSA* 74 (1989) 333-44, at 339ff.; Petrakou, *Ὁ δῆμος τοῦ Παμνοῦντος* (n. 67 above) 294ff.; Humphreys, *The strangeness of the gods* (n. 19 above) 115 n. 15; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 198ff.

⁷³ E. G. Pemberton, 'The gods of the east frieze of the Parthenon', *AJA* 80.2 (1976) 113-24, at 117ff., on the connection between Artemis and Nemesis.

⁷⁴ West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 30, 94ff.

helped them in their struggle against the barbarians. There is no need to dwell on the Parthenon, or even on the hypothesis that the 192 horsemen of the Parthenon frieze recall the Marathon warriors.⁷⁵ I will only mention Pheidias' bronze statue of Athena Promachos on the Acropolis, dated around 455 BC as a *dekate* from the spoils of Marathon (Paus. 1.28.2 and *aparchai* Paus 9.4.1).⁷⁶ This attribute of Athena Promachos is reminiscent of the language of the epigram (Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες) from the Stoa Poikile,⁷⁷ and serves as a constant reminder of the praise the Athenians won for their fighting spirit in the war against the barbarians (Demosthenes 19.272: ἀριστεῖον τῆς Ἀθήνας).

Athena is depicted on the base of the Athenian Treasure at Delphi,⁷⁸ and in the painting of the Stoa Poikile she is also presented as participating in the battle. It is clear, then, that the Athenians fully acknowledged the crucial support of their tutelary deity in the final victory.⁷⁹ Athena is related to Marathon in yet another way, as she is worshipped as Athena Hellotis (*i.e.* as a goddess of the marsh).⁸⁰ It is also no accident that in the second half of the fifth century Athena Nike appears as an independent force with her own shrine.⁸¹

Athena's presence is, of course, of a different nature from the presence of Artemis and Pan. Here, the superiority of the Athenians and the praise of their fighting spirit are

⁷⁵ J. Boardman, 'The Parthenon frieze – another view', in *Festschrift für F. Bommer*, ed. U. Hockmann and A. Krug (Mainz 1977) 39-49.

⁷⁶ The statue was fashioned some time between the battle of Eurymedon (465) and the completion of the Parthenon. See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 18, 55ff.; D. W. G. Gill, 'The decision to build the temple of Athena Nike (IG I³ 35)', *Historia* 50.3 (2001) 257-78. at 270ff.; H.-J. Gerhke, 'From Athenian identity to European ethnicity – the cultural biography of the myth of Marathon', in *Ethnic constructs in antiquity: the role of power and tradition*, ed. T. Derks and N. Roymans (Amsterdam 2009) 85-100, at 92.

⁷⁷ West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 6, 11; E. D. Francis and M. Vickers, 'The Marathon epigram in the Stoa Poikile', *Mnemosyne* 38.3-4 (1985) 390-93; E. Bowie, 'Marathon in fifth-century epigram', in *Μαραθών. Η Μάχη και ο αρχαίος Λήμος*, ed. K. Bourazelis and K. Meidani (Athens 2010) 203-20, at 212ff.

⁷⁸ Paus. 10.10.1. See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 17, 52ff. Athena and Theseus appear together on the metopes of the Treasure as well, see Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 343ff.

⁷⁹ The owl appeared in the sky before the naval battle at Salamis (Arist. *Wasps* 1111-86; Plut. *Them.* 12.1). Pallas is mentioned in an epigram (IG I³ 503/40) probably referring to the sea-battle of Salamis, see Bowie, 'Marathon' (n. 77 above) 205ff.

⁸⁰ For Athena's connection with Marathon, see *Odyssey* 7.80. For Athena Hellotis (Schol. Pind. *Ol.* 13.56), see F. Graf, 'Hellotis', *NP* III (1988) 326. An inscribed boundary stone was found near the site of the battle. See Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 57; Humphreys, *The strangeness* (n. 19 above) 172 n. 109; A. P. Matthaiou, 'Ἀθηναίοισι τεταγμένοισι ἐν τεμένει Ἡρακλέος (Her. 6.108.1)', in *Herodotus and his world: essays from a conference in memory of George Forrest*, ed. P. Derow and R. Parker (Oxford 2003) 190-202, at 201 n. 36.

⁸¹ The presentation of the temple of Athena Nike does not fall within the scope of the present study. See I. S. Mark, *The sanctuary of Athena Nike in Athens: architecture and chronology*, *Hesperia* Suppl. XXVI (Princeton 1993); D. Giraud, *Μελέτη αποκαταστάσεως του ναού της Αθηνάς Νίκης* (Athens 1994); S. L. Karakas, *Subject and symbolism in historical battle reliefs of the late classical and Hellenistic period* (Diss. Chapel Hill 2002) 22ff.

expressed in all their magnitude. In other words, gods newly integrated into the Athenian or Attic calendar and landscape,⁸² gods connected with the ferocity of the battlefield, and the tutelary deities of the city compose a complex image. This is an image expressive of the will of those who defended the Athenian democracy to incorporate into their city all the forces that contributed to the victory of the few against the barbarians. This framework works simultaneously on two levels. One is concerned with the preparation for battle, the fighting spirit of the warriors, the overcoming of obstacles, and the constant readiness of the young warriors to fight off any invasion. This is where Artemis, Pan, Demeter, and Athena belong. The other relates to the gratitude the Athenians felt and to the emphasis they placed on the bravery of their resistance. It is however remarkable that the contribution of the gods is in a sense secondary, as if their presence is merely the canvas on which the Athenian feat is drawn. The main burden for the defence, and the responsibility for the outcome of the battle, falls upon another group, that of the heroes, to whom tradition has assigned a special place.

B. The heroes

When it comes to the ideology of the battle of Marathon, the heroes, like the divinities we have seen above, work for Athenian mythic thought on two inter-complementary fields. The first encompasses the heroes who protect and defend the battlefield. We have already mentioned the cases of the hero Marathon, and of Epizelus and Echtleus. Each of these cases manifests in its own way the resistance of the local forces against the invasion and the fight for the sake of the land of Marathon. Equally crucial for the outcome of the battle is the presence of Heracles and Theseus. Their participation, however, is characterized by some distinctive features which I will examine below.

1. Heracles

Herodotus says that the Plataeans joined the Athenians at the Heracleion at Marathon before engaging with the Persians (6.108), and later on, when he refers to the march of the Athenian hoplites from Marathon to Phaleron, he mentions the Heracleion of Kynosarges (6.116). Herodotus' persistence in naming these places is, of course, not accidental.⁸³ The cult of Heracles at Marathon (during the festival of the Heracleia) is attested immediately after the battle: an inscription dating to shortly after 490 records the procedure of the election of the Officials for the Heracleian Games at Marathon (three men from each tribe participated and vowed ἱερὰ).⁸⁴ A festival and games in honour of Heracles at Marathon

⁸² Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 319.

⁸³ The study of H. Bowden, 'Herakles, Herodotos and the Persian Wars', in *Herakles and Hercules: exploring a Graeco-Roman divinity*, ed. L. Rawlings and H. Bowden (Swansea 2005) 1-13, is not very illuminating, but his remarks on the role of Heracles in the battle of Thermopylae are interesting (8ff.).

⁸⁴ *IG* I³ 2/3 early fifth century BC. See Woodford, 'Cults of Heracles in Attica' (n. 19 above); Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 56; Boedeker, 'Paths' (n. 4 above) 151 n. 20, 152 n. 26; Matthaiou, 'Ἀθηναίους' (n. 80 above) 190ff., states that the festival was probably established after the battle; Humphreys, *The strangeness* (n. 19 above) 166ff., esp. 166 n. 89, 171; Jung, *Marathon*

are also mentioned by Pindar (*Ol.* 9.89),⁸⁵ while according to Pausanias the people of Marathon worshipped Heracles as a god (Paus. 1.15.3, 32.4).⁸⁶ In addition, Herodotus mentions that the Persians camped at Marathon under the direction of Hippias, son of Peisistratos, who took refuge with the Persians c. 504 (Hdt. 5.96, 6.107). It is then clear that Herodotus is aware of the influence of the Peisistratids at Marathon (1.62.1) and recognizes the serious danger run by the Athenians because of the alliance of the enemies with the inhabitants of the area.⁸⁷ Thus, the reference to the shrines of the hero of Marathon is an intentional Herodotean reminiscence of the integration of Heracles in the struggle for democracy (and consequently his alienation from the Peisistratid circle), since the Greek struggle is also a fight against Hippias and tyranny.⁸⁸

The active participation of Heracles in the battle is depicted in the Stoa Poikile (or Painted Stoa), a Cimonean monument erected c. 460.⁸⁹ According to Pausanias the battle of Marathon was the last in a series of four murals (1.15.3). The murals depict among others Marathon the eponymus hero, Theseus rising from the ground, Athena, Heracles, Miltiades, Callimachus, and a hero named Echeteus, while the sophist Polemo the elder (AD 88-144) additionally mentions the presence of Demeter and Kore.

2. *Theseus*

The evidence concerning the participation of Heracles focuses on the connection between the hero and the place where the battle was fought. The case of Theseus, who is simultaneously connected both with Marathon and Athens, is more complex, since it is difficult to discern the domain of the hero. On the one hand, there is the well-known

(n. 4 above) 28ff.; P. Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven and London 2010) 118ff., for possible sites of the Heracleion.

⁸⁵ Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 32ff., 37.

⁸⁶ For sacrifices to Heracles, see Ecroth, *The sacrificial rituals* (n. 15 above) 219ff. For Heracles as heros-theos, see E. Stafford, 'Héraklès: encore et toujours le problème du heros-theos', *Kernos* 18 (2005) 391-406, at 399ff.

⁸⁷ Lavelle, *The sorrow* (n. 16 above) 31ff.

⁸⁸ See Lavelle, *The sorrow* (n. 16 above); A. Ruberto, 'Il *demos*, gli aristocratici e i persiani: il rapporto con la persia nella politica ateniese dal 507 al 479 a.c.', *Historia* 59.1 (2010) 1-25.

⁸⁹ For the painting (excavated in 1981) attributed to Micon, Polygnotus, or Panaenus, which was ordered by Peisianax, brother of Cimon, about 460 BC, see West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 14, 45ff.; Harrison, 'The south frieze of the Nike temple' (n. 56 above) 353-58; T. Hölscher, *Griechische Historienbilder des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, Beiträge zur Archäologie 6 (Würzburg 1973) 50-84; Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 313ff.; Francis, *Image* (n. 4 above) 85ff.; Castriota, *Myth, ethos* (n. 4 above) 28ff., 76ff.; F. De Angelis, 'La battaglia di Maratona nella Stoa Poikile', *ASNP* ser. IV, 1.1 (1996) 117-91; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 109ff.; L. Todini, 'Παλαιά τε καὶ καινά: Herodoto e il ciclo figurativo della Stoa Poikile', *Historia* 57.3 (2008) 255-62. L. Piccirilli, 'La Stoa Poicile: problemi di cronologia', *SIFC* 20 (2002) 119-25, offers a different dating around 489-79. For an epigram for the Athenians who died at Marathon, set up in the Stoa Poikile, see West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 6, 11ff.; Francis and Vickers, 'The Marathon epigram in the Stoa Poikile' (n. 77 above).

tradition about the hero's feat and the bull of Marathon,⁹⁰ the myth of the abduction of Helen, *etc.* The incorporation of Theseus into the territory of Marathon possibly explains his representation in the Stoa Poikile, where Theseus is depicted as rising from the ground. Moreover, it might be the case that the first scene of the Stoa that Pausanias describes does not refer to the battle of the Athenians against the Spartans at Oenoe of Boeotia. This Oenoe may well be that of the Marathonian *Tetrapolis*,⁹¹ where Arimnestus had led the Plataean soldiers on the eve of the battle. If that is indeed the case, a connection between the whole of the artistic representation and the territory where the battle was fought seems quite plausible. Thus, a coherent thematic programme stresses the participation of every force in the struggle against the ferocity of the barbarians. Gods, heroes, and Athenian generals protect and defend the land of Marathon as well as the Athenian democracy.⁹²

I focus on the prominence of Theseus, who rises from the earth and appears on the battlefield to direct Miltiades (Plut. *Theseus* 35.8-36), as the hero of the *polis* who leads the battle as *promachos*.⁹³ Given that the bones of Theseus were brought home in the 470s by Cimon, who instituted new festivals and civic rites (Paus. 1.7),⁹⁴ Theseus' resistance is perfectly congruent with Cimon's political programme. It is evident that the cooperation of historical personalities with mythological figures in the war against the Medes reflects Cimon's political intention to raise Miltiades' contribution over that of Themistocles, the victor of Salamis.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ See n. 17 above.

⁹¹ E. D. Francis and M. Vickers, 'The Oenoe painting in the Stoa Poikile, and Herodotus' account of Marathon', *BSA* 80 (1985) 99-111; Francis, *Image* (n. 4 above) 87ff. J. Boardman, 'Composition and content on classical murals and vases', in *Periklean Athens and its legacy: problems and perspectives in honor of J. J. Pollitt*, ed. J. M. Barringer and J. M. Hurwit (Austin 2005) 63-72 and D. Castriota, 'Feminizing the barbarian and barbarizing the feminine: Amazons, Trojans, and Persians in the Stoa Poikile', in *Periklean Athens*, ed. Barringer and Hurwit 89-102, agree with this interpretation. On the contrary, M. Stansbury-O'Donnell, 'The painting program in the Stoa Poikile,' in *Periklean Athens*, ed. Barringer and Hurwit 73-87, at 78ff., argues vigorously against this suggestion and proposes that the Oenoe painting is a later addition (420/410). For Oenoe see further n. 35 above.

⁹² Castriota, *Myth, ethos* (n. 4 above) 179ff.

⁹³ Lavelle, *The sorrow* (n. 16 above) 45ff.

⁹⁴ A. Podlecki, 'Cimon, Skyros, and Theseus' bones', *JHS* 91 (1971) 141-43; C. Calame, *Thésée et l'imaginaire athénien: légende et culte en Grèce antique* (Lausanne 1989, 1996²); Garland, *Introducing* (n. 21 above) 82ff.; H. A. Shapiro, 'Theseus in Kimonian Athens: the iconography of empire', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 71 (1992) 29-49; Lavelle, *The sorrow* (n. 16 above) 145ff.; S. Mills, *Theseus, tragedy and the Athenian empire* (Oxford 1997) 35ff., 62; Strawczynski, 'Artémis et Thésée' (n. 17 above) 5ff.; Fell, 'Kimon' (n. 70 above). On the various roles Theseus played in Athenian political affairs at different times, see Servadei, *La figura di Theseus* (n. 17 above) 210ff. for the time of Cimon.

⁹⁵ Theseus saved Athens again at the time when Themistocles was general, and the Athenians sought refuge at Troezen (Hdt. 8.41). For Theseus and Artemis at Salamis, see Strawczynski, 'Artémis et Thésée' (n. 17 above) 16ff.

Thus, in the heyday of the Athenian democracy Theseus has become the Athenian hero *par excellence*, and his resistance is now fully aligned with Cimonian policy. The boundaries between Marathon and Athens have now vanished and the idea of resistance has become part of the Athenian ideology. The central role Theseus played for the Athenians in the battle of Marathon had already been expressed in another monument of Panhellenic appeal. This is, according to Pausanias, the so-called Base of Marathon of the Athenian Treasury,⁹⁶ where Theseus' name is mentioned. This monument was set up by the Athenians from spoils of the battle of Marathon itself,⁹⁷ and dated after the battle and the foundation of the Treasury.⁹⁸ One could list three groups of statues at the entrance of the Sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. The first comprises Miltiades, Apollo, and Athena; the second group lists seven of the eponymous heroes of Cleisthenes; finally, the last group consists of Theseus, Codrus, and Philaeus (ancestor of Cimon).⁹⁹ Thus, there has been an attempt to incorporate Theseus into the pedigree of the Athenian *genē* and the system of Cleisthenes' eponymous heroes on a monument of religious and political significance.¹⁰⁰ Such an attempt evidently reflects the democratic organization of the Athenians into tribes, which seems to have been the way in which the Athenians fought at Marathon.¹⁰¹

What is more, given that on the *metopes* of the Treasury¹⁰² the feats of Theseus (among which is the bull of Marathon on *metope* 6)¹⁰³ are juxtaposed with those of Heracles (on the north side), it seems that the common presence of the two heroes, who

⁹⁶ Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 96ff.

⁹⁷ West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 8, 15ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 98 n. 88 for IG I³ 1463.

⁹⁸ For discussion of the date of the treasury, see R. von den Hoff, 'Herakles, Theseus and the Athenian treasury at Delphi', in *Structure, image, ornament: architectural sculpture in the Greek world*, ed. P. Schultz and R. von den Hoff (Oxford 2009) 96-104, at 96ff.

⁹⁹ Paus. 10.10.1-2, 10.11.5 (Pausanias does not mention Hippothoon, Ajax, and Oineus). For the statue group, see West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 17, 52ff.; Evans, 'Herodotus and the battle' (n. 2 above) 195 n. 111; P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Une énigme à Delphes: à propos de la base de Marathon (Pausanias, X, 10, 1-2)', in *Le chasseur noir: formes de pensée et formes de société dans le monde grec* (Paris 1981) 381-407, at 401ff.; Francis, *Image* (n. 4 above) 102ff.; Castriota, *Myth, Ethos* (n. 4 above) 81; Morris, *Daidalos* (n. 16 above) 293ff.; R. Neer, 'The Athenian treasury at Delphi and the materials of politics', *CA* 23.1 (2004) 63-93, at 82ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 109ff.

¹⁰⁰ On the role of Theseus at the time of Cleisthenes, see Solima, 'Era, Artemide e Afrodite' (n. 23 above) 7 n. 17; Servadei, *La figura di Theseus* (n. 17 above) 207ff.

¹⁰¹ See Vidal-Naquet, 'Une énigme à Delphes' (n. 99 above).

¹⁰² On the *metopes* of the treasury the Amazon battle is under the influence of Theseus. See Page du Bois, *Centaurs and Amazons: women and the pre-history of the great chain of being* (Michigan 1982, 1999⁶) 57-71, at 57ff. for analogies between centaurs, Amazons and Persians. The presence of Theseus becomes more significant, given the prominent place of the same subject in the painting of the Stoa Poikile. There, the fight against the Amazons is exclusively Theseus' domain, which is also evident from the rest of the paintings in the Stoa (Paus. 1.15.2). See J. H. Blok, *The early Amazons: modern and ancient perspectives on a persistent myth* (Leiden 1995) 349ff.

¹⁰³ Von den Hoff, 'Herakles, Theseus' (n. 98 above) 99 and n. 26.

had already been established as monster-fighters, is now taken for granted.¹⁰⁴ What is remarkable, though, is the emphasis on their deeds on a monument celebrating the Athenian victory, in which even Heracles has become part of the Athenian resistance,¹⁰⁵ despite his Panhellenic character.

Therefore the parallel action of Heracles and Theseus attests to the complete integration of these forces into the fight of the Athenians against the Persians: gods, heroes, and Athenian generals alike defend at the same time both the land of Marathon and the Athenian democracy.¹⁰⁶

C. Tomb cult or heroic cult

Admittedly, the final outcome of this unequal fight of the Athenians was due to the courage of the Athenians and of the few Plataeans who fought on the battlefield. It is said that the Athenians dedicated a high earthen mound (*Soros*) and some smaller ones to the 192 dead Marathon-fighters (Hdt. 6.117), and set up a trophy.¹⁰⁷ Thucydides (2.34.5) says that it was an exceptional mark of honour for the Marathon warriors to have been buried on the battlefield,¹⁰⁸ despite the fact that this seems to have been the usual practice at that time. Still, it is true that the dead did receive some sort of cult status. This is confirmed by ephebic inscriptions¹⁰⁹ (sacrifices made by ephebes in the Hellenistic era)¹¹⁰ and archaeological data, namely the tomb findings and the *stelae* with the names of the dead.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Von den Hoff, 'Herakles, Theseus' (n. 98 above).

¹⁰⁵ Neer, 'The Athenian treasury' (n. 99 above) 76; von den Hoff, 'Herakles, Theseus' (n. 98 above). Certainly this Panhellenic character of Heracles is still valid as is obvious from the epigram, which may refer to either the battle of Marathon or the battle of Plataea: ὄφρα ἀπὸ μὲν Μήδων/καὶ Περσῶν. Δόρου δὲ / παῖσι καὶ Ἡρακλέος (Simondes, *POxy* 2327 fr. 27 col. ii, vv. 8-10). See L. M. Kowerski, *Simonides on the Persian Wars: a study of the elegiac verses of the 'new Simonides'* (New York and London (2005) 51ff.; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 238 n. 47.

¹⁰⁶ Castriota, *Myth, ethos* (n. 4 above) 179ff.

¹⁰⁷ Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 61ff.; P. Valavanis, 'Σκέψεις για τις ταφικές πρακτικές προς τους νεκρούς της μάχης του Μαραθώνα', in *Μαραθών*, ed. Bourazelis and Meidani (n. 77 above) 73-98.

¹⁰⁸ A collective public burial on the battlefield for Athenian war dead took place some time around 506 BC. See B. Currie, *Pindar and the cult of heroes* (Oxford 2005) 108 n. 112.

¹⁰⁹ Matthaiou, 'Ἀθηναίοισι' (n. 80 above) 197ff., states that from the end of the second century funeral games were held with the participation of Athenian ephebes at the Theseia and the Epitaphia. See further n. 13 above.

¹¹⁰ *IG* II³ 1006, 11. 26-27, 69-70.

¹¹¹ Although the identification of the historical monuments has been doubted (see C. M. Antonaccio, *An archaeology of ancestors: tomb cult and hero cult in early Greece* [Lanham 1995] 118ff.), a recently discovered Marathon epigram as well as a fragment of the casualty list strongly suggest the establishment of a sort of cult of the fallen heroes. See West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) no. 5a, 8ff.; G. Spyropoulos, *Οἱ σῆλεις τῶν πεσόντων στὴν μάχη τοῦ Μαραθώνα ἀπὸ τὴν ἔπαυλη τοῦ Ἡρώδη τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ στὴν Εὔα Κυνουρίας* (Athens 2009); Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 84 above) 122ff., 216ff.; Petrovic in this volume.

It is still unclear however, if we are dealing with heroic cult or war dead cult.¹¹² The burial mound Pausanias saw six centuries later (1.29.4), where the dead soldiers were worshipped according to tribes (1.32.3), led him to call those dead soldiers heroes (1.32.4).¹¹³ The emphasis on the extraordinary achievement, as well as the constant reminder of the incessant readiness and vigilance of future hoplites, is concretized through the erection of a conspicuous monument in honour of the fallen heroes, who have now taken on the role of guardian.¹¹⁴ The Athenian defenders-in-the-making pay due honours to the generation that realized the values of freedom. In that light, the participation of the ephebes with sacrifices and honour offerings in the *polyandreion* is perfectly understandable. Peter Krenz suggests that the so-called oath of Plataea on the *stèle* of Acharnae (it is inscribed together with the ephebic oath, set up in the sanctuary of Ares and Athena Areia), where the allied Greeks vowed not to rebuild the temples until they had taken revenge on the Persians, could have been the oath of Marathon.¹¹⁵ If we accept his hypothesis, then our perspective becomes broader and there is still much work to be done concerning Athenian views with regard to Marathon.

Summary

The battle of Marathon was of great significance for the history of the ancient Greek world, especially for the Athenians. Apart from the help the Athenians were given by the one thousand Plataeans, they fought against the Persians at Marathon by themselves in a hoplite battle. It was a battle that turned out to be a triumph of democratization.¹¹⁶ By overcoming all the obstacles, not only did the Athenians claim for themselves the title of the Marathon-fighters, but also they came up with a mythological and cultic substratum that stressed all the difficulties they had to face in order to achieve their goal. Gods like Artemis or Pan stress the adversities the defenders of the land of Marathon had to tackle under the leadership of Miltiades and Callimachus. Local heroes like Echeteus, Marathon, Epizelus, Theseus, and Heracles also underscore the hardships with which the

¹¹² An issue extensively discussed in recent years, see J. Whitley, 'The monuments that stood before Marathon: tomb cult and hero cult in archaic Attica', *AJA* 98 (1994) 213-30, who notes that the Marathon tumulus indicates that older, aristocratic burial practices were put to the service of the newly established democracy (this is an illustrative example of how cult practices are transformed and adjusted to new conditions); Boedeker, 'Paths' (n. 4 above); Currie, *Pindar* (n. 108 above) 89ff., supposes that they were heroized after the battle; J. N. Bremmer, 'The rise of the hero cult and the new Simonides', *ZPE* 158 (2006) 15-26, at 14, states that cultic honours were not bestowed before the late second century, and that the dead received a special burial but not cultic honours. Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 61ff., argues that it is about granting honours to the dead. For a review of the whole discussion, see Valavanis, 'Σκέψεις για τις ταφικές πρακτικές' (n. 107 above) 86.

¹¹³ See also West, *Greek public monuments* (n. 3 above) xxxixff., no. 4, 6ff.

¹¹⁴ Currie, *Pindar* (n. 108 above) 118ff.

¹¹⁵ P. M. Krenz, 'The oath of Marathon, not Plataea?', *Hesperia* 76 (2007) 731-42.

¹¹⁶ N. Loraux, 'Marathon ou l'histoire idéologique', *REA* 75 (1973) 13-42; F. Prost, 'Les combattants de Marathon: idéologie et société hoplitiques à Athènes au V^e s.', in *Armées et sociétés de la Grèce classique. Aspects sociaux et politiques de la guerre aux V^e et IV^e s. av. J.-C.* (Paris 1999) 69-88; Jung, *Marathon* (n. 4 above) 131-33.

Marathon fighters had to cope. Once the undertaking was complete and the outcome of this major fight proved successful, all the aforementioned forces were integrated into the Athenian ideology. Taken together, they stress the glory the Athenians won, the gratitude of the Athenians towards Athena, the front-fighting goddess, and the constant readiness of the warriors to fight off any hostile invasion, which is characterized by *hybris* (Nemesis).

By integrating those forces into the centre of cult-life and artistic inspiration, Athenian ideology also unites myth and history into one scheme, which works as a reminder of the paradigmatic democratic victory, and epitomizes the Athenian *aretē*. We are therefore dealing with a complex intellectual structure that can be perceived only as a whole, since each part of it expresses a different facet of the resistance, and all of them together contribute to the war, which was after all a struggle of *kosmos* versus chaos, of culture versus barbarism, of freedom versus slavery.

The mythological and religious views regarding the battle of Marathon gave the Athenians a chance to re-examine themselves¹¹⁷ and to construct the concept of the feasibility of the overcoming of difficulties, and also of the courage that leads to glory, to the good repute of the soldiers. This network of ideas had indeed to be visible to all, like the statue of Athena Promachos. That is, visible for all to see, for all to participate in, for all to be ready for every danger.

¹¹⁷ Gerhke, 'From Athenian identity to European ethnicity' (n. 76 above).

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON AND THE INTRODUCTION OF PAN'S WORSHIP TO ATHENS: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF A LEGEND THROUGH WRITTEN EVIDENCE AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL FINDS

ANTONIS MASTRAPAS

The battle of Marathon was not only a landmark in the consciousness of the ancient Greek people, but also a crucial point in the development of Western civilization. The effect of the victory, which was achieved by a Greek city against a great Asian power, was enormous. Apart from the written evidence, the monuments that were erected on the site of the battle itself and in the major Greek temples reflected, and continue to reflect, the military, political, and cultural dimensions of the Athenian achievement. However, the winners, as already indicated, gave a great deal of thought to the question of how they beat the Persians, something that makes the distinction between the historical facts and ideological traditions very difficult.¹ Many legends were created to explain the contribution and the presence of gods or heroes standing by the Athenians during the battle. The development of cults such as that of Artemis Agrotera, Pan, Zeus Tropaïos, Athena Nike, Eukleia, Herakles, Theseus, and more, shows the intensity with which the Athenians experienced the threat and, then, the triumph.² The narration of Herodotus is more than usually enriched with legends and myths. Undoubtedly, the belief that great events are in need of great narration applies here. In this case, I am going to deal with a legend, as a result of the Marathon battle, which explains how the cult of Pan was adopted by the city of Athens. Given that the creation and diffusion of a narrative, which turned into a legend, has many dimensions, in this paper I will attempt to explore the political and social basis which contributed to its making.

The sources of information

The relevant legend is known to Herodotus, though the dissemination of the cult of Pan is also confirmed by more evidence prior to the works of Herodotus.

Herodotus mentions that before the generals left Athens to go to Marathon, they sent a herald, Pheidippides or Philippides, who was a trained all-day runner, to Sparta, to ask for the contribution of the Lakedaimonians. As Pheidippides himself said and announced to the Athenians, when he was on Mount Parthenion over Tegea, he met with the god Pan, who called him by his name and commanded him to ask the Athenians why they did not honour him at all, although he was favourable to them and had been and would be very useful to them. This evidence of Pheidippides, when things returned to normal, was

¹ R. Osborne, *Greece in the making 1200-479 BC* (London 1996) 329.

² R. Parker, *Athenian religion: a history* (Oxford 1996) 153-55.

believed by the Athenians, who founded a temple in the name of Pan under the Acropolis. After this command, they honoured him every year with sacrifices and a torch procession. Pheidippides reached Sparta and asked the Lakedaimonians for help one day after his departure from Athens. They decided to help the Athenians, but it was impossible for them to dispatch help immediately without violating their tradition, because it was the ninth day of the lunar month and they would not be able to start their expedition before there was a full moon (Hdt. 6.105-06).

Originally, it is obvious that what we have here is a quasi-mythic narration which tries to justify how an Arkadian god of minor importance helped the Athenians face the Persian danger and how the official acceptance of its cult was established by the city as a result. Pan played an unimportant role in worship in Attica before the Marathon battle.

The sources concerning the incident of Pheidippides and the introduction of the new cult in Athens could be divided into two groups: the older, which includes the evidence closer to the Marathon battle, and the more recent, which includes the information created after the end of the Persian wars.

Our oldest source on the subject is an attic sympotic song. Athenaeus in his work *Deipnosophistai* (Δειπνοσοφισταί) saved twenty-five such folk songs which he calls *Attic skolia* (σκόλια).³ They were composed by unknown Athenian citizens in public symposia in which mostly members of aristocratic families participated. The guests of a symposium improvised to the music of a lyre which was passed along with a branch of myrtle or laurel from one's hands to another's without following a predetermined order.⁴ The absence of an order of the guests who composed a contemporary verse probably gave the name *skolia* to this kind of poetic creation (*skolios*: he who is not straight). From their content it seems they were created in a transitional period from the tyranny of Peisistratidai until the Marathon battle. They were obviously included in the work of Athenaeus because they were particularly popular and were probably recorded to be used during the classical years by symposium participants who did not have the gift of composing poems. The fourth attic *skolion* refers to Pan (441 P.):⁵

ὦ Πὰν Ἀρκαδίας μεδέων κλεεννάς,
ὄρχηστὰ βρομίας ὅπαδὲ Νύμφαις,
γέλασεας ὦ Πὰν ἐπ' ἐμαῖς
†εὐφορόσυνας ταῖσδ' αἰοδαῖς αἰοδεῖ† κεχαρημένος.

Pan master of the famous Arkadia, companion to the ball of the noisy Nymphs, be happy, Pan, pleased with our songs.

³ Ath. 15.694c. See also C. M. Bowra, *Greek lyric poetry from Alcman to Simonides* (Oxford 1961, 2nd edn) 372.

⁴ O. Murray, 'The symposion in history', in *Tria corda: scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano*, ed. E. Gabba (Como 1983) 257-72; O. Murray, ed., *Symptotica: a symposium on the symposion* (Oxford 1990); J. Davidson, *Courtesans and fishcakes: the consuming passions of classical Athens* (London 1998) 43-49.

⁵ Bowra, *Greek lyric poetry* (n. 3 above) 385-86.

It is relevant to the introduction of the cult of Pan to Athens and was obviously composed at some festive symposium after the Marathon battle.⁶ We could suppose that its composer belongs to the group of the generals of this specific battle. Miltiades, who was a member of the aristocracy of the family of Kimonidai or Philaidai, played a major part in this group. If such an assumption has a basis in fact, then probably the legend relating to Pan was disseminated by the same circle.

The special relationship of Miltiades with the cult of this god is confirmed by an epigram on the base of a statue which the general had dedicated to the temple of Pan. This epigram which is attributed to Simonides from Keos, goes:

Τὸν τραγόπουν ἐμὲ Πᾶνα, τὸν Ἀρκάδα, τὸν κατὰ Μῆδων,
τὸν μετ' Ἀθηναίων στήσατο Μιλτιάδης.⁷

Me, the goat-footed Pan, the Arcadian, who is against the Medes, and for the Athenians, Miltiades put up.

The oldest temple of the god was founded on the northwestern slope of the Acropolis. Research has indicated three cavernous openings in a row, the farthest eastern, even if it is archaeologically uninteresting, was proved to be devoted to Pan.⁸ Apart from the stone carved cavities for the placement of offerings, part of a relief offering was found in the area which dates back to the fourth century BC and shows Pan playing the *syrinx* in front of a cave. Its function during the fifth century BC is confirmed by Euripides⁹ and Aristophanes.¹⁰ The comedian mentions the temple in *Lysistrata* in combination with the neighbouring fountain of Klepsydra. Kinesias, overcome by lust, indicates the temple of Pan to Myrrhine as a suitable place to meet and assures her that afterwards she would have the chance to take a bath at the neighbouring fountain of Klepsydra. The temple of Pan was probably the shelter of homeless couples of the city. Pan, a god with a tendency to lust, would never refuse to offer protection.

Evidence proliferates after the end of the Persian Wars which proves that during the decade of the 470s BC there was a systematic attempt to preserve the cult of Pan in Athens. Aeschylus, who took part in the Greek-Persian battles, narrates events of the battle of Salamis in an epic style in his work *Persai*, in 472 BC. The narration of an episode with Pan was not just an invention of the poet. The goat-footed god appears to wander in Psyttaleia, the isle in front of Salamis, so that he contributes to the defeat of a special Persian army with his appearance.¹¹ Pausanias was informed about this episode and indicates that: 'They say that about 400 barbarians had disembarked, however, after the defeat of the navy of Xerxes they say they were killed, too, because the Greeks landed on Psyttaleia. There is no artistic

⁶ Bowra, *Greek lyric poetry* (n. 3 above) 385-86.

⁷ *Anth. Pal.* 16232; 143 Diehl; D. L. Page, ed., *Further Greek epigrams* (Cambridge 1981) 194-95.

⁸ J. Travlos, *Pictorial dictionary of ancient Athens* (New York 1980) 417-21, figs. 536-39; J. Camp, *The archaeology of Athens* (London 2001) 254; G. Kavvadias and E. Giannikapani, ed., *Βόρεια, ανατολική & δυτική κλιτύς Ακροπόλεως* (Athens 2004) 19-21.

⁹ Eur. *Ion* 492-505, 938.

¹⁰ Ar. *Lys.* 910-13.

¹¹ Aesch. *Pers.* 448-49; see also Hdt. 8.76.

statue on the island, only idols of Pan made without skill'.¹² I assume that Aeschylus must have been directly connected to the group of generals who fought at Marathon. The well-known episode with Pheidippides was probably spread by this group, and the idea for the introduction of the cult of Pan in Athens may well have been promoted by them, too.¹³ The poet mentions Pan in quite a few extracts of his works.¹⁴ In the *Oresteia* (*Ορέστεια*), which was produced in 458 BC, he is characterized as a major god seemingly of equal rank to Apollo or Zeus, whilst he appears with the bucolic character of the god who protects herds and wildlife.¹⁵

In the decade of the 470s BC the goat-footed god began to interest Athenian art.¹⁶ The pioneer of the making of Pan's figure, who is portrayed with the head and the lower limbs of a goat, was an important pot-painter, known today by the conventional name of 'the Pan painter'. The pot from which the popular pot-painter got his name is a bell-shaped crater in the Boston Museum (37.1 cm high). On this, Pan is presented in a state of arousal, running after a young shepherd, maybe Daphnis (Δάφνις). The scene is framed on the left by the picture of an ithyphallic idol, which has the shape of a Herm. It is not by chance that this popular pot-painter chose as a theme for the other side of the pot Artemis killing the hunter Aktaion.¹⁷ Given that Artemis was one of the goddesses who contributed to the winning result of the battle, the specific pot has one more message to give us, apart from its artistic value. The pot from which the pot-painter took his name was decorated with this theme to show the gods and the legends which were relevant to the Marathon battle and was a pot directly relevant to the Marathon-fighters. Its theme was obviously not a choice of the artist but an official order. It is important to bear in mind that with its control of iconographic production the city meant to project its values.¹⁸

Kallimachos, the polemarch, was killed on the battlefield at Marathon, but had made a vow which was later fulfilled by his descendants or his co-fighters to honour him. So, they set up the statue of a winged goddess, Nike or Iris, on the Athens Acropolis on a high Ionian

¹² Paus. 1.36.2.

¹³ The poet himself, who probably took part in the battle, and his brother Kynegirus, who was one of the famous Athenians who bravely fought and was killed on the battle field; see Hdt. 6.114; *Vita* of Aeschylus 10-11, 24-27.

¹⁴ Aesch. *Fr.* 2, D 20b, 4; 8, A 65a-b; 17, A 143a; 25b 1.

¹⁵ Aesch. *Ag.* 56; *Eu.* 943.

¹⁶ The Athenian vases: J. Boardman and M. Pope, *Greek vases in Cape Town* (Cape Town 1961) 7-8, fig. II; E. Simon, 'Ein Nordattischer Pan', *AntK* 19 (1976) 19-23, pls. 4-6; Parker, *Athenian religion* (n. 2 above) 164.

¹⁷ J. D. Beazley, *Attic red-figure vase-painters* (Oxford 1963) 550, *The Pan painter* (Mainz 1974) 1-2, pls. 1-4; J. Boardman, *Athenian red figure vases. The archaic period* (London 1975) 181, fig. 335; E. Simon, *Die Götter der Griechen* (Munich 1985) 175-76, figs. 159-60; R. Buxton, *La Grèce de l'imaginaire. Les contextes de la mythologie*, trans. M. Wechsler-Bruderlein (Paris 1996) 73.

¹⁸ F. Lissarrague and A. Schnapp, 'Athènes, la cité, les images', in *Athènes et le politique. Dans le sillage de Claude Mossé*, ed. P. Schmitt-Pantel and Fr. de Polignac (Paris 2007) 25-55.



1a, b. Bronze caduceus (*kirykeion*) from the Acropolis Museum (photo V. Tsiamis). The edge of the caduceus is decorated with the head of Pan.

pillar with an epigram in which it is referred to as ‘the angel of the immortal’.¹⁹ Ronald Hampe attributed a caduceus (*kērykeion*, *κηρύκειον*) found on the Acropolis to this winged goddess.²⁰ The edges of this caduceus are decorated with the head of the goat-figured god (Figures 1a, b). If it belongs to the statue of Nike of Kallimachos, then the decorative theme was not an accidental choice. Those who put up this *ex-voto* statue to honour the memory of Kallimachos belonged to the circle of Marathon-fighters who promoted the introduction of the cult of Pan.

At about the end of the 460s BC the famous painters Mikon and Panainos made a work of art which was a big painting in the Poikile Stoa of the Athenian Agora showing scenes of the Marathon battle.²¹ From the combination of literary evidence, which mentions the painting,²² the pottery scenes, which show moments of the battle, and the relief presentation of the sarcophagus of Brescia, a hypothetical representation of the work

¹⁹ M. Brouskari, *Musée de l'Acropole. Catalogue descriptif* (Athens 1974) 134-35, figs. 239-40; A. E. Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis* (Chicago 1999) 18-20.

²⁰ R. Hampe, ‘Ein Denkmal für die Schlacht von Marathon’, *Die Antike* 15 (1939) 168-74, figs. 3-4; Ph. Borgeaud, *Recherches sur le dieu Pan* (Institut Suisse de Rome 1979) 196-97.

²¹ J. Camp, *The Athenian agora. Excavations in the heart of classical Athens* (London 1986) 66-72, figs. 43-44. For the Stoa Poikile see further Arafat in this volume pp. 86-88.

²² Dem. 59.94; Paus. 5.11.6; Plin. *HN* 35.57; Ael. *NA* 7.38.

was attempted by archaeologist C. Robert.²³ The figure of the goat-footed god dominates this art work. The hanging of this painting in a busy area of the city aimed at the celebration of all the factors, among which was Pan, that contributed to the victory in the battle. At that time, Cimon, Miltiades' son, who contributed to the decoration of Athens in many ways, dominated the political scene.²⁴ Among the works that were directly or indirectly related to him or his family were the Stoa Poikile²⁵ and the transformation of the Klepsydra cave into a tap for the water supply of Athens.²⁶ The proximity of the area of the Klepsydra with the Pan cave on the northwestern slope of the Acropolis leads us to the conclusion that during the Cimon era, the area in front of the cave was landscaped and took the form which is known today.

Archaeological research proved that some caves in Attica were used as sacred areas for the cult of Pan and the Nymphs. The Nymphs were goddesses of nature related to fertility and vegetation. Caves had served as the homes of the Nymphs since the Homeric era.²⁷ Worship of the Nymphs in the caves of Attica seems to have existed before the cult of Pan, and their relation with the generating power of nature related them to Pan. Robert Parker notes that Pan was worshipped in caves in Attica always with the Nymphs, whilst as an Arkadian god he had nothing to do with them. It seems that 'the true owners of the Attica caves are the Nymphs, while Pan is, as it were a lodger or a neighbour'.²⁸ Temples of Pan and the Nymphs have been explored on Mount Hymettos ('Nympholept' cave in Vari), on Mount Pendeli (Nymphaio), on Mount Parnitha (Lychnospilia of Phyle), in Marathon (Oinoae cave B), in Dafni (Pan's cave), and in Eleusina.²⁹ A relatively recent finding, which is connected to the works of restoration and unification of archaeological areas of Athens, is a cavernous temple, dedicated to Pan and the Nymphs on the eastern slope of the Pnyx hill. Nevertheless, they were not used systematically at least before the end of the fifth century BC. The archaeological history of those caves in the classical era is limited. *Ex-voto* offering reliefs which are not dated before the end of the fifth century BC are very important finds. These represent cave entrances in front of which mainly the

²³ N. Papahatzis, *Πανσανίου Ελλάδος Περιήγησις. Αττικά* (Athens 1974) 252-53, figs. 250-51.

²⁴ Plut. *Cim.* 13.8.

²⁵ P. Amandry, 'Sur les épigrammes de Marathon', in *Θεωρία. Festschrift für W.-H. Schuchhardted*. F. Eckstein (Baden-Baden 1960) 1-8; N. Loraux, *L' invention d' Athènes: histoire de l' oraison funèbre dans la "cite classique"* (Paris 1981) 163; Camp, *The Athenian agora* (n. 21 above) *ibid.*; B. Lamprinouidakis, *Οικοδομικά προγράμματα στην Αρχαία Αθήνα 479-431 π.Χ.* (Athens 1986) 56-60; E. D. Francis, *Image and idea in fifth-century Greece. Art and literature after the Persian Wars* (London 1990) 85-86; A. Ramou-Hapshiadi, *Σωτήρες της Ελλάδος. Ναυκράτορες* (Athens 1994) 90-91; Camp, *The archaeology of Athens* (n. 8 above) 63-69, fig. 64.

²⁶ Travlos, *Pictorial dictionary* (n. 8 above) 323-24, figs. 426-31; Lamprinouidakis, *Οικοδομικά προγράμματα* (n. 25 above) 61-62; Camp, *The archaeology of Athens* (n.8 above) 70-72.

²⁷ Hom. *Od.* 13.103-12.

²⁸ Parker, *Athenian religion* (n. 2 above) 165.

²⁹ The temples of Pan in Attica: Paus. 1.28.4, 32.7, 34.3, 36.2, 44.9. Also see J. Travlos, *Bildlexikon zur Topographie des Antiken Attika* (Tübingen 1988) 96, 177, 192, 218, 221, 319, 329, 447-48; B. Petrakos, *Ο Μαραθών* (guide) (Athens 1995) 36-37, 86-91; Camp, *The archaeology of Athens* (n. 8 above) 300, 317-18.

Nymphs and secondarily Pan and other gods like Hermes are portrayed, as well as worshippers with offerings.³⁰

The father of history collected the material and wrote his *Historiae* probably during the years 465-30 BC, though some would date the completion and publication of his work maybe to the decade of 420 BC.³¹ Herodotus gathered his evidence from oral sources, from signs, and monuments he saw himself. He evidently had no hesitation in including the episode with Pheidippides in his *Historiae*, even though he knew in advance that it was about a legend, a figment of the imagination. It is particularly difficult to distinguish the personal aspects of Herodotus concerning the divinity, because those views constituted strong social agreements. It seems that he was very cautious as he did not want to contradict the social and religious beliefs of his time. So, he detached himself from the conflict of rationalism and theology that had started to affect the spiritual circles of Athens.³²

At the time of Herodotus several veterans of the Marathon battle were still alive, and had formed their own picture about the facts they had lived through, sometimes complicated and relating to imaginary facts. Their impressions were equal to the magnificence and importance of their fight. Anyway, it is not strange that events that took place during crucial battles like the Marathon battle assumed supernatural dimensions in the minds of their leading men. The distinguished student of ancient Greek religion H. W. Parke argued that the narration of the experience of Pheidippides can very well be considered to be honest, as people who are tense like Pheidippides have such experiences or illusions according to which supernatural powers accompany or support them.³³ It could also be that the vision – and the narrative – have been attributed posthumously to Pheidippides to give an additional basis for the introduction of the cult of Pan, which itself would be a natural response to the remarkable victory against overwhelming odds.

The ideals for which the generation of the Marathon-fighters fought were still a living example at the time of Herodotus. As far as we know, some Marathon-fighters were probably still alive at least until the 420s BC at the time of Aristophanes. There is no doubt that their generation constituted a legacy of values and ideals for the popular comedian.³⁴ In *Acharnians*, he describes them as people who were tough and of great strength.³⁵ Also, it is perhaps not accidental that the protagonist of *Clouds* is called Pheidippides, which is the name of the famous messenger who was sent to Sparta. *Clouds*

³⁰ N. Kaltsas, *Τα γλυπτά. Εθνικό Αρχαιολογικό Μουσείο* (Athens 2001) 135, fig. 260; 218, fig. 450-52; 219; 221, fig. 458-59.

³¹ C. M. Fornara, 'Evidence for the date of Herodotus' publication', *JHS* 91 (1971) 25-34, 'Herodotus' knowledge of the Archidamian War', *Hermes* 109 (1981) 149-56; R. Bichler and R. Rollinger, *Herodot* (Hildesheim, Zürich, and New York 2001, 2nd edn) 111; M. Flower and J. Marincola, *Herodotus Histories. Book IX* (Cambridge 2002) 2.

³² J. Romm, *Herodotus* (New Haven and London 1998) 142-43; T. Harrison, *Divinity and history: the religion of Herodotus* (Oxford 2000) 1-30.

³³ H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 172.

³⁴ See A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes. Myth, ritual and comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 21, 24, 59, 87, 201; Th. Pappas, *Ο φιλόγελως Αριστοφάνης* (Athens 1996) 161-63.

³⁵ *Ar. Ach.* 179-81. For Marathon in comedy see Carey and Papadodima in this volume.

was a bitter satire of the crisis of moral values and the educational system.³⁶ Dikaïos Logos represents the old era and the values with which the Marathon-fighters were educated and grew up into manhood.³⁷

Herodotus deliberately enriches his *Historiae* with legends. He knows, though, that such figments cannot be set against logic. He is clear to his audience when he writes that when things had finally settled the Athenians believed this evidence of Pheidippides and established a temple devoted to the name of Pan, under the Acropolis (Hdt. 6.105). Narrations as such were in accordance with the historiographic choices of his era. The historiography of Herodotus has epic origins. Moreover, it is stated by himself in the introduction to his work that he chose to write about ‘the great works’.³⁸

The political dimension of the legend

In the nineteenth century Fustel de Coulanges, though insistent on the importance of historical evidence, argued that it is necessary for history to check fairy tales, legends, and fantasy dreams, under which it is possible to discover something realistic – human beliefs.³⁹ I would add that a legend which is connected to the adoption of a new cult may hide expediency which the researcher must track.

The establishment of the worship of a god or a hero in the Greek cities of classical times usually had political motives. Politics and religion were very closely related institutions although they were not identical, and constituted two sides of the same coin. Worshipping practices were very often confused with political facts.⁴⁰

The historical background

The narration of the appearance of Pan to Pheidippides is a legend in the making in which Miltiades and the Marathon battle generals who trusted him seem to have played a major part. The subject that has been occupying me is the causes which led to the making and spreading of this legend. It is a narration which attempts to explain the delayed version of a new god in Athens or a legend which served their political plans. One obvious effect of this legend was to bring the Athenians closer to the Arkadians and create prospects for their future cooperation.

Tegea and other Arkadian cities were the first allies of Sparta which made up the Peloponnesian alliance on not always friendly terms. The Arkadians, whenever they had

³⁶ Bowie, *Aristophanes* (n. 34 above) 110; Romm, *Herodotus* (n. 32 above) 201.

³⁷ Ar. Nu. 985-86. Also see Ar. Equ. 1334, Ran. 1012-17.

³⁸ D. Müller, ‘Herodot – Vater des Empirismus?’, in *Gnomosyne: menschliches Denken und Handeln in der frühgriechischen Literatur: Festschrift für Walter Marg zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. G. Kurz, D. Müller, and W. Nicolai (Munich 1981) 299-318; Harrison, *Divinity* (n. 32 above) 1-30, 82-83; R. Thomas, *Herodotus in context: ethnography, science and the art of persuasion* (Cambridge 2000) 168-212, 213-48.

³⁹ Jacques Le Goff, *Ιστορία και μνήμη*, trans. J. Koumpourlis (Athens 1988) 245.

⁴⁰ L. Bruit-Zaidman and P. Schmitt-Pantel, *Religion in the ancient Greek city*, trans. P. Cartledge (Cambridge 1992) 92-101; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, ‘What is polis religion?’, in *The Greek city: from Homer to Alexander*, ed. O. Murray and S. Price (Oxford 1990) 295-322.

the chance, challenged the leadership of the Lakedaemonians and caused a gap in the unity of the alliance. It seems likely that Miltiades and the other generals of the Marathon battle initially tried to take advantage of the potential for division between the Arkadians and the Spartan leadership through the legend of the appearance of Pan. As has been acutely observed, Pan entered Attica not unofficially through the mountains with his herds, but by the decision of the Athenian civic religion.⁴¹ With the diffusion of the legend not only was the admission of a cult effected which, even if it was known in Athens, had not managed to gain official recognition, but the most important achievement was the strengthening of relations between Athenians and Arkadians at a crucial moment, like the one of the conflict with the Persians. With the promotion of the legend, the strengthening of anti-Persian policy was furthered.

The answer that was given to Pheidippides by the Lakedaemonians to the request for help and finally their absence from the battle cast doubt on their potential role in dealing with Persian expansion.⁴² This becomes clearer from the attitude of Miltiades and those who shared his view concerning direct confrontation with the Persians. Apart from others, Miltiades had to face his political rivals in Athens, who preferred reconciliation with the Persians.⁴³ His speech, with which he associated himself with the war chief Kallimachos before the battle, may echo the context of their intense political arguments in the parliament and the church of the municipality whether they should risk a conflict with the Persians. The fact that the Persians were notified as soon as the army came out of the walls of Athens and the city was unprotected proves that there were political circles in the city which preferred the Athenians to be subject to the Persians and Hippias. Apart from the supporters of the Peisistratidai, from Herodotus' evidence, the Alkmeonidai also emerge as possible suspects (Hdt. 6.121-24).

According to the official Spartan version, the delayed help to the Athenians was due to religious reasons, because they did not want to go against their custom which did not allow the departure of the army from Sparta before the full moon.⁴⁴ According however to a hint known only from Plato's *Laws*, which has been greatly doubted, the delay of the Lakedaemonians was due to the rebellion of the slaves of Messenia and probably to other unknown reasons.⁴⁵

Probably, the most important issue that Sparta had to face during the days before the Marathon battle was the challenge to its leadership by the Arkadians, even the fear that they would withdraw their army from the Peloponnesian alliance. Kleomenes, one of the kings of Sparta, according to one account, sought to form an anti-Persian front in Arkadia

⁴¹ Parker, *Athenian religion* (n. 2 above) 166.

⁴² Osborne, *Greece in the making* (n. 1 above) 329; M.-C. Amouretti, J. Christien, Fr. Ruzé, and P. Sineux, *Le regard des Grecs sur la guerre: mythes et réalités* (Paris 2000) 33; S. Hornblower, *The Greek world, 479-323 BC* (London 2002, 3rd edn) 11.

⁴³ Osborne, *Greece in the making* (n. 1 above) 330-32.

⁴⁴ Hdt. 6.106.2-3; Justin 2.9.8.

⁴⁵ Pl. *Leg.* 3.698e.

in the 490s BC.⁴⁶ His policy must have given hope of release from the Spartan leadership to the Arkadians and intensified their anti-Spartan feelings (Hdt. 6.74). I suggest therefore that under these circumstances Miltiades, and the other generals of the battle who sought a direct conflict with the Persians, took advantage of the situation that existed in Arkadia and spread the legend of the appearance of Pan.

Herodotus gives us very little information about what was happening in Athens before the Persian forces started the second big expedition against Greece. Anyone who considered the result of the Marathon battle a matter of luck may have believed that an agreement with the Persians or even a total surrender would be profitable. But the person who was able to realize what the meaning of the victory in the Marathon battle was and the dynamics it offered to the city had come to the fore in a faction before 483 BC, which was in favour of the policy of armed resistance and the forming of alliances with the other Greek cities to create the critical mass needed to resist a possible Persian attack. Themistokles was the leader of this party.⁴⁷ The revival of the legend obviously served this policy. The reappearance of Pan in Psyttaleia during the Salamis sea-battle and the fulfilment as well of the promise he had given to Pheidippides that he would be useful to the Athenians in the future allow us to assume that the revival of this legend, this time by Aeschylus,⁴⁸ was connected with the establishment of an Arkadian-friendly policy by the political leaders of the time. The new rapprochement with the Arkadians before the Salamis sea-battle functioned as a means of pressure towards Sparta to ensure the immediate rejection of the Persians and the protection of the Athenians.

The problems that Sparta was facing with the slaves and the Arkadians must be among the reasons that hindered the undertaking of an expansionist policy during the fifty years that followed the Persian wars. Probably this situation is implied by the expression of Thucydides that the Lakedaemonians were hindered by internecine battles (τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξαιργόμενοι).⁴⁹ According to the view of Simon Hornblower, the worry over Arkadia must be considered as a major factor in the refusal of Sparta to be the leader of the Greeks after the end of the Persian wars.⁵⁰

The anti-Spartan feelings of the people of Tegea, if not all the Arkadians, were revived during the decade of the 470s BC. The king of Sparta, Leotychidas, sought refuge in Tegea directly after the end of the Persian wars, persecuted by his political opponents, which proves that Tegea was a safe place unfriendly to Sparta (479 BC). Herodotus mentions, in a brief intervention, that during the period following the battle of Plataea until the Tanagra battle (458 BC) the Lakedaemonians beat the Tegeates and then all the Arkadians apart from the Mantineians in Diptera (Hdt. 9.35).⁵¹ Towards the end of the

⁴⁶ The Arkadians were on bad terms with the Lakedaemonians in the past. See Plb. 4.33.2-3; Paus. 4.17.2.

⁴⁷ Osborne, *Greece in the making* (n. 1 above) 332.

⁴⁸ Aesch. *Pers.* 448-49.

⁴⁹ Thuc. 1.118.2.

⁵⁰ Hornblower, *The Greek world* (n. 42 above) 11-12.

⁵¹ G. A. Papantoniou, *Αρχαία Ελληνική Ιστορία 479-404 π.Χ.*, I (Athens 1967) 25-27; Hornblower, *The Greek world* (n. 42 above) 80.

same decade Mantinea was inhabited and fortified (471 BC) probably with the help of Argos and Themistokles, who attempted to create an anti-Lakonian front inside the Peloponnese. During this decade, many coins with the sign *Arkadikon* (Ἀρκαδικόν) were also minted, which lead us to the thought, if not of the creation of a loose Arkadian union, at least of the organization of an alliance of Arkadian cities.⁵² The minting of the new coin was done to cover the needs of the organization of an Arkadian alliance army.⁵³ This action, which constitutes proof of the emancipation of the Arkadians, could be manipulated by the political leadership of Athens. The Athenians were probably counting on the freelance services of the Arkadians;⁵⁴ this may be a reason why the cult of Pan is promoted in a selective way during the decade of the 470s BC.

During the 460s BC Cimon, who had every reason to promote whatever had to do with the Marathon battle, played a leading role on the political stage of Athens. Many initiatives were undertaken on his behalf which contributed to the reestablishment of his father's fame. In the frame of this policy, monuments which showed the Marathon battle were constructed.⁵⁵

The promotion of the worship of Pan by Cimon may not have been independent from the process of rapprochement between the Athenians and the Arkadians. It is a fact that in 462 BC Cimon led 4,000 Athenian soldiers, marching through Arkadia, and offered his assistance to the Spartans, to suppress the rebellion of the Messenian helots. His march through Arkadia created the right conditions for agreement between Cimon and leaders of Arkadian cities. The ineffectiveness, though, of the Athenian venture and the expulsion of the Athenian soldiers from Lakonia resulted in the ostracism of Cimon. It is certain that the decision of the Athenian *polis* to send help to the Spartans did not occur as a result of friendly sentiments towards them, but was absolutely a result of the eloquence and the political influence of Cimon. Unfortunately, the decrease of Athenian prestige meant the final break-up of the alliance with Sparta which had been formed twenty years before (481 BC). This behaviour of the Spartans apparently changed the previously pro-Lakedaemonian attitude of Cimon. The policy of rapprochement with the Arkadians which was adopted by the Marathon-fighters for the first time now served the political plans of Cimon and Athens.

The enquiry that I have attempted could lead us to some very crucial assumptions: the worship of Pan in Athens was not completely new. It was a revived form of the pre-existing cult of the Nymphs. Pan gradually stopped being considered the Arkadian god of the shepherds. His cult was officially introduced by the city itself and was promoted by the political leadership which had the historic course of Athens a little before and after the

⁵² R. T. Williams, 'The confederate coinage of the Arcadians in the fifth century BC', *Numismatic notes and monographs* 155 (New York 1965); T. Nielsen, 'Was there an Arcadian confederacy in the fifth century BC?', in *More studies in the ancient Greek polis*, ed. M. H. Hansen and K. Raaflaub *Historia Einzelschrift* 108 (Stuttgart 1996) 61; S. Pshoma, *Ἀρκαδικόν, ΗΟΡΟΣ* 13 (1999) 81-96; Hornblower, *The Greek world* (n. 42 above) *ibid*.

⁵³ Pshoma, *Ἀρκαδικόν* (n. 52 above) 94.

⁵⁴ Hdt. 8.26.1; Thuc. 7.57.9.

⁵⁵ Francis, *Image and idea* (n. 25 above) 85-87; Ramou-Hapshiadi, *Σωτήρες της Ελλάδος* (n. 25 above) 90-104; Lissarrague and Schnapp, *Athènes, la cité, les images* (n. 18 above) 39-40.

Medic wars. This spread was a means of alignment with the Arkadians with a view to countering Spartan attempts at leadership and at the same time the enforcement of the anti-Persian policy by the Athenians. The legend of the appearance of Pan to Pheidippides was a fiction which primarily served the external policy of Athens during the first half of the fifth century BC.

MARATHON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMIC PAST

CHRISTOPHER CAREY

According to Antiphanes (fr. 198 KA) in a much-quoted fragment, tragedy is an easy job. Its characters and themes come ready made and all you have to do is trigger audience knowledge and then work with it:

μακάριόν ἐστιν ἡ τραγωδία
ποίημα κατὰ πάντ', εἴ γε πρῶτον οἱ λόγοι
ὑπὸ τῶν θεατῶν εἰσιν ἐγνωρισμένοι,
πρὶν καὶ τιν' εἰπεῖν· ὥσθ' ὑπομνήσαι μόνον
δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν· Οἰδίπουν γὰρ ἂν μόνον
φῶ, τᾶλλα πάντ' ἴσασιν· ὁ πατήρ Λάιος,
μήτηρ Ἰοκάστη, θυγατέρες, παῖδες τίνες,
τί πείσεθ' οὗτος, τί πεποίηκεν. ἂν πάλιν
εἴπῃ τις Ἀλκμέωνα, καὶ τὰ παιδία
πάντ' εὐθὺς εἴρηχ', ὅτι μανεῖς ἀπέκτονεν
τὴν μητέρ', ἀγανακτῶν δ' Ἄδραστος εὐθέως
ἦξει πάλιν τ' ἄπεισι ...
ἡμῖν δὲ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα δεῖ
εὐρεῖν, ὀνόματα καινά, τὰ διωκημένα
πρότερον, τὰ νῦν παρόντα, τὴν καταστροφὴν,
τὴν εἰσβολήν. ἂν ἔν τι τούτων παραλίπη
Χρέμης τις ἢ Φεῖδων τις, ἐκσυρίττεται·
Πηλεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' ἔξεστι καὶ Τεύκρῳ ποιεῖν.

Tragedy is a lucky
kind of poetry in every respect. For firstly its plots
are recognized by the spectators
before anyone even speaks. So reminding them is all
the poet has to do. For if I just say Oedipus,
they know all the rest. His father Laios,
his mother Jocasta. His daughters, who his sons were,
what will happen to him, what he's done. Again
if someone says Alkmaion, immediately he's mentioned
all his children, that in madness he killed
his mother, and Adrastus with a grievance at once
will come and then go off again ...
We can't do this. But we have to invent everything,
fresh names, what happened in the past,

the current situation, the end,
 the beginning. And if any of this is missed out
 by some Chremes or Pheidon, he's hissed off.
 But Peleus and Teukros can do this.

The comic writer has a harder job. Unlike tragedy, comedy has to create its own plots. It must shape its own world and create its own myths. Antiphanes of course is scoring points. And in his desire for a neat antithesis (and one which elevates comedography as the more demanding dramatic craft) he ignores some key points of convergence. The tragic world is not a fixed but a fluid entity reshaped from author to author and play to play.¹ Antiphanes also cheekily elides the fact that comic myth too rests on a shared understanding with the public about a value system and a set of flexible conventions of plot and character. Part of the comic mythmaking is the creation of the past and within that process Marathon is part of the shared communicative system. But more than that it was also part of a shared cultural memory. This chapter addresses the creative results of the interaction between comic conventions and collective memory.

Memory, individual and collective, is always a construct based on selection and comedy is no exception. In part comic selectivity reflects the dynamics of oral culture. The comic memory runs to no more than three generations, which is broadly in line with Rosalind Thomas' results for family and even *polis* tradition.² Ancient history in comedy is the grandfather's generation. Comedy also shares with cultural memory the 'hourglass' effect discussed by Thomas (drawing on Vansina) in relation to Greek oral tradition,³ according to which the present and the more distant past come into focus, while the intervening period is squeezed out. In comedy however the shaping of the past is likely to be more than a passive response to collective memory patterns. It also reflects the rhetorical effects to be created by juxtaposing the present and the more distant past. Certainly for Aristophanes there is a large gap roughly occupied by the *Pentecontaetia*. There is a lack of interest in the intermediate past. What counts is the present and the past of sixty or seventy years ago. This grandfather past extends to cultural as well as political history; Euripides and Aischylos are fore-grounded, Sophokles is elided. But even for the grandfather's generation there is a further selectivity. Some things count and some things do not. Marathon is one of the things which count. And for comedy it counts for much.

I begin not with comedy but with Pindar. In a passage designed to magnify the achievements of the western Greeks against the barbarians in their backyard, the Etruscans at Kymai and the Carthaginians at Himera, Pindar sets them on a par with the victories of Old Greece against the Persians (*P.* 1.71-79):

λίσσομαι νεῦσον, Κρονίων, ἥμερον
 ὄφρα κατ' οἶκον ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ Τυρσα-
 νῶν τ' ἀλαλατὸς ἔχῃ, ναυ-
 σίστονον ὕβριν ἰδὼν τὰν πρὸ Κόμας,

¹ See C. Carey, 'The political world of Homer and tragedy', *Aevum Antiquum* N.S. 3 (2003) 463-84.

² R. Thomas, *Oral tradition and written record in classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989) 283.

³ R. Thomas, 'Herodotus' *Histories* and the floating gap', in *The historian's craft in the age of Herodotus*, ed. N. Luraghi (Oxford 2001) 198-210, at 198.

οἶα Συρακοσίων ἀρχῶ δαμασθέντες πάθον,
 ὠκυπόρων ἀπὸ ναῶν ὃ σφιν ἐν πόν-
 τῳ βάλεθ' ἄλικίαν,
 Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας. ἀρέομαι
 παρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθηναίων χάριν
 μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρτῃ δ' <ἀπὸ> τῶν πρὸ Κιθαιρῶ-
 νος μαχῶν,
 ταῖσι Μήδαιοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι,
 παρ<ᾧ> δὲ τὴν εὐυδρον ἄκταν
 Ἱμέρα παίδεσσιν ὕμνον Δεινομένεος τελέσαις ...

I implore you, son of Kronos, grant
 that the Carthaginian and the Etruscan battle-shout stay quietly at home,
 having seen their arrogance bring lamentation to their ships off Kymai.
 Such were their sufferings, conquered by the leader of the Syracusans,
 which flung their young men from their swift ships into the sea,
 delivering Hellas from heavy slavery. I will win
 from Salamis the gratitude of the Athenians as my reward,
 and in Sparta from the battles before Kithairon
 in which the Medes with their curved bows suffered,
 but beside the well-watered bank of the river Himeras I shall win my reward
 by paying my tribute of song to the sons of Deinomenes.

The implied narrative is revealing. As seen here the Persian Wars (or for Pindar in this context the Greco-barbarian wars) consist of a series of *aristeiai* by individual states, each represented by real or imagined celebration by Pindar. On this basis, the great pan-Greek infantry battle at Plataia belongs to Sparta, as it did for Herodotus and also for Simonides, at least in his Plataia elegy,⁴ which also confirms (with what we know of his other poems celebrating engagements in the Persian Wars) that Pindar's parcelling up of the Greco-barbarian conflicts is not idiosyncratic. For Athens the battle chosen is Salamis. For anyone looking from the outside into Athens in the fifth century, this is the great achievement. It is on Salamis that Herodotus places the emphasis when he praises Athens at length in book 7. The ships which (for Herodotus) were built for the wars with Aigina, are the ones which will later save Greece (7.144) and it is Athens' readiness to stay and fight, and at sea, which he singles out in his eulogy at 7.139.1, 5:⁵

ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν
 πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων, ὅμως δέ, τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχίσω. εἰ
 Ἀθηναῖοι καταρρωδήσαντες τὸν ἐπιόντα κίνδυνον ἐξέλιπον τὴν σφετέρην, ἥ καὶ

⁴ This is especially visible in fr. 11 West, with its geographical location in Sparta as the point of departure, the role given to Pausanias, and the presence of the Dioskouroi.

⁵ Cf. 7.144.2: οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους· αἱ δὲ ἐς τὸ μὲν ἐποικήθησαν οὐκ ἐχρήθησαν, ἐς δέον δὲ οὕτω τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐγένοντο ('This war which broke out saved Greece then (*i.e.*, in 480) by forcing the Athenians to become a sea power. The ships were not used for the purpose for which they were built but were there in time of need for Greece').

μη ἐκλιπόντες ἀλλὰ μέιναντες ἔδοσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς Ξέρξῃ, κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν οὐδαμοὶ ἂν ἐπειρῶντο ἀντιοῦμενοι βασιλείᾳ.... νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἂν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τάληθέος.

Here I am compelled by necessity to declare an opinion which will be resented by most men, but nonetheless I will not refrain from saying what seems to me to be the truth. If the Athenians had been overcome with fear of the danger descending on them and had left their land, or indeed without leaving their land had stayed and given themselves up to Xerxes, none would have attempted by sea to oppose the king.... As it is, if one were to say that the Athenians proved to be the saviours of Greece, he would not miss the truth.

Marathon is not played down; it has special position in the work, rounding off events prior to the invasion of 480; as such it forms the climax of the pre-invasion narrative.⁶ And it emphatically (7.1) prompts Darius' decision to invade, as it figures in Xerxes' and Mardonios' rhetoric of *tisis* (7.8β, 7.9). But the campaign is treated as what it was, a Persian punitive expedition against targeted enemies. Herodotus is impressed with the success; but from the panhellenic perspective of Herodotus' narrative Salamis is the more significant Athenian achievement.

The Athenian oratorical perspective is different but not dramatically so. Both battles find a place in the oratorical tradition. In surviving epideictic oratory Salamis is almost as prominent as Marathon; and unless this is simply the result of accident, it looks as though even in Athenian civic contexts Salamis was an important complement to Marathon, though individual texts vary in the emphasis they place on the two battles and some focus on one of them alone.⁷ It comes as something of a surprise, therefore, to discover that in comedy Salamis rarely gets a mention. Arguably the battle lurks just below the text whenever Salamis is named in comedy; but comedy is not interested in developing the tale

⁶ See Tuplin in this volume, p. 236.

⁷ Some data may help here:

Andok.1: Marathon §107

Lysias 2: Marathon §§20-26, Salamis §§27-43

Isok. 4: Marathon §91

Isok. 5: Salamis §147, Marathon §147

Isok. 8: Marathon §38

Isok. 12: Marathon §195

Isok. 15: Marathon §306

[Dem.] 13: Salamis §§21, 22, Marathon §§21, 22

Dem. 14: Marathon §30

Dem. 18: Salamis §208, Marathon §208

Dem. 19: Salamis §§311, 312, Marathon §§311, 312

Dem. 22: Salamis §13,

Dem. 23: Salamis §§196, 198, Marathon §§196, 198

[Dem.] 59: Salamis §§95, 97, Marathon §94

Aischines 1: Salamis §§34, 75, 172, Marathon §75

Aischines 3: Salamis §181, Marathon §§181, 186

Lykourgos 1: Salamis §§68, 70, 73, Marathon §§104, 109

Plato *Menexenus*: Marathon §§240c-241a, 241b, 245a, Salamis §§241a, 241c, 245a.

of Salamis or even making explicit use of it as part of the construction of Athenian history.⁸ In contrast Marathon is a recurrent and developed presence.

Actually, it is not quite true that the campaign of 480 goes unnoticed. But its presence in Aristophanes is very revealing. In the *epirrhemata* of the *parabasis* of *Wasps*, a text to which I shall return, we have a synoptic account of fighting against the Persian invader which incorporates what looks like a reference to the capture and burning of Athens in 480 (*Wasps* 1075-80):

ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς, οἷς πρόσσεστι τοῦτο τοῦροπόγιον,
Ἀττικοὶ μόνοι δικαίως ἐγγενεῖς αὐτόχθονες,
ἀνδρικότατον γένος καὶ πλεῖστα τήνδε τὴν πόλιν
ὠφελήσαν ἐν μάχαισιν, ἥνικ' ἦλθ' ὁ βάρβαρος,
τῷ καπνῷ τύφων ἄπασαν τὴν πόλιν καὶ πυρπολῶν,
ἐξελεῖν ἡμῶν μενοινῶν πρὸς βίαν τάνθηρνια.

We, who have this rump,
are the only truly full born natives of Attica,
the bravest race of all, who did so much for the country
in battle, when the barbarian came,
trying to choke our city with smoke and blazing fire
eager to seize our nests by force.

But the reference remains inexplicit and the Athenian counterattack is not the 'we embarked on our ships' of the Athenian oratorical tradition on Salamis;⁹ it is a hoplite battle which ends in a Persian rout with the Athenians in hot pursuit (*Wasps* 1081-88):

εὐθέως γὰρ ἐκδραμόντες “ζὺν δορὶ ζὺν ἀσπίδι”
ἐμαχόμεσθ' αὐτοῖσι, θυμὸν δ'ξίνην πεπωκότες,
στάς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἄνδρ', ὑπ' ὀργῆς τὴν χελύνην ἐσθίων.
ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τοξευμάτων οὐκ ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸν οὐρανόν.
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐωσάμεσθα ζὺν θεοῖς πρὸς ἐσπέραν·
γλαυξ γὰρ ἡμῶν πρὶν μάχεσθαι τὸν στρατὸν διέπτατο.
εἴτα δ' εἰπόμεσθα θυνάζοντες εἰς τοὺς θυλάκους,
οἱ δ' ἔφευγον τὰς γνάθους καὶ τὰς ὀφρὺς κεντούμενοι ...

At once we rushed out 'with lance and buckler', and
gave them battle, drunk with the acid wine of anger,
standing man to man and biting our lips with rage.
For the arrows you could not see the sky.
But still with the gods' help we pushed them back at evening;
for before we fought an owl flitted across the army.
Then we followed harpooning them in the pants,
and they fled stung in jaws and brows.

⁸ The bias is perhaps most tellingly pointed up by an absence; as Mike Edwards observes to me, though comedy coins the term *Μαραθωνομάχης*, it never (as far as our evidence allows us to judge) creates a parallel term *Σαλαμινομάχης*. Metre was no obstacle, since the prosody is identical.

⁹ Cf. Thuc. 1.18.2, 73.4, 74.2; Lys. 2.30, 40.

The striking reference to the Persian clothing reminds us that this was the first time an army in Persian dress had been seen in Greece proper, a point emphasized by Herodotus (6.112.3):

πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν δρόμῳ ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρήσαντο, πρῶτοι δὲ ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὀρώντες καὶ [τοὺς] ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι καὶ τὸ οὖνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

These were the first Greeks we know of who advanced at a run against the enemy and the first who withstood the sight of Mede clothing and the men dressed in it; until then hearing the name of the Medes inspired fear.¹⁰

The account in Aristophanes is the battle of Marathon as we meet it in Herodotus, with the Athenians pursuing the Persians to the ships, cutting them down (6.113.2):

φεύγουσι δὲ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι εἵποντο κόπτοντες, ἐς δ' ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπικόμενοι πῦρ τε αἴτεον καὶ ἐπελαμβάνοντο τῶν νεῶν.

They followed the fleeing Persians, stabbing them, until they reached the sea and demanded fire and laid hold of the ships.¹¹

Here in comedy we find not the brutally factual κόπτοντες, ‘striking’, ‘stabbing’, ‘cutting down’, of Herodotus but the wasps’ sting in the Persian baggy pants. It is also interestingly presented in Aristophanes as the foundation of empire. In the narrative of resistance to the invader in *Wasps*, there is a seamless progression from victory in the land battle in the *epirrhema* to the naval campaign against Persia in the *antode*, with empire as the proper reward for these achievements:

οἱ δ' ἔφευγον τὰς γνάθους καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς κεντούμενοι,
ὥστε παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροισι πανταχοῦ καὶ νῦν ἔτι
μηδὲν Ἀττικοῦ καλεῖσθαι σφηκὸς ἀνδρικώτερον.
ἄρα δεινὸς ἦ τόθ', ὥστε πάντα μὴ δεδοικέναι,
καὶ κατεστρεψάμην
τοὺς ἐναντίους, πλέων ἐκεῖσε ταῖς τριήρεσιν.

... and they fled stung in jaws and brows.

And so among the barbarians everywhere still to this day
nothing is said to be more manly than the Attic wasp.

I was indeed a terror then, afraid of nothing,
and I overthrew
the enemy, sailing there with the triremes.

It is as though the Athenian infantry having driven the invader back to the ships simply followed after them, carrying the war into enemy territory. We leap from Marathon to the Delian League (here represented as a single-handed Athenian achievement); Salamis is absorbed and elided.

¹⁰ For a discussion of the implications of this passage see Tuplin in this volume.

¹¹ For the fire at the ships see Pelling in this volume pp. 23-26.

Though it is not difficult to account for the interest in Marathon, the comic reaction to the two battles is striking. In a genre performed before a mass audience in a democracy whose power came from the fleet, manned by the poorer members of the community, the great naval victory which indirectly founded the empire receives scant attention. This fits into a larger pattern which places the emphasis in the conceptualization of warfare not on the sailor but on the hoplite. This way of thinking is also marked in the funeral oration, another genre performed before a mass audience which shows a hoplite bias.¹² There is however more at work here than a simple reflection of the dominance of the hoplite ethos. The prominence of Marathon reflects the nature of the battle itself as remembered in the Athenian tradition. It also reflects the nature of comedy. There is a natural affinity between the world and worldview of fifth century comedy, including the collective comic sense of self as genre, and the victory at Marathon.

Firstly, though the developed democracy may have relied on the rowers, there was an intimate connection between Marathon and the democracy. Marathon was the first real test of the new democracy and it was not just a victory over a foreign invader; it was also a victory over the sixth-century tyranny. Following a common pattern in the late sixth and early fifth centuries (and one later mirrored in appeals to Athens and Sparta in the Peloponnesian War), the Peisistratidai had appealed to Persia for support.¹³ Even before the disastrous campaign against Sardis in which Athenian forces participated, Persia and Athens were technically at war in the wake of the Persian demand that the Athenians restore the regime and the refusal by the new democracy (Hdt. 5.96.2):

ὁ δὲ Ἀρταφρένης ἐκέλευέ σφεας, εἰ βουλοίατο σοοὶ εἶναι, καταδέκεσθαι ὀπίσω Ἰππίην. οὐκ ὦν δὴ ἐνεδέκοντο τοὺς λόγους ἀποφερομένους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐκ ἐνδεκομένοισι δέ σφι ἐδέδοκτο ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι πολεμίους εἶναι.

Artaphrenes ordered them, if they were concerned for their safety, to take back Hippias. The Athenians did not accept the message which was conveyed to them, and in refusing to accept it they were committed to open war with Persia.

Whether or not Persian support for the Peisistratidai was a factor in the Athenian decision to support the Ionian Revolt, the Peisistratid link with Persia was a marked feature of the invasion of 480 (at least for the Athenians). Hippias accompanied the Persian forces to Marathon and the Athenians (and Herodotus) believed that some in Athens colluded with the Peisistratids to give them the city during the Marathon campaign. The place of battle itself was charged with political significance. Marathon was within the Peisistratid family sphere of influence;¹⁴ it had been the place selected for an earlier return of Peisistratos and this must have figured in Hippias' thinking when he guided the Persians there. Herodotus presents Peisistratid scheming to return as influencing Xerxes' decision to invade (the

¹² N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens: the funeral oration in the classical city* (Harvard 1986) 278; D. M. Pritchard, 'The "fractured imaginary": popular thinking on military matters in fifth century Athens', *Ancient History* 28 (1998) 38-61.

¹³ An honourable exception is Grillos (Hdt. 3.138), who stipulates peaceful intervention to secure his return in order to protect (Greater) Greece from Persia.

¹⁴ See Rhodes in this volume p. 5.

family were not finished yet).¹⁵ But they play at best an intermittent and marginal role in his narrative of the invasion itself.¹⁶ In contrast the role of Marathon as a personal and dynastic disaster for Hippias, whose hope of return died there, is emphasized in Herodotus' narrative of the campaign of 490.¹⁷ In the collective memory the invasion of 490 was much more firmly associated with the restoration of tyranny than 480. Marathon was a victory for democracy.

Marathon was also an uncomplicated victory. The Athenians made enormous propaganda use of the abandonment of Attica to the Persians in 480 and the decision to replace the land with the ships. Giving up their city to fight from the sea was a source of pride. But the earlier battle was a much neater story. Athenian comedy in the fifth century labours to simplify its world, at the level of plot, character, values. This gives a natural advantage to Marathon, which as an unambiguous victory without setback or compromise needed no glossing.

Another big advantage which Marathon enjoyed rests on a factoid which we meet in our Athenian sources. This is the claim that the Athenians defeated the Persians alone.¹⁸ The exaggeration here of course is that the Plataians fought on the Athenian side, an inconvenient fact which the Athenians generally chose to ignore (though they were depicted in the *Stoa Poikile*). But the airbrushing of the Plataians is a minor adjustment of the inconvenient facts of history. The other major powers (notably though for good reasons Sparta) were absent, and by the mid 420s (and probably earlier, if we accept Thucydides' account)¹⁹ the mass grant of citizenship to the Plataians meant that they could be seen as Athenian anyway. This was a victory for Athens alone. This makes Marathon especially appropriate in a genre which is often performed before an almost exclusively Athenian audience,²⁰ but even when performed before a larger public is usually unashamedly Athenocentric. Panhellenism is not absent from fifth-century comedy; but the comic focus is usually strongly Athenian. Plots are almost always located in Athens and the perspective is usually dominated by considerations of Athenian advantage. Even in a play like *Lysistrata*, which prefigures elements of Isokratean panhellenic rhetoric,²¹ *Lysistrata's* own rhetoric (*Lys.* 574-86) is ultimately about strengthening Athens. In contrast to Marathon, Salamis, though it could be presented as Athens' great contribution to the freedom of Greece, was a collaborative venture. And

¹⁵ Hdt. 7.6.2-4.

¹⁶ 'Peisistratidai' appear at 8.52.2 as (unsuccessful) mediators in the Persian assault on the Athenian Acropolis. The suggestion that Dikaios (8.65) was a Peisistratid is difficult to substantiate on present evidence, though his presence in the Persian army there is suggestive. Hipparchos son of Charmos again is a possibility. See A. M. Bowie, *Herodotus, Histories book VIII* (Cambridge 2007) on 8.52.2.

¹⁷ Hdt. 6.107.

¹⁸ See in this volume Volonaki, Xanthaki Karamanou, Kremmydas.

¹⁹ See S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides volume 1: books I-III* (Oxford 1997) on 3.59.

²⁰ Cf. *Acharnians* 502-07.

²¹ Cf. *Lys.* 1133-34, resumed in 1247-61, where the Spartans remind us of a shared Greek past fighting the barbarians, singing of the Athenians at Artemision and their own battle at Thermopylai.

though the Athenians provided the largest contingent and engineered the battle in the straits, the Aiginetans probably won the *aristeia*.²² And it did require manipulation and manoeuvre to get not just Persians but also Greeks to fight there. In the case of Plataia, though Herodotus gives a positive and partial account of Athens' contribution, this was the great Spartan success. Again, for a genre which likes its ethical issues straightforward, and which likes to place Athens at the centre of its world, Marathon was a much neater narrative.

A further dimension which makes Marathon especially significant for comedy is the disparity of scale. This was a David and Goliath match, in that the resources of the Persian empire were brought to bear on a single Greek *polis*. For the comic tradition this is a profoundly important detail. Greek satiric poetry likes to present itself as the little guy taking on the big guy. This is visible already in the iambic tradition, which when attacking likes to present itself as retaliation, not aggression, and in the case of Archilochos in particular uses images which present the satirist as small and easily underrated but devastatingly effective. The poet is the ant, in allusion to the fable in which the ant saves the pigeon (fr. 23.11 ff.):

ἐς τοῦτο δὴ τοι τῆς ἀνολβίης δοκ[έω
ἦκειν; ἀνὴρ τοι δειλὸς ἄρ' ἐφαινόμην[,
οὐ]δ' οἷός εἰμ' ἐγὼ [ο]ὔτος οὐδ' οἶων ἄπο. [
ἐπ]ίσταμαί τοι τὸν φιλ[έο]ν[τα] μὲν φ[ι]λεῖν[,
τὸ]ν δ' ἐχθρὸν ἐχθαίρειν τε [κα]ὶ κακο[
μύ]ρμηξ. λόγῳ νυν τ[ῶ]ιδ' ἀλη]θείη πάρ[α.

Do you think I have come to such a pitch of misery?
A wretched man indeed I seemed to you,
Not the sort I am nor the sort from which I come.
I know how to love the man who loves me
And hate my enemy and bad-mouth him (?)
The ant – there's truth in this story.

He is not the aggressive and devious fox but the hedgehog (fr. 201 West), a recalcitrant but more defensive creature. This David and Goliath narrative is one favoured by Aristophanes. In the *parabasis* of *Wasps* he describes his Herculean battle with the ultimate monster Kleon and his attack on other superhuman targets (1029-42):

οὐδ', ὅτε πρῶτόν γ' ἦρξε διδάσκειν, ἀνθρώποις φήσ' ἐπιθέσθαι,
ἀλλ' Ἑρακλέους ὀργὴν τιν' ἔχων τοῖσι μεγίστοις ἐπιχειρεῖν,
θρασέως ξυστὰς εὐθὺς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ τῷ καρχαρόδοντι,
οὐ δεινόταται μὲν ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν Κύννης ἀκτίνες ἔλαμπον,
ἑκατὸν δὲ κύκλῳ κεφαλὰὶ κολάκων οἰμωξομένων ἐλιγμῶντο
περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν, φωνὴν δ' εἶχεν χαράδρας ὄλεθρον τετοκυίας,
φώκης δ' ὁσμὴν, Λαμίας δ' ὄρχεις ἀπλύτους, πρωκτὸν δὲ καμήλου.
τοιούτον ἰδὼν τέρας οὐ φησιν δείσας καταδωροδοκῆσαι,
ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὕμῶν ἔτι καὶ νυνὶ πολεμεῖ. φησὶν τε μετ' αὐτοῦ
τοῖς ἡπιάλοις ἐπιχειρῆσαι πέρυσιν καὶ τοῖς πυρετοῖσιν,

²² Hdt. 8.93.1: ἐν δὲ τῇ ναυμαχίῃ ταύτῃ ἤκουσαν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστα Αἰγινήται, ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι.

οἱ τοὺς πατέρας τ' ἡγῶν νύκτωρ καὶ τοὺς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον,
κατακλινόμενοι τ' ἐπὶ ταῖς κοίταις ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπράγμοσιν ὕμῶν
ἀντωμοσίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων,
ὥστ' ἀναπηδᾶν δειμαίνοντας πολλοὺς ὡς τὸν πολέμαρχον.

And from his first productions he says he did not attack ordinary humans,
but with the spirit of a Herakles assailed the biggest,
and straight away went for the sharp toothed beast himself,
from whose eyes shone terrible flashes of Kynna,
and a hundred heads of cursed flatterers licked all about
his head; he had a voice like a torrent spawning death,
the stench of a seal, the unwashed balls of Lamia, and the arse of a camel.
At the sight of this horrible monster he says he did not make a deal in fright
but still to this day he wages war for you. He says that along with him
last year he attacked also those shivers and fevers
who strangled their fathers at night and choked their grandfathers,
who, settling on the beds of the easy-going among you,
cobbled against them suits, summonses and depositions
so that many of them leaped up in terror and fled to the Polemarch.

The description evidently pleased him, since he returned to it in the *parabasis* of *Peace* (751-60). More briefly in the *parabasis* of the second *Clouds* he prides himself on punching Kleon in the belly when he was at the height of his power but (equally proudly, though this is not unusual for comedy) not when he was down/dead (549-50):

ὃς μέγιστον ὄντα Κλέων' ἔπαισ' εἰς τὴν γαστέρα
κοὺκ ἐτόλμησ' αὐθις ἐπεμπεδῆσ' αὐτῷ κειμένῳ.

Who hit Kleon in the belly when he was at his greatest,
and did not choose to jump on him again when he was down.

A striking feature of these descriptions is the martial language. The comic poet too is a warrior.²³ There is a natural affinity between the self-image of comedy and the historical role of the fighters at Marathon, both as fighters and as fighters against the odds.

This affinity is underscored by the status attached to Marathon and the Marathon-fighters. The battle itself early attracted a mythology in a way that Salamis did not.²⁴ At Salamis a supernatural (*phasma*) female figure appeared and was heard urging on the Greeks. But this is as nothing compared with the repeated element of divine intervention at Marathon. It begins with the story of Pan's appearance to the messenger sent to Sparta.²⁵

²³ Cf. *polemein*: *Wasps* 1037; Plat. fr.107?, *polemizein*: *Peace* 759, *epicheirein*: *Wasps* 1038, *Peace* 752, *machesthai*: *Peace* 754.

²⁴ For the marked divine and heroic involvement in Marathon see Gartzou in this volume pp. 91-110, and for Pan see Mastrapas pp. 111-22.

²⁵ For the apparition at Salamis see Hdt.8.84.2 with p. 134 below, for Pan before Marathon Hdt. 6.105.

This is in itself a unique event in Herodotus' narrative.²⁶ And though Herodotus is careful not to vouch for the incident in his own persona (it is explicitly Philippiades' account), the element of physical divine intervention is reinforced in his narrative of the battle. At 6.117 Herodotus relays an account of a mysterious more than human figure active in the fighting. Again he scrupulously avoids vouching for an event for which he has only the one individual concerned as his source.²⁷ But the detail he gives and the cumulative effect of the incidents is to accentuate the superhuman element. Ultimately however Herodotus' opinion is less relevant here than that of the Athenians and for this we have ample evidence. The Athenians certainly accepted the encounter in Arcadia as fact (Hdt. 6.105):

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι, καταστάντων σφι εὖ ἤδη τῶν πρηγμάτων, πιστεύσαντες εἶναι ἀληθέα ἰδρύσαντο ὑπὸ τῇ Ἀκροπόλει Πανὸς ἱρόν, καὶ αὐτὸν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀγγελίης θυσίησιν τε ἐπετείοισι καὶ λαμπάδι ἱλάσκονται.

And because the Athenians believed this to be true, once their situation improved, they set up a sanctuary of Pan hard by the Acropolis, and because of this message they propitiate him with yearly sacrifices and a torch race.

Herodotus' account of superhuman aid in the fighting again corresponds to the perceptions of the Athenians themselves; Athenian sources gave names and shapes to the local heroes and even gods who fought on the Greek side in the paintings in the Stoa Poikile (Paus. 1.15.3-4):

ἐνταῦθα καὶ Μαραθὼν γεγραμμένος ἐστὶν ἥρως, ὃν τὸ πεδίον ὠνόμασται, καὶ Θησεὺς ἀνιόντι ἐκ γῆς εἰκασμένος Ἀθηνᾶ τε καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ... Καλλίμαχος τε, δὲ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμαρχεῖν ἤρητο, καὶ Μιλτιάδης τῶν στρατηγούντων, ἥρως τε Ἐχέτλος καλούμενος.

There also is depicted the hero Marathon, from whom the plain has its name, and Theseus depicted as rising from the earth and Athene and Herakles ... and Kallimachos, the elected Polemarchos of the Athenians and Miltiades, one of the generals, and a hero called Echelos.

Perhaps what is most striking here is the plethora of superhuman presence. The picture which Pausanias saw depicts a battle in which gods mingle among the human fighters, a depiction which has its roots in the larger epic canvas of the Theomachy in *Iliad* books 20-21.²⁸ The sense of a mythic-epic dimension is reinforced by the presence of Theseus both in the depiction of Marathon and the Amazonomachy in the same set of paintings, which binds the mythic and the historical events together as Athenian resistance to alien invasion. This is a collective imaginative response to, and understanding of, the battle

²⁶ See on this incident S. Hornblower, 'Epic and epiphanies: Herodotus and the "new Simonides"', in *The new Simonides: contexts of praise and desire*, ed. D. Boedeker and D. Sider (New York 2001) 135-47.

²⁷ λέγειν δὲ αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ πάθεος ἤκουσα τοιόνδε τινὰ λόγον· ἄνδρα οἱ δοκέειν ὀπλίτην ἀντιστῆναι μέγαν, ('I heard that he gave something like the following account of his affliction: it seemed to him that a hoplite of great stature confronted him ...').

²⁸ For Marathon as epic battle see Pelling in this volume pp. 25-26.

rather than an attempt to depict things actually seen. But the suggestion of Herodotus that the Athenians believed that some fighters observed a supernatural presence finds an echo in Plutarch (though evidently with some interference from the images in the Stoa Poikile).²⁹ The operation of the divine at Marathon and Salamis is strikingly different. Salamis was preceded by an attempt to bring the heroes of Aigina into the war against the Persians (8.64.2). And Themistokles is represented in Herodotus as claiming that success was due to the gods and heroes of the Greeks (8.109.3):

τάδε γὰρ οὐκ ἡμεῖς κατεργασάμεθα, ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἱ ἐφθόνησαν ἄνδρα ἓνα τῆς τε Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι, ἔοντα ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον· ὃς τὰ τε ἱρὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐν ὁμοίῳ ἐποιέετο, ἐμπιπράς τε καὶ καταβάλλων τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἀγάλματα· ὃς καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπεμαστίγωσε πέδας τε κατήκε.

This was not something which we achieved but the gods and heroes, who begrudged that a single man should be king of Asia and Europe, a man who is unholy and criminal, who made no distinction between sacred and private property, burning and overturning the statues of the gods, who even whipped the sea and dropped fetters into it.

There is no reason to doubt that Themistokles said something along these lines, even if Herodotus' account is ultimately conjectural. This was the natural Greek response to military success, and especially to success against the odds. But the invocation of the Aiakidai was just that, a human ritual, not an unsolicited divine gesture, as in the case of Philippiades. And any divine presence at Salamis was immanent, except (at least in Herodotus) for a brief moment at the opening of the engagement.³⁰ For Herodotus at least Plataia, the climactic battle against the invader, has a pronounced element of mysterious divine influence:

θῶμα δέ μοι ὄκως παρὰ τῆς Δήμητρος τὸ ἄλσος μαχομένων οὐδὲ εἰς ἐφάνη τῶν Περσέων οὔτε ἐσελθὼν ἐς τὸ τέμενος οὔτε ἐναποθανών, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἱρὸν οἱ πλείστοι ἐν τῷ βεβήλῳ ἔπεσον. δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι περὶ τῶν θείων πρηγμάτων δοκέειν δεῖ, ἡ θεὸς αὐτῇ σφεας οὐκ ἐδέκετο ἐμπρήσαντας τὸ ἐν Ἐλευσίνι ἀνάκτορον.

I find it marvellous that as they fought around the grove of Demeter it was found that not a single one of them either entered the precinct or died there but the majority fell on profane ground round the shrine. My view, if one can express a view about things divine, is that the goddess herself refused them entry because they had burned her site at Eleusis.

²⁹ Cf. Plut. *Thes.* 35.8: καὶ τῶν ἐν Μαραθῶνι πρὸς Μήδους μαχομένων ἔδοξαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι φάσμα Θησέως ἐν ὅπλοις καθορᾶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους φερόμενον ('and not a few of those fighting at Marathon thought they saw an apparition of Theseus in hoplite armour charging ahead of them against the barbarians').

³⁰ Hdt. 8.84.2: λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε, ὥς φάσμα σφί γυναικὸς ἐφάνη, φανεῖσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι ὥστε καὶ ἅπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον τάδε· 'ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμνην ἀνακρούεσθε;' ('this too is said, that an apparition of a woman appeared to them and on appearing urged them on so that the whole Greek army could hear, starting with the following reproach: "foolish men, for how long will you back oars?").

The shrine also figured in Simonides' account in his Plataia elegy, where the goddess herself may have been part of the narrative, though it is impossible to determine whether for Simonides she was a visible participant.³¹ Demeter also provides (for Herodotus) a suggestive link between the battles of Plataia and Mykale (9.97, 101), which between them put an end to the Persian threat. Mykale in turn was marked by the mysterious and uncannily accurate rumour which encouraged the Greeks with the news of the victory at Plataia (9.100-01). The Persian Wars were marked throughout by divine intervention,³² as was to be expected given the momentous importance of the events from the Greek perspective. But gods were not a perceptible presence in the other great battles. Attested and visible involvement of gods and heroes was a peculiarity of Marathon.³³

Divine epiphany is a rarity in the post-heroic world. It is unusual in fact even for Homer's heroes to encounter a god undisguised. Both the direct intervention of Pan and the heroic involvement in the fighting give Marathon the quality of an epic battle (in the generic sense). This is reflected in the (probable) collective heroization of the dead. Marathon had already become the stuff of myth during the fifth century.³⁴ By definition throughout the Athenian oratorical tradition the *progonoi* are an exemplar to be imitated, always by implication greater than the present. But these *progonoi* were not merely part of a generalized idealization; they are the stuff of legend. This gave the battle enormous iconic value for a genre which idealizes the past, since it offered comic writers a ready-made idealized and superhuman past to work with. Marathon came with its own associations which did not need to be elaborated; the mention sufficed to summon them up.

This mythic quality is captured exquisitely in Aristophanes' narrative in *Wasps*, his most ambitious treatment of Marathon. We begin (in the *ode*) with a nostalgic reminiscence of an earlier and glorious youth in the manner of Homer's Nestor. The *epirrhema* gives an account which absorbs under Marathon the whole history of the Persian invasions. Marathon itself is (as noted above) emphasized in the description of the hoplite line in 1083 (στὰς ἀνὴρ παρ' ἄνδρα) and in the account of the pursuit (1087-88). But the reference to the attempted burning of Attica in the guise of the smoking out of the wasps' nests takes us implicitly to 480, when the Persians did actually take and burn the Acropolis (Hdt. 8.53.2).³⁵ Most interesting of all is the claim in 1084 that the enemy arrows covered the sky. The statement points almost inescapably toward the famous remark of Deienekes (Hdt. 7.226):

³¹ See D. Boedeker, "Paths to heroization at Plataea", in *The new Simonides* (n. 26 above) 148-63.

³² See Gartzou in this volume.

³³ It is interesting to compare the account of the mysterious fighter in Herodotus 6.117 with the gigantic skeleton found at Plataia at 9.83.2. The latter takes place at a considerable but unspecified interval after the battle; it does not form part of eyewitness testimony.

³⁴ Cf. Arafat in this volume.

³⁵ The burning of the Acropolis is emphasized in Herodotus' account of the second invasion (8.53.2, 55, 140.α.2, 9.13.2). Though the Persians at Marathon had presumably come prepared to burn, the role of fire at Marathon is in the tradition attached not to Persian aggression but to the Athenian burning of the Persian ships, for which see Pelling in this volume.

ὅμως λέγεται ἀνὴρ ἄριστος γενέσθαι Σπαρτιήτης Διηνέκης τὸν τότε φασὶ εἰπεῖν τὸ ἔπος πρὶν ἢ συμμειῖσθαι σφεας τοῖσι Μήδοισι, πυθόμενον πρὸς τεο τῶν Τρηγινίων ὡς ἐπεὰν οἱ βάρβαροι ἀπίωσι τὰ τοξεύματα, τὸν ἥλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθεος τῶν οἰστῶν ἀποκρύπτουσι· τοσοῦτο <τὸ> πλήθος αὐτῶν εἶναι· τὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐκπλαγέντα τούτοις εἰπεῖν, ἐν ἀλογίῃ ποιούμενον τὸ τῶν Μήδων πλήθος, ὡς πάντα σφι ἀγαθὰ ὁ Τρηγίνιος ξείνος ἀγγέλλοι, εἰ ποκρυπτόντων τῶν Μήδων τὸν ἥλιον ὑπὸ σκιῇ ἔσοιτο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἡ μάχη καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἡλίῳ.

Still it is said that the bravest Spartan was Deienekes, who (they say) made the following remark before they engaged the Medes, after hearing from one of the Trachinians that when the barbarians release their arrows, they conceal the sun with the mass of the missiles, so great is the number; but he undeterred said, dismissing the number of the Medes, that their Trachinian friend brought them nothing but good news, since if the Medes concealed the sun the battle against them would be in the shade and not in the sun.

The passage suggests that Deienekes' *bon mot* was already part of the folk tradition when Herodotus was writing. But more important for our purposes is the appropriation of a famous detail of the Spartan engagement at Thermopylai for the Athenian battle at Marathon. There may be another such appropriation in the omen of the owl which flits across the army before the battle (1086: γλαῦξ γὰρ ἡμῶν πρὶν μάχεσθαι τὸν στρατὸν διέπτατο). This omen is attached by Plutarch (*Them.* 12.1) to the battle of Salamis:

λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν τὸν μὲν Θεμιστοκλέα περὶ τούτων ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος [ἄνωθεν] τῆς νεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, γλαῦκα δ' ὀφθῆναι διαπετομένην ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ τῶν νεῶν καὶ τοῖς καρχησίοις ἐπικαθίζουσιν· διὸ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα προσέθεντο τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ναυμαχίσοντες.

According to some, Themistokles was speaking on this matter from the deck of his ship and an owl was seen flying from the right of the ships and perching on his rigging, which made his hearers commit especially to his opinion and make ready to fight at sea.

Omens of course attach themselves readily to all significant events. And the owl was Athene's bird, as the men at Marathon were protecting Athene's city. So we cannot be sure that there was not also an owl in the Marathon tradition. Certainly the *scholia* to Aristophanes attach this incident to Marathon. *Schol.* V has: φασὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς γλαῦκα διαπᾶσθαι τὴν νίκην τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ('they say that in fact an owl flew across announcing the victory of the Athenians'). On balance Plutarch inspires more confidence, since the *scholium* contains nothing which could not have come from Aristophanes' text and looks like a straight extrapolation (at first or second hand) from the annotated passage. And the inescapable appropriation of the Thermopylai detail, together with the burning of Athens transferred to Marathon from the invasion of 480 (noted above), lends support to the view that Marathon may here have absorbed yet another memorable moment. What emerges overall is the fact that Aristophanes' Marathon as the archetypal battle against the Persians absorbs and subsumes the other anti-Persian conflicts.

All of this means that Marathon becomes a kind of comic shorthand term with a set of immediate associations (chronology, standards, ethics, potential) which can be summoned

up economically. Marathon in comedy becomes an extremely flexible device for opening up a range of issues. The factors which made it unique also made it a dense set of ideas. At its most basic level it is a chronological marker, as at *Acharnians* 179-81, where it marks hyperbolic old age (*Acharnians* 179-81):

ἐγὼ μὲν δευρό σοι σπονδὰς φέρων
ἔσπευδον· οἱ δ' ὠσφροντο πρεσβῦταί τινες
Ἀχαρνικοί, στιπτοὶ γέροντες, πρίνινοι,
ἀτεράμονες, Μαραθονομάχαι, σφενδάμνινοι.

I was hurrying to bring the treaties here
But they sniffed it, some ancients
of Archarnai, hard-packed old men, oaken,
tough, Marathon-fighters, made of maple.

The description of the charcoal burners there warns us that we are going to meet a cantankerous and irascible set of (very) old men. Marathon is never just a chronological indicator, however, for the reference, together with the other descriptive details, also prepares us for the paradoxical vigour with which they attack Dikaiopolis. The idea of extreme old age is taken up and revised in the *parabasis*, where it is used to associate Thucydides with the aged chorus and to create an exaggerated image of age and weakness. The implausibility of Marathon men being not just alive but active enough to merit prosecution is used self-consciously here to set up a grotesque exaggeration in the *epirrhema*, where the victim of malicious prosecution is not just old but senile and nearly dead (*Acharnians* 687-702):

κᾶτ' ἀνελκύσας ἐρωτᾷ σκανδάληθρ' ἰστάς ἐπ' ὧν
ἄνδρα Τιθωνὸν σπαράττων καὶ ταραττων καὶ κυκῶν.
ὁ δ' ὑπὸ γήρωι μασταρύζει, κᾶτ' ὀφλῶν ἀπέρχεται·
εἶτα λύζει καὶ δακρύει καὶ λέγει πρὸς τοὺς φίλους·
“οὐ μ' ἔχρηθ' ὁρὸν πρίασθαι τοῦτ' ὀφλῶν ἀπέρχομαι.”
ταῦτα πῶς εἰκότα, γέροντ' ἀπολέ-
σαι πολὺν ἄνδρα περὶ κλεψύδραν,
πολλὰ δὴ ξυμπονήσαντα καὶ θερμὸν ἀπο-
μορξάμενον ἀνδρικὸν ἰδρωτὰ δὴ καὶ πολύν,
ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν ὄντα Μαραθῶνι περὶ τὴν πόλιν;
εἶτα Μαραθῶνι μὲν ὅτ' ἤμεν, ἐδιώκομεν,
νῦν δ' ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν πονηρῶν σφόδρα δι-
ωκόμεθα, κᾶτα πρὸς ἀλίσκόμεθα.
πρὸς τὰδε τίς ἀντερεῖ Μαρψίας;

Then he drags us up and asks questions laying traps for us,
rending and confusing and confounding an old Tithonus.
And he from age mumbles, then goes off fined.
Then he weeps and he sobs and says to his friends,
“I'm fined of the money that was to have bought my coffin.”

How is this right? to destroy at the waterclock a white-haired veteran
who often joined the struggle and wiped off

warm manly sweat in quantity,
 who served the city bravely at Marathon?
 So then at Marathon, in our day, we pursued.
 But now by utter villains
 we are pursued in court – and we're caught.
 What Marpsias will reply to this?

The hyperbole here prepares very effectively for the *antepirrhemata*, which for those of us who felt that this was all too grotesque to be true gives a real (if arguably unique) instance of this grotesquerie in practice. Marathon is used here to create a set of stark polarities. Between youth and age, to prepare for the (appealing but – in a system reliant on the volunteer prosecutor – unfeasible) plea in the *antepirrhemata* that prosecutions should be age-related. Between past and present. Active and victorious at Marathon; passive and defeated in the courts (ἐδιώκομεν/διωκόμεθα). This contrast is underpinned by clever use of a pun based on the overlap between the literal language of pursuit and retreat in battle and its metaphorical use in the courts (697-99). But the choice of the pursuit is more than just a linguistic game. The pursuit of the fleeing enemy was singled out for mention in the choral account of their success at Marathon in *Wasps*. It reflects an image with which the Athenians were familiar from its depiction in the Stoa Poikile (Paus. 1.15.3). The final contrast is between citizen and foreigner. Though Marathon pops up literally only very briefly in the *antepirrhema*, its presence as subtext is felt throughout. Marathon was the archetypal Greco-barbarian battle and Aristophanes cleverly here deploys (and refreshes) one of the clichés of comic anti-demagogic *loidoria*; from at least Kleon onward the demagogue is for the comic poet a non-Athenian interloper. In keeping both with the comic cliché and the Marathon story Aristophanes here makes the Athenian politician who prosecutes Thucydides a non-Greek (*Acharnians* 703-12):

τῷ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄνδρα κυφόν, ἡλίκον Θουκυδίδην,
 ἐξολέσθαι συμπλακέντα τῇ Σκυθῶν ἐρημίᾳ,
 τῷδε τῷ Κηφισοδήμῳ, τῷ λάλῳ ξυνηγόρῳ;
 ὥστ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἡλέησα κάπεμορξάμην ἰδὼν
 ἄνδρα πρεσβύτερον ὑπ' ἄνδρὸς τοξότου κυκώμενον
 δις μὰ τὴν Δήμητρ', ἐκεῖνος ἦνικ' ἦν Θουκυδίδης,
 οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸν Ἀρταχαίην ῥαδίως ἠνέσχετο,
 ἀλλὰ κατεπάλαισε μὲν <γ> ἂν πρῶτον Εὐάθλους δέκα,
 κατεβόησε δ' ἂν κεκραγὼς τοξότας τρισχιλίους,
 περιετόξευσεν δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς.

Who can think it right that a man bent with age like Thucydides
 should be destroyed in a struggle with the Scythian wasteland,
 this Kephisodemos, the vocal prosecutor?
 I filled with pity and wiped a tear as I saw
 an old man confounded by a Scythian archer,
 By Demeter, Thucydides in his day

would not have given way to Artachaies himself,³⁶
 but would have thrown ten Euathloses,
 would have shouted down with a yell three thousand archers
 and outshot the ancestors of Euathlos' own father.

It is here that the David and Goliath aspect of Marathon is felt. The courtroom victim faces superior forces, like the men at Marathon, but this time we get the wrong result; the barbarian aggressor triumphs.

The Thucydides anecdote in *Acharnians* also draws on another aspect of the Marathon motif, which is merit. Marathon men as the supreme *progonoi* are also the supreme examples of service to the state, and a service which needs no argument. They are thus an ideal vehicle to address the theme of merit and reward. This is the case both with the chorus and with Thucydides in *Acharnians*, where hyperbolic service is juxtaposed with equal mistreatment which is tolerated by the *polis*. To abandon old men to the mercy of younger prosecutors becomes a betrayal both of them and of the principle of reciprocity which underpins dealing with the state as it underpins dealings between individuals.

This use recurs in the *parabasis* of *Wasps*, which presents a kind of positive counterpart to *Acharnians*, in that *charis* is requested, not its absence deplored. Service to the *polis* at Marathon and through Marathon the creation of the empire is used to establish the claim of the chorus to jury service as a kind of pension, though here too the reference to the drones (1114ff.) suggests that there is a mismatch between merit and reward. Closer to *Acharnians* is the role of Marathon later in the *agōn*, where Bdelykleon returns to the idea of empire as the natural reward for Marathon expressed in the *parabasis* (*Wasps* 706-12):

εἰ γὰρ ἐβούλοντο βίον πορίσαι τῷ δήμῳ, ῥᾶδιον ἦν ἄν.
 εἰσὶν γε πόλεις χίλιναι αἱ νῦν τὸν φόρον ἡμῖν ἀπάγουσιν·
 τούτων εἴκοσιν ἄνδρας βόσκειν εἴ τις προσέταξεν ἐκάστη,
 δύο μυριάδ' ἂν τῶν δημοτικῶν ἔζων ἐν πᾶσι λαγώοις
 καὶ στεφάνοισιν παντοδαποῖσιν καὶ πυῶ καὶ πυριάτῃ,
 ἄξια τῆς γῆς ἀπολαύοντες καὶ τοῦ ἔν Μαραθῶνι τροπαίου.
 νῦν δ' ὥσπερ ἐλαολόγοι χωρεῖθ' ἅμα τῷ τὸν μισθὸν ἔχοντι.

If they had wanted to offer a livelihood to the *dēmos*, it would have been easy.
 There are a thousand cities which now bring us the tribute.
 If someone assigned to each of these twenty men to support,
 twenty thousand common men would be living in the lap of luxury,
 and garlands of all kinds and beestings and curd,
 reaping the fruits of the earth in a manner worthy of the trophy at Marathon.
 As it is you go home with your pay like olive pickers.

Here the gap between merit and reward is much greater. The politicians are stealing the rewards of Marathon which the chorus should be enjoying. And as Bdelykleon has already made clear (650-51) and the *agōn* suggests throughout in focusing on the reality or

³⁶ I can do nothing with this verse. I print Borthwick's conjecture (E. K. Borthwick, 'Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 709: an old crux and a new solution', *BICS* 17 (1970) 107-10.), more from admiration for the ingenuity than because I am sure that the conjecture fixes the textual problem.

otherwise of Philokleon's power, Philokleon and the chorus between them beyond any individual characteristics represent the Athenian *dēmos* as a whole. We are not dealing here with a subgroup of society as in *Acharnians*; the *dēmos* voluntarily allows the politicians to take the rewards which the *dēmos* has earned. And in the contrast between the glories of the past and the scavenging in the present (ὥσπερ ἐλαολόγοι) there is a strong suggestion that the *dēmos* collectively behaves with a passivity unworthy of its past greatness. Given the affinities between Philokleon as the individual who typifies the *dēmos* and the figure Demos in *Knights* who personifies it, it comes as no surprise that the Marathon motif recurs to express the relationship of the *dēmos* with its political leaders, though in a corrupted form, when in the competition for the favour of Demos the sausage-seller points out that the Paphlagonian allows the Demos, hero of Marathon, to sit in discomfort (*Knights* 781-83):

σὲ γάρ, ὃς Μήδοισι διεξιφίσω περὶ τῆς χώρας Μαραθῶνι,
καὶ νικήσας ἡμῖν μεγάλως ἐγγλωττοτυπεῖν παρέδωκας,
ἐπὶ ταῖσι πέτραις οὐ φροντίζει σκληρῶς σε καθήμενον οὕτως ...

That you, who took your sword to the Medes for your country at Marathon
and with your victory allowed us a theme for grand work with the tongue,
should sit like so uncomfortably on the rocks he doesn't care at all ...

Implicit in the contrasts presented in *Acharnians* and *Wasps* is another dimension to Marathon, which is its capacity to encapsulate a set of values and in so doing activate associations which either tacitly or explicitly contrast the corrupt present with a simpler and more glorious past. This use recurs in Eupolis fr. 106 KA, probably from *Demes*:

οὐ γὰρ μὰ τὴν Μαραθῶνι τὴν ἐμὴν μάχην
χαίρων τις αὐτῶν τοῦμὸν ἀλγυνεῖ κέαρ.

No by my battle at Marathon,
Not one of them will grieve my heart.

This is probably (as Storey argues)³⁷ said by Miltiades, in a play which appears to be damning of the contemporary politicians.³⁸ This is also the way Marathon is used in the

³⁷ I. C. Storey, *Eupolis, poet of old comedy* (Oxford 2003) 136.

³⁸ Eupolis, *Demoi* fr. 384:

καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ πολλῶν παρόντων οὐκ ἔχω τί λέξω·
οὕτω σφόδρ' ἀλγῶ τὴν πολιτείαν ὄρων παρ' ἡμῖν.
ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω τέως ᾧ κοῦμεν οἱ γέροντες,
ἀλλ' ἦσαν ἡμῖν τῇ πόλει πρῶτον μὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων οἰκῶν, πλοῦτῳ γένει τε πρῶτοι,
οἷς ὥσπερ εἰ θεοῖσιν ἡνύχμεσθα· καὶ γὰρ ἦσαν
ὥστ' ἀσφαλῶς ἐπράττομεν· νυνὶ δ', ὅταν τύχωμεν,
στρατευόμεσθ' αἰρούμενοι καθάρματα στρατηγούς.

In truth though there is much to be said I'm at a loss for words.

So pained am I when I see our political life. We old men didn't run the city like this.

To start with our city's generals were

from the greatest houses, foremost in wealth and birth.

agōn of *Clouds* (986), where in response to an accusation that he is outdated Kreiton Logos defends his approach to education by claiming that it bred the Marathon men. Again in the *agōn* of *Frogs* (1296) Marathon is used (this time by the opponent) in relation to the upholder of traditional values.

The role of Marathon as an economical way of encapsulating a set of guaranteed values relating to a better past also makes it a useful means to associate particular figures with those values and so align audience sympathy. The automatic deference due to Marathon can thus serve to ensure a sympathetic reception for characters who invite less positive reactions and thereby generate ambiguous emotions in the audience. Before their entry the chorus of *Acharnians* are marked as Marathon-men at *Ach.* 181. They are also opponents of peace and supporters of a war which we have just seen to be ill-advised, poorly supported, and sustained on the basis of lies and corruption. They will further demonstrate their aggression with a violent attack on the hero and a steadfast refusal to listen. But the association with Marathon invites the audience to perceive a gap between these opponents of peace and charlatans like the politicians in the assembly at the opening of the play or the warmonger Lamachos who enters later; in the process it invites us to view them with less hostility. Like Dikaiopolis they are men who do the fighting, not the idlers, perverts, and degenerates who profit from the war. The detail hints at another side to the chorus and carries within it the hint of another development. The same is true of the chorus of wasps (*Wasps* 711), another set of initially unappealing characters who turn out to be dupes of the politicians. They have (as the *parabasis* insists) earned their right to draw state money as jurors. In the same way the passing reference to Marathon in *Lysistrata* 285 (in a play which otherwise – and unusually in Aristophanes – is more interested in events half a generation before Marathon) serves (along with the reminders of the Spartan invasions at the end of the sixth century) to ensure that the misguided male chorus (again unlike the politician who opposes *Lysistrata* in the *agōn*) do not quite lose audience sympathy.

In the examples studied the effect of the reference to Marathon is to highlight discontinuity, decline, and amnesia, whether it is a falling off of politics and politicians or art or education, a failure to live up to or to reward the warriors of the past, a readiness to surrender the rewards of past achievement to an elite group, or a readiness to allow the past to be cheapened by hypocritical demagogues. But Marathon when used in rhetorical appeal, and indeed when used in the *agōn* to articulate the gap between past and present, also reflects an opportunity. There is room to change for the better. In comedy the past is not irrecoverable. The comic past and the imagined comic future share a utopian tendency, unlike the comic present, which is usually flawed – worse politicians, worse policies, worse poetry, song, and drama. The opportunity inherent in the rhetorical appeals to Marathon is implicitly realized in the changes in the attitude of and to the chorus in *Acharnians*, *Wasps*, and *Lysistrata*. Utopian future and utopian past come together more explicitly in the Marathon motif at *Knights* 1334, where the restoration of Demos to his youthful self (itself a recurrent motif in comedy) is marked by allusion to Marathon, reversing its abusive use as part of the political manipulation of Demos at 781-83. The

To them we prayed like gods; for gods they were.
And so we were secure. But now, wherever it may be,
we go on campaign with trash we choose as our leaders.

personification of the people has been purged of error and folly and restored to the way the *dēmos* was in the idealized past (*Knights* 1334-35):

χαῖρ', ὦ βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων· καί σοι ξυγχαίρομεν ἡμεῖς·
τῆς γὰρ πόλεως ἄξια πράττεις καὶ τοῦ 'ν Μαραθῶνι τροπαίου.

Hail, king of the Greeks. We rejoice with you.

For you fare now as the city deserves and the trophy at Marathon.

The rejuvenation is not merely a recovery of youth and vigour but a recapture of the values of a better past, visually represented by change of costume, since Demos enters wearing the clothes and ornament of an earlier age (1331-32).

The use of Marathon in *Demes* is similar. This is a play which resurrects four political leaders from the past, one of them fittingly Miltiades. Here too Marathon represents both a past and a future, as in *Knights*. Less prominently the appearance of Marathon in the *agōn* of *Frogs* (along with much else) associates Aischylos with a better past which in this play with his victory also becomes a better future.

An interesting variation on the use of Marathon occurs in Eupolis fr.106 KA, quoted above. In Aristophanes Marathon is collectivized as the property of the people as a whole, or at least a subset of the common people represented by the chorus. In *Demes* (as Storey insists) Marathon is the personal property of Miltiades.

The fact that only Aristophanes survives of the Old Comic poets makes it difficult often to determine whether we are looking at a generic feature or an Aristophanic peculiarity. In this case however we can be reasonably confident that this is a generic habit. The presence of the motif in Eupolis confirms its generic status. So too does the fact that its first outing in Aristophanes (in *Acharnians*) is a passing mention, as though the audience is meant to pick up the resonances unassisted. It is, unsurprisingly, a fifth-century phenomenon. Fourth-century comedy (including Aristophanes) has no interest in Marathon and even by the end of the fifth century it seems largely to have disappeared as the nostalgia component in the comic plot dwindles.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON IN FIFTH-CENTURY DRAMA

EFI PAPADODIMA

References to the battle of Marathon in fifth-century drama fulfil two major functions. (1) The first function, which is more predictable, consists in the commemoration and celebration of the Athenian military victory which averted an imminent threat (*i.e.* the Greeks' enslavement by an aggressive and massive despotic ruler). This victory appears inseparably linked with various aspects of the Greek-barbarian polarity and, more evidently, the contrast between (Greek) freedom or liberty and (Oriental) despotism, which supposedly distinguishes – and defines – the two groups *par excellence*.¹ References to the victory thus contribute to the illumination of key constituents of the two nations' identity. (2) The second function is confined to comedy. It consists in the commemoration of and admiration for the old (moral) values which informed the Marathon-fighters and which are now allegedly distorted or absent from the Greek/Athenian world. This opposition between contemporary Athenians and those of past generations underlines the idea of an ethnic or cultural group's instability – and, for that matter, degradation. At the same time, Aristophanic characters employ the Greek victories over the Persians as a means for appealing to and encouraging the cultivation of Greek unity and concord.

References to Marathon, then, become a part of the exploration of identity in regard to both the Greek-barbarian polarity and the intra-Hellenic polarity. As a result, they most often lead to either self-praise or self-blame (which entails and underlines the need for active change), or a complicated blending of the two.

I. Tragedy

The Persians

The *Persians* dramatizes the naval battle of Salamis, in which an Athenian-dominated allied navy defeated the Persians. The battle and its consequences are presented from a Persian point of view, since the action is located at Susa and all dramatic characters are Persian. The play accordingly provides us with several references to Persian history, the accuracy or selectiveness of which is beyond our scope, and, more importantly for our purpose, brings on stage the ghost of Darius, the loser of Marathon.² The two battles, those of Marathon and Salamis, appear very closely connected in so far as the latter

¹ This point of opposition is a *topos* in fifth-century literature (especially drama and historiography), even though it is by no means always free of complications or contradictions.

² See, *e.g.*, A. J. Podlecki, *The political background of Aeschylean tragedy* (Ann Arbor 1966) ch. 2; E. Hall, ed., *Aeschylus' Persians* (Warminster 1996) 12; T. Harrison, *The emptiness of Asia: Aeschylus' Persians and the history of the fifth century* (London 2000) ch. 2.

(allegedly) constitutes Xerxes' attempt to avenge the dead of Marathon and surpass his father's achievements.³

Although the city of Athens is undoubtedly given a special position,⁴ especially in the exchange between the Queen and the Chorus, where Athens is virtually identified with Greece (233-34), there are other elements which suggest a consciousness of a collective Greek identity and spirit.⁵ There has been a fair amount of discussion about whether the play elevates the naval battle at Salamis over the battle of Marathon, as well as about whether the playwright is expressing any political bias (in favour of Themistocles over Cimon or Aristides) through this work. The play does indeed seem to downplay the *threat* posed by Darius at Marathon, as well as the consequences of his defeat for the Persians,⁶ while the ruin at Salamis is perceived and presented as an utter destruction.⁷ There is however a dramatic point to this, since the presentation maximizes the contrast between father and son – the prudent, or at least more prudent, Darius as opposed to the impulsive and transgressive Xerxes, which is of crucial significance in the drama.

Nonetheless, despite the dramatic need to place the emphasis on Salamis, Marathon is a constant background presence and there are several points in the drama where Darius' former defeat at Marathon is referred or alluded to – most of which are made by the

³ The latter motive also subsumes a deep-rooted custom of the Persian kings (expansionism), accompanied by a strong pressure experienced by each king to add to the empire – into which Herodotus can offer useful insights (e.g. 3.134, 7.5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 8a.1, 14). Cf. the exhortations of Pericles in Thuc. 2.36.1-3. See further S. Forsdyke, 'Herodotus, political history and political thought', in *The Cambridge companion to Herodotus*, ed. C. Dewald and J. Marincola (Cambridge 2006) 224-41. Other factors that contributed to Xerxes' decision are his youth and the influence of bad associates, as Atossa (753-58) and Darius (744, 782) point out.

⁴ For the view that the play emphasizes the central role of the Athenians (as opposed to other city-states) see R. Latimore, 'Aescylus on the defeat of Xerxes', in *Classical studies in honor of William Abbott Oldfather*, ed. by K. Abbott, et al. (Urbana 1943) 82-93; Harrison, *Emptiness of Asia* (n. 2 above) ch. 6; S. D. Goldhill, 'Battle narrative and politics in Aeschylus' *Persians*', in *Greeks and barbarians*, ed. T. Harrison (Edinburgh 2002) 50-61, at 52-61. Cf. Thuc. 1.73.2, 74.1-3; Lys. 2 *Epit.* 21-26, 42-46; Isoc. 4 *Paneg.* 85-87, 91, 98.

⁵ First of all, Atossa's dream, one of the few points where Greeks and barbarians are allegorically brought so close, each side being perceived and defined through its relation to the other, involves Hellas and 'the land of barbarians'. The two continents are spoken of as two sisters of equal size, beauty, and origin, who are distinguishable by their different clothing and who engage in a feud. Secondly, once hearing about his son's ruin, Darius states that Persia should henceforth remember Athens and Greece (824; cf. 814-17 on Plataea and the Dorians). His relevant instruction in Herodotus includes only Athens (5.105.2).

⁶ These are mostly confined to the casualties of the army and the women's grief. Note the Chorus' reference to hateful Athens and the previous 'unmanned' wives of Persia (cf. the first *stasimon*), which probably constitutes an allusion to Marathon (286-89).

⁷ Note especially 584-97, where the Chorus of Elders envisage the collapse of the entire Persian monarchy, and 751-52, where Darius claims that Xerxes' defeat means that Persia and its great wealth will be open to plunderers. See also 255, 282-83, 433-34, 515-16, 548-49, 595-97. Cf. the Thucydidean presentation of the magnitude of Athens' defeat in Sicily (6.30.2, 53-59, 7.57-58, 64.2).

Chorus of Elders, prior to the revelation of Xerxes' fate.⁸ Atossa's and the Chorus' exchange early in the play (231-45) illuminates certain Greek and, more particularly, Athenian values or institutions which are explicitly associated with their former victory at Marathon. These are: (a) self-motivated bravery and fighting merit; (b) devotion to freedom and liberty; and (c) emphasis on collectivity.⁹ When the Queen inquires into the size of the Athenian army, the Chorus stress its efficacy and allude to the defeat of Darius at the battle of Marathon (235-36). The exchange also illustrates the Athenians' free fighting spirit and, by extension, the free institutions they enjoy, underlined by the Queen's surprise at hearing that the Athenians managed to destroy Darius' large and excellent army,¹⁰ even though they were neither slaves nor subjects of a single man (243-44).¹¹

Marathon returns, tellingly, after the Messenger's account of Salamis. Atossa fleetingly refers to the numerous dead of Marathon, explicitly connecting the earlier battle with the present Persian enterprise and destruction (and with her son's motivation). Xerxes is said ironically to have exacted a bitter vengeance ('πικρὰν ... τιμωρίαν') from glorious Athens (473-75) in compounding the losses of Marathon,¹² here personified as the 'killer' of the Persians.¹³

⁸ At the same time, there are broader elements pertaining to the Greek victory at Salamis that could be seen as alluding to the victory at Marathon – like the reference to the dance-loving Pan, who haunts Psystalleia (448-49). Cf. Hdt. 6.105. Apollo is referred to as another god assisting the Greeks (205-06). According to Hall, *Aeschylus' Persians* (n. 2 above, 135), the suppression of the goddess Athena (referred to only once in 347) may be evidence for some attempt to make the victory at Salamis Panhellenic rather than Athenian.

⁹ Indeed, no Greek leader or individual is named in the play, by contrast with the extensive lists of Persian proper names (20-58, 302-30, 955-1001), the Persian king's titles (24, 654-55, 663, 666, 671), and the names of the king's nobles (2, 171, 304, 314, 443, 528, 681, 957, 979). These lists are suggestive of the rigid protocol of the Persian court and the formal language accompanying it.

¹⁰ Cf. Hdt. 6.117.1 on the Persian and Athenian casualties. There are numerous references to the enormity of the Persian army (e.g. 25, 40, 244, 352), as opposed to both the size of the Greek fleet and the divine will, which seems to be indifferent to such parameters (note, e.g., 337-47). Cf. Hdt. 7.9a.1, 9c, and 7.49. The numerical superiority of the Persian army works against them in the battle (413-21; cf. 793-94), similarly to several Herodotean contexts. On the Persian taste for quantification see D. Konstan, 'Persians, Greeks and empire', *Arethusa* 20 (1987) 59-73.

¹¹ This resembles the content and spirit of the more complex exchange between Xerxes and Demaratus in book 7 of the *Histories*. See F. Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis: Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts* (Basle 1945) 29-36; A. Dihle, 'Herodot und die Sophistik', *Philologus* 106 (1962) 207-20; D. Boedeker, 'The two faces of Demaratus', in *Herodotus and the invention of history*, special issue of *Arethusa* 20 (1987) 185-201; R. Thomas, *Herodotus in context: ethnography, science, and the art of persuasion* (Cambridge 2000) 109-11; R. V. Munson, 'Ananke in Herodotus', *JHS* 121 (2001) 30-50, at 44; E. G. Millender, 'Nomos despotes: Spartan obedience and Athenian lawfulness in fifth-century Greek thought', in *Oikistes: studies in constitutions, colonies, and military power in the ancient world offered in honor of A. J. Graham*, ed. E. Robinson and V. Gorman (Leiden 2002) 33-59.

¹² During their invocation of Darius' ghost, the Chorus sing about a 'double error', which could probably be linking Marathon and Salamis, though the sentence is severely corrupt (675-77).

¹³ Notice also Darius' statement that many evils can come from both land and sea and that the land itself is the Greeks' ally (790-94). On the duality between sea and land in the play see C. B. R. Pelling,

Finally, Darius, the loser of Marathon, is brought on stage (681-842) to offer advice to his people about how to handle the great crisis. Darius appears as an idealized wise-adviser, speaking in universal terms. First, he stresses his son's transgression in regard to the bridging of the Hellespont (725, 744-52) and the Persians' impious conduct, which consists in the burning down of the Greek temples (807-15). Both events are presented as constituting an offence to natural order and the divine.¹⁴ Darius thus makes clear that Xerxes' ruin is not a simple repetition of his own defeat. Even though both father and son failed in their military enterprises against Greece, it seems that the latter had a far more active share in his fall. Despite the disclosure of Zeus' oracle (739-42), which dictated that the Persian attack was destined to fail in the first place, Xerxes' personal responsibility is particularly emphasized. Darius suggests that his son has overstepped the mark even by the expansionist standards of Persian kings (808-10, 820-31, especially 821-22). Darius' incomprehension at his son's folly finds expression in a suggestion that Xerxes must have been suffering from a mental illness (750-51).¹⁵ Darius subsequently narrates the fortunate days of previous monarchs (765-81), concluding with the statement that no other Persian king had brought so much suffering on his people (785-86). Xerxes is thus presented as a negative example or exception in his community, because he reached the point of manifestly transgressing human limits and limitations (827-28).¹⁶

Marathon functions as an important reference-point for both worlds, the Greek and the Persian, one which maps present and past and underlines a certain degree of continuity in

'Aeschylus' *Persians* and history', in *Greek tragedy and the historian*, ed. C. B. R. Pelling (Oxford 1997) 1-19; Harrison, *Emptiness of Asia* (n. 2 above) ch. 7. Cf. Ar. *Ach.* 646-51.

¹⁴ See J. Romm, 'Herodotus and the natural world', in *Cambridge companion* (n. 3 above) 178-91. Romm points out the slightly differentiated treatment/assessment of Xerxes' bridging of the Hellespont by Herodotus and explores the complex interplay between nature and the divine in the *Histories*.

¹⁵ Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1407-09 and 1427-28. This sort of suggestion has a particular point in the context of Persian history because of Cambyses (Hdt. 3.25.1-2, 30, 33).

¹⁶ The silence about Darius' own errors or possible transgressions (especially the bridging of the Bosphorus [Hdt. 4]), known to the Greeks, reinforces the father-son contrast. Contrast Harrison, *Emptiness of Asia* (n. 2 above) 84-91, who argues that there is a continuation rather than a break between father and son. Garvie, on the other hand, claims that differences between father and son are reduced, and concludes that the play leaves the audience to choose between amoral explanation of Xerxes' and Persia's *pathos* (divine envy at Persia's *olbos*) and a moral view of it (result of *hybris*). See A. F. Garvie, ed., *Aeschylus' Persae* (Oxford and New York 2009) 321 and xxxi. Rosenbloom, in his turn, while reviewing Garvie's points, states that 'Dareios does not so much state that *hybris* is a bad thing or become Aeschylus' mouthpiece as claim that *hybris* is a thing and locate it in the framework of the tragedy as the source of the destructive delusion that is the cause and object of lament'. See D. Rosenbloom, review of Garvie, *BMCR* 2010.05.36. Darius' didactic tone, however, and his special status as both a reflective king and a ghost brought from the underworld to offer his guidance and advice make it more likely that he does not treat Xerxes' violation of natural order and insult to the divine amorally or descriptively. The implication of the play seems to be that Darius and (most of) the preceding Persian kings, even if they were treated like gods by their subjects and even if they were driven by 'selfish' motives and interests, refrained from acting like gods, thus leading their nation to ruin – an implication that Darius himself realizes.

each of them. This continuity is not confined to the two battles' outcome but embraces fundamental customs of the two communities – which are presumed to be connected with that outcome. However, unlike the Athenian values or institutions which are retained, strengthened, and expanded as we pass from Marathon to Salamis, the major Persian values or customs (notably despotism, materialism, and expansionism), though themselves retained and reinforced, become distorted or 'mistreated' by an individual king. This sort of divergence or transgression is presented as the major reason for which his expedition failed.

Children of Heracles

A more elusive, and perhaps contentious, echo of the Marathon campaign is to be found in Euripides' *Children of Heracles*. The play dramatizes the struggle of the Heracleidae to escape the murderous rage of their great enemy and pursuer, king Eurystheus of Argos, who had expelled them from their homeland after the death of Heracles. Athens, represented chiefly by king Demophon,¹⁷ is the only Greek city that grants them asylum (305-06). The drama thus explores and praises (what are presented as) Athenian ideals, notably freedom, justice, bravery, and piety (62, 113, 198, 244-45, 286-87, 329-32, 423-24, 901-09, 957). 'Athens' defence of the suppliants, particularly of the Heracleidae and the Argive mothers of the Seven, became a *topos* of self-praise in Athenian political oratory'.¹⁸

The connection with Marathon is suggested by the play's very setting and the identity of the Chorus;¹⁹ after wandering around Greece, the descendants of Heracles eventually seek refuge at the Athenian town of Marathon. The scene is set before the altar and temple of Zeus Agoraios (31-38), to whom the suppliants pray, while the Chorus is composed of Marathonian elders, who express their great devotion to and admiration for Athens (note especially 1018-19 and 901-27), depicting her as a city that reveres right and defends the afflicted (329-32), as well as their respect and support towards the noble suppliants. At the same time, the protagonists' glorious fathers (Heracles and Theseus), who are connected by bonds of blood (205-12) and who constitute important background presences in the drama, were both traditionally associated with Marathon and the great battle.²⁰

¹⁷ On Demophon and his affinities with both Theseus and Heracles, see H. C. Avery, 'Euripides' *Heracleidae*', *AJP* 92 (1971) 539-65, at 544-48.

¹⁸ W. Allan, *Euripides: the Children of Heracles* (Warminster 2001) 42-43. See also S. Mills, *Theseus, tragedy, and the Athenian empire* (New York 1997) 76; M. Heath, *The poetics of Greek tragedy* (London 1987) 64-65 (for aspects of Athenian patriotism in drama). The play at the same time exploits the consequences of war and civil conflict – and several pertinent issues, such as the proper use of power and the limits of revenge. The latter theme is explored in connection with the issue of the proper treatment of prisoners of war in the Alcmene-Eurystheus episode, where broader moral complications regarding revenge and justice emerge. See further A. P. Burnett, *Revenge in Attic and later tragedy* (Berkeley 1998) ch. 6.

¹⁹ For the idea that the drama's setting and the identity of the Chorus strengthen the play's patriotic force, see further Allan, *Children of Heracles* (n. 18 above) 48-49.

²⁰ See Plut. *Thes.* 35.5 (on the story that many of the Marathon-fighters thought they saw the apparition of Theseus in arms fighting against the Persians; this is presented as one of the reasons why the Athenians honour Theseus as a demigod). See also Paus. 1.15.3-4 (on the Stoa Poikile and

II. Aristophanic comedy

Marathon in Aristophanes frequently becomes a subject of patriotic nostalgia and pride.²¹ First, the battle itself is viewed both as a source of pride and privilege and as a responsibility; the Athenians who bravely and selflessly fought at Marathon saved Attica – and Greece – from foreign dominion (e.g. *Knights* 781-85) and made Athens special. As a result, the Marathon-fighters (and, by extension, the patriotic Athenians)²² are expected to enjoy privileges in the city they had defended (even though they were not themselves motivated by the hope of reward), but they also feel a certain pressure or duty to prove themselves worthy of their glory and trophies, and live up to the standards they themselves had established. In addition, Marathon conjures up respect for the old ways and values, which allegedly contributed or led to the victory by shaping the exceptional ethos of the Marathon-fighters.²³ References to Marathon, by extension, highlight how certain Athenians of the poet's day – individuals like Cleon or types of people – threaten the well-being of their city – as the barbarians once did²⁴ – and make her unworthy of her

the portraits of the Marathon-fighters including Theseus, represented as coming up from the underworld, Athena, and Heracles; notice also the Marathonians' reception of Heracles as a god, on which cf. Paus. 1.32.4; Athena, the patroness of Athens and former assistant of Heracles [Eur. *Heracl.* 920-23], was also worshipped at Marathon as the local goddess Athena Hellotis) and 1.32.6 (on Theseus' determination to offer refuge to the persecuted Heracleidae, which prompted a war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and on the spring Macaria, named after Heracles' daughter who voluntarily slew herself and thus gave the Athenians victory in the war). See further D. Castriota, *Myth, ethos, and actuality: official art in fifth-century B.C. Athens* (Madison 1992) 30-31 and 246-47 nn. 30-31. Cf. Hdt. 6.108.1, 116.

²¹ A casual reference to Marathon can be found in *Birds*, where the Hoopoe calls on the birds who live on the fine plain of Marathon (246), while summoning birds from different, unnamed locations around the world for the foundation of the new city. In *Frogs*, on the other hand, Marathon becomes a part of a joke about Aeschylus' unintelligible (as perceived by Euripides and Dionysus) vocabulary (1296). For various possible interpretations see E. K. Borthwick, 'New interpretations of Aristophanes *Frogs* 1249-1328', *Phoenix* 48 (1994) 21-41; K. J. Dover, *Aristophanes' Frogs* (Oxford 1997) on ll 1296f.

²² Scholars have often commented on the glaring anachronism whereby Aristophanic characters who claim to have participated in the battle could not have done so, given the relative date of the battle and the plays' composition. For Marathon and the past (and a different dimension of its role in the comic present) see also C. Carey in this volume.

²³ This reality is explicitly addressed in *Clouds*. The conflict between father and son as well as that between the Just and the Unjust Argument effectively encapsulate the loaded tension between the old and new ways, especially in regard to training and upbringing – which are directly linked with the young men's spirit and morale, as exhibited in fighting. The Just Argument indeed lays out the principles of the old system of education (961: τὴν ἀρχαίαν παιδείαν), the system that purportedly produced the men who fought at the battle of Marathon (985-86): youths were respectful, disciplined, masculine, and modest.

²⁴ And will probably do once again in the near future. See Ar. *Lys.* 1133, *Pax* 108, 406-13. Accusation (or the threat of accusation) of Greeks for collusion with Persia seems to be a *topos* in comedy (e.g. Ar. *Knights* 475-79, *Thesm.* 335-37, *Pax* 107-08). For the association of Euripides with the Persians as a threat to the parallel *polis* of the women see I. Karamanou in this volume.

glorious past. Contemporary citizens are sharply criticized and accused of: (a) falling short of their ancestors in terms of their moral values in general and their loyalty to their country in particular; and (b) failing to honour their old heroes properly or even exploiting them. Commemoration of the Hellenic victory over foreign enemies thus becomes a part of an evaluative comment on the present state of Greece and particularly Athens, highlighting the degrading effects of civil war, bad policies and politicians, and certain intellectual trends that have allegedly distorted or eliminated the old values.

Acharnians depicts a panorama of misfortune brought about by the ongoing civil war. The dominant atmosphere is one of material exhaustion, profound distrust, and hostility among Greek cities.²⁵ Dikaiopolis, though favouring peace and fervently hostile to the Spartans (509-12), locates the ultimate responsibility for the war with the Athenians and despite his initial hesitancy launches a fierce attack on representatives of the Athenian people who, to a greater or lesser extent, prevent life from being peaceful, just, and worthy of the Greek/Athenian past – of Marathon and Salamis. These types of people include the envoys, who are only interested in money on the pretext of working for peace (62-63, 135, 137);²⁶ the calumniators and sycophants, who are in fact presented as the Athenian species *par excellence* (902-08); the country-men, who are easily duped (370-74); the elders, who are rather aggressive and belligerent (375-76); and of course Cleon.

The Chorus of *Acharnians*²⁷ reproduce some of these accusations; they bitterly describe how the elderly Athenians are mistreated in their old age, even though they have gained so many victories for the Athenian fleets and, therefore, deserve honour (676-702). The old Athenians are being dragged into court by young orators, who exploit them by employing various disgraceful tricks. The Chorus directly reproach the city that failed to reward her heroes or even treat them decently (676), thus describing a situation in which familiar standards, conditions, and expectations are reversed.

This theme is reinforced by the contemporary warrior who appears in the play, Lamachus, who does multiple duty as a member of the corrupt political class, as a representative (like the Chorus) of Athenian belligerence, and as the antitype of the warriors of Marathon (note 595-617). Unlike the Chorus in their prime at Marathon, Lamachus also proves, after his threatening entrance, to be no match for Dikaiopolis, while at the end he enters injured as the result of a farcical campaign.

²⁵ See further A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: myth, ritual and comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 18-44.

²⁶ Notice the major distrust and revulsion with which Dikaiopolis receives the Persian and Thracian embassies (62-171) on account of the ambassadors' alleged arrogance, corruption by foreign customs, and numerous lies (e.g. their description of their alleged hardships in Persia (68-71); cf. Hdt. 5.52-54).

²⁷ Meanwhile, the veterans of Marathon (the Chorus of old *Acharnians*), tough as oak or maple, had run after the envoy Amphiaraus, upon his return from Sparta; they actually attempted to stone him, because he was bringing a truce to Dikaiopolis (179-85). These veterans, who (supposedly) once fought for their country against the barbarian invader, fervently oppose peace with the enemy, now a Greek city-state, who has just cut their vines. They actually consider the prospective peace-maker Dikaiopolis a major traitor to their city (219-36, 281-83, 285, 287-93, 297-304, 307-08, 315-16). Afterwards, the *Acharnians* are divided (557-71), but are eventually convinced to honour peace once they witness Dikaiopolis' material abundance and the figure of young Peace herself (988-99).

Marathon again plays an important role as a marker between present and past, and as a moral yardstick in *Knights* and *Wasps*, two plays which are more narrowly focused on the pathology of certain features and practices of contemporary Athenian life. *Knights* is structured on the parallelism between the dynamics of political hierarchy and the relations of the household – and there are multiple transitions between the domestic and public spheres. Demos, the Athenian people, appears as the master of the house, surrounded by the Paphlagonian²⁸ and the Sausage-Seller, who compete for a place near him by engaging in a contest of baseness. In the end, the latter manages to outdo the ethos of Cleon in all its negative traits or anti-values, even though he eventually adopts a didactic attitude towards Demos and seems to start using his power in order to benefit him. This is essential, since Demos is not at all blameless for Athens' present degradation.

The Chorus of aristocratic Knights indeed attack contemporary citizens on account of the way in which they relate to their country. In sharp contrast to their ancestors and the Knights themselves, many Athenians would only fight for their country if they were to receive concrete rewards and privileges (573-80). Cleon, in his turn, is personally targeted for the way in which he maltreats the old saviours of Greece.²⁹ The Sausage-Seller commemorates Demos' contribution to both Marathon and Salamis to that effect (781-85), and the battle of Marathon is here identified as the one which secured freedom for Attica.

Towards the end of the drama, after Demos' rejuvenation and restoration to his former glory by the Sausage-Seller (1316-34), the latter announces that Demos has once more become as he was in the days when he lived with Aristides and Miltiades;³⁰ he is now

²⁸ Paphlagonia was a country of origin of slaves. The Paphlagonian is Cleon, whose name is only mentioned once in 976. For the significance of the term Paphlagonian to designate Cleon see M. Ostwald, *From popular sovereignty to the sovereignty of law: law, society and politics in fifth century Athens* (Berkeley 1986) 215; J. Ober, *Mass and elite in democratic Athens: rhetoric, ideology, and the power of the people* (Princeton 1989) 266-70; G. Bohak, 'Ethnic portraits in Greco-Roman literature', in *Cultural borrowings and ethnic appropriations in antiquity*, ed. E. S. Gruen (Stuttgart 2005) 207-37, at 211-12. On the other hand, the verb παφλάζω (Ar. *Knights* 919) might point to the speech and accent of Cleon. Cf. Ar. *Pax* 314.

²⁹ In *Acharnians* as well, Cleon is portrayed as the contemptible and dangerous politician *par excellence* who opposes freedom and virtue by contriving and cheating, hindering justice through lies and calumnies, and virtually silencing any criticism of himself (297-302, 377-84, 659-64). See also Ar. *Wasps* 1030-35, 1284-86 with D. M. MacDowell, *Aristophanes: Wasps* (Oxford 1971) 299. See further W. R. Connor, *The new politicians of fifth-century Athens* (Indianapolis 1992) chs 3 and 4. For Aristophanes' hostility to Cleon and a more generous appraisal of the politician see G. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. VI (London 1849) 32-33, 332-33, 657-58, 661; K. E. Whedbee, 'Reclaiming rhetorical democracy: George Grote's defense of Cleon and the Athenian demagogues', *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 34 (2004) 71-95. Cf. Ostwald, *From popular sovereignty* (n. 28 above) 215-29; L. Edmunds, *Cleon, Knights, and Aristophanes' politics* (Lanham 1987); R. M. Rosen, *Old comedy and the iambographic tradition* (Atlanta 1988) 59-82. See also D. M. MacDowell, *Aristophanes and Athens: an introduction to the plays* (Oxford 1995) 42-45. For the broader theme of comic attacks on demagogues see H. Lind, *Der Gerber Kleon in den 'Rittern' des Aristophanes* (Frankfurt am Main 1990) 245-52; C. Carey, 'Comic ridicule and democracy', in *Ritual, finance, politics: Athenian democratic accounts presented to David Lewis*, ed. R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (Oxford 1994) 69-83.

³⁰ Cleon, on the other hand, takes as his model Themistocles (810-19). See C. A. Anderson, 'Themistocles and Cleon in Aristophanes' *Knights* 763ff.', *AJP* 110 (1989) 10-16.

living in ancient Athens (‘ἀρχαίαισιν Ἀθήναις’), which is now again worthy of the poets’ songs (‘λίπαραι καὶ ἰοστέφανοι καὶ ἀριζήλωτοι Ἀθῆναι’). Demos appears in person with his hair held in place with a golden band, in all the glory of his ancient dress, perfumed with myrrh, and spreading around him the odour of peace. His rejuvenation is at the same time a leap back in time. The leader of the Chorus salutes him as the single ruler of the city and the whole of Hellas (‘μόναρχον ... βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων’). Demos’ blessedness is said to be worthy of Athens and the trophy of Marathon (1330-34). The ending of this play is notoriously perplexing and ambivalent on many levels,³¹ especially given Demos’ address as a ‘μόναρχος’.³² But within the uncertainties Marathon at all events functions as a yardstick of the city’s glory and status.

One of the central themes of *Wasps* is the Athenian jury system – both the conduct of the jurors themselves and more generally the political context in which they function. The play presupposes and explores polarities of different sorts, notably those between Greeks and barbarians, slave and free, as well as patriotic and unpatriotic Athenians. In the *agōn* between father and son,³³ as well as in the *parabasis*, the point that worthless Athenians exploit their ancestors – in the very frame of their city’s institutions – is bitterly stressed by Bdelycleon, the young Athenian, and by the Chorus of old jurors who initially oppose the former. In the *agōn*, Bdelycleon attempts to prove that being a juror is far from being a noble or affordable thing. He accordingly claims that his father is actually a slave, despite his former services to his country (682-85). Bdelycleon explicitly cites Marathon when pointing out how small a percentage of the tribute given by the Athenian allies is offered to the jurors (698-712). The implication is that Cleon and his people are taking it for

³¹ Those favouring a happy reading of the ending include: A. H. Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Knights* (Warminster 1981) 2-3; L. J. Bennett and W. B. Tyrrell, ‘Making sense of Aristophanes’ *Knights*’, *Arethusa* 23 (1990) 235-54, at 248-49; Bowie, *Aristophanes* (n. 25 above) 72-77; H. Yunis, *Taming democracy: models of political rhetoric in classical Athens* (Ithaca and New York 1996) 52. Those favouring an ironic reading include: J. Hesk, ‘Intratext and irony in Aristophanes’, in *Greek and Roman textual relations*, ed. A. Sharrock and H. Morales (Oxford 2000) 227-61, at 257-58; V. Wohl, *Love among the ruins: the erotics of democracy in classical Athens* (Princeton 2002) 110-23. For a discussion of the way in which the ending affects the play’s unity see E. R. Schwinge, ‘Zur Ästhetik der aristophanischen Komödie am Beispiel der Ritter’, *Maia* 27 (1975) 177-99; R. W. Brock, ‘The double plot in Aristophanes’ *Knights*’, *GRBS* 27 (1986) 15-27. Cf. D. Konstan, *Greek comedy and ideology* (New York 1995) 5.

³² Cf. Hdt. 3.82.1, 5.46.2, as well as *PV* 326.

³³ Before the *agōn*, Bdelycleon summons three slaves in order to help him restrain his father, who attempts to escape the net cast around the house with the help of the Chorus. The names of these slaves are Eastern (Midas, Phryx, and Masyntias), while the ensuing scuffle is a comic reenactment of the battle of Marathon (433). See P. Meineck, *Aristophanes 1: Clouds, Wasps, Birds* (Indianapolis 1998) 161. Philocleon in response calls on Cecrops, the first king of Athens born from the earth, complaining that he is abused by these barbarians in his very country (cf. Dikaiopolis’ similar complaint in *Ar. Ach.* 167-71), despite the fact that he has many times made them weep a full bushel of tears (438-40). For the idea of Athenian autochthony cf. *Ar. Wasps* 1075-80, where the Chorus deny that younger Athenians are indigenous (thus creating another sort of polarity between old and young Athenians), and Eur. *Ion* 1163-65. See further N. Loraux (trans. C. Levine), *The children of Athena* (Princeton 1993) 184-263; B. Isaac, *The invention of racism in classical antiquity* (Princeton 2004) ch. 1.

themselves. In a similar fashion, the Chorus, who have already alluded to their past military exploits,³⁴ evoke memories of the victory at Marathon and condemn the gobbling up of imperial revenues by worthless men, who had never fought (1075-121). The point of the old jurors is similar to that of Bdelycleon: Cleon has debased those who were once the living embodiment of Athenian excellence.

In *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Lysistrata*, references to Marathon are incorporated into the gender conflict and are thus invested with a more comic flavour, especially in the former play. *Thesmophoriazusae* touches upon contemporary artistic, intellectual, and socio-political issues mostly centred on Athenian life, such as the festival of the Thesmophoria,³⁵ the evolution of tragedy, freedom of speech,³⁶ and the interaction between the sexes. The women are determined to restore their honour and assert their value; it is in this frame in which they allude to Marathon. While attempting to demonstrate the superiority of their sex, they compare certain women with certain men in the *parabasis*. Charminus, an admiral who was defeated by Astyochus the Lacedaemonian,³⁷ is said to be inferior to Nausimache, a celebrated courtesan; Sallabacho, another prostitute, is said to be better than the politician Cleophon.³⁸ The women conclude that no contemporary man is a match for Aristomache, the heroine of Marathon,³⁹ or Stratonice (806-07) – two fictitious figures who symbolize Athenian military victories. These two names, as their very etymology suggests, represent the old values and, more particularly, nobility and fighting merit.⁴⁰

In *Lysistrata*, on the other hand, the confrontation between the sexes arises from the grim reality of civil war. It thus concerns a more immediate, pressing, and vital affair. There are three major conflicts which are either represented or recalled and interact in

³⁴ Such as at Byzantium (236-37) and Naxos (354-55).

³⁵ See further Bowie, *Aristophanes* (n. 25 above) 205-12. For Marathon in *Thesmophoriazusae* see further I. Karamanou in this volume.

³⁶ See especially A. W. Saxonhouse, *Free speech and democracy in ancient Athens* (Cambridge 2006) 134-38.

³⁷ See Thuc. 8.41-42, 4.73.

³⁸ In *Frogs*, Cleophon is mocked because of his mother's alleged Thracian origin, which makes him speak differently and associates him with the swallow (676-83). For the swallow metaphor in connection with unintelligible, barbaric language see also Aesch. *Ag.* 1050-51; *Soph. Ant.* 1001-02; *Ar. Birds* 199-200. Cf. Hdt. 2.54-57. For other Aristophanic passages in which it is either stated or implied that a figure who claims to be an Athenian citizen is actually of foreign descent, see D. M. MacDowell, 'Foreign birth and Athenian citizenship in Aristophanes', in *Tragedy, comedy and the polis*, ed. A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson, and B. Zimmermann (Bari 1993) 359-71.

³⁹ The idea of barbarians, and more particularly Persians, as the Greeks' great and perpetual enemies is also highlighted in the play (337, 365-66).

⁴⁰ See also C. Tuplin, *Achaemenid studies* (Stuttgart 1996) 145-46 n. 26. Later, Euripides introduces himself as Artemisia – thus recalling a real heroine of the Persian Wars – to the Scythian archer, who comically mispronounces her name (1200-01). Cf. *Ar. Lys.* 675-81, where Artemisia is referred to together with the Amazons. For the warrior-ruler Artemisia (in reference to whom boundaries are blurred in terms of gender, ethnicity, and the contrast between freedom and tyranny) see Hdt. 7.99, 8.68-69, with Munson, 'Ananke in Herodotus' (n. 11 above) 48 n. 92.

subtle ways: the Persian Wars – pointing to the past glory but also basic unity of the Hellenic world; the ongoing Peloponnesian War; and the newly arisen clash between the sexes – both of which point to the fragmentation of the Hellenic world that jeopardizes its well-being and survival.

As is the case with the divisions within Greece because of the war, the clash between the sexes is reflected in the split in the Chorus. The two Choruses, one of Old Men and one of Old Women, will eventually be united, in harmony with the establishment of peace. The former is composed of old Athenians, who are rather exhausted, clumsy, and ineffective. Early in the play, they struggle to smoke the women out of the Acropolis, which the women have seized so as to secure the money intended for the prosecution of the war. The men consider these women major traitors to their city (in the same way as the veterans of Marathon viewed Dikaipolis) and, therefore, worthy of the death penalty. The leader of the Chorus alludes to the men's former military achievements when claiming that, if they get defeated in this confrontation, they will prove unworthy of their glory and the trophy in the *tetrapolis* (281-85).⁴¹ The massive and threatening barbarian enemies of Marathon have now been replaced by a bunch of aggressive women, who manage to outdo the men by combining their femininity with their masculinity – both in the particular contest and in the long run.

The drama, however, promotes and proclaims an ultimate sense of reconciliation and overcoming of differences in regard to both the battle of the sexes and, even more strongly, the hostile city-states of the Hellenic world. Even more so since, as Lysistrata underlines while equally reproaching Athens and Sparta for destroying Hellenic cities and men, the barbarians are lurking, waiting outside the borders (1128-34). Thus, the heroine appeals to the deeper unity of the Greeks, by emphasizing a broader, threatening, as well as quite familiar gulf – the one between Greeks and barbarians. Accordingly, after an agreement has been reached, the Chorus of Lacedaemonians celebrate an Athenian and a Spartan 'victory' in the Persian Wars – at Artemisium and Thermopylae respectively (1247-70). Lysistrata had meanwhile highlighted the common heritage of Athens and Sparta, and depicted them as two cities that had previously assisted one another and which owe a debt to each other (1112-56). The Persian Wars and Marathon ultimately invite the Greeks to remember and honour their kinship and common past.

III. Conclusion

In both Aeschylus and Aristophanic comedy, Marathon functions as a reference-point or a point of comparison, becoming an integral part of the exploration of identity issues. Representatives from both the Greek and the Persian community detect and articulate central, if not necessarily uncontroversial, constituents of their own collective identity, as these are either retained and strengthened or distorted and eliminated in particular incidents or in the course of time – and as they work and interact during the two communities' confrontation.

⁴¹ At the moment at which the men are being outwitted by the women towards the end of the play, the women refer to the Tricorysian gnat, which bugs one of the men (1030-32); Tricorythus or Tricorynthus was the last town of the *tetrapolis*. Thus, the men are at this point associated with their past achievements at Marathon – by the very women who previously 'jeopardized' their reputation.

In Aeschylus, the temporal and thematic distance is certainly much shorter, since the play treats a recent Greek victory in the Persian Wars. The victory at Marathon, as well as that of Salamis, which constitutes the drama's subject-matter, are interwoven with the broader interplay between Greeks and Persians and, more particularly, between the two nations' major customs which prove of central importance to the overall course of the war. Commemoration of the battle serves to highlight focal aspects of each community's image, as it is supposedly perceived by its people themselves (since we are dealing with a Persian point of view as explored through a Greek's eyes).

In Aristophanic comedy, the nature of which is strongly topical, Marathon functions more evidently as a yardstick of the Greeks' image, quality, and self-perception in a particular historical context, different in many respects from that of the Persian Wars. Most references to Marathon are made by the lone comic hero, the one who attempts to check, reverse, or undermine some decadent *status quo*, and the Choruses – who eventually side with him, despite their initial objections or reservations. Commemoration of the battle is employed both as a subject of patriotic, idealizing nostalgia and as a means for highlighting the contemporary Athenians' failure to honour their past and their heroes, let alone prove themselves equally noble, selfless, and patriotic. The first aspect points to a sense and consciousness of continuation, reflected at points in which Athenians not only celebrate their former triumph but also assert or at least attempt to prove that they are indeed worthy of it, while the second aspect points to a great contrast and break. This tension ultimately reflects the longing for moral excellence or at least decency, which in Aristophanes is often tied to the broader interplay between the old and new state of affairs. Even though this intra-Hellenic discrepancy is occasionally viewed in the light of – and complicated by – the wider Greek-barbarian polarity and animosity, the fact remains that Aristophanic Athenians are more frequently contrasted with Athenians of past generations rather than with their foreign enemies.

AS THREATENING AS THE PERSIANS: EURIPIDES IN ARISTOPHANES' *THESMOPHORIAZUSAE**

IOANNA KARAMANOU

The *Thesmophoriazusae* has widely been regarded as one of Aristophanes' least political plays. It focuses on the clash between women and Euripides as a dramatist and as a 'slanderer' of women.¹ It is thus a play about gender and about drama treating the definition, as well as the crossing of the generic boundaries between Aristophanic comedy and Euripidean tragedy.² Nonetheless, there are certain references to issues of contemporary political crisis, and I shall argue that they are brought to the fore by means of the parallel drawn by the women at the Thesmophoria between their two worst enemies: Euripides and the Persians. My purpose, therefore, is to attempt to interpret this interesting simile and explore its dramatic function and implications throughout the play.

The *Thesmophoriazusae* can be firmly dated to 411 BC.³ Early in that year the Athenian Assembly had agreed to send an embassy under the leadership of Peisander to negotiate with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, with a view to securing Persian support for Athens in the Peloponnesian War. The conditions for the negotiations to succeed would be the Athenian agreement to recall the exiled Alcibiades, since he was the only person who could bring over Tissaphernes, and the change of constitution from democracy to oligarchy. According to

* I am grateful to Professors Chris Carey and Mike Edwards for their valuable comments.

¹ For the non-political focus of the *Thesmophoriazusae*, see, for instance, D. M. MacDowell, *Aristophanes and Athens* (Oxford 1995) 251-52; A. H. Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (Warminster 1994) 4; C. Austin and S. D. Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (Oxford 2004) xxxii.

² For Aristophanes' reception of Euripidean tragedy, see M. Silk, *Aristophanes and the definition of comedy* (Oxford 2000) ch. 2 and 'Aristophanic paratragedy', in *Tragedy, comedy and the polis*, ed. A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson, and B. Zimmermann (Bari 1993) 477-504; P. Rau, *Paratragodia* (Munich 1967); J. A. Dane, 'The Euripides plays of Aristophanes', in *Critical concepts versus literary practices. Aristophanes to Sterne* (Oklahoma 1988) 17-64; P. Pucci, *Aristofane ed Euripide. Ricerche metriche e stilistiche* (Roma 1961); C. Prato, *Euripide nella critica di Aristofane* (Galatina 1955); I. Karamanou, 'Εὐριπίδαριστοφανίζων: Η πρόσληψη του Ευριπίδη στην αρχαία κωμωδία' ('The reception of Euripides in old comedy'), in *Αττική κωμωδία: πρόσωπα και προσεγγίσεις*, ed. A. Markantonatos and T. Pappas (Athens 2011) 675-737.

³ The dating of the play is based on a combination of evidence: *Th.* 1060-61 (*Andromeda* was produced the previous year in 413/12), in conjunction with Schol. Ar. *Th.* 190 (Euripides' death in 406/05 occurred six years after the staging of the play), *Th.* 804 (reference to Charminus' defeat at Syme in 412/11; cf. Thuc. 8.42) and the Athenian negotiations with Persia in 411 discussed in this article. See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* ii (Berlin 1893) 343-55; K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic comedy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1972) 168-72; A. H. Sommerstein, 'Aristophanes and the events of 411', *JHS* 97 (1977) 112-26; Austin and Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) xxxiii-xxxvi, with many bibliographical references.

Thucydides, the Assembly gave its consent to the embassy to negotiate with Tissaphernes ‘in whatever way seemed best to them’, acting out of insecurity, as well as out of the expectation that full democracy would soon be restored.⁴ The Athenian negotiations with Persia collapsed, but this antidemocratic movement went ahead, preparing the way for the oligarchic *coup* which occurred in the summer of that year.⁵

The play seems to have been staged at the time Peisander and his ambassadorial colleagues set off to meet Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. This emerges from the repeated condemnation of those wishing to make alliances with Persia and overthrow the established constitution. More specifically, in *Th.* 335-39, 349-51 a curse is uttered against anyone who enters into negotiations with Euripides and the Persians, with a view to bringing any harm upon the women or joining in restoring tyranny in Athens, respectively:⁶

εἴ τις ἐπιβουλεύει τι τῷ δήμῳ κακὸν	335
τῷ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἢ ᾧ πικηρυκεύεται	
Εὐριπίδῃ Μήδοις τ’ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τινὶ	
τῇ τῶν γυναικῶν, ἢ τυραννεῖν ἐπινοεῖ	
ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκατάγειν ...	
κακῶς ἀπολέσθαι τοῦτον αὐτὸν κῶκίαν	349
ἄρᾱσθε, ταῖς δ’ ἄλλαισιν ὑμῖν τοὺς θεοὺς	
εὖχεσθε πάσαις πολλὰ δοῦναι κάγαθά.	

If anyone contrives any evil against the people	335
of the women or negotiates	
with Euripides and the Medes, in order to harm	
women, or is planning to become a tyrant	
or to join in restoring a tyrant ...	
curse that person to perish miserably, himself and his house,	349
but to all you others pray that the gods	
give many blessings.	

As the Aristophanic women point out, a potential Athenian alliance with Persia would threaten the *polis* and its democratic constitution, and this idea recurs in the choral prayer for protection from those seeking to subvert the established laws and democratic decrees by inviting the Persians to intervene (356-67). See especially 365-67:

ἢ Μήδους ἐπάγουσι τῶν
κερδῶν οὔνεκ’ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ,
ἀσεβοῦς’ ἀδικοῦσί τε τὴν πόλιν.

⁴ For these events, see Thuc. 8.53-54; D. Kagan, *The fall of the Athenian empire* (Ithaca 1987) 51-139; M. Ostwald, *From popular sovereignty to the sovereignty of law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986) 344-58; T. L. Dynneson, *City-state civism in ancient Athens* (New York 2008) 79-81; J. K. Davies, *Democracy and classical Greece* (Cambridge Mass. 1993²) 134-35; P. J. Rhodes, *A history of the classical Greek world, 478-323 BC* (Oxford and Malden 2010²) 178-79; J. F. Lazenby, *The Peloponnesian War: a military study* (London 2004) 184-86.

⁵ Thuc. 8.63.3; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 32.1.

⁶ See also Isoc. 4.157 for curses uttered against anyone negotiating with the Persians.

(As for all women who) urge the Medes
to cause harm for the sake of gain,
they offend the gods and do injustice to the city.

References to the Persian threat are completely absent from the *Lysistrata*, which was also staged in 411 and had a far more political character than the *Thesmophoriazusae*. The available evidence thus favours the possibility that the *Lysistrata* was produced earlier that year, probably at the Lenaea, while the *Thesmophoriazusae* was staged two months later, at the City Dionysia, when the oligarchic conspiracy was more advanced, causing an extremely critical political situation in Athens.⁷

This parallel between Euripides and the Persians clearly indicates that in the eyes of the women the dramatist is considered to be as menacing as the Persians. Euripides is accused by his female opponents of slandering women in his tragedies, by presenting them as adulterous, man-chasers, wine-bibbers, betrayers, garrulous, and as a great curse for men (384-94). It should be noted, however, that the women of the *Thesmophoria* prove to be exactly as described by Euripides,⁸ and the reason they are furious at him is for his having raised their husbands' suspicions against them and, as a result, for undermining the safety and stability of their households (384-428). In fact, Euripides is described by these women as a 'destroyer of the household' (426: *ὠκότηρις*), in that by slandering them he threatens the integrity of their *oikos*. This accusation bears serious implications not only for the household, but for the city-state as well.

Aristotle in the *Politics* (1.1252a24-1253b23) presents the *oikos* as the atom of the *polis*. It is worth noting that the protection of the *oikos* was part of Athenian legislation as early as Solon, whose poetry draws a close link between the *oikos* and the *polis* (fr. 4W.). As the former was a constituent element of the latter, it may not be accidental, as Aristotle again points out, that the roots of public disasters, such as revolutions, are often traced to private issues (*Politics* 5.1303b19-1304a17).⁹ The integrity of the household was thus considered to be essential to the stability of the city-state as a whole and, in turn, the fate

⁷ Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (n. 3 above) 343-52; Sommerstein, 'Aristophanes and the events of 411' (n. 3 above) 112-26; J. Henderson, *Aristophanes: Lysistrata* (Oxford 1987) xv-xxv; Austin and Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) xli-xliv; Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 2-4.

⁸ *Th.* 424-25, 430, 433-42, 531-32, 339-50. For the alleged Euripidean misogyny, see *Lys.* 283-84, 368-69 and Schol. 283 (Hangard-Holwerda); *Vita Eur.* II (*TrGF* V, 1, A.IB) iii-iv; Satyr. *Vita Eur.* (*POxy.* 1176) fr. 39.x; Diphilus, *Synoris* fr. 74 K.-A., fr. adesp. 1048 K.-A.; Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 15.20.6; Suda ε 3695 (Adler). See also R. Finnegan, *Women in Aristophanes* (Amsterdam 1995) 54-65; Prato, *Euripide* (n. 2 above) 54-62; N. Loraux, 'Aristophane, les femmes d'Athènes et le théâtre', in *Aristophane*, ed. by J. M. Bremer and E. W. Handley, *Entr. Fond. Hardt* 38 (Geneva 1993) 203-44, at 235-42, with rich bibliography.

⁹ For the *oikos-polis* interconnection, see M. H. Hansen, *Polis* (Oxford 2006) 109-12; W. K. Lacey, *The family in classical Greece* (Ithaca 1968) 84-150; C. Patterson, *The family in Greek history* (Cambridge Mass. and London 1998) 85-91; E. Hall, 'The sociology of Athenian tragedy', in *The Cambridge companion to Greek tragedy*, ed. P. E. Easterling (Cambridge 1997) 93-126, at 104-05; S. B. Pomeroy, *Families in classical and hellenistic Greece* (Oxford 1997) 36-39; J. Henderson, *Three plays by Aristophanes: staging women* (New York 1996) 22-24.

of the *oikos* in fifth-century Athens was intrinsically interwoven with the fate of the *polis*. Hence, by threatening the safety of the microcosm of Athenian households, Euripides is perceived as affecting the stability of the city-state and, in turn, is regarded as being as harmful to Athens as the Persian invaders.

This parallel drawn between Euripides and the Persians may be further reinforced by the self-presentation of women as a metaphorical political entity. More specifically, women at the Thesmophoria are envisioned as members of a religio-political association and self-defined as *dēmos* (335, 353; see also below on 1145) and as participants in the Assembly (84: ἐκκλησιάζειν).¹⁰ Their choice to hold their meeting near the Pnyx (658) also points in this direction.¹¹ Moreover, the *parodos* follows the procedure at the opening of a meeting of the Assembly with a prayer for divine blessing and a series of curses on the enemies of the community (295-371).¹² Furthermore, the resolution of the female council in 372-79 closely reproduces the form and contents of a *probouleuma* by naming the chair(wo)man, the secretary, and the proposer of the motion.¹³ The civic dimension of female contributions is further illustrated in the *parabasis*, as noted below.

On this basis, the perception of women as a symbolic political entity could underscore the analogy between Euripides and the Medes. As the Persians threatened Athens with destruction and still retain their destructive potential, so Euripides represents a threat to the whole female sex. By this time, the ethnic division and polarity between Greeks and barbarians has become firmly embedded in Athenian discourse.¹⁴ Hence, this parallel may suggest a natural enmity between women and Euripides comparable to the canonical antithesis of Greeks and barbarians.

In order to evade confronting his female opponents, Euripides sends his relative disguised as a woman to defend him at the Thesmophoria. Considering that female nature

¹⁰ A. Tzanetou, 'Something to do with Demeter: ritual and performance in Aristophanes' *Women at the Thesmophoria*', *AJPh* 123 (2002) 329-67, at 331-38; E. Bobrick, 'The tyranny of roles: playacting and privilege in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*', in *The city as comedy*, ed. G. W. Dobrov (North Carolina 1997) 177-97, at 182-85; C. Moulton, *Aristophanic poetry* (Göttingen 1981) 125-26; J. A. Haldane, 'A scene in the *Thesmophoriazusae* (295-371)', *Phil.* 109 (1965) 39-46; A. M. Bowie, *Aristophanes: myth, ritual and comedy* (Cambridge 1993) 205-12.

¹¹ Moulton, *Aristophanic poetry* (n. 10 above) 126 and n. 61; Henderson, *Three plays by Aristophanes* (n. 9 above) 92-94.

¹² Tzanetou, 'Something to do with Demeter' (n. 10 above) 335-37; Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 176.

¹³ Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 181; and on the form of *probouleumata*, see, for instance, P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) 52-87; R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and participation in Athens* (Cambridge 1988) 88-98; M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian democracy in the age of Demosthenes* (Oxford 1991) 138-40.

¹⁴ See, for instance, E. Hall, *Inventing the barbarian: Greek self-definition through tragedy* (Oxford 1989) esp. ch. 4; T. Harrison, ed., *Greeks and barbarians* (New York 2002); T. Long, *Barbarians in Greek comedy* (Carbondale and Edwardsville 1986); C. Carey, *Democracy in classical Athens* (Bristol 2000) 83; R. Hartog, *The mirror of Herodotus: the representation of the other in the writing of history* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1988) ch. VI; M. Rosellini and S. Said, 'Usages de femmes et autres *nomoi* chez les 'sauvages' d' Hérodote', *ASNP* 8.8 (1978) 949-1005.

is intrinsically associated with ruse, particularly in Euripidean tragedy,¹⁵ the feminine disguise of the kinsman, as well as that of Euripides towards the end of the play, points to their use of female plotting to confront the women at the Thesmophoria with their own weapons.

The male identity of the kinsman is quickly exposed, and the women have him arrested and report the matter to the magistrates. To escape punishment the kinsman vainly employs Euripidean stratagems based on paratragedies of the *Telephus* (689-758), *Palamedes* (765-84), *Helen* (850-928), and *Andromeda* (1009-1134). After these successive abortive attempts, it becomes clear that Euripidean escape mechanisms fail to rescue the kinsman and, in turn, to provide a successful denouement in their tragic guise.

As a result, the untying of the plot is attained in comic terms. To make amends with the women, Euripides employs female ruse by entering disguised as a female brothel-keeper named Artemisia and promises not to offend them anymore in his plays (1160-71). However, if they do not accept his offer, he threatens that he is going to reveal to their husbands all their plotting behind their backs. Having been persuaded that Euripides does not represent a threat anymore, the women prompt him to outmanoeuvre the Scythian guarding his relative (1170-71). The dramatist entices the barbarian archer from his post by using the charms of a dancing girl (Elaphion).

In terms of these closing dramatic mechanisms, it should be noted that the figure of the procuress is not completely alien to Euripidean drama, as in Aristophanes' eyes she is perceived as the comic counterpart of the tragic nurse (*Ra.* 1079).¹⁶ In addition, the possible reception of dramatic devices from the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, such as the rescue thanks to Artemis(ia) and Elaphion ('young deer', 'fawn'; see *IT* 28) and the deception of the barbarian opponent in each case (Scythian archer/king Thoas),¹⁷ could point to the concealed application of Euripidean dramatic mechanisms in a comic guise. In this manner, the gap between comedy and Euripidean tragedy seems to be bridged, and an autonomous comic result is produced by means of this covert fusion.¹⁸ I would thus argue that, in terms of dramatic genre, the play does not seem to end with the triumph of

¹⁵ F. I. Zeitlin, 'Playing the other: theater, theatricality and the feminine in Greek drama', in *Nothing to do with Dionysos*, ed. J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (Princeton 1990) 63-96, at 79-84 (also in F. I. Zeitlin, *Playing the other: gender and society in classical Greek literature* [Chicago 1996] 341-74); S. Murnaghan, 'Women in Greek tragedy', in *A companion to tragedy*, ed. R. Bushnell (Oxford and Malden 2005) 234-50, at 238; R. G. A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek tragedy: a study of peitho* (Cambridge 1982) 64; R. Just, *Women in Athenian law and life* (London 1989) 196; M. Heath, *The poetics of Greek tragedy* (Stanford 1987) 160; and for Euripidean passages illustrating female ruse, I. Karamanou, *Euripides: Danae and Dictys* (Munich and Leipzig 2006) 58.

¹⁶ See, for instance, the matchmaking efforts of the nurses in *Hipp.* 433-731 and *Stheneboea* fr. 661.10-14 K.

¹⁷ E. Bobrick, 'Iphigenia revisited: *Thesmophoriazusae* 1160-1225', *Arethusa* 24 (1991) 67-76, at 71-74. See also M. Wright, *Euripides' escape tragedies* (Oxford 2005) 50-52; P. Kyriakou, *A commentary on Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris* (Berlin and New York 2006) 41-42; MacDowell, *Aristophanes and Athens* (n. 1 above) 269 n. 45.

¹⁸ See Karamanou, 'Εὐριπίδαριστοφανίζων' (n. 2 above) 713-15. For the autonomy of Aristophanic 'hybrids', see Silk, *Aristophanes* (n. 2 above) 97.

comedy over tragedy, as suggested by most critics,¹⁹ but rather with a reconciliation between Euripidean drama and comedy, which would correspond to the settlement between Euripides and the women at the Thesmophoria.

Euripides having been reconciled with his female opponents, he and the women join at the close of the play for the sake of the common welfare against the barbarian threat, as in *Lys.* 1128-34.²⁰ This purpose is attained through the dramatization of the initial parallel drawn between the dramatist and the Persians which is actually 'staged' upon Euripides' entry in this closing scene. To deceive the Scythian archer the dramatist disguised as a procuress distracts him with a dancing girl to the sound of a Persian tune (1172-1201). Going after the girl the Scythian hands over his bow-case to Euripides and asks his name. The latter introduces himself as 'Artemisia' (1199-1201). Apart from the above-mentioned dramatic connotations of this name, I shall argue that the figure of Artemisia, as well as the Persian melody, creates a 'Persian' dramatic atmosphere within which the barbarian threat is comically eliminated.

Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus and an ally of Xerxes in the naval battle of Salamis, where she commanded five ships, has remained famous for her female skill and resourcefulness. In *Lys.* 674-75 she is paralleled to the title-heroine with regard to her ingenuity.²¹ Our main source for her life is Herodotus, who underlines that Artemisia was the only one of Xerxes' counsellors to advise him not to fight a naval battle at Salamis (Hdt. 8.68).²² While the king's forces were in disorder during this naval battle, Artemisia's ship was pursued by an Athenian vessel. Having no way of escape and being very close to the enemy, she decided to make for a friendly ship and ram it. This ship was commanded by the king of the Calyndians. She rammed and sank it. When the captain on the Athenian ship saw her attacking an enemy vessel, he supposed that Artemisia's ship was either Greek or was a deserter from the enemy who was fighting for the Greeks, so he changed course and turned to the rest of the enemy ships. This outcome turned out to her advantage in that she escaped without harm and at the same time gained Xerxes' admiration. According to the story, the king was watching and assumed that Artemisia

¹⁹ Bowie, *Aristophanes* (n. 10 above) 220-25; T. K. Hubbard, *The mask of comedy. Aristophanes and the intertextual parabasis* (Ithaca 1991) 182-99; J. Gibert, 'Falling in love with Euripides' (*Andromeda*), in *Euripides and the tragic theater in the late fifth century*, ed. M. J. Cropp, K. H. Lee, and D. Sansone (*JCS* 24/25, Urbana 1999/2000) 75-91, at 87-90; N. W. Slater, *Spectator politics: metatheatre and performance in Aristophanes* (Philadelphia 2002) 178-79; Henderson, *Three plays by Aristophanes* (n. 9 above) 96-97; Zeitlin, 'Playing the other' (n. 15 above) 182; C. Platter, *Aristophanes and the carnival of genres* (Baltimore 2007) 163-64; MacDowell, *Aristophanes and Athens* (n. 1 above) 270; L. K. Taaffe, *Aristophanes and women* (London and New York 1993) 99; Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 9-10.

²⁰ E. Hall, 'The archer scene in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*', *Phil.* 133 (1989) 38-54, at 50-51; Austin and Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) lxvi; Slater, *Spectator politics* (n. 19 above) 180; H. J. Tschiedel, 'Aristophanes und Euripides: zu Herkunft und Absicht der Weiberkomödien', *GB* 11 (1984) 29-49, at 36-37.

²¹ See Henderson, *Aristophanes: Lysistrata* (n. 7 above) xxxv-xxxvi.

²² See also Schol. Ar. *Lys.* 675 (Hangard); Paus. 3.11.3; Suda α 4030 (Adler); Plut. *Mor.* 869F-870A.

sank an enemy ship. He is reported to have said: 'My men have become women and my women, men' (Hdt. 8.87-88).

The choice of the Aristophanic Euripides to impersonate Artemisia is ingenious for many reasons. The choice of this particular woman famous for acting like a man corresponds to the dominant theme of gender inversion in the *Thesmophoriazusae*.²³ Though some critics have seen the presence of Artemisia in this scene as reflecting her courage,²⁴ her resourcefulness and trickery are more to the point. Artemisia's use of female ruse at Salamis is congruent with the idea of female ingenuity throughout the play.²⁵ By impersonating her Euripides employs female plotting as the sole means of subverting the dominant power of the superior male, in this case, the barbarian guard. Like Artemisia, the dramatist gains a double benefit, in that by assuming her role he rescues his relative and, at the same time, outwits the foolish barbarian character, whose intellectual inferiority to the Greeks has already been demonstrated by his inability to comprehend the preceding paratragic scenes.²⁶ The close association of Artemisia with resourcefulness also emerges from Euripides' appeal to Hermes as god of deception (1202) right after introducing himself to the Scythian under her name. Subsequently, having realized that he was cheated, the Scythian cries that he has been deceived by Artemisia (1213-14)! As I pointed out above, in the final negotiation between Euripides and the women the dramatist applies female plotting, thus turning women's own weapons against themselves. In the same manner, the impersonation of Artemisia is a 'Persian' weapon applied by Euripides and deviously turned against the barbarian intruder within the realm of comic fantasy and, in turn, against any kind of barbarian intruder, including the Persians, who still remain the worst enemy of the women and of the Athenian *polis*.

Apart from the figure of Artemisia, the Persian tune to which Euripides enters is another indicator pointing to the Persians as a target in this scene and creates, at the same time, a Persian ambience within which the Scythian archer is lured by Euripides-'Artemisia'. This oriental melody produced by pipes also seems to involve a criticism of Euripides' penchant for the so-called New Music, in which the Dionysiac *aulos* had a prominent position.²⁷ The alleged aestheticism of the New Music also suits the context of seduction in this scene.

²³ F. I. Zeitlin, 'Travesties of gender and genre in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*', in *Reflections of women in antiquity*, ed. H. P. Foley (New York 1981) 169-217, at 193 (also in Zeitlin, *Playing the other* [n. 15 above] 375-416); C. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the comic hero* (Cambridge Mass. 1964) 225; Bobrick, 'Tyranny of roles' (n. 10 above) 68-69.

²⁴ C. F. Angus, 'Aristophanes' *Thesm.* 1200: Artemisia', *PCPS* (1905) 20-21; J. Taillardat, *Les images d'Aristophane* (Paris 1962) §317.

²⁵ See also below, on the allegation of female superiority over men in the *parabasis* (800-29).

²⁶ *Th.* 1082-1124, 1129-31. See Rau, *Paratragodia* (n. 2 above) 87; M. G. Bonanno, 'Metateatro in parodia', in *L'allusione necessaria* (Urbino 1990) 259-61; Gibert, 'Falling in love with Euripides' (*Andromeda*)' (n. 19 above) 79-81; Long, *Barbarians in Greek comedy* (n. 14 above) 105-08; Hall, 'The archer scene' (n. 20 above) 50; Slater, *Spectator politics* (n. 19 above) 178. Cf. similarly the Scythian's inferiority to women in *Lys.* 449-65.

²⁷ See Austin and Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 340 and *Ra.* 1302. For the prominent role of the *aulos* in the New Music, see P. Wilson, 'Euripides' tragic muse', in *Euripides*

The audience is prepared for the elimination of the Persian threat at the close of the comic play by the choral prayer to Pallas Athena (1136-59), which is located precisely before the entry of the disguised Euripides:

Παλλάδα τὴν φιλόχορον ἔμοι
 δεῦρο καλεῖν νόμος εἰς χορόν,
 παρθένον ἄζυγα κοῦρην,
 ἥ πόλιν ἡμετέραν ἔχει 1140
 καὶ κράτος φανερόν μόνῃ,
 κληδοῦχος τε καλεῖται.
 φάνηθ', ὦ τυράννους
 στυγοῦς', ὥσπερ εἰκός.
 δῆμός τοί σε καλεῖ γυναι- 1145
 κῶν· ἔχουσα δέ μοι μόλοις
 εἰρήνην φιλέορτον.

It is appropriate for me to call here
 to our dance Pallas, lover of the dance,
 the virgin unwed maiden,
 who rules our city, 1140
 is the only one to have obvious power over it
 and is called the Keeper of the keys.
 Appear, as is proper,
 you hater of tyrants!
 The people of women call you. 1145
 May you come to bring me
 festive peace.

The goddess is invoked as the traditional patroness of Athens and as guardian of the city against tyranny and those wishing to impose it. Once again women use political vocabulary by describing themselves as *dēmos* (1145; see also above on 335) and appealing to Athena as key-holder of the city, which corresponds to the role of women as key-holders of their *oikos*. Moreover, the invocation of the goddess in a bacchiac tetrameter (1143-44) is expressive of heightened emotion and draws attention to the dangers posed by antidemocratic treachery and to this extremely critical situation for Athens.²⁸

and the tragic theater, ed. Cropp, Lee, and Sansone (n. 19 above) 427-49, at 433-39; E. Csapo, 'Late Euripidean music', in *Euripides and the tragic theater*, ed. Cropp, Lee, and Sansone 399-426, at 415-26; E. Pöhlmann, 'Aristophanes, free form and the monody', in *Gegenwärtige Vergangenheit* (Berlin and New York 2009) 258-71, at 263-67; P. Wilson, 'The *aulos* in Athens', in *Performance culture and Athenian democracy*, ed. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge 1999) 58-95, at 58-59, 64-75; P. Wilson, 'Music', in *A companion to Greek tragedy*, ed. J. Gregory (Oxford and Malden 2005) 183-93, at 190-93.

²⁸ See C. Anderson, *Athena's epithets: their structural significance in the plays of Aristophanes* (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1995) ch. 3; Austin and Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) xliii, 334-35; Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 231-32; Bowie, *Aristophanes* (n. 10 above) 227; A. M. Dale, *The lyric metres of Greek drama* (Cambridge 1968²)

This type of anxiety also emerges from the nostalgic reference to the battle of Marathon in the *parabasis* and the assertion that Athens has not won a major battle ever since. The passage runs as follows (804-07):

Ναυσιμάχης μὲν γ' ἦττων ἐστὶν Χαρμῖνος-δῆλα δὲ τᾶργα-
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Κλεοφῶν χεῖρων πάντως δήπου Σαλαβακχοῦς. 805
πρὸς Ἀριστομάχην δὲ χρόνου πολλοῦ, πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν Μαραθῶνι,
καὶ Στρατονίκην ὑμῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἐγχειρεῖ πολεμίζειν.

Charminos is weaker than Nausimache ('Naval Battle') – the facts are evident –
and Cleophon is in every aspect inferior to Salabaccho. 805

As for Aristomache ('Excellent Battle'), that one at Marathon,
and Stratonice ('Army Victory'), it has been a long time since any of you has even
attempted to compete with either one of them.

To demonstrate their superiority over men, women appeal to proper names that turn them into symbols of traditionally masculine virtues in male spheres of activity, such as war.²⁹ This gender inversion is further emphasized by their questioning of male ability to perform their gender role in a period of crisis. Within this context of the past-present antithesis, the reference to Marathon functions as a paradigm, as well as a challenge, urging the Athenians to compete with their glorious past and beat the new Persian menace. Considering that the reference to the Marathon battle is a compulsory *topos* of Athenian eulogy, especially in public epideictic oratory,³⁰ the gender inversion in this passage would constitute an interesting serio-comic reworking of this motif.

In conclusion, I hope to have pointed out the political resonance in the substratum of the *Thesmophoriazusae*, on the basis of the parallel between Euripides and the Persians. Through the dramatization of this simile Aristophanes manages to eliminate the barbarian

101; C. Austin, 'Observations critiques sur les *Thesmophories* d'Aristophane', *Dodone* 19 (1990) 9-29, at 28.

²⁹ Bobrick, 'Iphigenia revisited' (n. 17 above) 185-86; Austin and Olson, *Aristophanes: Thesmophoriazusae* (n. 1 above) 263; Taaffe, *Aristophanes and women* (n. 19 above) 76-78; Moulton, *Aristophanic poetry* (n. 10 above) 129-31; Zeitlin, 'Playing the other' (n. 15 above) 185-86.

³⁰ See Hdt 9.27; Thuc. 1.73.4, 2.34.5; Ar. *Eq.* 1316-1408, *Ach.* 181 and the note by S. D. Olson, *Aristophanes: Acharnians* (Oxford 2002) 128; Dem. 14.29-30, 40, 18.208, 19.311-12, 23.196, 198; Aeschin. 2.75, 3.181 and the note by C. Carey, *Aeschines* (Austin 2000) 226; Isoc. 4.91, 8.38, 15.306, 12.195; Andoc. 1.107; N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens*, trans. A. Sheridan (Cambridge Mass. 1986) 155-71; R. Thomas, *Oral tradition and written record in classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989) 221-26, 234-36; C. Carey, 'Epideictic oratory', in *A companion to Greek rhetoric*, ed. I. Worthington (Oxford 2010) 236-52, at 243-45; S. Usher, *Greek oratory. Tradition and originality* (Oxford 1999) 275, 349-51; J. E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the tradition of funeral speeches at Athens* (New York 1981) *passim*; A. Missiou, *The subversive oratory of Andokides* (Cambridge 1992) 51-52, 152; G. Crane, *Thucydides and the ancient simplicity: the limits of political realism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1998) 269-73; H. J. Gehrke, 'From Athenian identity to European ethnicity: the cultural biography of the myth of Marathon', in *Ethnic constructs in antiquity*, ed. T. Derks and N. Roymans (Amsterdam 2009) 85-100, at 88-94; E. D. Francis, *Image and idea in fifth-century Greece* (London 1990) 21-66.

threat within the microcosm of the comic situation and the macrocosm of Athenian politics. The particular reference to Marathon is an appeal to this historical paradigm challenging the Athenian men to overcome the shortcomings of their recent military and political activity and a covert indication that dealing with the Persians is a betrayal of the Athenian tradition. Accordingly, the *parabasis*, the public curse, and the choral prayer to Pallas Athena invite the Athenians not to tolerate those who are plotting against the democratic constitution and the integrity of the *polis*. Overall, the dramatic conflict is effectively brought to an end in three levels by means of comic fantasy. Apart from the reconciliation attained in terms of gender and dramatic genre, the controversy is successfully resolved within the realm of city-state politics through the comic elimination of the Persian menace. The final disguise of Euripides as ‘Artemisia’ thus involves the fusion of a historical, tragic, and comic persona illustrating the multilayered function of this Aristophanic closure.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON IN FUNERAL SPEECHES

ELENI VOLONAKI

The conventional conception of epideictic as a discourse of ‘praise and blame’, familiar from Aristotle, is neatly summed up in the distinction of the types of oratory in Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1358b:

συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή: αἰεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλευόντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία, τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία: τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.

The concern of counsel/advice (*symbolē*) is partly exhortation, partly dissuasion. For in every case people who offer private advice and people who speak in public on civic issues do one or the other of these. The concern of the lawsuit is partly accusation, partly defence. For inevitably people in dispute do either of these. The concern of display is partly praise and partly blame.

According to this categorization of the three ‘species’ of rhetoric – judicial, deliberative, epideictic – which remained fundamental in the history of classical rhetoric, a speech is called ‘epideictic’ if the audience is not being asked to take a specific action, unlike forensic and deliberative oratory, which seek to have a practical outcome and make the audience reach a decision. Nevertheless, epideictic oratory served practical goals and was of ideological importance. It gave the opportunity to skilful orators and politicians to impress their audiences and advertise their own political ideals. It could also play an important role in rhetorical education, since it demonstrated methods of argumentation.¹ Furthermore, epideictic oratory could influence opinion in the city of Athens by offering advice and criticism. The concept of epideictic oratory needs to be broadened beyond the limitations of fourth-century rhetorical theory.²

The funeral oration, the example *par excellence* of this category, played an important role in its civic setting; it reviewed the achievements of the mythical and historic past of the city of Athens, both celebrating and setting an example of virtue in political life, and finally it provided pieces of advice and counsel for the consolation of the living. In the process it also cemented and enhanced the status of the speaker. The funeral orations (*epitaphioi*) were delivered as part of a state burial ceremony. Thucydides, in his

¹ Isokr. 12.271, 4.17.

² Aristotle’s division ‘ignores the flexibility of and fluidity between literary forms in living traditions’; cf. C. Carey, ‘Epideictic oratory’, in *A companion to Greek rhetoric*, ed. I. Worthington (Oxford 2007) 236-52, at 236-37.

introduction to Perikles' funeral oration (2.34), gives us our fullest account of this tradition, which was celebrated annually, whenever there were Athenian war-dead to bury.³ The ceremony consisted of four stages: the *prothesis*, where the remains of the dead bodies were brought in the coffins, one for each of the ten Athenian tribes; the *ekphora* – a formal procession to the public cemetery, named the Kerameikos; the burial in the *dēmosion sēma*;⁴ and finally the funeral oration delivered by a chosen, distinguished orator. Just as the occasion reflects a democratization of traditional elite practice, so the surviving funeral speeches reflect a democratic reading of Athenian history. In Homer's world, funeral ceremonies were restricted to the individual aristocrat, but in democratic Athens they were anonymous and collective, since they represented ordinary Athenian soldiers (particularly hoplites) and not their leaders. The precise date of the introduction of the public burial ceremony is controversial but it probably began in the late 470s or early 460s.⁵ As to the delivery of an oration, this institution may have been one of the later additions to the public funeral. Our evidence of the surviving *epitaphioi* starts from 431 BC – the date of Thucydides' funeral oration, but the reference to the practice of delivery in its introduction indicates that it must already have been established. Demosthenes' statement in his speech *Against Leptines* (141), 'you alone of all men make public funeral orations for the dead', suggests that the custom was considered uniquely Athenian.

A speaker at a public burial ceremony is under pressure to say something significant and original. On the other hand, he needs to satisfy audience expectations which involve traditional cultural ideals, such as patriotism, freedom under the law, self-confidence, and public democratic debate, and to articulate these through a set of typical narrative components.⁶ All the surviving speeches display a common structure, and later rhetoricians refer to these same typical elements for funeral orations. In the proem the speaker explains that his words are inadequate to the occasion. The *epainos* or 'praise' section follows, which included standard mythological and historical exploits, one of which was the praise of the ancestors and their accomplishments. In the final section, the speaker should give some consolation to the relatives of the dead.

In reviewing the past history of the city, the victory mainly of the Athenians in the Persian Wars was a rhetorical *topos*, widely used in all kinds of oratory and especially in

³ According to Thucydides 34.1 and 47.1, the ceremony was held in the winter, a time most appropriate for the Athenians to gather and bury their dead, after the battle operations had ended and the dead bodies had been brought to Athens.

⁴ Thucydides (2.34.5) observes that the burial of the dead in 490 at the battle site in Marathon was exceptional as a special honour, although the practice was not uncommon at the time. Marathon was located within Attica and the cult activity would continue and remain within Athenian territory; this might have counted for its special status. Cf. S. C. Todd, *A commentary on Lysias, speeches 1-11* (Oxford 2007) 149-50.

⁵ For a discussion of the slight and rather contradictory evidence, cf. J. Herrman, *Athenian funeral orations* (Newport MA 2004) 2-3. For a full reference to all scholars' views divided into those who think that the ceremony was introduced and developed by stages and those who have argued for specific dates in the late 470s or 460s, cf. J. Herrman, *Hyperides. Funeral oration* (Oxford 2009) 14 n. 77.

⁶ Cf. G. A. Kennedy, *A new history of classical rhetoric* (Princeton 1994) 21-22.

epideictic funeral orations, as a unique and exemplary act of bravery in the cause of freedom for the Greeks. Our emphasis in this chapter will be placed on the use of the battle of Marathon as a *topos* of reference in setting an example of virtue, education, and political life. A detailed examination of all surviving *epitaphioi* will show that the particular example from the history of the city was used in different ways depending on the context for which each oration was composed and in connection with the evolution of Athenian history from the second half of the fifth to the end of the fourth century BC.

Thucydides' *epitaphios* is arguably the boldest reworking of the funeral oration.⁷ Its specific political goal, which is to glorify the Athenian democracy, gives it a very unusual relationship with the deeds of the ancestors. The *epainos* begins with praise of the *progonoi* (ancestors) by asserting (2.36.1):

ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἅμα ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης δίδοσθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἔλευθέραν δι' ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν.

I will begin with our ancestors; it is both just and proper that to them first be given the honour of remembrance on an occasion of this kind. For the same people having been always in succession the inhabitants of this land, by their valour they have delivered it to us in the state of liberty.

This is the only reference made to the ancestors. Thucydides moves to the next generation by saying that καὶ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν· κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσιν ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον (2.36.2: 'for which they deserve commendation, but our fathers deserve yet more; for in addition to what they had received, not without great labour of their own have they acquired this our present dominion and delivered it to us in the present generation'), a statement that may undermine the glory of the more distant ancestors – the generation of the Pentekontaetia are important because they acquired the empire. Finally, Perikles' own generation follows, which is praised for strengthening the empire and making Athens self-sufficient in all aspects, for both war and peace (2.36.3):

τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἶδε οἱ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπηυξήσαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην.

We ourselves who are present here and are for the most part in the prime of life have enlarged and furnished the city with everything, both for peace and for war, such that it is now self-sufficient.

⁷ Thucydides' programmatic statement (1.22.1) that the speeches are reconstructed on the basis of probability with an attempt to keep as closely as possible to what was actually said and his observation on the problems of memory, his own and others', leaves for this as for all his speeches a large question about the accuracy of what we are offered; in this case, however, since he was in Athens at the time and there was no shortage of witnesses, we can be reasonably confident that this is a distillation of what Perikles actually said, though it would be unwise to press the details.

The largest part of the speech concentrates on the Athenian way of life and nothing is said of the past Athenian achievements and history. No reference to the Persian Wars or the battle of Marathon is made in the funeral oration, though the narrator notes in his introduction that the dead from the Marathon battle were, exceptionally, buried on that site.

The real subject of the praise in Perikles' *epitaphios* is the Athenian way of life, not its historical antecedents. The remarkable rhetorical achievement of Perikles here lies in the way he blends the past and the present in a 'timeless encomium of the city'; the city of Athens is praised as a city worth dying for.⁸ Perikles avoids referring to the achievements of the ancestors, since 431 had been a year of invasion and destruction; the first year of the war was marked by lack of military and political success. Therefore, any comparison between the past and the present would open up negative reactions and criticism.

Perikles' silence is not however reflected in Athenian rhetoric in Thucydides more generally. Praise of the men of Marathon and Salamis is placed in the mouths of the ambassadors at Sparta and Euphemus at Syracuse (1.73.4-74.4, 6.82.3), who emphasize the risks taken in those battles as part of a rhetoric which justifies the empire on the basis of Athens' panhellenic contribution. In both cases, the Athenians are praised for securing the freedom of Greece; at Marathon they fought unaided against the barbarians, whereas at Salamis they sacrificed their land in order to fight the enemy in the sea battle.

We have what looks like a near-contemporary funeral oration composed by Gorgias, the famous sophist from Leontini. It survives only in fragments and there is not much to conclude about the content or the rhetorical *topoi* included. It is unlikely that Gorgias actually delivered this funeral oration since he was not an Athenian citizen. Gorgias' *epitaphios* was most probably written as a demonstration speech for students of rhetoric and as an example of what a funeral oration should look like. But that if anything adds to its value for a reconstruction of the proprieties of the genre.

The first fragment (1.5: 'Xerxes, the Zeus of the Persians') indicates that the speech must have contained an account of the Persian Wars, commonly included in the section on Athenian history. The most extensive fragment of Gorgias' funeral oration (4.6) clearly deals with praise of the dead, and it appears that this type of praise was ordinarily presented in the *epainos*. For the dead the *epainos* refers to their noble death and their sacrifice of life in order to benefit their country. The *topos* of the victory of the few over the immense power of the enemy in funeral orations aims to glorify and idealize the achievement of the dead, as for example the triumph of the Athenians in the battle of Marathon.

Gorgias must have also had a political objective since he criticized the Athenians for their fighting against fellow-Greeks (5b: 'trophies over the barbarians call for hymns of praise, those over Greeks call for lamentations'). Philostratos (*Lives of the Sophists* 1.9 [493]) states that Gorgias advocated a reconciliation between the Greek states involved in the Peloponnesian War. This was an agenda also pursued in Gorgias' *Olympikos*, where the theme of Greek *homonoia* is used, as in Lysias' and Isokrates' Olympic speeches, to enhance the ideal and concept of panhellenic unity at Olympia; it is also stressed for deliberative ends, urging the audiences of the Olympic Games to take action against the barbarians. The *epitaphios*, however, is much bolder, since its form suggests that it was delivered in Athens

⁸ For a further discussion on the context of the *epitaphios*, cf. A. B. Bosworth, 'The historical context of Thucydides' funeral oration', *JHS* 120 (2000) 1-16.

(since this seems to have been a particularly Athenian genre) and that it engages very daringly with the Athenian tradition.⁹ This is a singularly subversive use of the Athenian genre, which for historical reasons invariably figured the burial of those who died fighting Greeks. Gorgias (it seems) uses the Athenians' achievements against the Persians to contrast the contemporary wars and to urge them to fight against the common foe.

The *epitaphios* attributed to Lysias was composed during the Corinthian War of 395-87 for those who died 'assisting the Corinthians'. Due to the clear divergence of the funeral speech from the rest of the *corpus Lysiacum*,¹⁰ its authenticity has been questioned;¹¹ on balance I am inclined to accept authenticity on the grounds that it accords with what we know of Lysias,¹² though we may doubt that it was actually delivered.¹³

⁹ According to Philostratos (*Lives of the Sophists* 493), Gorgias incited the Athenians against the Medes and the Persians: παροξύνων τε γὰρ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ Μήδους τε καὶ Πέρσας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοῦν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ ὁμονοίας μὲν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, οὐδὲν διήλθεν, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἦν ἀρχῆς ἐρῶντας, ἦν οὐκ ἦν κτήσασθαι μὴ τὸ δραστήριον αἰρουμένους; ('for though he incited the Athenians against the Medes and Persians, and was arguing with the same purpose as in the *Olympian Oration*, he said nothing about a friendly agreement with the rest of the Greeks, for this reason, that it was addressed to Athenians who had a passion for empire, and that could not be attained except by adopting a drastic line of policy'; trans. W. C. Wright, Loeb [Cambridge, Mass. 1921]).

¹⁰ Further on the divergence, cf. S. Usher and D. Najock, 'A statistical study of authorship in the corpus Lysiacum', *Computers and the Humanities* 16 (1982) 85-105. It is to be noted that epideictic oratory has more freedom than other types of oratory and applies an elaborate syntax and style; cf. Carey, 'Epideictic oratory' (n. 2 above) 246.

¹¹ Dionysios of Halikarnassos (*Lysias* 29) quotes the Olympic speech (33) of Lysias as an example of his style in the genre of epideictic oratory, whereas he does not mention at all the more famous *Funeral Speech* (2). This may at first sight indicate that Lys. 33 is a genuine and Lys. 2 is not a genuine work of Lysias; cf. S. C. Todd, *Lysias* (Texas 2000) 26-27, 331-32. However, given that Lysias was mostly popular for his forensic orations, it would seem particularly difficult to accept such an observation with reference to his skill as an epideictic orator, especially if we consider that Dionysios attributes only this specific epideictic oration (33) to Lysias.

¹² Todd, *Lysias* (n. 11 above) 207, points out that the speech highlights the contribution played by *xenoi* (foreigners) in the democratic counter-revolution (Lys. 2.66) and such an emphasis would be more likely in Lysias' interests. For the idea that the funeral oration may seem the sort of patriotic speech Lysias would be expected to write, cf. C. H. Kahn, 'Plato's funeral oration: the motive of the Menexenus', *CPh* 58 (1963) 220-34, at 231.

¹³ The funeral oration was most probably designed as model to be used for rhetorical training, as a pamphlet addressing a reading audience, or finally as a purely literary work designed for public recitation. In fourth-century Athens, the market for public speeches was open since the book trade was flourishing; cf. K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley 1968) 25-26. The publication of speeches involved a continuing contest to shape opinion and policy, and consequently contributed to political rivalry and competition; cf. C. Carey, 'Propaganda and competition in Athenian oratory', in *The manipulative mode: political propaganda in antiquity. A collection of case studies*, ed. K. Eeenkel and I. Pfeijffer (Leiden 2005) 65-99, at 92-95. Thus, Lysias might be interested in publishing such a speech for purposes of prestige.

Modern scholars view Lysias' *epitaphios* as an example of a typical funeral oration of the period.¹⁴ Lysias' *epainos* is taken almost completely from the *genos* and extends to over sixty sections. Such a lengthy mythical-historical narrative is often considered the most typical and important part of classical funeral orations.¹⁵ Lysias develops the *epainos* chronologically according to three broad divisions, the ancestors (§§ 3-19), their descendants (§§ 20-66), and those now being buried (§§ 67-70). For our purposes, we will focus on the description of the wars with Darius (§§ 20-26). This first section of the historical narrative suppresses the Ionian Revolt and consequently Athens' participation in the sack of Sardis, the Persian sack of Eretria in the run-up to the Marathon campaign, and the Plataean support for Athens at Marathon. In effect, the Persians are depicted as the aggressors and the Athenians are praised as the isolated defenders and saviours of Hellas: 'for they alone risked their lives against many myriads of barbarians in defence of the whole of Greece'.¹⁶ It is unlikely that Datis and Artaphernes intended to capture Greece – they focused on Athens and Eretria – but the panhellenic project of 480 is here retrojected to cover the much more narrowly focused Marathon campaign.¹⁷

Strikingly, in chapter 20, the victors of Marathon are represented as the descendants of their mythological forefathers and not as the ancestors of the deceased:

καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ φύντες καλῶς καὶ γνόντες ὅμοια, πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ οἱ πρόγονοι τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμένων εἰργάσαντο, ἀείμνηστα δὲ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ οἱ ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότες τρόπαια διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν κατέλιπον.

For indeed, being of noble birth and having minds as noble, the ancestors of those who lie here have achieved many good and admirable things, while their descendants have everywhere left behind them memorable and mighty trophies owing to their virtue.

Though Lysias probably draws on an ancestral tradition where the victors of Marathon have been idealized and stereotyped within Athenian history, it is striking that Lysias will praise Salamis 'as the greatest of Athenian victories' (2.40-42) and Marathon comes in second place. Salamis offers much better ground for idealization of the Athenian contribution to the larger Greek cause. Though Salamis gets more space, Marathon is rewritten in a creative way which plays effectively to the political agenda of this speech.¹⁸

¹⁴ Cf. J. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the tradition of funeral speeches at Athens* (New York 1981) 78-79; Herrman, *Funeral orations* (n. 5 above) 27-28; Todd, *Commentary* (n. 4 above) 163-64; N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens. The funeral oration in the classical city* (English trans. Cambridge Mass. 1986, originally Paris 1981) 136-39.

¹⁵ Cf. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides* (n. 14 above) 78-79.

¹⁶ Lys. 2.20: μόνοι γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας τῶν βαρβάρων διεκινδύνευσαν.

¹⁷ The view that the Athenians alone fought against the barbarians is also adopted by Thucydides in the reply of the Athenian embassy to the Corinthians' pressures against the Athenians (1.73.2) in 432 BC; there too, as here, the aim is to present the Athenian hegemony as prevailing over the Greeks.

¹⁸ Cf. below p. 173.

Lysias' account of Marathon includes a degree of exaggeration of numbers¹⁹ and in § 21 he reports the figure of a 500,000-strong Persian army, which is directly paralleled only in Plato's *Menexenos* (240a6), as we shall discuss further below; Isokrates in his *Panegyrikos* (4.86) simply has 'many myriads' and nowhere else is a figure given. Lysias wishes to emphasize the importance of the Athenian victory by picking up the themes of altruism and isolation. In this context, he goes on to explain extensively the Persians' thinking for choosing to disembark to Marathon: they believed that they would defeat the Athenians without any interference from other Greek cities (21-22):

ήγησάμενοι δέ, εἰ τήνδε τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἐκοῦσαν φίλην ποιήσαιτο ἢ ἄκουσαν καταστρέψαιτο, ῥαδίως τῶν πολλῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρξιν, ἀπέβησαν εἰς Μαραθῶνα, νομίσαντες οὕτως ἂν ἐρημοτάτους εἶναι συμμάχων [τοὺς Ἑλληνας], εἰ ἔτι στασιαζούσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὃ τινι χρῆ τρόπῳ τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἀμύνασθαι, τὸν κίνδυνον ποιήσαιτο.

ἔτι δ' αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοιαύτη δόξα παρειστήκει, ὥς εἰ μὲν πρότερον ἐπ' ἄλλην πόλιν ἴασιν, ἐκείνοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμήσουσι· προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἤξουσι βοηθήσοντες· εἰ δ' ἐνθάδε πρῶτον ἀφίξονται, οὐδένας ἄλλους τῶν Ἑλλήνων τολμήσειν ἑτέρους σώζοντας φανερὰν ἔχθραν πρὸς ἐκείνους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καταθέσθαι.

They believed that if they could either obtain the willing friendship of our city or force it unwillingly, they would easily gain control of the rest of the Greeks. So, they sailed to Marathon, thinking that we should be most destitute of allies if they made their venture while Greece was still divided how best to repel the invaders.

In addition, because of previous actions of our city they retained a particular opinion of the Athenians: that if they attacked any other city first, they would be at war with it and Athens as well, because the Athenians would eagerly come to rescue those who were being wronged; but if they came here first, the rest of the Greeks would not dare to defend another city, creating open hostilities with Persia.

The praise of the Athenians implied here involves two ideals of the Athenian supremacy. First, the Athenians succeeded in subverting so many Persians, even though the Persians had believed in their own victory as secure and certain. Secondly, the Athenians' superiority is emphatically reflected in the allegation that they would have supported any other Greek city if it had suffered such an invasion first – a kind of altruism that appears to have scared the enemy. The implication, of course, is that contrary to the Athenians' self-sacrifice, the other Greek cities did not run to help. It is interesting the way in which Lysias retrojects the Greek disunity of 481-80, which figures so prominently in Herodotos, again making this an Athenian lone championship of a common Greek cause rather than a defence of Attica.

In § 23 Lysias draws on the typical characteristic of funeral orations to praise not the lives of the citizens but their choice of death.²⁰ There is an extensive account of the

¹⁹ For a discussion of the numbers, cf. P. J. Rhodes, 'The battle of Marathon and modern scholarship', in this volume, p. 3-22.

²⁰ Todd, *Commentary* (n. 4 above) 105; Loraux, *Invention* (n. 14 above) 98-118.

reasons for which the Athenians rushed to send the army out to Marathon without waiting for the allies to hear the news and come to help; the emphasis on their direct response elides the fact that the Spartans arrived late because they waited until the full moon, as stated in Herodotos' narrative (6.105.1); the narrative also ignores the support that they did receive from the Plataians, even though it was not well received.²¹ The Athenians considered that they alone should save Greece and therefore decided to act thus to defend their own ideals of glorious death, virtue, and courage, which appear to reflect an epic value (2.23):

οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι οὐ λογισμῷ εἰδότες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κινδύνους, ἀλλὰ νομίζοντες τὸν εὐκλεᾶ θάνατον ἀθάνατον περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καταλείπειν λόγον, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτῶν ἀρετῇ μᾶλλον ἐπίστευσαν. καὶ αἰσχυνόμενοι ὅτι ἦσαν οἱ βάρβαροι αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, οὐκ ἀνέμειναν πυθέσθαι οὐδὲ βοηθήσαι τοὺς συμμάχους, οὐδ' ᾤθησαν δεῖν ἑτέροις τῆς σωτηρίας χάριν εἶδέναι, ἀλλὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας.

Our ancestors took no account of military danger but reckoned that a glorious death leaves behind an immortal fame. They did not fear the multitude of their adversaries, but rather had confidence in their own ability. They were ashamed that the barbarians were in their country, and did not wait till their allies should be informed and help them; rather than have to thank others for their safety, they chose that the rest of the Greeks should be in debt to them.

In §§ 24-25 Lysias praises the ancestors for their bravery, generosity, and virtue in establishing a trophy for Greece over the barbarians. They were driven out of respect for the laws rather than fear for the enemy.²² Their self-sacrifice is underlined again in § 26, emphasizing the misleading assertion that Athens did not receive nor even send for help.²³

It has become clear that Lysias manipulates the Athenians' victory at Marathon rhetorically in order to isolate their heroic choice of death and exaggerate their altruistic resistance, as is reflected in the closing statement:

ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, πάλοι τῶν ἔργων γεγενημένων, ὥσπερ καινῶν ὄντων ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ζηλοῦσθαι.

It is not surprising, therefore, that, due to the deeds performed long ago, even today their merit is praised by all men, as if their actions were still new.

²¹ Hdt. 6.108.1: 'Hippias supposed that the dream had in this way come true. As the Athenians were marshalled in the precinct of Heracles, the Plataeans came to help them in full force. The Plataeans had put themselves under the protection of the Athenians, and the Athenians had undergone many labors on their behalf' (trans. A. D. Godley, Loeb [Cambridge, Mass. 1920]).

²² μᾶλλον τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῖς νόμους αἰσχυνόμενοι ἢ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους κίνδυνον φοβούμενοι.

'They respected their own laws more than they feared danger at the hands of the enemy'.

²³ The same assertion is made by Isokrates in the *Panegyrikos* (4.86-87), where he states that the Athenians did not wait for their allies.

The uniquely high status of the Athenian victors of Marathon obtained a mythical dimension, as is widely attested in literature;²⁴ the exemplary virtue of the men of Marathon is to be admired and imitated by all generations. Though Salamis receives more space in this speech, the way in which Marathon is rewritten gives it a powerful suggestiveness of its own.

Lysias' speech offers us the best example of the 'Greek patriotism' reading of Marathon. The speech was composed within the period of the Corinthian War, when the Athenians had joined Corinth, Argos, and Thebes in revolt against Sparta. The ancestors are praised at such a length and with such pronounced exaggeration to encourage the Athenians to aid the Corinthians; the enmity against the Spartans is apparent, since they were at this stage the main cause of struggle among the Greeks. Lysias' *epitaphios* tries to support the earliest attempts to reconstruct the Athenian empire; thus it presents a contrast between the glorious Athenian power and the negative depiction of the Lakedaimonian hegemony. Despite its epideictic style, occasion, and content, Lysias' funeral oration has many features of a symbouleutic narrative and is effective in that it calls for a return to the past – a theme central to fourth-century Athenian politics. He appeals to the Athenian ideals of self-sacrifice, salvation of Greece, and heroic death, moving between 'repetition and renewal' at a time when 'hegemonic discourse' was limited and the Spartans were about to win the war with Persian support.²⁵ The funeral oration, though theoretically just about display, also responds very subtly to the politics of the moment.

The battle of Marathon, attributed to the generation of *πύλαι*, is used as an example of the virtue shown in the past that is to be remembered as if it were recent; thus, the quality of the ancestors' deeds is effectively used to form a continuum in Athens' history. The continuity of the Athenians' achievements appears so strong that the past and present are blurred in order to present Athenian virtue as a constant and continuous merit. As Grethlein has rightly pointed out, 'this effective use of the traditional and exemplary modes of memory enables the funeral speeches to make contingency of chance virtually disappear at an occasion that ritually reflects on the strongest experience of contingency, death'.²⁶

As has been stated, there are similarities in the *epainos* of the ancestors between Lysias' *epitaphios* and the funeral oration that has been incorporated into Plato's dialogue *Menexenos*. The historical detail in the speech indicates that it was written after the Corinthian War and Lysias' funeral oration, though its fictive date is the 420s. Socrates presents a funeral oration by Aspasia, the well-known mistress of Perikles, and the ascription to Aspasia establishes a connection between Plato's *Menexenos* and the famous Periklean funeral oration by Thucydides. Scholars differ in their interpretation of the dialogue:²⁷ some see the speech as an antagonistic response to Thucydides' idealized view

²⁴ Todd, *Commentary* (n. 4 above) 234 with n. 40; cf. Ar. *Acharnians* 181, *Clouds* 986; Plat. *Mx.* 240e6-241a2.

²⁵ Loraux, *Invention* (n. 14 above) 136-37.

²⁶ J. Grethlein, *The Greeks and their past: poetry, oratory and history in the fifth century BCE* (Cambridge 2010) 117. For an analysis of Lysias' funeral speech as having an important role in the establishment of the continuum of Athenian history, cf. Grethlein 105-25.

²⁷ For a detailed discussion of the scholars' views, cf. Herrman, *Funeral orations* (n. 5 above) 45-47.

of Athenian democracy under Perikles, whereas others see it as a sort of parody that adopts an ironic tone on Lysias' *epitaphios*. On any reading this speech, despite its lack of real ceremonial occasion, offers as serious an engagement with Athenian politics as any other instance of the form.

Many parallels can be observed between Plato's and Thucydides' orations, such as the antithesis of word and deed (*logos* and *ergon*), the tradition of the funeral oration, and the emphasis placed upon *paideia* and *politeia*.²⁸ There are, however, differences between the two orations concerning the individual and collective ideal of virtue, the vocabulary, the tone, and approach to the audience.²⁹ Despite the polemical relationship between the two orations, the *Menexenos* can be seen as an alternative and an answer to the Periklean oration in two aspects, the rhetoric and the politics. It offers an analysis of the faults of rhetoric by recognizing the falsehood of the idealized portrayal of Athens, which in effect becomes an object of parody in Socrates' funeral oration.³⁰ Thus, Plato takes the opportunity to demonstrate how a funeral oration should be written. In terms of politics, the contrast between the two figures Perikles and Socrates is obvious; the former represents the prestige of the Athenian empire and naval power, whereas the latter reflects the ideals of virtue (Socratic *aretē*) and justice. Plato's target is the construction of Perikles as a symbol, and he criticizes Thucydides' portrayal and the Athenian practice, particularly in the funeral oration, of exemplifying Perikles, his leadership, and his policy.³¹ Thus, the appeals to the traditions of Athenian history are presented in order to offer a judgement against Perikles' imperial policy.

Plato's *epainos* (239a6-246b2) is treated in a long section that includes the stories of the mythical background and a survey of Athenian history from the Persian Wars down to the Peace of Antalkidas in 387 BC. Plato makes no distinction between the deeds of the present dead and the deeds of their ancestors. His strongest resemblances are with Lysias. In particular the closeness of the relationship between the two texts can be seen in the description of the battle of Marathon, though there are significant differences as well.

Plato praises the dead for their virtue as they set an example to imitate in later battles (240d):

ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἂν τις γενόμενος γνοίῃ οἷοι ἄρα ἐτύγγανον ὄντες τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ Μαραθῶνι δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν καὶ κολασάμενοι τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ πρῶτοι στήσαντες τρόπαια τῶν βαρβάρων, ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἴη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ ὑπεῖκει.

It is by realizing this position of affairs that we can appreciate what manner of men those were, in point of virtue, who defended against the barbarians' power and

²⁸ For an analysis of these parallels, cf. Kahn, 'Plato's funeral oration' (n. 12 above) 221-22; S. S. Monoson, 'Remembering Pericles: the political and theoretical import of Plato's *Menexenus*', *Political Theory* 26 (1998) 489-513, at 491-92.

²⁹ Cf. S. C. Salkever, 'Socrates' Aspasian Oration: the Play of philosophy and politics in Plato's *Menexenus*', *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993) 133-43, at 134-35.

³⁰ Cf. L. Coventry, 'Philosophy and rhetoric in the *Menexenus*', *JHS* 109 (1989) 4-10.

³¹ Cf. Monoson, 'Remembering Pericles' (n. 28 above) 492-500.

punished the pride of all Asia, and were the first to raise trophies of victory over the barbarians; whereby they pointed the way to the others and taught them to know that the Persian power was not invincible, since there is no multitude of men or wealth but courage conquers it.

The most obvious overlap in theme and subject matter with Lysias' *epitaphios* is the emphasis placed in both speeches on Athens as champion of liberty, who alone defeated the barbarians, and also the size of the Persian army at Marathon, rated by both authors as fifty myriads. There are, however, two points in Plato's narrative that may indicate that his version is meant to undermine Lysias' praise of the Athenian hegemony. Plato subverts Lysias' silence concerning the Athenian support in sacking Sardis at the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt and the Persians' sailing first against Eretria before attacking Marathon by giving these details as a pretext for Darius' expedition. The first detail presents a more aggressive Athens, whereas the second undermines the claim that the Athenians were isolated and unsupported. Plato stresses the active support of the Spartans, while noting their late arrival,³² as reported in Herodotos' description of the battle.

The praise of the ancestors and their victories in the Persian Wars reveals an educative tone, since their action has set an example for imitation, which however was not consistently followed by the post-war generations. The ancestors are depicted as ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι, and Plato stresses the importance of the battle of Marathon both for subsequent Greek resistance to the barbarian and for the Athenians of his time to honour the memory of the dead by 'living well'.³³

Plato uses the historic example of the battle of Marathon not only to criticize the political circumstances in Greece following the Corinthian War but also probably to influence the policy of his city after his first return from Sicily.³⁴ Beyond the antagonistic relationship between the *Menexenos* oration on the one hand and the Periklean funeral oration and Lysias' *epitaphios* on the other hand, which was analysed above, Plato intends to offer advice drawing on the common theme in epideictic oratory, the appeal for panhellenic unity, *i.e.* the need for concord between the Greek cities in the face of Persian intrusion. Thus, Socrates' oration appeals to tradition but his attack on Perikles' imperial policy and the rhetorically exaggerated idealization of the past of Athens, as presented in Lysias' funeral oration, is meant to underline the importance of Socratic *aretē* and the ideal of moral integrity for the improvement of contemporary Athenian politics.

The last two surviving *epitaphioi* are the only ones which were 'certainly' delivered on the occasion of a burial ceremony. In 338 BC, Demosthenes was chosen by the Athenians to deliver the funeral oration over those Athenians who had died fighting Philip II at the battle of Chaironeia.³⁵ There has been a dispute about the authenticity of the funeral

³² 240c: τῶν δ' ἐπιχειρουμένων οὗτ' Ἐρετριεῦσιν ἐβοήθησεν Ἑλλήνων οὐδεὶς οὔτε Ἀθηναίους πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων – οὗτοι δὲ τῇ ὕστεραίᾳ τῆς μάχης ἀφίκοντο; ('and while these actions were being accomplished none of the Greeks helped the Eretrians not yet the Athenians except the Lakedaimonians, and they arrived on the day after the battle').

³³ 241c: παιδευθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν κατὰ γῆν; ('the rest of the Greeks to be trained, taught by the soldiers by land').

³⁴ Cf. Kahn, 'Plato's funeral oration' (n. 12 above) 230.

³⁵ Dem. 18.285; Plut. *Dem.* 21.2.

speech that has been preserved to us, on the basis of its stylistic differences from Demosthenes' surviving oratory and the fact that it does not follow the conventional structure of a funeral oration. Its distinctiveness, however, in genre and content is not a sufficient reason for discarding it as not a genuine work of Demosthenes.³⁶ As was noted above in the case of Lysias' *epitaphios*, epideictic oratory allows for a more elaborate style and syntax as well as extemporaneous elements. Given that Demosthenes has been traditionally considered to have delivered his Funeral Oration after the battle of Chaironeia,³⁷ it seems plausible that the oration known to us is a reworking of the original funeral speech performed by him in 338 BC.

The defeat of the Athenians, the Thebans, and the Boiotians by Philip II signalled the beginning of the end for the independent Greek city-states of the classical period. The *epitaphios* had to deal with a terrible defeat, which involved an enemy who was not Greek. Therefore, the section on the *genos* is very brief, in particular the reference to the Persian Wars (60.10):

ἐκεῖνοι τὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι δις ἡμύναντο καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων κοινῆς σωτηρίας πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν αἴτιοι κατέστησαν.

Those alone twice repulsed both by land and by sea the navy that had assembled from the whole of Asia, and in debt of their individual risks they caused the joint salvation of all the Greeks.

The Persian Wars are singled out from the history of the city and the battles of Marathon and Salamis are highlighted for bringing security and freedom for all the Greeks. It is striking that here again the Athenians are referred to as fighting 'alone' (μόνοι) against the Persians in defence of the freedom of all Greeks.

At the beginning of the fifth century BC the battle of Marathon signalled the rise of the Athenian hegemony and its growth within the Greek world. Almost a century later, the battle of Chaironeia signalled the complete fall of Athenian power and the rise of the Macedonian hegemony. The contrast between the Athenian victory of Marathon and the Athenian defeat in Chaironeia might seem too intense to leave space for an extended praise of the ancestors. The praise is focused on the dead, their virtue and courage, and their self-sacrifice in order to indicate that they deserve honour from the living. Demosthenes departs from the tradition outlined in the previously described speeches by praising the men as children and adults before their service as soldiers (15-24); the emphasis is on the *topoi paideia* and *epitedeusis*. In order to counteract any hint of failure on the part of the dead, Demosthenes states that all those who die in battle have no share in defeat but should all equally share in victory (60.19); he also criticizes the Theban commanders for their performance on the battlefield (60.18, 22). The *epainos* may be directed toward the present rather than the historic past of the Athenians, but Demosthenes

³⁶ For a detailed analysis of the authenticity of Demosthenes 60, cf. I. Worthington, 'The authorship of the Demosthenic *Epitaphios*', *Museum Helveticum* 60 (2003) 152-57.

³⁷ 60.1: ἔδοξεν τῇ πόλει δημοσίᾳ θάπτειν καὶ προσέταξεν ἐμοὶ τὸν νομιζόμενον λόγον εἰπεῖν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς; ('the Athenian *dēmos* decided they should have a public funeral and appointed me to the duty of delivering over them the customary speech').

connects the eulogy for both the ancestors and the dead by depicting the birth link which joins the latter to their ancestors by birth (60.12). Demosthenes' *epitaphios* contains the sad immediacy of the recent defeat and a gap opens between the legendary past and the present.³⁸ Nevertheless, the ancestors are used as a point of reference to underline the praise of the dead, whose death has set an example of nobility and freedom. The model of the Persian Wars is still used rhetorically to heroize the Athenian effort at Chaironeia. He praises the Athenians for following a policy that aimed at the freedom of the Greeks just as before, drawing an explicit analogy between the campaign of 338 and the Persian Wars.

Finally, Hyperides' *epitaphios* was delivered in 322 BC at a burial ceremony in the form we have now,³⁹ at the end of the first season of the so-called Lamian War, which was largely successful for the Greeks, though the general Leosthenes, a friend of Hyperides, was killed. The speech was presented after the initial victory in Boiotia, the siege at Lamia, and the defeat of Leonnatus (12-14). Later that year the Athenian fleet suffered two major losses and the army was defeated soon afterwards. The war was a complete failure for the Greeks. More than one thousand Athenians died and two thousand were taken hostage; the rest of the Greeks also suffered losses. As a result, the Athenians had to submit to Macedonian terms while Hyperides and Demosthenes, the leading opponents of Macedonian involvement in Greek affairs, were condemned to death by the Athenian *dēmos*.⁴⁰ Hyperides' funeral oration highlights the Athenian policy of resistance to Macedon.⁴¹

Hyperides gives more details of the occasion of death than the earlier speakers. The oration provides an unusual amount of specific historic detail and discusses the general Leosthenes at length. Hyperides underlines that Leosthenes deserves more praise than his predecessors whereas earlier *epitaphioi* praise the deeds of the dead for being equivalent to those of their ancestors. A description of the war in which the men died is uncommon in the funeral speeches, let alone the focus so exclusively on one person.⁴² Hyperides brings an innovation to the traditional themes and structure of *epitaphioi logoi* by inserting a picture of the present;⁴³ he adapts the standard content of the genre to the immediate historical context. He deliberately rejects any reference to the past, explaining his decision at the outset with a firmness reminiscent of Perikles' *epitaphios*. Hyperides emphasizes the virtues of the Athenians of the present, wishing probably to encourage and mobilize them to fight, though the war was in the end unsuccessful. Hyperides' innovation lies in the fact that the standard account of the Persian Wars has been replaced by an account of recent events. Furthermore, the description of the heroes in the Lamian War

³⁸ Loraux, *Invention* (n. 14 above) 181.

³⁹ Hyperides' delivery of the funeral oration is referred to by Diodoros Siculus (18.13.5), Pseudo-Plutarch (*Lives of the Ten Orators* 849f) and Longinus (*On the Sublime* 34.2); cf. Herrman, *Funeral orations* (n. 5 above) 77.

⁴⁰ For details about the arrest and death of Demosthenes and Hyperides, cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1, *Dem.* 28.2-4.

⁴¹ Herman, *Hyperides* (n. 5 above) 3.

⁴² For the unusual element of narrative, cf. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides* (n. 14 above) 88; Herrman, *Funeral orations* (n. 5 above) 77.

⁴³ Cf. Loraux, *Invention* (n. 14 above) 182.

echoes the language and ideas typically used to depict the role of the Athenians in the Persian Wars, as for example § 9: ‘I think it is simplest to narrate their courage in war and how they were responsible for many benefits to their fatherland and to the other Greeks’;⁴⁴ § 16: ‘those who died in the war and gave up their lives for the freedom of the Greeks, considering that the clearest proof of their willingness to provide freedom to Greece was dying for it in battle’;⁴⁵ § 24: ‘these men acquired immortal glory for the price of a mortal body and with their own individual virtue they secured common freedom for the Greeks’;⁴⁶ *etc.*⁴⁷

To conclude, there is a variation in the use of the *topoi* of *genos*, of the ancestors’ virtues, of Athenian history, and in particular the Athenian victory at the battle of Marathon by the surviving *epitaphioi*. Nevertheless, they do not entirely depart from the theme that the ancestors set an example by offering freedom to all Greece, which is peculiar to the genre. There is a shifting relationship between the *epitaphioi* and the evolution of the city and thus a change from the *hēgēmonikos logos* of Perikles to the eulogy and individual praise of Hyperides, where the emphasis shifts from the praise of the past to the praise of the present. As has been shown, in the earlier funeral orations the Persian Wars and in particular the battle of Marathon serve the idealization of Athens, whereas toward the end of the fourth century BC the historical past is adapted to present history and the battles involved. Thus, an evolution can be observed in the development of the genre within a period of more than one hundred years (431-322 BC) in the emphasis of content and language depending on the political circumstances at a given battle and time.

Our surviving *epitaphioi* cannot be included in one and the same group, since they were not all delivered at a public burial nor are they all dated to the same period. The central themes of all the speeches are the ‘noble death’ and the ‘freedom’ of Greece due to the achievements of the ancestors and the dead from specific battles. The tone of funeral orations is both educative and symbouleutic; the orators attempt to influence public opinion for resistance and continuing the war, and the emphasis placed upon the battle of Marathon has been transformed to that purpose.

The funeral orations attributed to Gorgias and Lysias, and the one included in Plato’s *Menexenos* are all literary works composed for publication or public recitation rather than actual performance at burial ceremonies. As exemplary pieces of rhetorical training, the three funeral speeches concentrate on the *epainos* of the history of Athens; a shift can be seen, however, in the use of the historical battles of the Persian Wars from Gorgias’ to Plato’s work, since the orators apply the deeds of the ancestors earlier as memorable and later as instrumental examples. In all cases, the exemplary modes of memory are effectively used to guide the present generation, who are invited to emulate their

⁴⁴ ἀπλούστατον οἷον ἢ γοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διεξελθεῖν ἀρετὴν, καὶ ὡς πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίοι γεγενῆσθαι τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν.

⁴⁵ οἱ τὰς ἑα[υτῶ]ν ψυχὰς ἔδωκαν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶ]ν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας, [φα]νερωτάτην ἀπόδειξιν τ[αύτ]ην ἡγούμενοι εἶναι τοῦ [βούλ]εσθαι τῇ Ἑλλάδι [τὴν] ἐλε[υθερ]ίαν περιθεῖναι, τὸ μαχομ[ένους] τελευτήσαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς.

⁴⁶ οἵτινες θνητοῦ σώματος ἀθάνατον δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν τὴν κοινὴν ἐλ[ευ]θερίαν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐβεβαίωσαν.

⁴⁷ Herrman, *Hyperides* (n. 5 above) 76, 81, 92-93.

forefathers. The funeral speeches function as ‘action’ speeches, since there is a ‘dialectical relationship between words and deeds’.⁴⁸ The symbouleutic character of the funeral speech contributes to the continuity and regularity in the history of the city of Athens. The funeral speech offers the audience a model to be imitated and thus contributes to the timeless *epainos* and excellence of the polis.

The funeral orations supposedly composed by Perikles, Demosthenes, and Hyperides to be delivered in honour of the dead at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, after the defeat in the battle of Chaironeia, and during the Lamian War respectively present a different form of the *epainos* section. The appeals to the tradition of Marathon, and the Persian Wars in general, are either brief or non-existent. The emphasis in all three speeches is placed upon the present. In Perikles’ oration the Persian Wars are not mentioned at all, but the most extensive part of the *epainos* section involves the Athenian constitution. In Demosthenes’ funeral speech, the reference to Marathon and Salamis may be brief but is emphatically incorporated in the praise of the dead, who had fought worthily of their ancestors; still the *epainos* focuses on the dead rather than their ancestors. Finally, in Hyperides’ oration the past has been replaced by the present but the idealization of Athens in the Persian Wars is emphatically reflected and adjusted to the heroic resistance against Macedon. It can be thus assumed that in the actual funeral orations which were delivered at burial ceremonies, the tradition of Marathon is not explicitly used to praise the heroic past but is adapted to the praise of recent events, and the individual leaders may reflect the glory of the famous Themistokles and Miltiades, though their heroism is more distinctly eulogized.

⁴⁸ For analysis of the funeral speech as a ‘speech act’, cf. Grethlein, *The Greeks and their past* (n. 26 above) 117-21.

THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLE OF MARATHON AS USED IN THE SPEECHES *ON THE FALSE EMBASSY, ON THE CROWN, AND AGAINST CTESIPHON* BY DEMOSTHENES AND AESCHINES

ATHANASIOS EFSTATHIOU

Pericles, the famous Athenian politician of the fifth century BC, is presented by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* (book 6) as an ideal orator for his practical wisdom; it is the virtue of *phronēsis* which embellishes Pericles' personality and offers him the ability to perceive what is good for himself and for mankind (1140b).¹ In the *Rhetoric* also Aristotle presents Pericles as an exemplary figure of rhetorical skill, both for his effective choice of the right rhetorical strategies and for the persuasive appeal of his own character. Thus, Pericles, according to Aristotle, personifies the successful combination of rhetoric with *phronēsis*, possessing, among other skills, successful use of the interrogative question (1419a), but – most importantly – adroit use of simile (1365a and 1407a) and analogy (1411a).²

In sum, Aristotle tends to believe that the orators have to filter their ideas through the literary and historical tradition, using *exemplum-παράδειγμα* as an alternative mode of 'proof' (1356b);³ moreover, in rhetorical theory and practice *exemplum* appears to be used either to prove or to clarify a case or even to help the audience memorize a general proposition.⁴

In addition, Aristotle goes further, dividing *exemplum* in two categories, factual examples (simply called historical examples) coming from historical experience, and

¹ ... Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν.

² See in the *Rhetoric* the following passages: a) 1419a (on the interrogative question): οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπῆρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἦρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δὲ “καὶ πῶς, ἀτέλεστος ὢν;” ...; b) 1365a (on simile): μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἷον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνηρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαίρεθῃ. καὶ τὰ ἐν χρεῖα μείζονι, b1) 1407a (on simile): διαλυθέντα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται. καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, εἰκέναι αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ἃ τὸν ψωμὸν δέχεται μὲν, κλαίοντα δέ, καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις; c) 1411a (on analogy): τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν εὐδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητα τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλκοι.

³ πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστει ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.

⁴ See further K. Demoen, ‘A paradigm for the analysis of paradigms: the rhetorical exemplum in ancient and imperial Greek theory’, *Rhetorica* 15 (1997) 125-58; and B. J. Price, *Παράδειγμα and exemplum in ancient rhetorical theory* (Diss. University of California 1975).

fictitious ones, two in total (παραβολή and λόγοι), invented to support the argument.⁵ So, narrative examples have the rhetorical force of proof in the same way that an account by a witness may help to prove a case in legal contexts. Aristotle regards *exemplum* as a counterpart of logical induction (1356b3);⁶ he goes so far as to explain precisely how narrative proofs and examples should be placed within a larger argument claiming that (Arist. *Rh.* 1394a9ff.):

δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐνθυμήματα ὥς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἢ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων), ἔχοντα δὲ ὥς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγῇ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός· διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἱκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ χρηστός καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος.

in a case where there is no supply of enthymemes, one should use examples as demonstrative proofs; for persuasion [then] is dependent on them. But if we have enthymemes, examples should be used as witnesses, and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes. When the examples stand first, there is the appearance of induction, and induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in a few cases; when they stand at the end they resemble witnesses, and a witness is in every case persuasive. Thus, too, when they are first, it is necessary to quote many of them; when they are mentioned at the end, one alone is sufficient; for even a single trustworthy witness is useful.

Quintilian, on the other hand, points out that some teachers argued that the example was more appropriate in speaking and the enthymeme in writing.⁷

The use of historical examples in oratorical composition was based on the principle of winning over the audience's good will, and this principle after a period of empirical use seems to be drawn by Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Theophrastos' theory on style.⁸

It has also been urged that an interaction is pinpointed between historians and orators from the fourth century onwards: after Herodotos and Thucydides,⁹ historians like Theopompos, Anaximenes, Ephoros, Xenophon, or Callisthenes became well-known for their oratorical accomplishments. They also were involved in almost all forms of literature: rhetorical treatises, biography, didactic fiction, or even philosophical dialogue, while the orators of the time showed a distinctive preference for the use of historical events in their

⁵ *Rh.* 1393a: παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἶδη δύο· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγενομένα, ἐν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. τούτου δὲ ἐν μὲν παραβολῇ ἐν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώπειοι καὶ Λίβυκοί; see also Cic. *Inv.* 1.27.

⁶ ἔστιν γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγῇ, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ('for the example is an induction and the enthymeme a syllogism').

⁷ *Inst.* 12.10.51: ... magistri παράδειγμα dicendo, ἐνθύμημα scribendo esse aptius tradiderunt.

⁸ See Arist. *Rh.* 1415b; on Theophrastos see Demetr. *Eloc.* 173.

⁹ Although they both became famous for the introduction in their works of speeches delivered or supposedly delivered by historical characters.

speeches.¹⁰ Indeed, if one looks to the corpus of Greek oratory of the classical period, it is clear that there existed an abundance of historical examples used by the orators, who took advantage of the veneration in which major historical figures and events were held to enlist them in support of their arguments.¹¹ Demosthenes, for example, although he is keen to include in his speeches quite an amount of enthymematic reasoning, relies on examples more than logic in order to make his point, performing in a way a fact-based argumentation.¹²

Appeal to historical examples, then, at its rhetorical level and particularly as a means of winning over the audience to the speaker's point of view was destined to be one of the characteristic features of Attic oratory in the classical period. Since the main motivation was the ensuring of persuasion, the orators preferred to rely on popular tradition as the main fund of the examples used, although popular tradition could not have guaranteed the accuracy of the examples. The orators' purpose was not to risk the good will of the audience, and thus they strove not to present themselves as people cleverer than the audience; and that was an attempt to appropriate popular culture, making people's beliefs their own.¹³

In the *Rhetoric* again,¹⁴ Aristotle designs a broad framework for praise of the audience quoting Socrates' original idea (*cf.* Plat. *Mx.* 235d) that it is not hard to praise Athenians among Athenians. Marathon and Salamis as historical examples are suggested for use by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1396a6), who believes that the Marathon battle together with the Salamis sea-battle are strongly connected with praise of the Athenians as examples *par excellence*.¹⁵

However, Aristotle's suggestion not only brings to the fore the importance of those two battles but seems to reflect the views already expressed by the orators of the fourth century and their frequent use of the events as a means for political propaganda.¹⁶ Thus, it is

¹⁰ See further: K. Sacks, 'Rhetoric and speeches in Hellenistic historiography', *Athenaeum* 47 (1986) 383-95, at 383; for the much-discussed influence of Isocrates' school on the historiography of the fourth century BC see S. Perlman, 'The historical example. Its use and importance as political propaganda in the Attic Orators', *Studies in History: Scripta Hierosolymitana* 7 (1961) 150-66, at 151 n. 6.

¹¹ S. Usher, *Greek orators V: Demosthenes On the crown* (Warminster 1993) 202; see also K. Jost, *Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern und Geschichtsschreibern bis auf Demosthenes* (Paderborn 1936); L. Pearson, 'Allusion in the Attic orators', *CPh* 36 (1941) 209-29.

¹² F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit. Demosthenes*, 2nd edn vol. 3.1. (Leipzig 1893) 206-07.

¹³ See also K. J. Dover, *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974) 11ff.

¹⁴ See 1367b, c. 30 and 1415b, c. 11; *cf.* Quint. *Inst.* 3.7.23.

¹⁵ ἢ ἐπαινέειν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες ('or [how could we] praise [the Athenians] if we did not know about the naval battle at Salamis or the fight at Marathon, or [how could we praise the Spartans without knowing] all that was done by the Heraclids or anything else of this kind? For [men] base their praise upon fine deeds that are, or seem to be, relevant facts').

¹⁶ See Plat. *Mx.* 239d1-2: Πέρσας ἡγουμένους τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ δουλουμένους τὴν Εὐρώπην ἔσχον οἱ τῆσδε τῆς χώρας ἔκγονοι, γονῆς δὲ ἡμέτεροι, ὧν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ χρὴ πρῶτον μεμνημένους ἐπαινέσαι αὐτῶν τὴν ἀρετήν. In this passage, Plato makes an ironic comment on the *arriviste* usage of the Persian Wars by his contemporary authors.

conceivable, even within the parameters which Attic oratory offers, that Marathon and Salamis served as stock subjects used by the Athenian orators. Demosthenes and Aeschines, for example, seem to participate in a prolonged literary tradition concerning the battle and the victory of Marathon,¹⁷ from the epigram of Marathon quoted by Lykurgos and Pindar's fragment commenting on the ensuring of liberty because of the Athenian youth, up to the encomiastic comments quoted by Isocrates in various speeches and Plato's discussion of the victory in the *Menexenos*, and going on to the later reception of the event in Athenaios.¹⁸ Furthermore, all these references – very few among a great number of the kind – to the Marathon battle may set Marathon apart not only as an historical event but also as a cultural achievement with influence on later generations. Sallust's view seems pertinent: 'the deeds of the Athenians, in my judgment, were indeed vast and great, but rather less important than report represents them. But since writers of exceptional talent grew up there, the deeds of men of Athens are renowned as unsurpassed throughout by the words of praise of these outstanding literary minds'.¹⁹

The trials On the false embassy and On the crown

In order to facilitate my research, I have chosen to study the use of Marathon in two political battles, the case *On the false embassy* (of 343) and the case *On the crown* (of 330), two acts of a lasting confrontation between Aeschines and Demosthenes. Since in these political trials

¹⁷ The glorification of Athens through the deeds in the Persian Wars appears from Aeschylos *Persai* (472 BC) onwards: Marathon echoes in Hdt. 9.27.26, in Ar. *Nu.* 986 (ἐξ ὧν ἄνδρας Μαραθωνομάχους ἡμὴ παίδευσις ἔθρεψεν), and elsewhere in Aristophanes (e.g. *Ach.* 181). The orators of the fourth century frequently appeal to the admirable moments of Marathon and Salamis; cf. N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens: the funeral oration in the classical city* (Harvard and London 1986) 155-57; with C. Habicht, 'Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege', *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1-35; and R. Thomas, *Oral tradition and written record in classical Athens* (Cambridge 1989) 84-93, 225; see also Plut. *Mor.* 814B, where the suggestion for the Greek city politicians not to use the Persian Wars to excite 'the many' (τοὺς πολλοὺς) implies that politicians even in AD 100 used the Persian Wars for their own propagandistic purposes.

¹⁸ *Leocr.* 109: ὦ ξεῖν', ἄγγελον Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇδε κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις, τοῖς δ' ὑμετέροις προγόνοις· Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι χρυσοφόρων Μήδων ἐστόρεσαν δύναμιν; Pi. fr. 77: ὅθι παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἐβάλοντο / φαεινὰν κρηπίδ' ἐλευθερίας; Isoc. *Paneg.* 91: Ταῦτα δὲ ποιεῖν ἐτόλμων οὐχ οὕτω τῶν πολεμίων καταφρονοῦντες ὥς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀγωνιῶντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ζηλοῦντες τὴν πόλιν τῆς Μαραθῶνι μάχης καὶ ζητοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἐξιῶσαι καὶ δεδιότες μὴ δις ἐφεξῆς ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτία γένηται τοῖς Ἑλλησιν τῆς σωτηρίας, *Ant.* 306: Ἀναμνήσθητε ... τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἔργων τῶν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις πεπραγμένων ... ποῖος δὲ τις ὁ τοὺς βαρβάρους Μαραθῶνι τῇ μάχῃ νικήσας καὶ τὴν δόξαν τὴν ἐκ ταύτης γενομένην τῇ πόλει κτησάμενος, τίς δ' ἦν ὁ μετ' ἐκείνων τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἐλευθερώσας καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν ἦν ἔσχον προαγαγών; Plat. *Mx.* 240d3: ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἂν τις γενόμενος γνοίῃ οἷοι ἄρα ἐτύγχανον ὄντες τὴν ἀρετὴν οἱ Μαραθῶνι δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν καὶ κολασάμενοι τὴν ὑπερφηανίαν ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ πρῶτοι στήσαντες τρόπαια τῶν βαρβάρων, ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἴη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ ὑπέκει; Ath. *Deipnosophistae* (Kaibel) 12.520: καὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν [οἱ τοιοῦτοι] οἱ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι νικήσαντες μάχην καὶ μόνοι τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας ἀπάσης δύναμιν χειρωσάμενοι.

¹⁹ Sall. *Cat.* 8.2-4.

we have the rare case of the survival of both speeches, prosecution and defence,²⁰ they provide an opportunity to study the way Marathon is used as an historical example in these consecutive trials by both orators, and how it served their argumentation and played its role within the overall political propaganda of the orators.

The case *On the false embassy* was tried by the Athenian court in 343, when Demosthenes resumed the unsuccessful attack made by himself and Timarchos two years before, in 345, against Aeschines for alleged misconduct during the Second Embassy to Philip in 346. Beginning with the prosecution speech delivered by Demosthenes, we come across the Marathon battle used as an historical example in §§303, 311, and 312. However, Demosthenes already in a *prokatastasis* (§§9-28) makes a preliminary exposition of his arguments, where he presents his version of events on Aeschines' position during the peace deliberations (*sc.* on the eighteenth and nineteenth of Elaphebolion), the delay of the Second Embassy going to Pella, Aeschines' report, and his promises to the Assembly after the return of the Second Embassy, and, finally, refers to Aeschines' allegedly famous change of policy and Demosthenes' reaction to that change. In addition, Demosthenes returns to the accusation of change of policy in §§288-314, where he also makes reference to the results of Aeschines' treachery and his change of policy. Thus, the abandonment of all the ideals and popular motives of Marathon and Salamis and the trophies of the ancestors, according to Demosthenes, is irrefutable proof that in the meantime Aeschines became a traitor being bribed by Philip.²¹

In particular, in §303 Demosthenes gives the jury details of Aeschines' embassy to Arkadia in order to make a coalition of Greek states against Philip in 348/47. His description is vivid and rhetorically powerful: 'Who was it cried that Philip was forming a coalition of Greece and the Peloponnese while you were fast asleep? Who made those fine long speeches, and read out Miltiades' decree and Themistocles' and the young men's oath in the precinct of Aglauros?' In this context also Demosthenes does not fail to mention the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles, which allegedly were read out by Aeschines.²² The essence of Demosthenes' narrative may be true, since at the time Aeschines made an effort to implement Eubulus' policy of forming a united front against the Macedonians. Moreover,

²⁰ Although Demosthenes' speech *On the crown* is a *synēgoros* speech, due to its great importance it may be regarded as presenting a full account of defence argumentation.

²¹ See also Dem. *On the false embassy* 27-28: ... ἵνα τὴν ὅτ' ἄδωροδόκητος ὑπῆρχε προαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τῆς πολιτείας ἀναμνησθέντες, ὡς προβεβλημένη καὶ ἄπιστος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον, τὴν μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐξαίφνης γεγονυῖαν πίστιν καὶ φιλίαν σκέψησθε, εἴτ' εἰ μὲν ἐκβέβηκεν ὅς' ἀπήγγειλε πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὗτος καὶ καλῶς ἔχει τὰ πεπραγμένα, διὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῇ πόλει γεγενῆσθαι νομίσητε, εἰ δὲ πάντα τάναντί' ὧν οὗτος εἶπε πέπρακται, καὶ πολλὴν αἰσχύνην καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους ταῦτ' ἔχει τῇ πόλει, διὰ τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸ χρημάτων ἀποδόσθαι τάληθ' μεταβεβλημένον αὐτὸν εἰδῆτε ('It is so that, reminding yourselves of that policy of precaution and distrust towards Philip, when he was still unbribed, you may consider then his sudden confidence and friendliness and, if his report to you has really proved true, and the results have been satisfactory, suppose that that friendship was formed for the truth and the best interests of the city; but if the results have been quite the contrary of what he said and have involved the city in much disgrace and grievous perils, then be assured that his own greed and selling the truth for a bribe were the cause of his conversion').

²² See also D. M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes: On the false embassy* (Oxford 2000) 337.

the situation was befitting a revival of the atmosphere of the Persian Wars, and the Athenian supporters of war sought to liken the Macedonians to the Persians. So Aeschines, in that period, was in accord with this policy and is said by Demosthenes to have called Philip a ‘barbarian’ (see Dem. *On the crown* 305, 308, 313), while the same characterization was attributed by Demosthenes himself to the Macedonians (e.g. Dem. *On the false embassy* 327) and to Philip personally (see Dem. 19.31).

The two decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles very interestingly are mentioned in this passage in connection with the ephebic oath of the Athenians sworn in the precinct of Aglauros. However, it is tempting to look at what is the content of these decrees and what rhetorical purpose is served in their use by Demosthenes. Miltiades’ decree (although there is no evidence that Miltiades proposed it) is mentioned by writers only in the fourth century: apart from the Demosthenes reference, we have Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1411a10-11), who mentions the decree in a discussion of metaphors. Later, Plutarch (*Moralia* 628E) and Pausanias (7.15.7) discuss the decree adding some details, the first on the prytany (Aiantis) when it was proposed, and the second on its provision to endow freedom on the slaves who fought in the battle. Probably the Athenian army was sent to Marathon according to a decree which was passed in the *Ecclesia*,²³ while the texts of Aristotle and Demosthenes in the fourth century must be a reworking of the decree’s content formed in such a way as to satisfy their current purposes. On the other hand, the fourth-century version of Themistocles’ decree was found in 1959 in Troizen (ML 23). It seems to be a reworking of the original decree of the fifth century, adapted to the events which happened shortly before the battle of Chaironeia (338 BC). This more recent version of the decree is directly connected with the case of an Athenian *metic*, Athenogenes, a pro-Macedonian in his political beliefs who, being in Troizen, was responsible, among other things, for the expulsion of certain Troizenians, probably anti-Macedonians, who were forced to take refuge in Athens. These Troizenians afterwards were admitted to Athenian citizenship, because of the memory of the Troizenians’ gesture of welcoming Athenian refugees in 480 BC.²⁴ Lastly, the ephebic oath (see also Plut. *Alc.* 15.7; Pollux 8.105-06) was an oath of loyalty taken by Athenian citizens when they reached the age of 18 (Lyc. *Leoc.* 76). The inscription which preserves the oath is of dubious date,²⁵ but because of the phrase ὄρκος ἐφήβων πάτριος (‘the ancestral oath of

²³ Hdt. 6.109-10 seems to give a narrative of events at Marathon and not the decree previously passed at the Athenian *Ecclesia*.

²⁴ See Plut. *Them.* 10.4, on the welcome of the Troizenians in Athens see 10.5; on Athenogenes’ policy and the political situation of the time see Hyp. *Ath.* 29-33 and *passim*; further on this situation and the fourth-century version of Themistocles’ decree see M. Jameson, ‘A decree of Themistokles from Troizen’, *Hesperia* 29.2 (1960) 198-223, at 202 and n. 6; on the extensively discussed issue of the authenticity of the fourth-century version of this decree see D. Hamel, *Athenian generals. Military authority in the classical period* (Leiden 1998) 176-80; Habicht, ‘Falsche’ (n. 17 above); P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) 17 n. 4.

²⁵ See L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques*, Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études 272 (Paris 1938) 302-07; and Tod 2.204. The text of the oath runs: ‘I shall not dishonour the sacred weapons which I bear, nor shall I desert my associate soldier at my side, wherever I stand in the line. I shall fight defending sacred and secular things and I shall not hand down a lessened country, but one increased in size and strength both as far as it depends on me and with the assistance of all, and

the ephebes') which the wording includes, MacDowell logically supposes that it may preserve an old text.²⁶

These two decrees and the ephebic oath belong to a stock of recognized and widely accepted texts invoked by orators and politicians when they wish to exploit the authoritative value of the past and the deeds of the ancestors. In that case, they take refuge in the glorious victories of the ancestors, especially those against the Persians, and the incomparable ancestral constitution (πάτριος πολιτεία), which in the democratic context was represented mainly by Cleisthenes and in later periods, predominantly in the fourth century, by Solon and Draco. Political propaganda needed imposing texts related to specific glorious events in order to substantiate the claims. So, in the fourth century the Persian Wars and texts like the decrees of Marathon and Salamis were of first priority. It does not matter whether the decrees were preserved into the fourth century or not; the Athenians of the time could have reworked the texts, adding convincing details like the *deme* of the proposer or the *prytany*, aiming at verisimilitude.²⁷

The use of the ancestors as a part of the orator's argumentation tactics originates as a stereotype that gives priority to the ties of kinship. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (1385a1-3) discusses the issue of kinship and how men feel about their ancestors' acts: 'People also are ashamed, whenever they have deeds or achievements which bring disrespect – whether their own or their ancestors' or certain others' with whom they have some kinship'.²⁸ Thus, Aristotle seems to attempt a psychological analysis of kinship ties; it is the sense of belonging and attachment which makes us identify with the ancestors. In such a way, deeds and errors of the ancestors, through an extension of the self, become sources of pride and shame.²⁹

In addition, Demosthenes in §311³⁰ tries to corroborate his main argument that Aeschines moved from supporting the glory of Marathon and the other victorious battles to the opposite policy of compromise and retreat, neglecting the symbols of the glorious past and giving the counsel to demolish the city walls. Again, the main issue attached to Demosthenes' core argument is that the change of Aeschines' policy happened because he

I shall be obedient to those who exercise power on any occasion are in power prudently and to the laws that are established and any that in future may be established prudently. If anyone attempts to destroy them, I shall resist both as far as it depends on me and with the assistance of all, and I shall honour the sacred rites that are ancestral'.

²⁶ MacDowell, *Demosthenes* (n. 22 above) 338.

²⁷ See Rhodes, *Boule* (n. 24 above).

²⁸ καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἃ καταισχύνουσιν ἔργα καὶ πράγματα ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ προγόνων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγγιστεία τις.

²⁹ See for more N. Sherman, *The fabric of character. Aristotle's theory of virtue* (Oxford 1991) 136.

³⁰ ... ὅς, ὃ γῆ καὶ θεοί, ἐκεῖν' ἃ διεξῆλθον ἐν ἀρχῇ δεδημηγορηκώς, τὸν Μαραθῶνα, τὴν Σαλαμῖνα, τὰς μάχας, τὰ τρόπαια, ἐξαίφνης ὥς ἐπέβη Μακεδονίας, πάντα τάναντία τούτοις, μὴ προγόνων μεμνήσθαι, μὴ τρόπαια λέγειν, μὴ βοηθεῖν μηδενί, μὴ κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων βουλευέσθαι, μόνον οὐ καθελεῖν τὰ τείχη. ('a man who [heaven and earth!], after speaking at first on the issues which I described to you – Marathon and Salamis and the battles and the trophies – from the moment he set foot on Macedonian soil, opposed his own utterances, telling you not to remember ancestors, not to recall victories, not to send support to anyone, not to take common counsel with the Greeks, and all but to demolish the city walls!').

was bribed by Philip. In §312 he reaches the climax of his argumentation. He tries to reaffirm his loyalty and the Athenian people's loyalty to the excellent deeds of the past, and he regards Marathon and Salamis as an essential part of Greek history, and as events that secured Greece and protected Greek identity. Thus, Demosthenes claims: 'Tell me, is there any part of this country of Greece, as it now exists and is inhabited, which would have that name or would be inhabited by the Greeks who now occupy it, if the men at Marathon and Salamis, our ancestors, hadn't performed those brave deeds on their behalf? No one, I'm sure, would say there was'.³¹ Demosthenes' core argument is simple: Aeschines, at first, played a leading role in the Athenian opposition to Philip, evoking the glorious past, the deeds at Marathon and Salamis; however, after he was bribed by Philip, he changed his policy and abandoned the city, showing disrespect for Athens' common values and the achievements of the ancestors.

On the other hand, Aeschines in his defence speech refers to Marathon and Salamis in §§74 and 75 within a longer narrative section comprising §§70-80.³² A reference to fourth-century history in a historical digression (§§70-73) is followed by another narrative (§§74-80), which takes us back into the fifth century, setting the negotiations with Philip in an even broader context and covering almost one hundred years of history.

Although both historical parts, §§70-73 and §§74-80, are highly selective presentations of the historical data, the second is more overtly selective; in addition, while they look similar in structure, in essence they are doing rather different jobs. Both take us to the same conclusion but by different routes: the first part is about the circumstances which compelled them to make peace, thus justifying the peace on practical grounds, while the second part is actually justifying his insistence on peace on broader chronological grounds, on grounds of historical precedent, and replying to Demosthenes' appeal to the ancestors.

Concentrating on §§74-80, we can realize that Aeschines implements the typical motif of funeral orations, 'our ancestors, our fathers, ourselves' (*cf.* Thuc. 2.36.1-4).³³ It is

³¹ εἰπέ μοι, τῆς νῦν οὔσης Ἑλλάδος ταυτησὶ καὶ οἰκουμένης ἔσθ' ὃ τι ταύτην ἂν τὴν προσηγορίαν εἶχεν ἢ ὦκειθ' ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν ἐχόντων Ἑλλήνων, εἰ μὴ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐκείνας οἱ Μαραθῶνι κὰν Σαλαμῖνι παρέσχοντο, οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι; οὐδ' ἂν εἰς εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι φήσειεν....

³² (74) Οἱ μὲν καιροὶ τῆς πόλεως τοιοῦτοι ἐν οἷς οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐγίνοντο λόγοι· ἀνιστάμενοι δὲ οἱ συντεταγμένοι ῥήτορες, περὶ μὲν τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως οὐδ' ἐνεχείρουν λέγειν, ἀποβλέπειν δὲ εἰς τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐκέλευον ὑμᾶς, καὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι πρὸς τὸν Πέρσῃν ναυμαχίας μεμνήσθαι, καὶ τῶν τάφων τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν τροπαίων. (75) Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπάντων μὲν τούτων ἔφην δεῖν μεμνήσθαι, μιμεῖσθαι μέντοι τὰς τῶν προγόνων εὐβουλίας, τὰ δὲ ἁμαρτήματα αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἄκαιρον φιλονικίαν φυλάττεσθαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πεζομαχίαν, καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα, καὶ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην, καὶ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ ναυμαχίαν, καὶ τὴν Τολμίδου ζηλοῦν στρατηγίαν κελεύων ... ('Such was the situation of the city, when the debate on peace was taking place. But the speakers who were on duty arose and made no attempt to propose solutions for the city's rescue, but urged you to gaze at the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and remember the naval battle at Salamis, and the tombs and trophies of our ancestors. For my part, I replied that you should remember all these, you should imitate the wisdom of our ancestors, and beware of their mistakes and their ill-timed ambition; I called on you to emulate the battle against the Persians at Plataea, the struggles off the shores of Salamis, the battle of Marathon and the naval battle at Artemisium, and the generalship of Tolmides ...').

³³ *Cf.* Loraux, *Invention* (n. 17 above) 120-21.

illuminating to compare the use of Athenian history by Aeschines here with that of [Dem.] 60, which is typical of the *epitaphios logos*;³⁴ pseudo-Demosthenes' narrative comprises three high points for the history of Athens, that of myth,³⁵ of Marathon, and of Chaironeia, and two low points, the most recent past and the future.³⁶ Aeschines, however, maintains references to some distinctive glories of the Athenian past, like Marathon, Salamis, and Artemisium, but leaves out of his narrative the period of myth. He presents the ancestors' past judiciously, in order to reach the period of his father and relatives, emphasizing their participation in the city's deeds of excellence; and he ends the narrative with his role in recent Athenian history, especially with his position concerning the Peace of Philocrates, offering finally an argument on the appropriate way to treat ambassadors.

The section §§74-77 is essentially a list, in which Aeschines contrasts successful policy with ill-fated choices. In this section what is worth noticing is the technique of brachylogy that is frequently adopted by Aeschines: unhappy events and awkward situations, like the period of the Thirty Tyrants, have to be mentioned as briefly as possible. At the end of this section the transition to the present situation is eased by the reference to his family, by which Aeschines takes the chance to discuss the immediate historical situation briefly, and finally to present his policy and his actions (*cf.* §§79-80).

In sum, Aeschines' account is evasive, since he deals with generalities and not with the specific position he adopted in the Assemblies of the eighteenth and the nineteenth of Elaphebolion, and his lasting insistence on obscurity is by itself suggestive. Even when he discusses the folly of the ancestors he remains unclear, since he does not tell us how the Athenians should have avoided the ἀμαρτήματα (= ill-fated choices).

Moving to §§78 and 79, we can see that these are exceptionally aggressive in tone, a personal attack rich in various accusations and allegations against Demosthenes. The accusations are particularly dense here, as Aeschines gradually reaches the point where he discloses his policy towards Philip and admits that he proposed peace (see §79: ὁμολογῶ συμβουλευσαι τῷ δήμῳ ... τὴν εἰρήνην συνθέσθαι),³⁷ something no different in essence from what the disreputable Philocrates had proposed.

However, it is worthwhile focusing on Aeschines' strategy in this part of the speech: he diverts the audience's attention by repeating his allegations about Demosthenes' alleged

³⁴ See especially [Dem.] 60.7f.

³⁵ This tendency to avoid extensive discussion of myth and the mythical period of the Athenian past can also be found in Aeschines' report of his speech before Philip during the First Embassy (see *On the false embassy* 31).

³⁶ *Cf.* Loraux, *Invention* (n. 17 above) 127.

³⁷ See also the same statement in Aeschin. *Against Timarchos* 174. The conclusions that can be deduced from both passages are that Aeschines did indeed support peace during the peace deliberations on the eighteenth and nineteenth of Elaphebolion; more specifically it seems likely that Aeschines avoided an open conflict with those opposing peace and temporized, avoiding explicit support of peace. However, this stance does not necessarily mean that Aeschines was bribed; he simply was forced to accept the terms of Philip. Probably Aeschines was not the only one who adopted such a political line; See further E. M. Harris, *Aeschines and Athenian politics* (Oxford 1995) 70-74; and A. Efsthathiou, 'The "Peace of Philocrates": the assemblies of 18th and 19th Elaphebolion 346 B.C. Studying history through rhetoric', *Historia* 53.4 (2004) 385-407, at 386 n. 2.

foreign origin. In this awkward position he chooses the kind of technique which can be specified as ‘defence by attack’³⁸. Once more, all his accusations against Demosthenes function as a smoke screen, which skilfully covers Aeschines’ support of the peace with Macedon. Most interestingly these accusations are preceded by the skilful use of history, which includes the historical example of Marathon, Salamis, and Artemisium. The whole passage seems to form a defence pattern (historical example [Marathon, Salamis, *etc.*] – personal attack – answer to the main charge of the opponent) used not only by Aeschines but also by Demosthenes himself in a similar situation: Demosthenes in his speech *On the crown* 209-12 comes forward attacking Aeschines with reference to his allegedly disreputable family and his low-esteem past jobs, just before answering, only with a rhetorical question, the crucial charge made by Aeschines on Demosthenes’ responsibility for military and strategic failures (see esp. §212). Aeschines here needs ten paragraphs (§§70-80) to reach smoothly the point where he accepts his responsibility for the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates.

What is most fascinating from a rhetorical point of view is the way Aeschines and Demosthenes approach the past history of Athens. Aeschines in §§70-80 offers a new way of looking at it; he encounters the Athenian past with a careful attitude and strives to adjust the balance between the deeds and failures of the ancestors. On the other hand, Demosthenes exaggerates: in the same speech (see Dem. *On the crown* 269) he argues that the Athenians are the only people among the nations of the world who had ancestors worth imitating. So, both orators in their attempt to use historical examples present a novel approach to the past. Demosthenes as a prosecutor makes an exaggerated statement supporting emphatically the glory of Athens, forming an appropriate and powerful argument with the display of an authoritative creativity. Conversely, Aeschines, trying to defend himself and giving a practical answer to Demosthenes’ charges, keeps his distance from an uncritical avowal of the city’s past and in this manner modifies a content-specific *topos* rather than merely reproducing it. Thus, sometimes historical examples may be used in an innovative manner but in a plausible and appropriate way in order to enhance their persuasive impact,³⁹ though Aeschines’ task in that case was harder and more risky.

The second act of this political confrontation between Aeschines and Demosthenes was played out in 330 before the Athenian court, after the allegedly illegal proposal of a gold crown for Demosthenes made by Ctesiphon in 336, two years after the battle of Chaironeia. Aeschines gave a sworn notice (*hypomosia*) of his intention to indict Ctesiphon for proposing an illegal decree (*graphē paranomon*), and by this measure prevented its progress through the Assembly and hence its enactment. Aeschines waited until 330 to prosecute Ctesiphon, probably for political reasons. Although Aeschines appears as the formal prosecutor in this trial, Demosthenes acts as the supporter (*synēgoros*) of the technical defendant, who was Ctesiphon.

In the trial *On the crown* we should be particularly cautious of what the orators say, because of the way the changing roles of the protagonists shape and reshape their arguments

³⁸ Cf. also E. M. Burke, *Character denigration in the Attic orators, with particular reference to Demosthenes and Aeschines*. (Diss. Tufts University, Medford, Mass. 1972) 190-91.

³⁹ For alterations and adjustments to *topoi* see J. Hesk, “‘Despisers of the commonplace’: meta-topoi and para-topoi in Attic oratory”, *Rhetorica* 25.4 (2007) 361-84.

and the reconstruction of the past: in 343 it is Aeschines who is the defendant and Demosthenes the prosecutor, but in 330 Aeschines is reversing the polarity of Demosthenes' arguments. Aeschines, now in Demosthenes' role, seems to have sometimes copied some of his views and arguments.

Aeschines in §178 starts by stressing the idea of the ancestors' value and their prominence over the politicians of his time, and this reminds us of Demosthenes' argument from the speech *On the false embassy* 312; so, Aeschines says: 'If anyone were to ask you whether our city seems to you more glorious at the present time or in our ancestors' time, you would all agree in our ancestors' time. And were men better then or now? Then they were outstanding, but now they are far inferior'.⁴⁰ Again, this is the necessary foundation for his argument that the crowning of Demosthenes cannot be acceptable, since he was not a man of equal value with those grand figures of the past. In the same paragraph he goes further, arguing that in the past there was a scarcity of honours and crowning despite the merits of the men serving the city. So, he adds to his first point: 'And were the rewards and crowns and proclamations and free meals in the Prytaneum more common then than now? Then, distinctions were rare in our city, and the name of virtue was itself an honour. Now the custom has been completely discredited, and you do the crowning as a matter of habit, not on purpose'.⁴¹

However, a general comparison between past and present is not enough for Aeschines' argumentation. He attempts to make his argument clearer and adds more strength to it by making a direct comparison between Demosthenes on the one hand and great figures of the past on the other, by mentioning specifically Themistocles, Miltiades, the citizens who came from Phyle to restore democracy in Athens, and finally Aristides. Thus, using a series of rhetorical questions in §181, he brings out Demosthenes' rejection after an unequal comparison:

Πότερον ὑμῖν ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ εἶναι δοκεῖ Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ στρατηγῆσας ὅτε τῇ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα ναυμαχίᾳ τὸν Πέρσιν ἐνικάτε, ἢ Δημοσθένης ὁ νυνὶ τὴν τάξιν λιπών; Μιλτιάδης δὲ ὁ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην τοὺς βαρβάρους νικήσας, ἢ οὗτος; ἔτι δ' οἱ ἀπὸ Φυλῆς φεύγοντα τὸν δῆμον καταγαγόντες; Ἀριστείδης δ' ὁ δίκαιος ἐπικαλούμενος, ὁ τὴν ἀνόμοιον ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν Δημοσθένης;

... who was the better man, Themistocles, who served as general when you defeated the Persians in the naval battle of Salamis, or Demosthenes, who the other day deserted his post? Was it Miltiades, who won the battle of Marathon against the barbarians, or this man? Or again, the men who brought back the people from exile from Phyle? And Aristides, known as 'the just', a title most unlike the name men give Demosthenes?

⁴⁰ Εἰ γάρ τις ὑμᾶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πότερον ὑμῖν ἐνδοξότερα δοκεῖ ἢ πόλις εἶναι ἐπὶ τῶν νυνὶ καιρῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων, ἅπαντες ἀνὴρ ὁμολογήσῃτε, ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων. Ἄνδρες δὲ πότερον τότε ἀμείνων ἦσαν ἢ νυνί; τότε μὲν διαφέροντες, νυνὶ δὲ πολλῶ καταδεέστεροι.

⁴¹ Δωρεαὶ δὲ καὶ στέφανοι καὶ κηρύγματα καὶ σιτήσεις ἐν πρυτανείῳ πότερα τότε ἦσαν πλείους ἢ νυνί; τότε μὲν ἦν σπάνια τὰ καλὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄνομα τίμιον· νυνὶ δὲ καταπέπλυται τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ στεφανοῦν ἐξ ἔθους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας ποιεῖσθε.

Themistocles, Miltiades, Aristides, and other fifth-century leaders are often held up by fourth-century orators as great men in very general terms. In that case the *exemplum* is presented by mentioning the names of representative figures for the events which must be used.⁴² Their specifications are usually invoked as positive *exempla*, but it is interesting to see how orators stand with regard to these emblematic figures of past, how they exploit their authority from case to case in forming their arguments. For example, Aeschines uses in his speech against Timarchos the *exemplum* of Solon, as an ideal orator in terms of appropriate deportment; he attempts to make a clear distinction between Solon and Timarchos in order to condemn Timarchos through comparison (see *Against Timarchos* 25-27). However, Demosthenes, now in the speech *On the false embassy* almost two years after, grasps the opportunity and attacks Aeschines' invocation, pointing out that he bases his discussion of Solonian gesture on a very recent statue whose sculptor could have had no idea of the way in which Solon delivered speeches (Dem. *On the false embassy* 249). But Demosthenes goes one step further, using Solon's verses on corrupt politicians selectively. Solon's verses on corruption suit his main charge against Aeschines on bribery and corruption very well (*On the false embassy* 252-55).⁴³ Therefore, we can realize that there was clearly much room for selective and strategic emphasis in such representations; as J. Hesk has already pointed out, 'the paradigmatic force of 'great' historical figures is highly malleable and contestable. Orators can be creative in their representation or interpretation of the words and deeds of past figures. This creativity and selectivity of representation is undoubtedly strategic'.⁴⁴

The outcome of the comparison of Demosthenes with the famous Athenian forefathers is given at §182, where Aeschines states:

Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς Ὀλυμπίους οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡμέραις ἄξιον ἡγοῦμαι μεμνησθαι τοῦ θηρίου τούτου κακείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν. Ἐπιδειξάτω τοίνυν Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ εἴ που γέγραπται τινα τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν στεφανῶσαι. Ἀχάριστος ἄρ' ἦν ὁ δῆμος; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μεγαλόφρων, κακείνοί γε οἱ μὴ τετιμημένοι τῆς πόλεως ἄξιοι· οὐ γὰρ ὥοντο δεῖν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τιμᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν εὖ πεπονθότων, ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας ἀθάνατος οὐσα διαμένει. Δωρεὰς δὲ τίνας ἐλάμβανον, ἄξιον μνησθῆναι.

But in my own opinion, by the Olympian gods, it is not right even to mention on the same day this beast and those men. Now let Demosthenes exhibit in his speech whether there is any record of a decree to crown any one of those men. So were the people ungrateful? No, they were great-hearted, and those men were worthy of the city. For they thought that their honour should be conferred not in written words but

⁴² This is an explicit reference to the great figures connected with the specific events of the historical examples; for implicit or allusive references to names or major characters related to the events in question see Demoen, 'Paradigm' (n. 4 above) 142.

⁴³ See E. Lowry, *Thersites: a study in comic shame*, Harvard dissertations in Classics (Harvard 1991) 163ff., on this exchange of evaluations and Demosthenes' evocation of Solon's 'shame-causing' speech and ruse to incite an invasion of Salamis.

⁴⁴ See J. Hesk, *Deception and democracy in classical Athens* (Cambridge 2000) 105.

in the memory of those whom they had served; and this memory from that day to this has abided immortal. And it is worthwhile to recall what rewards they did receive.⁴⁵

Conclusively, the above argument aims at eliminating Demosthenes' personality and his desire to be crowned; Aeschines already in §181 has compared Demosthenes with all these great figures of the past and now argues quite aptly that if these great men were not crowned – despite their worth – Demosthenes, a minor figure, would not have the right to be crowned.

Finally, in an impressive device in his peroration (§259) Aeschines condemns his opponent in the name of Themistocles and the dead of Marathon and Plataia. This is a quite emotional and effective appeal to the glorious ancestors, who allegedly would support the orator's thesis if they could be present in the discussion. And this appeal seems to be a pretext for Demosthenes' oath to the ancestors (*On the crown* 208, see below).⁴⁶

Demosthenes defends himself in §§206-10 of his speech *On the crown*. In §206 he tries to find the right terrain to play on; he says:

Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῦτ' ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, ὥς ἐγὼ προήγαγον ὑμᾶς ἄξια τῶν προγόνων φρονεῖν, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅστις οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἐπιτιμήσειέ μοι. νῦν δ' ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμετέρας τὰς τοιαύτας προαιρέσεις ἀποφαίνω, καὶ δείκνυμ' ὅτι καὶ πρὸ ἐμοῦ τοῦτ' εἶχεν τὸ φρόνημ' ἢ πόλις, τῆς μέντοι διακονίας τῆς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τῶν πεπραγμένων καὶ ἐμαυτῷ μετεῖναι φημι.

If I had attempted to say that I induced you to feel sentiments worthy of your forefathers, everyone would justly criticize me. But I do not: I am asserting these principles as your principles; I am pointing out that such was the spirit of the city long before my time – though for myself I do claim some credit for each of the actions you took.

He recognizes the unattainable grandeur of the forefathers, implying that he has no intention to be compared with them; next, he tries to place himself in civic society, a citizen who may be used as an instrument for saving the city's principles. However, with the last phrase implementing a rhetorical technique which could be defined as 'honour by association' he attempts to gain some personal credit. On the other hand, it is interesting to see Demosthenes' effort to disengage himself from the discussion of the forefathers' glory; he

⁴⁵ Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς Ὀλυμπίους οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡμέραις ἄξιον ἡγοῦμαι μεμνησθαι τοῦ θηρίου τούτου κάκεινων τῶν ἀνδρῶν. Ἐπιδειξάτω τοίνυν Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ εἶπου γέγραπταί τινα τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν στεφανῶσαι. Ἀχάριστος ἄρ' ἦν ὁ δῆμος; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μεγαλόφρων, κάκεινοί γε οἱ μὴ τιμημένοι τῆς πόλεως ἄξιοι· οὐ γὰρ ὄντο δεῖν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τιμᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν εὖ πεπονθότων, ἢ ἂπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας ἀθάνατος οὕσα διαμένει. Δωρεὰς δὲ τίνας ἐλάβανον, ἄξιον μνησθῆναι.

⁴⁶ Θेमιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι τελευτήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων οὐκ οἶσθε στενάζειν, εἰ ὁ μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ὁμολογῶν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἀντιπράττειν στεφανωθήσεται; ('Don't you think Themistocles and those who died at Marathon and at Plataea, and the very sepulchres of our ancestors will groan aloud, if the man who admits that he has plotted with the barbarians against the Greeks receives a crown?') On the rhetorical device see Dem. *On the false embassy* 66 with MacDowell, *Demosthenes* (n. 22 above) 236.

also strives to leave out any hint of a possible comparison of himself with them and probably his participation in the battle of Chaironeia.

In §207,⁴⁷ Demosthenes attacks Aeschines who denounces the whole enterprise to stop Philip; thus, Demosthenes is trying to present himself as the city's servant, following the previous paragraph, while attempting to show that Aeschines is not his own enemy but the city's enemy, since he arraigns the anti-Philip campaign, which was actually Athens' strategic plan and not Demosthenes' personal one.

After §§206 and 207, which were used as a rhetorical background, Demosthenes reaches §208,⁴⁸ where he compares the forefathers' successful battles and the situation affected by the lost battle in Chaironeia. His main rhetorical purpose is to make the Athenians feel 'as proud of the battle with Philip in Chaironeia as of the triumphs of Marathon and Salamis'.⁴⁹ Once again the passage stresses the role played by Athens in the Persian Wars, the claim that the Athenians fought almost alone and took the risk to confront the Persians, saving not only

⁴⁷ οὗτος δὲ τῶν ὅλων κατηγορῶν καὶ κελεύων ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ πικρῶς ἔχειν ὡς φόβων καὶ κινδύνων αἰτίῳ τῇ πόλει, τῆς μὲν εἰς τὸ παρὸν τιμῆς ἔμ' ἀποστερήσαι γλίσχεται, τὰ δ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἐγκώμι' ὑμῶν ἀφαιρεῖται. εἰ γὰρ ὡς οὐ τὰ βέλτιστ' ἐμοῦ πολιτευσαμένου τουδὲ καταψηφιεῖσθε, ἡμαρτηκέναι δόξετε, οὐ τῇ τῆς τύχης ἀγνωμοσύνῃ τὰ συμβάντα παθεῖν ('But Aeschines charges the whole policy, urges you to feel bitterness towards me because I am the cause of terrors and dangers for the city, and, in his eagerness to strip me of this honour of a moment, would rob you of the enduring praises of posterity. For if you condemn Ctesiphon on the grounds that my policies were not for the best, you yourselves will be regarded as being wrongdoers, and not as men who owed the disasters they have suffered to the unkindness of fate').

⁴⁸ (208) ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετ', ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι, μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐτέρους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν κειμένους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, οὓς ἅπαντας ὁμοίως ἢ πόλις τῆς αὐτῆς ἀξιώσασα τιμῆς ἔθαπεν, Αἰσχίνη, οὐχὶ τοὺς κατορθώσαντας αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς κρατήσαντας μόνους. δικαίως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργον ἅπασι πέπρακται· τῇ τύχῃ δ', ἣν ὁ δαίμων ἐνεμεν ἐκάστοις, ταύτῃ κέχρηται. (209) ἔπειτ', ὃ κατάρατε καὶ γραμματοκούφων, σὺ μὲν τῆς παρὰ τουτωνὶ τιμῆς καὶ φυλάθρωπίας ἔμ' ἀποστερήσαι βουλόμενος τρόπαια καὶ μάχας καὶ παλαί' ἔργ' ἔλεγε, ὃν τίνος προσεδεῖθ' ὁ παρὼν ἀγὼν οὐτοσί; ἐμὲ δ', ὃ τριταγωνιστά, τὸν περὶ τῶν πρωτείων σύμβουλον τῇ πόλει παριόντα τὸ τίνος φρόνημα λαβόντ' ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμ' ἔδει; ('But no; you cannot, men of Athens, you cannot have done wrongly when you have taken upon yourselves the burden of risks of war for the freedom and security of mankind; I swear it by our ancestors who were in the front lines at Marathon, who stood in array of battle at Plataea, who fought in the naval-battles of Salamis and Artemisium, and by many other brave men who lie in our public tombs, whom the city buried there, because it accounted them all to be alike worthy of the same honour – all, Aeschines, not only the successful and the victorious. And justly so: for all of them accomplished the duty expected of brave men: their fortune was such as Heaven allotted to them. (209) But you, disreputable clerk, wanting to rob me of the honour and the affection given me by the fellow citizens, talked about trophies and battles and deeds of the past; but, which of them do we need in the present case? Tell me, you third-rate actor, in what spirit did it befit me to approach the speaker's platform to advise the city how to retain her supremacy?').

⁴⁹ See [Longinus] *On the sublime* 16.2.17 (Russell): ... μηδὲν ἔλαττον τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Φύλιππον ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ Μαραθῶνα καὶ Σαλαμῖνα νικητηρίοις παρίστασθαι φρονεῖν....

themselves but mankind as a whole.⁵⁰ Moreover, Demosthenes projects a new and helpful argument: the city shows respect to all the men who fought in wars for freedom, there is no distinction between victorious and defeated. The implication is that Demosthenes, although he has taken part in the battle of Chaironeia, is worthy of being honoured by the city.

At this point, Demosthenes presents an oath to 'the ancestors who were in the front lines at Marathon, who stood in array of battle at Plataia, who fought in the naval-battles of Salamis and Artemisium ...'; this oath in the name of the men of Marathon elevated these men to the status of the gods and heroes who were normally invoked,⁵¹ while it guarantees the central claim of the speech that the Athenians cannot have done wrongly when they took the risk of making war for the freedom and security of mankind.

Many later rhetoricians have expressed their admiration for this virtuoso passage, firstly in its balance between formal structure and underlying thought, and also in the sense of appropriateness that this novel way of praising the ancestors as a whole ensures. Tiberius comments on the way Demosthenes expressed his main idea of the forefathers' superiority by an imaginary oath producing brilliance and cogency.⁵² Pseudo-Longinus regards the oath as a form of the figure of apostrophe, by which Demosthenes avoids addressing the Athenians, while he grasps the opportunity to respond in a successful way to Aeschines' charges.⁵³ In sum, this highly emotional and admirable device is used by Demosthenes in order to respond to Aeschines' appeal to the glorious ancestors (§259, see above) and also to the charges directed by Aeschines against Demosthenes for his responsibility for the dead citizens at Chaironeia (§§152-58).⁵⁴

Conclusion

The past is commonly used by the orators either in circumstantial citations or as well-structured historical examples with reference to the current historical and political situation. The generic idea is that the past ought to be used in such a way as to guide the present and future and inspire citizens to reach the right decisions.⁵⁵ This idea was expressed by Thucydides, who pursued a deep analysis of the historical past anticipating that the conclusions regarding the past will help people to understand correctly similar situations in future. However, the orators of the fourth century, unlike him, need the past not for any far-sighted usage but to support their arguments, as a kind of witness, in order to persuade their audience. Thus, the orators use the past with close reference to the present and their quite *arriviste* attitude towards the past originates in the propagandistic needs of oratory.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ The claim that Athens confronted the Persians with no other help is also found in Isoc. 4.86, 12.50ff., 16.27; and Dem. 13.21ff., 23.196, 198.

⁵¹ See Usher, *Demosthenes* (n. 11 above) 242.

⁵² Tib. *Fig.* 22, ll. 13-15 (Ballaira): Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρᾶγμα παράδειγμα ἐποίησεν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ εὐθέως εἰπεῖν ἐσχημάτισεν, πρὸς τε τὸ λαμπρὸν ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἀξιόπιστον εἰς ὄρκου φαντασίαν μεταβάλλων.

⁵³ See n. 49 above.

⁵⁴ See H. Yunis, *Demosthenes: On the crown* (Cambridge 2001) 226.

⁵⁵ See Isoc. 1.34, 2.35, 6.59; Lys. 25.23; And. 3.2.

⁵⁶ See on this Plat. *Mx.* 239d1-2 (n. 17 above).

In fourth-century oratory, a preference for the use of certain periods of history is traceable; among these periods are the Persian Wars, Pericles' age and even Pericles himself as a personality of distinction, the tyranny of the Peisistratids, and the restoration of democracy after the short tyranny of the Thirty (403 BC). Marathon and Salamis served as stock subjects of historical examples used by the Athenian orators. An extensive literary tradition concerning the battles and victories at Marathon and Salamis not only highlights the importance of those two battles but seems to reflect the views of the orators on these events, the historical consciousness and attitude towards these events on the part of the Athenian public, where these views ought to be based, and the great influence which these glorious events obtained as military as well as cultural achievements.

Moreover, the Persian Wars, and especially the glorious moments of this period, are cited frequently by orators of the second half of the fourth century due to the specific situation of the period: Philip attempts to conquer the whole of Greece, and this fact recalls similarities from the epoch of the Persian Wars. In this case, pro-war politicians – e.g. Aristophanes of Azenia, Demosthenes, and even Aeschines in the period between 349-47 BC (see Aeschines. *On the false embassy* 75 with Dem. *On the crown* 303) – invoked the glory of the Persian Wars to support their proposals for a high-powered confrontation with Philip. Thus, in general, historical examples with a given content are altered and adapted to a specific situation serving as a means of political propaganda. Consequently, Marathon or other victorious moments of the Persian Wars are applied by Demosthenes and Aeschines to the current situation in such a way as to create a new effect, supporting their political proposals.

The framework for the presentation of Marathon and the Persian Wars is carefully designed. First, Marathon is put in the broad context of Athenian glories of the past, supported by the idea of the ancestors' prominence over contemporary politicians (Aeschines. *Against Ctesiphon* 178; cf. Dem. *On the false embassy* 312). Moreover, Demosthenes presents Marathon and Salamis as essential parts of Greek history, and as victories that secured Greece and protected Greek identity (Dem. *On the false embassy* 312); and again he stresses the role played by Athens in the Persian Wars, the claim that the Athenians fought almost alone and took the risk of confronting the Persians, thereby saving not only themselves but mankind as a whole (Dem. *On the crown* 208). This is not a unique statement, since Isocrates in his *Philip* (§147) claims that Athens enjoys the praise of all for the distinctive service the Athenian citizens offered to mankind in fighting at those two battles.⁵⁷

In addition, the two decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles which are strongly connected with the two battles, together with the ephebic oath, are mentioned as texts read out by the pro-war politicians to inspire their fellow-citizens to oppose Philip. This invocation of the decrees adds up to the authority of Marathon and Salamis as incomparable models for imitation (Dem. *On the false embassy* 303). In sum, Marathon and Salamis become representative events for patriotism and patriotic policy, while the abandonment of these

⁵⁷ *Philip* (5.147): ἐκ δὲ τῆς Μαραθῶνι μάχης καὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι τὴν αὐτῶν ἐξέλιπον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας, ἅπαντες ἐγκωμιάζουσιν. See also Dem. 22.13, 23.196, 198, 24.184.

ideals reveals that the politician who adopts this policy is a traitor (Dem. *On the false embassy* 311).

Likewise, the two orators take refuge in the great figures, Miltiades and Themistocles, who were the leaders of the army in those battles. These men represent the traditional values of Athenian society and promote communal heroism and civic integration. Demosthenes, by including an oath sworn to these great men (*On the crown* 208), underlines the value of these figures and elevates them to the status of gods and heroes. It is also the case that Aeschines brings these men forward to be compared with Demosthenes (Aeschin. *Against Ctesiphon* 181) in his attempt to make the comparison between past and present more tangible.

In sum, Marathon and Salamis seem to obtain a significant role in all four speeches connected directly to the main arguments of the prosecutors. In particular, in the case *On the false embassy*, Marathon is used by Demosthenes in such a way as to support his main thesis that Aeschines changed his policy because he was bribed by Philip; the indication is, according to Demosthenes, that Aeschines neglected the glorious Athenian past which is represented by Marathon. Aeschines had to answer this maintaining a delicate balance; he argues that the Athenians must engage with the past, while they had to imitate the deeds of excellence and avoid the ill-fated choices. In the case *On the crown* Aeschines attacks Ctesiphon's proposal and at the same time questions the value of Demosthenes' personality; in that case Aeschines exploits the incomparable value of Marathon and reaches a comparison between Demosthenes and the protagonists of the Persian Wars, with potentially devastating consequences for Demosthenes.

It is equally important to note that historical examples coming from the Persian Wars (Marathon, Salamis, etc.) are incorporated in the orators' important rhetorical technique 'defence by attack', forming a new argumentation pattern (historical example [Marathon, Salamis, etc.] – personal attack – answer to the main charge of the opponent). First, it is Aeschines who follows this pattern in the speech *On the false embassy* (§§74-80), where, after the reference to the glorious Persian Wars and Marathon and other historical events, he goes straight onto the attack against Demosthenes' family, origin, and citizenship (§78), in order to reach as smoothly as possible the crucial point of acknowledging his responsibility for the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates (§80). Similarly, Demosthenes, in his speech *On the crown* (§§209-12), attacks Aeschines with reference to his allegedly disreputable family and his low-esteem past jobs, just before answering, only with a rhetorical question, the main charge concerning his responsibility for military and strategic failures (see especially §212).

Finally, the use of Marathon and the Persian Wars as historical examples by Demosthenes and Aeschines brings forward the issue that trials were competitions with certain rules, and should be also approached as role-plays. We have to be particularly cautious of what the orators say, because of the way the changing roles of the protagonists shape and reshape their arguments. The objective was to exploit the great fame of Marathon and its connotations of patriotism and the choice of the right policy against Macedon. In 343 it is Aeschines who is the defendant and Demosthenes the prosecutor, who relates Aeschines' change of policy to his stance towards Marathon and the deeds of the past, while in 330 Aeschines is reversing the polarity of Demosthenes' arguments: Aeschines, now in Demosthenes' role of the prosecutor, seems to have copied his views and arguments.

Aeschines in that case is exploiting the glory of Marathon and Salamis and their leading figures to eliminate Demosthenes, and makes use of almost the same thread of argument as Demosthenes had done against him thirteen years earlier.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT, ATHENS, AND THE RHETORIC OF THE PERSIAN WARS¹

CHRISTOS KREMMYDAS

In 336 the twenty-year-old son of the assassinated King Philip, Alexander III, inherited not only his father's throne of Macedon but also his war against Persia. The first abortive episode of that war, little more than a reconnaissance mission under Parmenion and Attalus, had already been played out in north-western Asia Minor. Along with this war, Alexander inherited his father's propaganda² that marketed the war to the Greeks of the mainland as a revenge campaign.³ The idea of a panhellenic venture against the Persians to avenge the wrongs committed in the Persian Wars one hundred and fifty years before had been popular with the Greeks for over a century⁴ and had recently received the backing of a prominent Athenian intellectual, Isocrates.⁵ This idea of a collective expedition of the Greeks against the Persians was sustained by Alexander at least until 330 when the royal capitals of the Persian Empire were captured.⁶

Alexander's panhellenic rhetoric employed powerful and long-cherished slogans, such as 'freedom of the Greeks' and 'autonomy'⁷ in order to rally the Greeks behind his

¹ I wish to thank the organizers of the Marathon conference, Professor Chris Carey, Professor Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou, and Dr Eleni Volonaki for the invitation to participate in the conference and to contribute the present paper to this volume.

² 'The systematic dissemination of doctrine, rumour, or selected information to propagate or promote a particular doctrine, view, practice, *etc.*; ideas, information, *etc.* disseminated thus' (*Shorter Oxford English dictionary*, n. 3). Due to the negative connotations of the term 'propaganda', I will also use terms that are less loaded such as 'discourse' and 'rhetoric' as synonyms.

³ Note *e.g.* Diod. 16.89.2.

⁴ See H. Bellen, 'Der Rachedanke in der griechisch-persischen Auseinandersetzung', *Chiron* 4 (1974) 43-67. Bellen argues (48-49) that the Peace of Callias in 449 (the historicity of which is disputed) should have laid any anti-Persian revenge rhetoric to rest.

⁵ *E.g.* Isocr. 5 (To Philip); see also M. Flower, 'From Simonides to Isocrates: the fifth-century origins of fourth-century panhellenism', *Cl. Ant.* 19 (2000) 65-101, and 'Alexander the Great and panhellenism', in *Alexander the Great in fact and fiction*, ed. A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham (Oxford 2000) 96-135; on the ambiguities of Alexander's propaganda see M. Faraguna, 'Alexander and the Greeks', in *Brill's companion to Alexander the Great*, ed. J. Roisman and J. Worthington (Leiden 2003) 107-15.

⁶ Neither Thucydides nor Polybius are in any doubt that the slogan of revenge against the Persians was merely a pretext serving the Athenians' and Alexander's imperialistic designs respectively: see Thuc. 1.96.1 (πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον) and Polyb. 3.6.13 (προφάσει χρώμενος ... τὴν Περσῶν παρανομίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας).

⁷ On the use of these terms since the fifth century see R. Seager and C. Tuplin, 'The freedom of the Greeks of Asia Minor: on the origins of a concept and the creation of a slogan', *JHS* 100 (1980) 141-54.

campaign into Persia. While he was in western Asia Minor he even appeared to manipulate aspects of democratic ideology,⁸ even though he was not necessarily operating with a consistent policy of spreading democracy to the East. Besides verbal means of persuasion, Alexander's propaganda was also non-verbal. He often manipulated the visual to get his message across to his intended audiences, Macedonian, Greek, and later Persian, too. His use of images and symbols in statues,⁹ coins,¹⁰ and wall-paintings was an effective way of steering public opinion where it suited him, namely the panhellenic war against the Persians (from 336 to 330).

Alexander's panhellenic propaganda was doubtless a means to an end but its use brought up tensions with Greek communities of the mainland. After all, the very Greekness of the Macedonians was disputed in some quarters. Paul Cartledge believes that for the Greeks of the mainland:

It was Macedon, not the Great King, which they thought was the real, or at any rate the more immediately present, danger and enemy. For many Macedonians, conversely, Greeks were members of a recently defeated and so despised people who did not know how to conduct their political and military life sensibly. This, I think, is the true light in which we must view Alexander's inherited panhellenic propaganda. If he kept it up until 330, despite its increasing awkwardness, this was because it was his only means of attempting to conciliate the considerable amount of hostile Greek opinion and so of helping to keep the Greek mainland quiet.¹¹

In the field of propaganda, Alexander inevitably found himself antagonizing Athens, a former hegemonic power in the Greek world. He no doubt had hoped to take Athens on board and use her as a powerful asset in his panhellenic venture to the East. One even gets the impression from some sources that Alexander was adopting Athenian propaganda methods reminiscent of the fifth-century Athenian Empire and even Athenian moral traits in order come across as more acceptable to the Greek world and Athens in particular.¹² Take for instance the use of *philanthrōpia* and *epieikeia* (two characteristically Athenian traits) to denote the way he treated the Athenian envoys in the aftermath of the sack of

⁸ Arrian 1.17.4 (Sardeis), 1.18.2 (democracies set up in Ionian cities), 1.19.6 (Miletus), 2.5.8 (democracy at Soloi), 2.7.3-9 (pre-battle 'speech' before Issus), 3.27.5 (freedom granted to Ariaspai/Euergetai on account of 'Hellenicity' and justice prevalent in the city), 5.2.2 (Alexander and the Nysaians); cf. Rhodes-Osborne 84 (Alexander's letter to the Chians: 334/33 or 332 BC).

⁹ See e.g. P. Stewart, *Faces of power: Alexander's image and Hellenistic politics* (Berkeley 1993) 21-41, on what the sources tell us about statues of Alexander late in his reign until the Roman period.

¹⁰ See e.g. A. R. Bellinger, *Essays on the coinage of Alexander the Great*, Numismatic Studies no. 11 (New York 1963) 1-34; K. Dahmen, *The legend of Alexander the Great on Greek and Roman coins* (New York 2007).

¹¹ P. Cartledge, *Alexander: the hunt for a new past* (London 2004) 95.

¹² One should probably attribute this portrayal of Alexander's public *ethos* to Callisthenes, the court historian and chief propagandist. The same attitude towards Athens on the part of Alexander is attested on other occasions, too: e.g. Arrian 2.15.4; Diod. 17.2.2, 17.4.3, 17.22.5, 17.38.3-4.

Thebes (and Greeks in general throughout his reign). But Athens, too, was spared due to ideological as well practical reasons (Arrian, *Anab.* 1.10.6):¹³

καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀφῆκε, τυχὸν μὲν αἰδοῖ τῆς πόλεως, τυχὸν δὲ σπουδῇ τοῦ ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν στόλου, οὐκ ἐθέλων οὐδὲν ὑποπτον ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὑπολείπεσθαι.

Alexander relented, whether due to his respect for Athens, or because of his haste to launch the expedition into Asia he did not want to leave any feeling of suspicion behind among the Greeks.

Being a pragmatist at heart he realized the practical as well as ideological benefits of having the city on his side. On the one hand, he appreciated the enormous ideological potential held by the city if his panhellenic rhetoric was going to be credible while, on the other, he needed its material help (*i.e.* naval resources) and also had to secure his back as he was launching his punitive expedition to the East. Athens reluctantly decided to join the panhellenic campaign,¹⁴ but there is no denying the fact that the Athenians were less than enraptured by the young Macedonian king. Their military cooperation was no more than half-hearted. We know that at the start of the campaign Athens had the potential to contribute far more than the twenty ships that eventually joined Alexander's naval force in the early stages of the war (until the disbandment of Alexander's navy in 333).¹⁵ Meanwhile, many Athenians, either disillusioned with the city's decision not to fight Alexander or simply cash-strapped, joined the forces of the Great Persian King as mercenaries.¹⁶ Repeated calls to resistance and revolt from 335-23 were unheeded as the Athenians preferred to keep as low a profile as possible.¹⁷ Despite this ostensible acquiescence or passivity towards Alexander, many in Athens continued to harbour visions of leadership in the Greek world, as they had done throughout the first two-thirds of the fourth century in the days of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy.¹⁸

The conceptual pool from which both Alexander and Athens drew slogans and ideals was restricted, thus leading to tension between their competing discourses. Terms such as ἐλευθερία, and αὐτονομία were employed by Alexander in his panhellenic expedition, while Athenian politicians were using the same terms in their internal blame games (as invective in the courts) or were calling for the freedom of Greece from Alexander.¹⁹

¹³ Cf. Diod. 17.4.9.

¹⁴ *IG* ii² 329.

¹⁵ Diod. 17.22.5 according to *IG* ii² 1627, they had 392 triremes in 330/29.

¹⁶ Prominent Athenians included Iphicrates and Charidemus, Thrasybulus and Ephialtes.

¹⁷ E.g. Aesch. 3.159-64; Diod. 17.62.7; P. Harding, 'Demosthenes' (in)activity during the reign of Alexander the Great', in *Demosthenes, statesman and orator*, ed. I. Worthington (London 2000) 90-100.

¹⁸ Cf. Plut. *Phocion* 17.5; Diod. 17.3.2 (τῆς ἡγεμονίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἐξεχώρουν τοῖς Μακεδόσι, 'they did not cede the leadership of the Greeks to the Macedonians'); contrast Aeschines' pessimistic assessment in 330 at 3.134.

¹⁹ Diod. 17.9.6: the Thebans' rhetoric of freedom of the Greeks from Alexander's tyranny; cf. Arrian 1.7.2, who suggests the flexibility of these terms as propaganda material (παλαιὰ καὶ καλὰ ὀνόματα), and Plut. *Alex.* 12.5.6.

Whereas Alexander was bestowing autonomy on cities allied to the League of Corinth, there were protests in mainland Greece against Macedonian intervention in their internal affairs.²⁰

A pivotal position in Alexander's propaganda was occupied by the Persian Wars. The rhetoric of the Persian Wars was central to Alexander's goal of forging panhellenic unity in view of the expedition to the East. At the same time it was asserting his Hellenic identity. However, the manipulation of this key milestone in Hellenic history by Alexander's propaganda created further tension in his relationship with Athens as the city justified its former hegemony in Greece through its role in safeguarding Greek freedom during the Persian Wars.²¹ Therefore, Alexander's Persian Wars rhetoric antagonized Athens' rhetoric with regard to the panhellenic effects of their own contribution to the Persian Wars.²² Alexander repeatedly attempted to mollify the Athenians as long as they were vital to his propaganda but ultimately he was unsuccessful. The battle of Marathon, in particular, demonstrates the limitations he faced in terms of his rhetoric.

Six Episodes in Alexander's Persian Wars Rhetoric

In what follows I will explore in chronological order a number of episodes highlighting the ways in which Alexander manipulated events and ideas relevant to the Persian Wars. In some of these, the links to Athens are made explicit.

1. The Persian Wars rhetoric was inaugurated by Alexander early on in his reign. It was employed in 335 after the sack of Thebes in order to justify this brutal act to the rest of the Greeks. As is well known from Herodotus, the Thebans had 'Medized' during the Persian Wars (7.132), therefore at the start of a panhellenic campaign they should be punished for it, especially as they now stood in the way of the *hēgemon* of the Greeks. After a long digression enumerating disasters on a similar scale from fifth- and fourth-century history,²³ Arrian reports the view that the fate of Thebes was their overdue punishment, divinely ordained, for their 'medism' in 480 (1.9.7):

... ἐς μῆνιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνιχνέχθη, ὡς τῆς τε ἐν τῷ Μηδικῷ πολέμῳ προδοσίας τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ μακροῦ ταύτην δίκην ἐκτίσαντας Θηβαίους ... καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τῆς ἐρημώσεως ἐν ὅτῳ οἱ Ἕλληνες παραταξάμενοι Μήδοις ἀπώσαντο τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸν κίνδυνον, καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναίους αὐτοὶ τῇ ψήφῳ ἀπώλλυνον, ὅτε ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πόλεως γνώμη προὔτεθι ἐν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις
.....²⁴

²⁰ E.g. [Dem.] 17.4-7.

²¹ Thuc. 1.96.1; Isoc. 4.22.

²² E.g. Hdt. 7.139 and Thuc. 1.74.1.

²³ A. B. Bosworth, *Historical commentary on Arrian's history of Alexander*, 2 vols. (Oxford 1980-95), i (1980) 84-85, comments on the topicality of the passage and points to Thucydides and Xenophon as possible sources for the list of Greek disasters.

²⁴ Cf. Diod. 17.14.2-4; Justin 11.3.9-11; Rhodes-Osborne 88 ('oath of Plataea').

This was divine wrath, justice was being meted out to the Thebans after a long time for their betrayal of the Greeks in the Persian wars ... and for the ruined state of the Plataean countryside, on which the Greeks, drawn up in battle order against the Persians, had repelled the threat to Greece, and, finally, for voting to enslave the city of Athens when a proposal was put before the allies of Sparta

One may safely attribute this reference to Theban ‘medism’ to Alexander’s propaganda rather than to the historian himself. Although the larger section of which this passage forms part is a moralizing excursus by Arrian on the theme of divine wrath (μῆνιν) for wrongs committed in the past (1.9.6),²⁵ the connection between Theban ‘medism’ in 480 and retribution in 335 is more likely to have been established by Macedonian propagandists first: Callisthenes and Ptolemy (he is cited at 1.8.1) are two obvious candidates.²⁶ The reference to the Theban vote to raze Athens after the end of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19-20) affirms the attribution to Macedonian propaganda as it is consistent with the systematic courting of Athens by Alexander before and during the campaign into Persia.

Reference to the wrongs committed by a Greek city during the Persian Wars was the only way of justifying the brutal treatment it suffered at the hands of Alexander.²⁷ Thebes was thus associated with Xerxes’ barbaric treatment of Greek cities and is rightfully placed on the ‘hit-list’ of Alexander’s revenge campaign. This, then, was an intelligent propaganda *coup* on the part of Alexander that aimed to maintain the pretence of the upcoming panhellenic venture against the Persians.

2. One of the best-known episodes of Alexander’s campaign comes in the immediate aftermath of the victory at Granicus, in 334. Alexander carries on his courting of Athens as he manipulates the precedent of the Persian Wars for his own panhellenic propaganda.²⁸ The victorious Macedonian king sent the goddess Athena three hundred Persian panoplies²⁹ inscribed with the famous epigram ‘except the Lacedaemonians’.³⁰ According to Arrian (1.16.7):

²⁵ Note the strong echoes of Xenophon’s *Hellenica* evoked by Arrian’s extended passage: Xenophon’s account of the arrival of the Paralus at Piraeus bearing the grim news of the disaster at Aigos Potamoi in 405 (*Hell.* 2.2.3) is a close parallel.

²⁶ Bosworth, *Commentary* (n. 23 above) 84-85, adds Aristobulus to the possible sources.

²⁷ Although Arrian tries to exonerate Alexander and the Macedonians by attributing the worst crimes to vendettas pursued by the other Boeotians (1.8.8).

²⁸ An interesting parallel from Athenian propaganda in the first half of the fourth century is provided by Aeschines 3.116: in the early 360s the Athenians sent a dedication to the temple of Apollo at Delphi from booty captured at Plataea in 479. The inscription sent a strong signal to the Thebans: Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε τάναντία τοῖς Ἑλλήσι ἐμάχοντο (‘the Athenians are sending this booty from the Medes and the Thebans, when they were fighting against the Greeks’). It is likely that Alexander had seen it on his visit to Delphi in 335 (*cf.* n. 36 below).

²⁹ ἀσπίδας (‘shields’), according to Plut. *Alex.* 16.8.

³⁰ According to Plutarch, the epigram accompanied all the spoils of Alexander’s victory, not just the gift sent to Athena.

ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀθήνας τριακοσίας πανοπλίας Περσικὰς ἀνάθημα εἶναι τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἐν πόλει· καὶ ἐπίγραμμα ἐπιγραφῆναι ἐκέλευσε τόδε· Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικούντων.

He sent to Athens three hundred Persian panoplies as a dedication to the goddess Athena on the Acropolis; he ordered this inscription to be inscribed on them: ‘Alexander, son of Philip and the Greeks, except the Lacedaemonians, dedicate these from the barbarians living in Asia’.

Alexander was clearly trying to portray himself as the avenger of Athens’ patron goddess.³¹ The Athenian temple(s) on the Acropolis had been famous victims of Xerxes’ barbarity in 480 (Hdt. 8.53), therefore Alexander’s gift of the Persian panoplies to Athena was meant to be a token of revenge exacted. What is more, he would thus establish a visual reminder and a symbolic presence on the Athenian Acropolis. At the same time, one cannot help noticing Alexander’s ‘winking’ at the Spartans: the number three hundred would have implicitly reminded them of their heroic sacrifice for Greece at Thermopylae, which is now juxtaposed with their refusal to engage in the panhellenic campaign led by Alexander. Nevertheless, this highly symbolic gesture looks more like an attempt to placate the Athenians in front of a panhellenic audience rather than either Athena or the Lacedaemonians.³²

3. In 332 after his first victory over Darius at Issus, Alexander received a letter from the defeated Persian King, in which the latter was requesting the release of his captive family and an amicable settlement to the war (Arrian 2.14.1-3).³³ Alexander’s response is, in essence, a document of Macedonian propaganda with multiple recipients: the Macedonians themselves, the cities on the Greek mainland, the Persians and peoples inhabiting the vast Persian Empire. At the very outset, it contains a succinct summary of the expedition’s *raison d’être* (Arrian 2.14.4):

οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι ἐλθόντες εἰς Μακεδονίαν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα κακῶς ἐποίησαν ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν προηδικημένοι· ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμὼν κατασταθεὶς καὶ τιμωρήσασθαι βουλόμενος Πέρσας διέβην ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὑπαρξάντων ὑμῶν.³⁴

Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece and did us great harm, although we had not wronged them prior to that; I have been appointed *hēgemon* of the Greeks, and invaded Asia wishing to punish you, Persians, for something you started.

³¹ Alexander had already demonstrated his respect for Athena by erecting an altar on the point of landing in Asia Minor (Arrian 1.11.7).

³² I see no reason to suppose, with Cartledge (*Alexander* [n. 11 above] 125), that this was meant to demean and infuriate the Athenians.

³³ On the view that this letter, too, is in fact a product of Alexander’s propaganda see G. T. Griffith, ‘The letter of Darius at Arrian 2.14’, *PCPS* 194 (1968) 33-48.

³⁴ Cf. Curtius Rufus 3.10.8-9 and Justin 11.9.4-5.

Although in this particular instance there is no mention of Athens, Alexander's special interest in having the city on his side resurfaces in the immediate context. The historian discusses how Alexander dealt with Greek mercenaries captured in the battle of Issus. Four individuals are singled out, two from Thebes, one from Sparta, and Iphicrates, the son of the famous Athenian general of the first half of the fourth century. According to Arrian (2.15.4), Iphicrates junior was honoured because of Alexander's friendship for Athens (φιλία τε τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως) and the memory of his famous father's reputation. After his death, his bones were repatriated in another symbolic, magnanimous gesture.

4. Alexander's decisive victory over Darius at Gaugamela in 331 signalled his defeat of the Persian Empire and the end of the military operations in the War of Revenge. He could now assume the coveted title 'Lord of Asia' (Plut. *Alex.* 34). In two symbolic gestures harking back to the Persian Wars, he reserves Plataea in Boeotia and Croton in Southern Italy for preferential treatment (Plut. *Alex.* 34.1-2):

... ἰδίᾳ δὲ Πλαταιεῦσι τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν, ὅτι τὴν χώραν οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας παρέσχον, ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ Κροτωνιάταις εἰς Ἰταλίαν μέρος τῶν λαφύρων, τὴν Φαῦλλου τοῦ ἀθλητοῦ τιμῶν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, ὃς περὶ τὰ Μηδικὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἰταλιωτῶν ἀπεγνωκότων τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἰδιόστολον ἔχων ναῦν ἔπλευσεν εἰς Σαλαμίνα, τοῦ κινδύνου τι μεθέξων.

... he wrote to the Plataeans in particular that he would rebuild their city, because their ancestors had given their territory to the Greeks in the fight for freedom. He sent also to the people of Croton in Italy part of the spoils, honouring the zeal and bravery of their athlete Phayllus, who, at the time of the Median wars, when the rest of the Greeks in Italy refused to help the Greeks, fitted out a ship at his own expense and sailed to Salamis, in order to take part in the danger there.

Plataean territory was hallowed ground for the Greeks since the last land battle of the Persian Wars had been fought there in 479 (Hdt. 9.58-75)³⁵ and Plataea had been linked with the Greek war of freedom ever since. Alexander's promise to rebuild the city was a propaganda gesture meant on the one hand to stress that the war of revenge against the Persians was approaching its conclusion while, on the other, sending yet another strong signal to Thebes, the menacing neighbour of Plataea.

Phayllus, the famous Pythian victor,³⁶ had commanded Croton's warship in the battle of Salamis, the only contribution of the western Greeks to the Greek armada in 480 (Hdt. 8.47). Although distant Croton had not taken a part in Alexander's expedition as far as we know, he still wished to include it in his Persian Wars propaganda, albeit belatedly. He was thus extending the reach of his panhellenic venture to western Hellenism as well³⁷

³⁵ Annual funerary rites for the Greek dead at Plataea: Thuc. 3.58.4; Plut. *Arist.* 21.2.

³⁶ According to Pausanias 10.9.2, his statue had been erected at Delphi. Alexander may have seen it on his visit to Delphi in 335 (Plut. *Alex.* 14.4).

³⁷ I doubt this gesture had anything to do with Alexander's putative plans for a campaign to the West according to his 'Last Plans' circulated towards the end of his life (Diod. 18.4.2-5).

and Phayllus provided a prominent figurehead, well known in the Greek world beyond his hometown.

5. After Gaugamela and the effortless capture of Babylon, Alexander continued his long march into the Persian heartland, while the defeated Persian King fled to Media. The destination was Susa, one of the Persian royal capitals. After getting there in twenty days, Alexander laid his hands on the coveted royal treasure. What is more important from the point of view of his propaganda is the retrieval of highly symbolic artefacts. According to Arrian (3.16.7-8):³⁸

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κατελήφθη αὐτοῦ, ὅσα Ξέρξης ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄγων ἦλθε, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ Ἄρμοδιου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος χαλκαὶ εἰκόνες. [8] καὶ ταύτας Ἀθηναίοις ὀπίσω πέμπει Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ νῦν κεῖνται Ἀθήνησιν ἐν Κεραμεικῷ αἱ εἰκόνες³⁹

He captured there a great deal more, namely the objects which Xerxes took away from Greece, and the bronze statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton among other things. Alexander sent them back to the Athenians and they now stand in Athens in the Cerameicus.

Three years after the start of his campaign, despite the fact that Darius has already been comprehensively defeated, Alexander was still preoccupied with the reception of his panhellenic campaign by the Athenians and wished to win them over. Whereas the three hundred panoplies presented Alexander as the avenger of the goddess Athena, this episode projects him in the role of the protector of Athenian democracy. The statues of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton by Aгенor embodied the end of the Peisistratid tyranny in the minds of many Athenians, and heralded the start of Athenian democracy.⁴⁰ Therefore, Xerxes' 'abduction' of the original tyrannicides' complex was a highly symbolic blow against Athenian democracy. Although the Athenians soon commissioned a new complex (by Critius and Nesiotes), Alexander's gesture reminded them that this remained very much an open wound in Athenian collective memory.

Therefore this is a highly symbolic act in Alexander's propaganda that links the rhetoric of the Persian Wars with the effort to win Athens over. It is another token of revenge against the Persians as his campaign approaches its closure. But if Athens was the primary objective of this act of propaganda, the rest of the Greek world was also meant to watch on.

6. The return of the tyrannicides' statues from Susa looks forward to the last and probably most potent acts of Alexander's panhellenic war of revenge, the sack of Persepolis and the burning of the Royal Palace. Here, too, the connections to Athens are strong. The capital

³⁸ See Bosworth, *Commentary* (n. 23 above) 317, on diverging ancient views regarding the time of the return of the statues to Athens.

³⁹ Cf. Plut. *Alex.* 37-38.

⁴⁰ M. W. Taylor, *The tyrant slayers. The heroic image in fifth-century B.C. Athenian art and politics* (Salem, NH 1991).

of Persia, 'the most hateful of cities in Asia' and the 'wealthiest under the sun',⁴¹ is therefore singled out for the harshest treatment as the seat of Persian barbarism. It is sacked, plundered by the Macedonians, and its palace is burned down (Diod. 17.70.1):

τὴν δὲ Περσέπολιν, μητρόπολιν οὖσαν τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας, ἀπέδειξε τοῖς Μακεδόσι πολεμιωτάτην τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν πόλεων καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἔδωκεν εἰς διαρπαγὴν χωρὶς τῶν βασιλείων.

Alexander declared to the Macedonians that Persepolis, the capital of the Persian kingdom was the most hateful of the cities of Asia, and gave it all over to his soldiers to plunder, except the royal palace.

This certainly leads the war of revenge to a dramatic closure as Alexander and the Macedonians take full revenge for Xerxes' sack of Athens in 480. Yet, in this instance, we are witnessing a striking role-inversion with decadent, corrupt overtones. While the giving over of the city to plunder is attributed to Alexander himself, a *hetaira* from Attica spurred him on to commit one of the most brutal and uncalled-for actions, the burning down of the Persepolis palace. Thais and other women play a key role in order to humiliate the Persians further and magnify the revenge (Diod. 17.72.2-4) for the impieties committed by the Persians in Greece (Athens in particular).

The Persian Wars and the absence of Marathon

It is obvious from the discussion of these episodes that, while Alexander did allude to the Persian Wars in order to sustain the rhetoric of a panhellenic revenge campaign, he only did so in rather vague terms while throwing into relief any Athenian connections wherever possible in order to placate Athens. References to specific battles of the Persian Wars in the Alexander historians were few and far between. It could be argued that their infrequent mention can be attributed to the historians' own interests and the literary tastes of their own age and not necessarily to Alexander's own propaganda. Drawing parallels to well-known historical events served the wider moralizing agenda of Roman historians of the Imperial period. Three key battles, Salamis, Artemisium, and Plataea,⁴² are mentioned in passing, while the role of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians is also stressed in rather general terms.⁴³ Even so, the omissions are quite striking: Thermopylae (see the above discussion of the three hundred panoplies incident) and Mycalē from the key battles of 480/79 (and there was quite a bit Alexander could do rhetorically with regard to Mycalē: see the description of his campaign at 1.18-19), and, of course, Marathon in 490. Neither Thermopylae nor Marathon are left out accidentally.

⁴¹ Almost *verbatim* expression in Curtius Rufus 5.6.1, probably drawing on a common source.

⁴² Salamis: Plut. *Alex.* 34.2 (after the battle of Gaugamela); Arrian 6.11.6; Artemisium and Salamis cited by Arrian, *Cynegeticus* 24.5.1; Plataea: Arrian 1.9.7; Plut. *Alex.* 34.5, 7.

⁴³ *E.g.* Arrian 4.11: Callisthenes' speech in the *proskynesis* debate. He was a key propagandist for Alexander (*qua* official court historian) and his subtle allusions to the victory of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians over the Persians are indicative of the discourse employed by Alexander until that point (328 BC).

Since the slogan of the ‘freedom of the Greeks of Asia Minor’ was part of Alexander’s panhellenic propaganda and Athens’ victory at Marathon in 490 was central in the Greek wars of freedom against the Persians, why did Alexander shy away from referring to this battle? Why was Marathon off-limits for Alexander’s propaganda?

An anecdote dating to the 350s, twenty years before Alexander’s invasion into Persia, is indicative of Athenian public discourse from the 350s to the 320s and demonstrates how loosely past history could be related in fourth-century Athens. Towards the end of the Social War in 357-56, Chares, an Athenian *condottiere* acting in a private capacity, claimed a famous victory against the forces of the Persian King (the Persians under the leadership of Tithraustes).⁴⁴ Despite the fact that his force comprised mercenaries and he was siding with Artabazus, one of the rebel Persian satraps, he was still able to gloat that his victory over the Persians was ‘sister to that of Marathon’ (*Schol.* on *Dem.* 4.19). We do not know, of course, whether Chares’ propaganda was received by his contemporary Athenians with admiration or mirth. What is certain though is that it indicates the flexibility with which the Athenian victory could be reshaped and adapted to suit propaganda, despite the obvious lack of parallels: the only thing that Chares’ victory had in common with Marathon was the fact that an Athenian general was fighting the forces of the Persian King. The absence of Marathon, on the one hand, illustrates the limits of Alexander’s Persian Wars rhetoric while, on the other, it speaks volumes about Athenian propaganda at the time.

It is obvious that from a purely semiotic perspective Marathon was not as suited for panhellenic ‘consumption’ as other victories in the Persian Wars (e.g. Salamis or Plataea). Although the Athenians were joined by Plataeans in the battle, the latter’s assistance was progressively ironed out of fifth- and fourth-century retellings of the story. The perception of Marathon as a solely Athenian exploit was too deeply ingrained in Hellenic consciousness for Alexander to be able to manipulate it rhetorically.⁴⁵ Alexander faced an even bigger obstacle with regard to Marathon. Shortly before 351 his father, Philip, had raided Marathon, captured Athens’ sacred trireme, and thus terrorized the city (*Dem.* 4.34). We do not know whether anti-Macedonians in Athens exploited this parallel to 490 (Philip invaded the very territory where Athens had repelled the Persian invasion) in their anti-barbarian, anti-Philippic rhetoric, but the memory of this incident would have doubtless been too strong a mere two decades later for Alexander to invoke Marathon in his Persian Wars rhetoric.

However, an exploration of the Athenian political scene from the 340s to the 330s may provide further clues as to Alexander’s inability to harness the rhetorical potential of this battle. Since the ascendancy of Macedon to a position of power in the Greek world under Philip II there was a division of opinion in Athens regarding the best anti-Macedonian strategy. This debate gained in intensity, especially after the defeat at Chaeroneia in 338 and later during Alexander’s expedition into Persia.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ On Chares’ role in the battle of Chaeroneia see *Diod.* 16.85.

⁴⁵ See papers by Xanthaki-Karamanou, Markantonatos, Volonaki, and Efstathiou in this volume.

⁴⁶ On the public disagreements between the moderate Phocion, the pro-Macedonian Demades, and the anti-Macedonian Demosthenes and Hyperides see e.g., *Arrian* 1.10.2-6; *Plut.* *Dem.* 22-24 and *Phoc.* 16-17.

Competing Athenian discourses

Athens avoided challenging Alexander militarily but the mood in the city remained generally hostile towards Alexander, and his panhellenic rhetoric was challenged in Athenian public *fora*. Demosthenes is alleged to have predicted that Alexander would be trampled under the hooves of Darius' horses at Issus (Aesch. 3.164), yet he was reluctant to embroil Athens in Agis' revolt. Athenian hostility towards Alexander and Macedon was probably enhanced by a sense of inadequacy or inability to take him on on the field of battle.

A patriotic mood, which was strengthening despite or in response to the repeated setbacks since Chaeroneia, is manifested in three ways:

i) On a very practical level, Athens passed reforms in areas thought to have led to the setbacks of the previous decades. The reform programme was orchestrated by Lycurgus: public finances as well as naval resources improved, while the Athenian military was re-organized and Athenian defences were repaired and strengthened.⁴⁷

ii) Other measures suggest a renewed emphasis on civic, democratic ideology as a response to the outside threat posed by Alexander: Eucrates' anti-tyranny legislation⁴⁸ and the (re)introduction of the cult of Demokratia indicated an apprehension of tyranny and a desire to safeguard the democratic constitution.⁴⁹

iii) Glimpses of Athenian patriotism can also be seen in forensic oratory post-Chaeroneia. Two speeches from 330 are Demosthenes' speech *On the crown* and Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*. In the latter, Lycurgus uses the terms 'liberty of the Greeks', 'courage', 'virtue', and 'the city's glory' as inspirational slogans. A central section in his speech (68-87) is occupied by a reference to the Persian Wars, the Athenian ephebic oath, and the events of mythical times (king Codrus and his sacrifice) in order to highlight the Athenian exploits in the service of Greece, which won the city its position of supremacy in the Greek world. This is proper Athenian panhellenism and Marathon is one of the episodes singled out (Lyc. *Against Leocr.* 104):

τούτων τῶν ἐπῶν ἀκούοντες, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ πρόγονοι ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων ζηλοῦντες οὕτως ἔσχον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὥστ' οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πατρίδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης <τῆς> Ἑλλάδος ὡς κοινῆς ἤθελον ἀποθνήσκειν. οἱ γοῦν [ἐν] Μαραθῶνι παραταξάμενοι τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας στόλον ἐκράτησαν, τοῖς ἰδίοις κινδύνοις κοινὴν ἄδειαν ἅπασι τοῖς Ἑλλησι κτώμενοι ...

These are the epic lines [*Iliad* 15.494], gentlemen, to which your ancestors listened and such are the deeds which they emulated. They thus became so brave as to be willing to die not just for their own country but also for the whole of Greece as their common country. Certainly those who were drawn up in battle against the barbarians at Marathon defeated an army from the whole of Asia and won, at their own peril, security for all Greeks.

⁴⁷ See C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Actium* (Cambridge, MA 1997) 22-30; F. Mitchel, 'Athens in the age of Alexander', *G&R* 12 (1994) 194-202.

⁴⁸ *Agora* 16.73, SEG 12.87.

⁴⁹ *IG* ii² 1496 I.131.

Around the same time, Demosthenes delivered his famous speech *On the crown* (Dem. 18). He explains the failure of his policy and defeat at Chaeroneia by attributing it to the will of the gods. Like Lycurgus, Demosthenes' panhellenic rhetoric is meant to counteract Alexander's propaganda. Athenian cooperation with Thebes was justified. Even the problem of Theban 'medism' in the Persian Wars is overlooked by referring to the myth of the Heraclidae ('Demosthenes' decree': Dem. 18.181-87). The point that Demosthenes tries to drive home is: 'there is no shame in failure when fighting for the freedom of the Greeks'. Thus, the defeat at Chaeroneia is placed in the same line of Athenian military exploits that extended back to Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea (Dem. 18.208):

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετ', ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι, μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους, καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ, καὶ πολλοὺς ἑτέρους τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις μνήμασιν κειμένους ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, οὓς ἅπαντας ὁμοίως ἡ πόλις τῆς αὐτῆς ἀξιώσασα τιμῆς ἔθαπεν, Αἰσχίνη, οὐχὶ τοὺς κατορθώσαντας αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς κρατήσαντας μόνους.

But no way, you cannot have done the wrong thing, men of Athens, when you took upon yourselves the danger for the sake of freedom and salvation for all. I swear it by our ancestors who first took upon themselves the danger at Marathon, who were drawn in battle order at Plataea, who fought in the sea-battles at Salamis and Artemisium, and by all the brave men who are buried in our public tombs. They were buried there by a city who considered them all worthy of the same honour, Aeschines, not just the successful and the victorious.

One could argue that these references to the famous battles of the Persian Wars are simply rhetorical *exempla* reinforcing Demosthenes' arguments as he accounts for his long public career. After all, in the same trial Aeschines, too, had referred to the glorious Athenian victories of old.⁵⁰ I would like to suggest, however, that the references to the Persian Wars in both speeches are more than rhetorical *topoi*. They reflect the prevalent Athenian civic discourse at the time; a discourse that sought to reinforce the Athenian contribution to the freedom of the Greeks and remind the Athenian audience of their position of leadership in the fight against the Persians. The Athenian Persian Wars rhetoric had first made its appearance around the mid-fourth century when the Macedonians started being perceived as the threatening 'barbarians'. It was in this period that a number of forged inscriptions relating to the Persian Wars made their appearance in Athens.⁵¹ This patriotic discourse intensified during Alexander's reign and had a bearing on the new labours in the cause of freedom that Athens was anticipating.

In the mid-320s the clouds of war had started gathering. Rumours of war were already spreading before the proclamation of Alexander's Exiles Decree in 324. Athens was preparing mentally and militarily for a final showdown which ultimately came after

⁵⁰ E.g. Aesch. 3.181, 186 (contrasting Demosthenes and Miltiades).

⁵¹ According to Dem. 19.303, Aeschines had quoted the decrees of Miltiades, Themistocles, and an ephobic oath in a speech to the Athenian Assembly. On forged historical documents see C. Habicht, 'Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege', *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1-35.

Alexander's death in 323. Athens had forfeited the position of leadership in the Greek world and needed a morale-booster in the dark days of the late 330s and 320s. The Persian Wars from Marathon down to Plataea provided that inspiration to carry the torch of Greek liberty as its only genuine defenders. And as it turned out, the Athenian Persian Wars rhetoric outlasted and outlived Alexander's.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON AS A *TOPOS* OF ATHENIAN POLITICAL PRESTIGE IN CLASSICAL TIMES

GEORGIA XANTHAKI-KARAMANOU

My purpose in this paper is to define the common motifs in fifth and fourth-century prose-writers, especially Thucydides, the orators, and Plato, that defined the battle of Marathon as a *topos*, a model for contemporary political decisions.

Topos as a *terminus technicus* in rhetoric denotes a commonplace or recurrent element. In *Rhet.* 2.26, 1403a18 Aristotle clarifies that ‘I regard element and topic as identical, since element (or topic) is a head under which several enthymemes are included’.¹ In *Rhet.* 1.2, 1358a12-14, in the discussion of syllogisms, ‘topics’ are said to be applied alike to law, physics, and politics, while in 2.19 the ‘κοινοὶ τόποι’ are treated under the three heads of a) the possible and impossible, b) fact, past, and future, and c) amplification and depreciation.²

The case of Marathon should be included under the second head, the topic of fact ‘whether such and such a thing has been done or not’. Such a topic is for Aristotle mainly used by orators and suggests arguments to prove the probability of some act³ which the pleader wishes to establish against his opponents.⁴ The battle of Marathon can thus be appropriately used, according to Aristotle, as an example in rhetorical texts and political orations (*Rhet.* 2, 1396a7-14), adding ‘for all derive their encomiums from the fair deeds...’⁵ He also expresses the idea ‘how could we make a panegyric of the Athenians, if we did not have at our disposal... the land battle of Marathon?’ For later generations the victory at Marathon provides an indisputable fact for the political supremacy of Athens over all Hellas. Marathon is cited in texts, both in association with the other battles against Persia, called *ta Mēdika*, and separately and distinctly from them.

Thucydides refers to Marathon to support his historical narrative. In the so-called ‘Archaeology’ (1.18.1), in the framework of the political development of both Sparta and Athens, the battle of Marathon is vaguely dated ‘a few years after the expulsion of the Greek

¹ In *Rhet. ad Alex.* 36 (37).9 στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων seems to mean *topoi*: cf. E. M. Cope and J. E. Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 3 vols, 2nd edn. (Hildesheim and New York 1970) II.232.

² See Cope and Sandys, *Rhetoric* (n.1 above) 178-79, 188, 232.

³ Cope and Sandys, *Rhetoric* (n. 1 above) 188, determine it as the στάσις στοχαστική (‘status conjecturalis’) characterizing the orators.

⁴ This mainly applies to cases especially in Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Lycurgus: see pp. 219-20 below.

⁵ Cope and Sandys, *Rhetoric* (n. 1 above) 226-27.

tyrants by the Spartans'.⁶ The historian uses the landmark of Marathon to move his narrative from Sparta to Athens⁷ and mark the beginning of its military and political rise. The Persian Wars provide the turning point after which the political power and imperial development of both Athens and Sparta were gradually accomplished. The Spartans were powerful by land and the Athenians by sea. The historian clearly determines the victories against the Persians as the starting point of the Pentekotaetia (480-30 BC) and the narrative of the Peloponnesian War which is to come.

Thucydides uses the battle not only for structural purposes, but also for the evaluation of historical events. Therefore, in 1.23.1 he stresses the superiority of the Persian Wars over all earlier military operations, obviously also including the war against Troy.⁸ Nevertheless, he regards them as inferior to the Peloponnesian War.⁹

It is worth noting that Thucydides refers less to the Persian Wars and specifically to Marathon to suggest Athenian political worth than the fourth-century orators. Nevertheless, for Thucydides Marathon and Salamis especially offer a good *paradeigma oikeion* to justify the city's claim to leadership. The passage in 1.73.2 provides the main evidence for Thucydides' approach to Marathon. The historian presents *ta Mēdika* as used here by the political persons involved in this narrative, namely the Athenian embassy at Sparta. Nevertheless, despite the initial disclaimer that 'the repetition of the victories against the Persians is disagreeable',¹⁰ the present passage explicitly illustrates the political ambitions of the Athenians and the justification of their Empire (1.73.1):¹¹ 'we do not hold what we possess unreasonably (*apeikotos*)' and 'we are worthy of the empire we hold'. The culmination of their superiority and their contribution to the common salvation justifying their claim to rule are powerfully expressed in their closing remarks (1.74.4): 'but if we had yielded to the Mede, like the others, out of fear for our territory... the enemy's objectives would have been obtained at leisure'.¹² Thucydides will soon be passing at chapter 89 to the Pentekontaetia and the aftermath of the Persian Wars, clearly demonstrating the significance of the Athenian victory.¹³

⁶ Thucydides implies here Hippias, the son of Peisistratus, and his expulsion by Cleomenes, the King of Sparta, in 510 BC; cf. Thuc. 6.59.4; Hdt. 5.64-65.

⁷ Cf. S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1 (Oxford 1991) 51.

⁸ τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν. ('The Persian War was the greatest achievement of former times.')

⁹ A. W. Gomme, 'The greatest war in Greek history', in *Essays in Greek history and literature* (Oxford 1937) 116-24, defended the Thucydidean view. For this issue see also Hornblower, *Thucydides* (n. 7 above) 62.

¹⁰ Greeks probably were tired of Athenian references to their role in the Persian Wars; in contrast, Athenian audiences apparently never tired of hearing about Marathon and Salamis.

¹¹ For this speech see esp. A. E. Raubitschek, 'The speech of the Athenians at Sparta', in *The speeches of Thucydides*, ed. P. H. Stadter (Chapel Hill 1973) 32-48.

¹² According to Raubitschek's translation of the passage in 'The speech' (n. 11 above) 37.

¹³ Cf. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (n. 7 above) 118, referring to N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens: the funeral orations in the classical city*, trans. A. Sheridan (Cambridge Mass. 1986) 156.

The kernel of the Athenians' speech in this first convention of the Peloponnesian allies at Sparta in 432 is to remind the Spartans and their allies of the power of the Athenian empire, which is not opposed to its wish for peace. Sparta will have to fight against such a city if it takes the wrong decisions.¹⁴

Marathon is used in Thucydides to stress the fact that the Athenians 'fought in the front line alone', 'we, first and alone, dared to fight the Persians at Marathon',¹⁵ without any help from the Spartans.¹⁶ The absence of the Plataeans in this passage has been much discussed. The silence here is underscored by Thucydides' own narrative in 3.55.3 (the speech of the Plataeans against the Thebans) and in 3.63.2 (the speech of the Thebans), where the closeness between Athens and Plataea is clear, and the 'isopolity', the full rights of Athenian citizenship granted to Plataeans, is explicitly recognized.¹⁷ Προκινδυνεύσαι ('run the risk before others'), a synonym of προμάχεσθαι, μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ ('the Athenians alone braved the barbarian for Hellas'), denotes the Athenian claim that the victory at Marathon explicitly points to the bravery and the military power of the city.

In Thucydides' introduction to Pericles' *Funeral speech* (2.34.1) it is said that the dead receive a public tomb (δημόσιον σῆμα) at Kerameikos according to the hereditary law, the custom of their fathers (πάτριος νόμος), except the dead at Marathon, since their bravery (ἀρετή) was thought to be exceptional.¹⁸ Jacoby, however, suggested that 'the burial of the *Marathonomachoi* on the battlefield is not an exception, but the rule' and the special honour conferred on them consisted 'in the cult established at their grave and performed annually through the polemarch who in this battle had still been commander-in-chief of the army'.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Marathon seems to be used here of the dead in the Persian Wars in general, since the fallen at Salamis and Plataea were also buried on the battlefield.²⁰ Interestingly, the emphasis put on the bravery of the fallen warriors, their

¹⁴ πρὸς οἷαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται ('with that kind of city you will fight, if you take wrong decisions') (1.73.3).

¹⁵ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι. ('At Marathon we alone ran the risk before others' 1.73.4).

¹⁶ For the exaggeration involved, see K. R. Walters, "'We fought alone at Marathon': historical falsification in the Attic funeral speech', *RhM* 124 (1981) 204-11. See also Pelling in this volume p. 27. Raubitschek, 'The speech' (n. 11 above) 36-37, noticed that the Spartans turned this argument against the Athenians before the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 8.142.2).

¹⁷ καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβε. The exact date of this privilege is unknown. 'Isopolity' seems to have been granted before the Peloponnesian War, for there is an explicit reference to it in the Theban speech (Thuc. 3.63.2), said of the Plataeans as 'allies and citizens of Athens'. According to Hornblower, *Thucydides* (n. 7 above) 449 (but without any specific evidence), the Plataeans 'had had the citizenship since 519 (or possibly since the Persian Wars or even 431)'. The Plataeans explicitly underline that they, alone of the Boeotians, contributed to the freedom of Hellas (Thuc. 3.54.3). Marathon is not explicitly named here.

¹⁸ ἐκείνων (*sc.* the dead at Marathon) δὲ διαπρεπὴ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ταφὴν ἐποίησαν ('since they considered their virtue exceptional, they buried them on the battlefield', 2.34.5).

¹⁹ F. Jacoby, 'Patrios Nomos', *JHS* 64 (1944) 37-66, esp. 47. Jacoby's arguments are summarized by A. W. Gomme, *A historical commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 2 (Oxford 1956) 94, 102.

²⁰ Gomme, *Historical commentary*' (n. 19 above) 94; Hornblower, *Thucydides* (n. 7 above) 292, for the interpretation especially of the πάτριος νόμος and bibliographical references.

military and political excellence, provides the main criterion for Marathon as an everlasting symbol from the fifth century onwards.

In fourth-century prose the development of the *topos* finds its fullest expression in funeral speeches. The praise of the Athenians' moral and political qualities reaches its climax. The heroization of the ancestors was institutionalized with the era's funeral orations.²¹ This heroizing is especially marked in the extensive treatment of Marathon in Lysias' *Funeral oration* 21-26 (esp. 23), which includes the main elements of the traditional *topos*: the Athenian warriors' ἀρετή is associated with glorious death and immortal fame.²² These brave men, says Lysias, did not fear the multitude of their enemy but, confident in their own ability, did not wait for any allies to help them. On the contrary, they marched few against many (24), responding to the danger so quickly that the same messenger announced to the rest of the Hellenes both the arrival of the barbarians and the victory of the Athenians (26). With respect for their own laws they made the others free and put up a trophy on behalf of Hellas. It is not surprising therefore that their merit is praised by all men even a century after their deeds, Lysias concludes.²³ Lysias implies that the absence of the Spartans from the Battle of Marathon helps the Athenian claim to rule. Athens is depicted as a united community fighting for the freedom of all.

Isocrates in *Panegyricus* 86-87 seems to follow Lysias in depicting Athenian supremacy and ἀρετή.²⁴ The victory at Marathon was not caused by fortune (τύχη) but by the warriors' courage (ἀρετή).²⁵ The motifs are common: the Athenians did not wait for allies but they made the common war their private one. A few against many tens of thousands,²⁶ they fought victoriously against an enemy who despised the whole of Hellas, and they set up a trophy of victory. Interestingly, Isocrates, contrary to other sources, mentions the help of the Lacedaemonians, who in three days and nights covered twelve

²¹ Thus C. Carey, *Aeschines. The oratory of classical Greece* (Austin 2000) 119.

²² Loraux, *Invention* (n. 13 above) 171, aptly observed that valour is a prominent characteristic of the exploits of the funeral oration as an official celebration of Athens.

²³ Loraux, *Invention* (n. 13 above) 157-58, pointed out the exaggerations in numbers and the traditional elements in Lysias' *epitaphios*. She also noticed (162-63 and n. 223) similarities between the democratic Lysias' account of Marathon and that of the oligarch Andocides.

²⁴ For further similarities in the treatments of Lysias and Isocrates see Loraux, *Invention* (n. 13 above) 159.

²⁵ *Paneg.* 91.

²⁶ Herodotus attests the immense Persian forces (6.95), but his numbers cannot safely be used as a basis for calculations, as commentators have noted: e.g. W. W. How and J. Wells, *A commentary on Herodotus*, vol. 2 (Oxford 1912) 100, 103. L. Scott, *Historical commentary on Herodotus Book 6* (Leiden and Boston 2005) 610-11, noted that Datis' 600 triremes or ships is a conventional figure. Cf. Plat. *Mx.* 240a: πέμψαι (Δαρείος) μυριάδας μὲν πενήκοντα ἔν τε πλοίοις καὶ ναυσίν, ναῦς δὲ τριακοσίας ... ('[Darius] dispatched fifty myriads of men in transports and warships, together with three hundred ships of war'; trans. R. G. Bury, *Plato*, Loeb Library vol. IX [Cambridge, Mass. and London 1929] 350). Figures given by later sources seem to be guesstimates. It is plausible to suggest that the actual Persian soldiers numbered 20,000 to 30,000, and outnumbered the Greeks by at least two to one; see Scott 611 and n. 37.

hundred stades in marching order to share the dangers with the Athenians. This was however as far as revisionism could go, but the orator admits that the latter joined battle before the arrival of their allies.²⁷ The explicit reference to the Lacedaemonians aims at proving the rivalry (*ἄμιλλα*) between them and the Athenians for common freedom and safety,²⁸ but also for military and political power in Hellas. However, Isocrates strangely does not mention the Spartans' praise for the Athenians and their actions after they had seen the Medes' dead.²⁹ And in a narrative which is interested only in Athens and Sparta he also omits the presence of the Plataeans.

In Isocrates' treatment of the conventions of panegyric oratory we can clearly see the way in which the anticipated audience shapes the narrative. This speech, aimed at both a Spartan and an Athenian audience, adopts a different perspective on Athenian history from that found in the inwardly focused *epitaphios logos*. This is also visible later in the *Panegyricus* (164-66): Isocrates uses Marathon in the framework of his argument to convince the Athenians to gather troops in Lydia and Ionia in order to prevent the Persian King from organizing his forces. Athens withdrew its support³⁰ from the Ionian Revolt of 500-494 BC, some time before it was finally suppressed. To correct this serious political mistake the Athenians, according to Isocrates, faced courageously the greatest risks at Marathon.³¹ Accordingly, Isocrates suggests that it is better for the Athenians to fight against the King of Persia than to dispute for the empire and leadership.³² In the *Panegyricus* Marathon provides a spur to the Hellenes to face the Persian danger united, especially after the humiliating Peace of Antalkidas, and to revitalize the city's power. Therefore, the leadership, claims Isocrates in 380 BC, belongs to Athens in view of its victories in the Persian Wars and its contribution to the freedom of Hellas.³³

²⁷ The help from Sparta arrived after the victory of the Athenians: Hdt. 6.106, 120; Plat. *Laws* 3.698e, cf. 692d.

²⁸ *Paneg.* 85: Περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ὁμονοοῦντες ... περὶ τούτου ποιούμενοι τὴν ἄμιλλαν ('On the contrary, they were of one mind when the common safety was in question ... and their rivalry with each other was solely to see which of them should bring this about'; trans. G. Norlin, *Isocrates*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1961) 170). S. Usher, *Isocrates. Panegyricus and To Nicocles* (Warminster 1990) 169, notes Isocrates' wish to reveal comparable warlike zeal and also the orator's hope that the *Panegyricus* would be read by Spartans as well as Athenians. M. Nouhaud, *L'utilisation de l'histoire par les orateurs attiques* (Paris 1982) 152, suggests that Isocrates implies a contrast between the Spartans of 490 and those of 387 who concluded the peace of Antalkidas.

²⁹ Hdt. 6.120 and Usher, *Isocrates* (n. 28 above) 169.

³⁰ Of approximately 2000 men: Nouhaud, *L'utilisation* (n. 28 above) 150.

³¹ Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν προεξαμαρτόντες ἅπαντα ταῦτ' ἐπηνωρθώσαντο καταστάντας εἰς τοὺς μεγίστους ἀγῶνας ('[Our fathers], having made this mistake before, completely retrieved it, after engaging in the greatest struggles'; cf. Norlin, *Isocrates* (n. 28 above) 225).

³² *Paneg.* 166: πολὺν δὲ κάλλιον ἐκείνῳ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας πολεμεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀμφοισβητεῖν ('it is much more glorious to fight against the king for his empire than to dispute against each other for the leadership'; cf. Norlin, *Isocrates* (n. 28 above) 227).

³³ The view is also explicitly expressed in *Philippus* 147: ... ἐκ δὲ τῆς Μαραθῶνι μάχης καὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι τὴν αὐτῶν, ἐξέλιπον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλληνῶν σωτηρίας ἅπαντες ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ('because of the battle of Marathon, the naval battle at Salamis, and most of all

Plato in the *Menexenus* (240c-e), following the typical construction and motifs of funeral orations, masterfully depicts the symbol of Marathon based on the Athenians' ἀρετή. Like Isocrates, Plato in Socrates' fictitious funeral speech admits that only the Spartans, despite their late arrival on the day after the battle,³⁴ helped the Athenians. According to this passage of the *Menexenus*,

... οἱ Μαραθῶνι δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν καὶ κολασάμενοι τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ πρῶτοι στήσαντες τρόπαια τῶν βαρβάρων, ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἴη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ ὑπεῖκει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας φημὶ οὐ μόνον τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἡμετέρων πατέρας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ τῶν συμπάντων τῶν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡπείρῳ. εἰς ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τὸ ἔργον ἀποβλέψαντες καὶ τὰς ὑστέρας μάχας ἐτόλμησαν διακινδυνεύειν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας, μαθηταὶ τῶν Μαραθῶνι γενόμενοι.

... the *Marathonomachoi*, chastised all Asia's insolent pride and were the first to raise trophies of victory over the barbarians; they taught the others to know that the Persian power was not invincible, since there is no multitude of men or money but courage conquers it... The defenders of Marathon were not merely the Athenians' physical ancestors but also the founders of their freedom and of the freedom of Hellas as a whole. The example of their exploit fired the Hellenes with courage to risk the later battles in the cause of salvation, learning their lessons from the men of Marathon.³⁵

Socrates' funeral speech focuses on the punishment of Asiatic arrogance and the superiority of courage over the multitude of warriors. He explicitly stressed that Athens proved that the Persians could be defeated, providing an example for his contemporaries to follow. Nevertheless, the reference by both Isocrates and Plato to the presence of Sparta at Marathon seems to reflect the concept of Panhellenism which characterizes their era. On the other hand, the silence of Lysias, Isocrates, and Plato on the contribution of the Plataeans to the victory is likely due to these authors' wish not to alter the praise of the Athenians.³⁶

The flexibility of Marathon as a *topos* is not exhausted by its role in the funeral orations and deliberative speeches. It also becomes a useful element in forensic speeches with a pronounced political dimension. In funeral orations and deliberative speeches the recognition of the Athenians' excellence and courage at Marathon, which decisively contributed to their political power during the Pentekontaetia, is emphatically described. In forensic speeches with political overtones, though the elements constituting the *topos*

because her citizens abandoned their own homes for the salvation of Hellas, our city is praised by all').

³⁴ Plato in *Laws* 3.698e attributes the Spartans' delay to their war with the Messenians.

³⁵ Similarly, in *Laws* 4.707c the importance of the victory at Marathon for the later victories in the Persian Wars is emphasized.

³⁶ Cf. also Nouhaud, *L'utilisation* (n. 28 above) 149.

of the praise of Athens are similar, the orator's purpose is exclusively one: to attack his opponent and reveal his low moral status.

Marathon unsurprisingly figures in Demosthenes' heroic vision of the Athenian tradition. It becomes part of the presentation of the glorious heritage of Athens. The orator refers to Marathon and the other victories against the Persians, particularly Salamis³⁷ and Artemision, especially in his speeches against Aeschines. In his masterful *On the crown* (208) one of the central elements of the *topos*, namely that Athens alone defended Hellas at Marathon securing its freedom and safety, is explicitly expressed as in Thucydides by *προκινδυνεύσαντες* ('who fought in the front')³⁸. The word aptly denotes the Athenian supremacy in courage. The invocation of Marathon, Plataea, Salamis, and Artemision functions in the framework of Demosthenes' oath made to answer convincingly Aeschines' outburst against him for the lives wasted at Chaeronea. As with the funeral oration, we have a heroization of the recent dead by association with the great warriors of Marathon. Demosthenes claims that both in the Persian Wars and at Chaeronea the fallen on the battlefield proved to be brave men (*ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες*), since they risked their lives for the freedom and the sake of the community. A fundamental link exists between the *Marathonomachoi* and those who fought at Chaeronea, since they risked death in pursuit of goals more important than life.³⁹

Accordingly, the reference to Marathon and to the other battles against the Persians is used to support decisively the central argument of this speech that the Athenians were not wrong to take the risk at Chaeronea for the freedom and the safety of all [Hellenes] and were alike worthy of the same honour as the fallen at Marathon. For Demosthenes, the victorious Persian Wars are linked with contemporary military events of unfortunate outcome, but equally marked by bravery. The unsuccessful outcome at Chaeronea was (as Demosthenes repeatedly emphasizes) due to fortune, but the duty of brave men was accomplished. Again, as with the *epitaphios logos*, the continuity of the Athenians' excellence is underscored by the orator,⁴⁰ which contributes a moral dimension to the military action.

The glory of the collective dead is also transmitted on occasion to their leaders. Such brave and noble men (*καλοὶ καγαθοί*) were chosen by the Athenians to lead them, as Demosthenes attests in his speech *Against Aristocrates* (196, 198 = *On organization* 21).

³⁷ Loraux, *Invention* (n. 13 above) 161-62, remarked that in the fifth century 'a whole ideological structure was built around the exaltation of Marathon at the expense of Salamis', due to the work of Kimon and his circle. On the other hand, in the fourth century both Marathon and Salamis seem to be linked by the orators and the two battles are given the same glory. However, this goes beyond the scope of this paper.

³⁸ H. Yunis, *Demosthenes. On the Crown* (Cambridge 2001) 226, compares Lycurg. 109 (= Simon. Epigram 21 Page) and Thuc. 1.73.4, and refers to Loraux, *Invention* (n. 13 above) 155-71. H. Wankel, *Demosthenes Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz* (Heidelberg 1976) 961-62, aptly, following Blass, thinks that *προκινδυνεύσαντας* may equally be a reminiscence of both Thucydides and Simonides' epigram.

³⁹ Yunis, *Demosthenes* (n. 38 above) 224, noted that this concept also exists in funeral orations (Thuc. 2.42.4; Lys. *Epit.* (2) 62; Dem. *Epit.* (60) 1, 28, 31; Hyp. *Epit.* 16; Plat. *Mx.* 246d).

⁴⁰ Cf. Nouhaud, *L'utilisation* (n. 28 above) 148.

Miltiades and Themistocles are the models for leaders of sobriety and merit whose achievements were not on a level with the fourth-century commanders and their services are proved to be far greater than those of contemporary generals. Nevertheless, the honour of the achievements in the Persian Wars does not belong to the leaders but to the city as a whole, since, as Demosthenes says, ‘no one could speak of Miltiades’ battle at Marathon, but of the Athenians’ battle’ (198).

Marathon can also serve as a weapon in prosecution speeches. In a direct and very powerful attack on his opponent, Demosthenes in his speech *On the embassy* (311-13), when asking the Athenians to cast a just and righteous vote against Aeschines, compares the glorious dead at Marathon and Salamis with Aeschines’ disgraceful behaviour. He accuses him of having contradicted his own utterances on these victories as soon as he set foot in Macedonia; he forbade the Athenians to offer help to their friends, recalling the example of their forefathers, because of his bribes from Macedonia. The typical element of the *topos*, especially in funeral orations, namely that praise for remarkable achievements belongs to those who have gloriously died, is repeated by Demosthenes to serve the purposes of his attack against Aeschines. Aeschines, in his turn (*Ctes.* 181), compares Demosthenes negatively with Miltiades and Themistocles and says, ‘does it seem to you that Themistocles was the better man or Demosthenes, who the other day deserted his post? Miltiades, who won the Battle of Marathon, or this man (ἢ οὗτος)?’, namely Demosthenes.

Further on (*Ctes.* 257-59) Aeschines, seeking here to counteract Demosthenes’ appeal to Marathon as the model for Chaeronea, urges the Athenians not to hold the words of Demosthenes as more weighty than their oaths and the laws, saying ‘the dead at Marathon and at Plataea will groan aloud, if the man who has negotiated with the barbarians against the Greeks, the man who has received a bribe and still has the money, now receives a crown’.

Aeschines maintains a directly laudatory tone for the victories against the Persians in his speech *On the embassy* (*De falsa legatione* 75-76), which recalls funeral orations. He urges the Athenians: ‘we must imitate the wisdom of our forefathers, and beware of their mistakes and their unreasonable jealousies. I urge that we should emulate the battles of Marathon and Artemision’. Interestingly, Aeschines mentions distinctly the Athenian victories at Marathon and Artemision to put the emphasis on the excellence of the city. His appeal to *ta Mēdika* helps to retain the audience’s *eunoia*.

Marathon again serves as the basis of attack in Lycurgus (*Leocr.* 108-10), where some of the fundamental elements of the *topos* are included. Lycurgus deals with the symbol of Marathon much more skilfully than Aeschines. The personal attack against Leocrates is masterfully located in the framework of the powerful rhetorical opposition. The orator, quoting Simonides’ epigram (Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες ... δύναντιν), underlines that the Athenians’ courage at Marathon was proved to be superior to the multitude of the Persian forces. Their victory provides explicit evidence of their excellence and has left everlasting glory. Marathon here clearly receives the dimension of a symbol. It is used to oppose the glorious historical event to the disgrace that the traitor Leocrates caused to the city when he abandoned Athens after the battle of Chaeronea. Lycurgus says of Leocrates (110): ‘if the judges save his life, they will give a bad example to the citizens, since they will replace the old glory by shamelessness, treachery, and cowardice (ἀναΐδεια, προδοσία καὶ δειλία)’.

Conclusions

We have seen that the Marathon victory is a recurrent *topos* of Athenian political prestige exemplified in fifth- and fourth-century prose-writers. The victory of Marathon is especially the landmark for Athenian military and political distinction. The main motifs constituting the *topos* are: a) Athens alone, without allies, defended Hellas against the Persians (Thuc. 1.73.2; Dem. *On the crown* 208; Isoc. *Paneg.* 86), and saved the country from the enemy (Plat. *Mx.* 240c-e, *Laws* 4.707c; Isoc. *Paneg.* 91, *Philippus* 147); b) the Athenians fought with remarkably fewer forces against the numerous Persian troops, chastised Asia's insolent pride, and set up a trophy of victory on behalf of Hellas (Lys. *Epit.* 21-28; Isoc. *Paneg.* 86, 164-66; Plat. *Mx.* 240d-241b); c) accordingly, the warriors' postmortem distinction at Marathon (Thuc. 2.34.1) and the praise of their virtue are also basic elements of the *topos*; d) the glory of the victory at Marathon and in the Persian Wars in general is attributed not merely to the leaders but to the city and the Athenians as a whole (Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 198, *On organization* 21); e) the Athenians chosen to lead them were brave and noble personalities, men of sobriety and wisdom (Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 197; Aeschin. *On the embassy* 75-76). We have seen that the elements of the *topos* are deployed in a flexible way to meet the requirements of different contexts. At its most obvious the *topos* serves the glorification of the war dead by association with the great deeds of the ancestors. But it can constitute a major argument for the decisive contribution of Athens to civic freedom and its consequent claim to the leadership of Hellas. It can serve as the justification for policy decisions; f) and in contrast, in certain forensic speeches with political dimensions (Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lycurgus) the comparison with the glorious fighters of Marathon is used to attack the opponent powerfully in court and shed light on his vicious intentions.

Accordingly, all existing sources of the fifth and fourth centuries BC on the supremacy of Athens in the victory of Marathon justify the claim of the city to keep the leadership and its prestige, to be the only power able to protect Hellas, to guarantee the principle of equality before the law (ἰσονομία), and to continue to offer a model of political value.

INTOLERABLE CLOTHES & A TERRIFYING NAME: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ACHAEMENID INVASION FORCE¹

CHRISTOPHER TUPLIN

When the army had been drawn up and the sacrifices turned out favourable, the Athenians were released and charged the barbarians at a run. The distance between the lines was no less than eight stades. When the Persians saw them attacking at a run, they began to prepare to meet them. But their view was that the Athenians were mad to the point of self-destruction, since they saw that they were few in number and were, moreover, coming on at a run with neither cavalry nor archers in support. So that was what the barbarians reckoned. But when the Athenians *en masse* came into contact with the barbarians, they put up a remarkable fight. For they were the first of all Greeks known to us to use a running-attack against the enemy, and the first to endure the sight of Median clothing and of the men wearing it. Until then even to hear the name ‘Mede’ was a cause of fear to Greeks.

Herodotus 6.112 is mostly famous – or infamous – for the statements that the Athenians were the first to do a running attack and that they did so over 8 stades. This is not my chief concern here, but by way of *Priamel* I make four observations. (1) Running is a way of having less time to be frightened by the enemy’s clothing. (2) Contemplation of a passage in Pausanias, *Messenika* (4.8.1), where running into battle is characteristic of the reckless passion of men fighting for freedom and their fatherland against a more numerous enemy and such men are said to be close to mad, suggests some readers thought the Athenians’ behaviour was due to their political situation not, as moderns have it, a desire to get through the arrow barrage as quickly as possible. (3) Marathon is not the only occasion on which Herodotus’ Persians think Greek combat-opponents mad. At Artemisium Xerxes’ soldiers and generals reckon the Greek challenge to battle a sign of madness, and (as at Marathon) the small size of the Greek fleet is implicitly the ground for this judgment (8.10).² (4) No other Persian War battle involved a Greek running attack – but Herodotus’ account of Plataea makes the *Persians* attack *dromōi* (9.59). There are other vaguely contrary

¹ This chapter (which, as a further investigation of the Persian perspective of Marathon, is a companion piece to C. J. Tuplin, ‘The Marathon campaign: in search of the Persian perspective’, in *Marathon: the battle and the ancient deme*, ed. K. Buraselis and K. Meidani [Athens 2010] 251-74) is essentially an annotated version of the paper delivered in Kalamata on 7 October 2010. I am most grateful to the organizers for inviting me to participate in this most enjoyable conference.

² Away from the battlefield Alexander characterizes the Athenian wish to continue fighting as madness (8.140). Slightly differently Mardonius calls Greek resistance *aboulie* (7.9), a term that recurs in Xerxes’ estimate of the Spartans at Thermopylae (7.210).

resonances between 6.112 and the Plataea narrative – the madness of Amompharetus, which made him stand still (9.53-57, esp. 55); repeated Greek shifts of position, as though they *were* afraid to confront the enemy; comments on the clothing, or at least the defensive weaponry, of the Persians (see below); superlatives that are not firsts (Pausanias won the fairest victory of all those we know of [9.64] and got greatest fame of the Greeks of whom we know [9.78]); and explicit allusion to the Athenians' prior experience in 490 (9.27) – and I feel sure Herodotus' introduction of a running attack is quite knowingly done.³ Marathon is rather under-narrated in Herodotus: the economy of his work does privilege 480/79 over 490.⁴ But 6.112 is a compensating explicit marker of the event's status.

But my particular interest is the second part of the final sentence. The Athenians were the 'first of all Greeks known to us' to do a running attack, but they were also 'the first to endure the sight of Median clothing and of the men wearing it.'⁵ Until then even to hear the name 'Mede' was a cause of fear to Greeks'. This was not the first time Greeks had looked upon Persians and their clothing long enough to attempt to fight them,⁶ and certainly not the first time they had looked upon them in other contexts (Greeks cooperated with Persian military forces in Anatolia, Egypt, and Scythia),⁷ so the sentence is really a way of saying that this was the first time Greeks had confronted *and defeated* a Persian army. But, why not say that, instead of talking about clothes and a name? One sort of answer is that, although all of Herodotus' readers doubtless knew who won at Marathon, it would slightly spoil the narrative effect to assert as much in the middle of the story. Herodotus needed an indirect way of putting it. But it is still worth unpicking some of the implications of the indirect approach he chose – and assessing how justified a choice it actually was.

³ For another resonance (46 nations) see below p. 230.

⁴ On this cf. K. Raafaub, 'Herodotus, Marathon and the historian's choice', in *Marathon*, ed. Buraselis and Meidani (n. 1 above) 221-235.

⁵ On the 'known to us' (*tōn hēmeis idmen*) qualification cf. B. Shimron, 'Πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν', *Eranos* 71 (1973) 45-51. In Herodotus the phrase vouches accuracy only back to the mid-sixth century (except in Egypt, where the limit can be the early Saite era). In the present case he is not, I imagine, consciously envisaging that there might have been Greek-Median confrontations before the time of Croesus in which the Greeks displayed a tough-minded response to Median clothing and its wearers. Incidentally, of the eleven passages where Herodotus identifies some person(s) as the first to do something, only three relate to Greeks; the other two are about Arion (who invented the dithyramb: 1.23) and Polycrates who was 'the first known Greek to attempt control of the sea, apart from Minos and any others there may have been before him...' (3.122) – a lame passage (he was the first to do it apart from those who had done it before!), caused by the tension between the normal limitation of 'first/best of those whom we know' statements to the relatively recent past and the apparent impossibility of ignoring the case of Minos.

⁶ E.g. Hdt. 1.169, 5.2, 102, 110-114, 120, 6.29. (L. Scott, *Historical commentary on Herodotus Book 6* [Leiden 2005] at 6.112, wants to put aside Ephesus [5.102] on the grounds that the enemy there might be 'territorials' and not sartorially noteworthy, because, implicitly, not really Persian; in Appendix 3, however, he seems to take an at least partially different view.) On the other hand there is no explicit sign that Greek allies/subjects fought alongside the Lydians against Cyrus at Pterie or Sardis.

⁷ Hdt. 1.171, 3.1, 4.89, etc.

Median name

Fear of a name is not, I think, a common trope;⁸ and the usage of ‘Mede’ in Greek confirms that there is something special about the word, since it is persistently used where ‘Persian’ would be expected. In a discussion published over 15 years ago I concluded that there was a strong tendency for this to occur when the focus is ‘on the empire as an alien, faceless military and political threat’.⁹ What lies behind this is the fact that the first Persian conquest of Greeks was perceived as the work of the Medes; and what lies behind *that* fact is the historical contiguity of Lydian and Median spheres of power in central Anatolia: when a conqueror from beyond the Halys captured Sardis and subjugated Ionia it was natural to call him a Mede – especially as his principal generals *were* Medes.

I still stand by this argument, but there are two problems, one for the substance of the argument, and one for the role 6.112 plays in it.¹⁰

The substantial problem is an Egyptian one. My position in 1994 was that Greek use of ‘Mede’ for ‘Persian’ was not properly paralleled in other western parts of the Achaemenid Empire and that there could therefore be an uncomplicatedly Anatolian explanation of the phenomena. It now seems to me that, in the light of material to hand (which exceeds what was available in 1994), one must at least leave open the possibility that ‘Mede’ was used for ‘Persian’ in pre-Hellenistic Egypt, especially in contexts that were remote from official ones and were concerned with the Persian threat to the country.¹¹ How is one to square this with my Greco-Anatolian explanation of the frightening associations of the Median name in Greek contexts?

⁸ The implicit interplay of name and substance appears, of course, in other rhetorical constructions: cf., e.g., *Od.* 4.710; Demetr. Phal. 228 F39 = Polyb. 29.31 (where utter annihilation means that ‘even the name’ has disappeared).

⁹ C. J. Tuplin, ‘Persians as Medes’, in *Achaemenid History*, ed. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. T. Kuhrt VIII (Leiden 1994) 235–66, at 249.

¹⁰ Another small correction: in 1994 I repeated Hinz’s claim that ‘Median’ was applied to various objects in the pre-Achaemenid Susa Acropole texts. This view cannot now be sustained. See W. Henkelman, ‘Persians, Medes and Elamites: acculturation in the neo-Elamite period’, in *Continuity of empire (?): Assyria, Media, Persia*, ed. G. B. Lanfranchi *et al.* (Padua 2003) 181–232, at 200–11, esp. 202–05.

¹¹ For some details see the *Appendix* below. The topic is not easy and, in the Hellenistic use of ‘Persian’ and ‘Mede’ to describe people who show no sign of being either, throws up real peculiarities. For recent comment, see G. Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut in ägyptischer Überlieferung’, in *Das Ägyptische und die Sprachen Vorderasiens, Nordafrikas und der Ägäis*, ed. T. Schneider (Münster 2004) 129–82, at 140f. Those wishing to grapple with the Hellenistic problems may turn to J. Oates, ‘The status designation Πέρσης τῆς ἐπιγονῆς’, *YCS* 18 (1963) 1–129; C. A. Lada, ‘Ethnicity, occupation and tax-status in Ptolemaic Egypt’, in *Acta Demotica* (Pisa 1994) 183–189, and ‘Who were ‘those of the *Epigone*’?’, in *Akten des 21. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses*, ed. B. Kramer *et al.* I (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1997) 563–69; K. Vondorp, ‘Persian soldiers and Persians of the *epigone*’, *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* 54 (2008) 87–107, as well as brief remarks in W. Clarysse and D. Thompson, *Counting the people in Hellenistic Egypt* (Cambridge 2006).

The ultimate historical starting point for Medes becoming an object of terror to anyone was their role alongside the Babylonians in the destruction the Assyrian empire.¹² These were developments of direct interest to Egyptians; one direct consequence was the Egyptian attempt to occupy the Levant that was thwarted at Carcemish in 605¹³ and followed by Babylonian acquisition of the region. We can reasonably assume that from this era the Egyptians saw the geopolitical space to their north and east as defined by Babylonians and Medes. They should also have been aware that the erstwhile allies did not remain friends. From the Babylonian point of view land to the east and the north was a potential cause of trouble; Nabonidus represents Harran as vulnerable to the Medes in the mid-sixth century and Jewish prophets cast the Medes as a threat to Babylon.¹⁴ Meanwhile, there was active military confrontation between Lydians and Medes in Anatolia in the early sixth century (Hdt. 1.74). In short, the Medes, though distant, must have been part of the Egyptian world-picture. So, what did they make of it when Lydia and then Babylon succumbed to a conqueror from Iran? Babylonians knew who they were dealing with, as did Jews: neither group confused a historical Median threat to Babylon with the actual Persian (or Anshanite) conquest of the latter. Were Egyptians so precise? And what about Lydia? Croesus made an alliance with the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis (Hdt. 1.77). Did a Lydian perspective on the eastern conqueror influence Egyptian reactions to events in western Anatolia and southern Mesopotamia either side of 540 BC – events that actually represented an even greater geopolitical derangement than those that had occurred in northern Mesopotamia 70 years earlier? I suggest that it is possible that Egyptians were inclined to categorize this new upheaval in terms that had been appropriate throughout much of the intervening period – and that, under Anatolian and even Greek influence (for Egypt was full of Anatolian and Greek mercenaries), they continued to see things thus when their turn came in 526.¹⁵

My second problem brings us back to Herodotus 6.112. In 1994 I took the *persistence* of the use of ‘Mede’ for ‘Persian’ in contexts of threat to reflect a special aura of fear or horror surrounding the original conquest, a view for which 6.112 plainly seems to offer support. But is everything straightforward here?

¹² See ABC no. 3 (where the Medes are called ‘Ummanmanda’: on which see below). Much important discussion of the historical setting of these events is to be found in *Continuity of empire* (?), ed. Lanfranchi *et al.* (n. 10 above).

¹³ See ABC no. 5.

¹⁴ Harran: S. Langdon, *Die neubabylonische Königsinschriften* (Leipzig 1912) no.1 = P. A. Beaulieu, *The reign of Nabonidus, King of Babylon 556-539 BC* (New Haven 1989) no.15. Jewish prophets: *Jeremiah* 25.25, 51.28; *Isaiah* 13.18, 21.2. For hostile Medes *cf.* also Beaulieu no.13, GCCI 2.395 = E. Ebeling, *Neubabylonische Briefe* (Munich 1949) no. 255.

¹⁵ The Inaros Epic, whose setting is the neo-Assyrian era, has references to Media: there is a king of Media, and Inaros attacks fortresses called (it seems) Elvend and Hagmatana = Ecbatana. *Cf.* K. Ryholt, ‘The Assyrian invasion of Egypt in Egyptian literary tradition’, in *Assyria and beyond: studies presented to M. T. Larsen*, ed. J. G. Dercksen (Leiden 2004) 484-511, at 493; Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ (n. 11 above) 143, 147-48. Unfortunately one cannot be sure that this tells us anything about Saite views of the outside world, since there are certainly some Achaemenid era elements in the text of the Epic as it is now known to us.

On the one hand, there is certainly an element of demonization of Medes in Near Eastern texts. Isaiah 13.18 spoke of the 'bow-bearing Medes who care nothing for gold and silver, only slaughter of young men and unborn children', while many texts in Akkadian describe the Medes as Ummanmanda, an old term for fearsome eastern mountain-dwellers whose original meaning is perhaps 'human? perhaps' – with a decided implication that they are not.¹⁶

Did this attitude percolate through to Anatolians? I make two observations.

(1) The Medes were not the first easterners to disturb the peace of western Anatolia. That honour goes to the Cimmerians. Direct evidence about them is slight, but they evidently left a significant mark upon the collective historical memory: location of Cimmerians at the entrance to Hades in *Odyssey* XI is surely a sign of this. They are also visible in Near Eastern sources, and one such source describes Dugdamme (Lygdamis) as a 'mountain king, an arrogant Gutian and the seed of *halgate*'.¹⁷ The seed of *halgate* are the Ummanmanda of the Cuthaeen legend of Naram-Sin, so seventh-century Cimmerians were seen by Assyrians in terms similar to those used by Babylonians of sixth-century Medes. Moreover Lanfranchi has argued that, since the Ummanmanda of the Cuthaeen Legend were bird-monsters appropriate to a Mesopotamian underworld, the Homeric location of the Cimmerians shows that Mesopotamian reactions to Cimmerians were transmitted to western Anatolia.¹⁸ If so, then might the negative stereotyping of Medes also have been transmitted at a later date?

(2) The Herodotean image of Cyrus' Iranians as the tough scions of a rugged land who know nothing of luxury (9.122) is in contrast to normal Greek perceptions of the Persians and may even, under a classical Greek veneer, distantly echo Mesopotamian views of men from the Zagros. Eventually a view of history emerged in which Medes were as luxury-loving as the Persians were reckoned to have become (a view reflected in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*),¹⁹ but this need not be what 'Mede' originally evoked – and one could say that, in terms of spectacular nastiness, the Thyestean feast served by Astyages to Harpagus (Hdt. 1.119) out-trumps the most horrible of Achaemenid behaviour. There is a remnant here too, perhaps, of a sense of Medes as demonic transgressors.

And yet there is a problem. The capture of Sardis must have been shocking, and supposedly involved much slaughter (Hdt. 1.80), even if Croesus was not then burned to

¹⁶ M. Liverani, 'Uomini, forse', *Vicino Oriente* 7 (1988) 253-55. The bad associations of mountains in the (lowland) Mesopotamian mind are illustrated by the way that in the Assyrian investiture ritual the battle against chaos is figured as 'going into the mountains'. Cf. D. Bonatz, 'Ninurtas Gaben: Assyrische Kriegsdeologie und ihre Bilder', in *Krieg, Gesellschaft, Institutionen: Beiträge zu einer vergleichenden Kriegsgeschichte*, ed. B. Meissner et al. (Berlin 2005) 61-88, at 81.

¹⁷ Ishtar Temple inscription: R. C. Thompson and M. Mallowan, 'BM excavations at Nineveh 1931-2', *LAAA* 20 (1933) 74-186, at 80-113; A. Fuchs, 'Die Inschrift vom Ištar-Tempel', in R. Borger, *Beiträge zur Inschriftenwerk Assurbanipals* (Wiesbaden 1996) 258-96, 264-96.

¹⁸ G. Lanfranchi, 'The Cimmerians at the entrance of the netherworld. Filtration of Assyrian cultural and ideological elements into archaic Greece', *Atti e memorie dell'Accademia Galileiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti. Parte III: Memorie della Classe di Scienze Morali, Lettere ed Arti* 114 (2002) 75-112.

¹⁹ Cf. also Clearchus 49 Wehrli = Athen. 514D on Median *truphē*.

death.²⁰ The relentlessly successful sieges of Greek cities frightened even islanders into surrendering to the non-naval Persians;²¹ and Harpagus made lower Asia *anastatos* – a quite powerfully negative idea in Herodotean terms.²² But one cannot say that the Herodotean narrative of these things exactly luxuriates in the trauma of conquest. And the same is true down to 490, when Greeks were allegedly still afraid just of the name ‘Mede’. For example, the results of defeat for rebel Ionians were death, deportation, castration, and the burning of sanctuaries, but Herodotus does not dwell upon the details or colour his narrative here or elsewhere to evoke the image of an enemy from hell.²³ It was quite reasonable to be afraid at Marathon: the Persians’ few unsuccessful land-battles had been against non-Greeks and Marathon would be the first time victorious Greeks were left in control of a battlefield full of dead Persians. But the starkness of the claim at the end of 6.112 may nonetheless be thought to come as something of a surprise.

²⁰ For doubts about Croesus’ survival cf. S. West, ‘Croesus’ second reprieve and other tales of the Persian court’, *CQ* 53 (2003) 416-37. The shocking improbability of the event is reflected in the stratagem stories associated with it (Ctes. 688 F9[4] and 9b-c; Polyaen. 7.6.10; Front. 3.8.3) and in the idea that it was succeeded by the deliberate transformation of Lydians into effeminate non-fighters (Hdt. 1.155; Just. 1.7.11; Polyaen. 7.6.4). Note also the threatened reprisal killing of non-combatants in Polyaen. 7.6.3. On the vexed question of the date of Sardis’ capture note the recent contribution of N. Kokkinos, ‘Re-dating the fall of Sardis’, *SCI* 28 (2009) 1-25, which tries to prove that at least part of the Greek chronographic tradition actually assigned it to 542/41 or 541/40.

²¹ Another example of people surrendering at the spectacle of their neighbour’s conquest: Hdt. 3.13 (Libya).

²² Surrender: Hdt. 1.169. *Anastatos* is associated with *hubris* and *oligoriē* in 1.106, with *anomiē* in 1.97, with the devastating effect of the King’s Dinner in 7.118, with Xerxes-Zeus leading all mankind against Greece in 7.56, with complete depopulation of Ionia in 9.106, and with reduction to slavery in 1.115.

²³ Hdt. 6.18, 19, 25, 32, 33. There is undeveloped talk of slaughter in other cases (3.147 (Samos), 5.102 (Ephesus)). The punning association of Persians with destruction (*persein*) in Aesch. *Pers.* 65, 99, 101f., 857f., 865 postdates the events of 480-79. In non-Greek sources Cyrus’ victory at Opis involved slaughter of the defeated Babylonians (ABC no. 7 iii 14; A. Kuhrt, *The Persian empire: a corpus of sources from the Achaemenid period* (London 2007) 51), and some of the battles of 522/21 occasioned a substantial death toll (the notes in Kuhrt, *Persian empire* 154-57 are a convenient place to find the relevant information; otherwise see E. N. von Voigtlander, *The Bisitun inscription of Darius the Great: Babylonian version* (London 1978) or F. Malbran-Labat, *La version akkadienne de l’inscription trilingue de Darius à Behistun* (Paris 1994), and J. Greenfield and B. Porten, *The Bisitun inscription of Darius the Great: Aramaic version* (London 1982) or TADAE III C2.1, on the evidence of the Aramaic and Akkadian versions of the Behistun narrative). But notice that, although there were exemplarily unpleasant executions of particularly guilty ‘rebels’ against Darius’ authority (as many as 3000 victims are postulated at Babylon in Hdt. 3.159), neither here nor elsewhere in Greek or non-Greek sources is there much sign that Persians engaged in the extensive and indiscriminate post-victory battlefield *Grausamkeit* we encounter in Assyria (cf. F. de Backer, ‘Cruelty and military refinements’, *Res Antiquae* 5 (2009) 13-50): they sometimes counted corpses and captives but did not habitually mutilate them. It is much less obvious that Greeks perceived across-the-board brutality as a distinctive feature of Persian military methods than one might expect. Even the mutilation of Leonidas’ body (Hdt. 7.238) was seen as unusual.

Median clothes

I shall leave that thought hanging for the moment, and move to the issue of clothing.

First, what *is* ‘Median dress’? If ‘Median’ is a proper ethnic term, the term designates whatever was properly and distinctively the dress of ethnic Medes. But, even if it is merely a word to describe menacing Persians, the fact that Herodotus has told us in 1.135 that Persians adopted Median dress invites the same conclusion. And that conclusion must be that the dress is the tunic-and-trousers outfit worn by most Iranians and some courtiers on the Apadana frieze and by all Persian soldiers in Greek representations, both visual and verbal.²⁴

Are there any *other* relevant clothes that might have been seen at Marathon?

Persian iconography offers a form of Persian infantry not dressed in tunic and trousers, most famously represented by the Susa archers. It is easy to regard the long robes of such figures as parade-dress, but robed infantry appear in combat situations (and wielding spears) on a number of seals and in one of the Tatarlı wall paintings.²⁵ Most of these (some twenty items) are crown-wearing royal figures and may have a symbolic quality; but the seal repertoire of combat scenes does contain six examples of non-royal robed infantry as against ten of non-royal trousered infantry,²⁶ and that may be enough to give one pause about

²⁴ It is slightly disconcerting that in 1.135 Herodotus says Persians adopted this Median dress because they thought it *kalliō* – ‘more beautiful’, ‘finer’? – but he is not there focusing on its military associations (the comment in that passage about warfare is that the Persians have taken to wearing Egyptian *thorēkes*) and we must remember that colour, design, and even appliqué ornament might make some versions of the costume sartorially quite handsome.

²⁵ L. Summerer, ‘Picturing Persian victory: the painted battle scene on the Munich wood [sic]’, *ACCS* 13 (2007) 1-30, and ‘Imaging a tomb chamber: the iconographic programme of the Tatarlı wall paintings’, in *Ancient Greece and ancient Iran: cross-cultural encounters*, ed. S. M. R. Darbandi and A. Zournatzi (Athens 2009) 265-300; L. Summerer and A. von Kienlin, ed., *Tatarlı: Renklerin Dönüşü = Tatarlı: the return of the colours* (Istanbul 2010).

²⁶ Non-royal robed infantry in combat: PFUTS 273 (figure [a]); L. J. Delaporte, *Catalogue des cylindres orientaux et des cachets assyro-babyloniens, perses et syro-cappadociens de la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris 1910) no. 403; O. M. Dalton, *The Oxus treasure* (London 1964) no. 114 = J. Curtis and N. Tallis, *Forgotten empire: the world of ancient Persia* (London 2005) no. 413; H. H. von der Osten, *Ancient oriental seals in the collection of Mr Edward T. Newell* (Chicago 1934) no. 453; D. Kaptan, ‘Clay tags from Seyitömer Höyük in Phrygia’, in *The world of Achaemenid Persia*, ed. J. Curtis and S. J. Simpson (London 2010) 361-368, at 365-67 (SHS 3) (left-hand figure). Non-royal robed infantry in prisoner-parade + combat: E. Porada, *Corpus of Near Eastern seals in North American collections I* (Washington 1948) no. 833 = W. H. Ward, *Seal cylinders of western Asia* (Washington 1910) no. 1033. Non-royal trouser-wearing infantry in combat: PFUTS 273 (figure [b]); J. Boardman, *Persia and the west* (London 2000) fig. 5.21 (the ‘Arshama seal’); W. Henkelman, C. E. Jones, and M. W. Stolper, ‘Clay tags with Achaemenid seal impressions in the Dutch Institute of the Near East (NINO) and elsewhere’, *ARTA* 2004.001 (2004) no. 7; Curtis and Tallis, *Forgotten empire* no. 423 (ANE 89333); P. H. Merrillees, *Catalogue of western Asiatic seals in the BM: VI pre-Achaemenid and Achaemenid periods* (London 2005) 43 n. 9 (Rabenou seal); Boardman, *Persia and the west* pl. 5.7 = P. Bordreuil, *Catalogue des sceaux ouest-sémitiques inscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale, du Musée du Louvre et du Musée Biblique de Bible et Terre Sainte* (Paris 1985) no. 106, Kaptan, ‘Clay tags’ 365-67 (SHS 3) (right-hand figure); PTS 29; D. Kaptan, *The Daskyleion bullae: seal images from the western Achaemenid empire* (Leiden 2002) no. DS 64. Non-royal trouser-wearing infantry in prisoner-parade + combat: E. Porada, ‘Achaemenid art

simply denying that Susa archers were ever used in battle. But the virtually total absence of any pertinent Near Eastern parallel for fighters wearing such encumbering dress,²⁷ the possibility that *all* seal-images are prone to symbolism, and the single-mindedness with which Greek sources envisage nothing but trouser-wearers²⁸ in the end leave one doubting that the Susa archer was much in evidence at Marathon.

What about non-Persian clothing? Who else was in the Persian army? Later sources speak of 500,000 or 600,000 troops or of an army of many myriads drawn from all of Asia;²⁹ for a ship-borne force this is excessive fantasy even by Greek standards.³⁰ Herodotus' narrative avoids numbers (save for a historically useless 600 ships),³¹ but he has the Athenians at Plataea speak of fighting 46 nations at Marathon (9.27); and 46 is the number of peoples providing infantry units (with or without cavalry) in the Xerxes army list (7.61-83).³² Herodotus has done some arithmetic to construct rhetoric for his Athenian speakers – which exemplifies the resonances between the Marathon and Plataea narratives (already noted), but is perfectly useless for the historian.

The narrative locates Persians, Sacae, and some Greeks in the Marathon army. One of the commanders is described as a Mede, but Sekunda's inference that Medes predominated

monumental and miniature', in *Highlights of Persian art*, ed. R. Ettinghausen and E. Yarshater (Boulder 1979) 83, 86, fig. 45 (the Foroughi cylinder). A number of uncertain items include: PTS 28 (robed but not clear whether royal), PTS 30 (non-royal but garment below waist uncertain), PFUTS 251 (archer's dress unclear). In PFUTS 2286 we have an archer in 'Assyrian garment' – which effectively means he is being treated like the 'hero' figure in many other images not involving human combat.

²⁷ This is easily seen by contemplating the illustrations in N. Stillman and N. Tallis, *Armies of the ancient Near East, 3000-539 BC: organisation, tactics, dress and equipment* (Devizes 1984). Figures with calf- or ankle-length robes are almost invariably kings, commanders, charioteers, bodyguards in ceremonial garb, or non-combatants. The only apparent exceptions are items 98 and 106, both (it happens) from Syria.

²⁸ C. J. Tuplin, 'Treacherous hearts and upright tiaras: on the head-gear of Persian kings', in *Persian responses: political and cultural interactions (with)in the Achaemenid empire*, ed. C. J. Tuplin (Swansea 2007) 67-97.

²⁹ 500,000: Lys. 2.21; Plat. *Mx.* 240a. 600,000: Just. 2.9.9. Many myriads from all of Asia: Isoc. 4.82, 86. Many myriads: Lys. 2.20; Plat. *Leg.* 698c. Xen. *An.* 3.2.11 contrasts the *pamplēthei stolōi* of Marathon with the *anarithmēton stration* of Xerxes. For the numbers see also Rhodes in this volume, p. 8-9.

³⁰ The only contexts for which these or other sources postulate comparable (actually higher) figures are Darius' invasion of Scythia, Xerxes' invasion of Greece, Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa, and Darius III at Issus and Gaugamela.

³¹ Too much of a stereotype to admit of any calculations or indeed to admit of any thought that Herodotus thought it had a bearing. When he compares Xerxes' invasion army with other armies in 7.20 they are the armies used by Darius against Scythia, the Scythians against Western Asia, the Greeks against Troy, and (more obscurely) the Mysians and Teucrians when invading the Balkans as far as Peneius. At this point, anyway, he is not in the business of associating Marathon and 480/79.

³² That excludes cavalry-only Sagartians and ship-only providing maritime states.

in the rank-and-file is not obviously compelling.³³ There are unclarities about the status and origin of the Greeks,³⁴ but nothing suggests that Herodotus thought they played any role in the battle. The presence of Sacae is *not* necessarily a sign that the army was a composite entity drawn from many parts of the empire, since there is arguably a sense in which they are core imperial troops. Saka are among the few groups fully retained by Mardonius in 480/79 (Hdt. 8.113); they appear with Persians and Medes as on-ship marines in Xerxes' war-fleet (7.96); and both Ctesias and Xenophon (in *Cyropaedia*) provide indirect evidence of their importance to the military establishment.³⁵ Nor in general should we rush to think of Persian armies as heavily multi-ethnic composites, at least if we mean composites including significant numbers of non-Iranians. The historical record provides evidence on about 450 military events in the course of Achaemenid history. In all this material there are only four Persian armies for which we have descriptions that itemize significant numbers of ethnic contingents,³⁶ and there are only five further (largely) unitemized assertions of multi-ethnicity or all-parts-of-empire origin.³⁷ The evidence of such cases plus a few other

³³ N. Sekunda, *Marathon, 490 BC: the first Persian invasion of Greece* (Oxford 2002) 25. Sekunda's suggestion is that Datis "the Mede" was not really an ethnic Mede but simply satrap of Media, and that his army was largely drawn from his satrapy. The first step in this argument is of uncertain force, and the second begs many questions about the procedures for Persian army-mobilization.

³⁴ The Ionians and Aeolians appear suddenly in 6.98 (as Datis leaves Delos); they are not said to be naval but, in view of the later revelation that a Parian trireme joined the Persians (6.132), that may seem the natural assumption. The narrative does say that Datis took *stratiē* (and hostage children) from the islands he visited between Delos and Carystus (6.99). Since in 7.122-23 getting *stratiē* from various North Aegean places is verbally distinguished from getting ships and in 5.30 Aristagoras has *pollēn stratiēn kai pollas neas*, the view could be taken that Datis was levying troops for use on land rather than getting more ships. But one might hesitate to push the linguistic point – and Paros probably gave its trireme precisely during Datis' post-Delos voyage around the islands (he evidently did not go Delos-Carystus by the straightest route). In any case, there is no sign in Herodotus of Ionians and Aeolians doing anything – for that we have to wait until the *Suda* (s.v. *khōris hippeis*).

³⁵ Ctesias has Cyrus taking the Sacan king Amorges as *sunergos* on the campaign against Sardis (688 F9[4]); later he participates in the war against the Derbices and, in his death-bed dispositions, Cyrus makes him a *philos* to both his sons. Xenophon's treatment of Medes, Armenians, Cadusians, Sacae, and Hyrcanians in *Cyropaedia* might be a hint at what he believed about the identity of real core troops (alongside Persians). We should not just assume that they provided cavalry. But Sekunda's identification (in *Marathon, 490 BC* [n. 33 above]) of the solidly cuirassed horseman on W. Raeck, *Zum Barbarenbild in der Kunst Athens im 6. und 5. Jhdt. vor Christ* (Bonn 1981) no. 578 = Faina 65 (a vase that certainly could, for date, be a reflection of Marathon) as a Saka *might* be right. (He also found a Saka in Raeck no. 604 = MMA 1980.11.21 (ex-Basseggio) – this was also claimed for Marathon by D. Williams, 'A cup by the Antiphon Painter and the battle of Marathon', in *Studien zur Mythologie und Vasenmalerei: Konrad Schauenburg zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. E. Bohr and W. Martini [Mainz 1986] 75-81, but the 470 date means there is no particular reason to go for that.)

³⁶ Xerxes' invasion force (7.61-100) and, by (much smaller) extension, Mardonius in 479 (8.113); Autophradates (Nep. *Dat.* 8); Issus (Arr. 2.8; Curt.3.9.1-6); Gaugamela (Arr. 3.11; Curt. 4.12.5-14).

³⁷ Cunaxa (Xen. *An.* 1.8-9; Diod. 14.22); Cyrus against Croesus (Hdt. 1.76); Cambyses 526 (Hdt. 3.1) – cf. Udjahorresnet (G. Posener, *La première domination perse en Égypte* (Cairo 1936) no.1; Kuhrt, *The Persian empire* (n. 23 above) 117-22, at 118[c]: Cambyses came with the army of all

instances of military activity by ethnically-defined units³⁸ and the absence of any suggestion of generalized demilitarization of subject-peoples is probably enough to establish that Persian campaigns *could* draw on non-Iranian troops. A tablet from Sippar (CT 57.82) noting a payment of silver for ‘Šamaš-iddin and his horsemen who have come back from Egypt’ in the fourth year of Darius (518/17) provides welcome independent evidence that such troops might participate in a foreign venture – for we have reason to believe Darius *did* go to Egypt in his fourth year. But it is a real question how much this sort of thing happened. Just as Greek neglect of Susa archers argues *they* were comparatively rare in the real world of military practice, so visual reactions to the Persian invasions in general suggest that it was not variegation but an overwhelming uniformity of Iranian character that impressed. One exception, perhaps, is the appearance of black figures;³⁹ and Herodotus 9.32 does place Ethiopians among Mardonius’ 479 forces. But the black figures are in quasi-Persian dress and never part of combat scenes; they are peripheral and Persified, which tends to confirm that Greek viewers were blind to the presence of significant numbers of distinctively non-Iranian troops. The stress on multi-ethnic diversity characteristic of Herodotus’ Army and Tribute List and (in almost entirely non-military mode) of the Achaemenid king’s own representations of imperial subjects at Persepolis and Naqš-e Rostam is not a reliable guide to actual battlefield practice.

The Marathon army came from the heartland: the situation resembles Mardonius in 492 or the second force sent against Inaros (Diod. 11.75), but differs from the campaign against Cyrene/Barca, the Naxos expedition, the land-forces deployed against the Ionian Revolt, the force of Mazaeus and Belesys fighting Tennes in the 340s, and the Granicus army, all of which represent use of satrapy-based forces certainly or possibly including non-Iranians.⁴⁰ If the Marathon army contained anything that would not look Iranian, it might precisely be Mesopotamian – the only significant source of non-Iranian troops lying between Iran and Cilicia (where the army took ship).⁴¹ And, remarkably, an Assyrian-style helmet was part of the Marathon booty.

foreign lands); Darius’ abortive mobilization after 490 (Hdt. 7.1); Diod. 11.71 (first anti-Inaros army).

³⁸ E.g. the Lydians, Phrygians, and Paphlagonians in Cyrus’ army in 401 (Diod. 14.22.5); Egyptian troops at Elephantine (cf. TADAE I A4.5, A4.7, A4.8, A6.2).

³⁹ Cf. Raeck *Zum Barbarenbild in der Kunst Athens* (n. 35 above) nos. 392, 393.

⁴⁰ Naxos (Hdt. 5.32): there are Persians and ‘other (? non-Greek) allies’. Cyrene/Barca (4.167): all the army of Egypt – which might include Egyptians presumably. Ionian revolt: one of the dead is a Lydian, Myrsus, son of Gyges (5.121). Mazaeus and Belesys v. Tennes (Diod. 16.42). Granicus: Paphlagonians (Diod. 17.19). In some high-profile cases it is hard to know what the situation was: Orontes and Tiribazus in Cyprus (Diod. 15.2); Pharnabazus and Iphicrates in Egypt (Diod. 15.41); Artybius in Cyprus (represented as containing ‘Persians’ and ‘others’, Hdt. 5.110).

⁴¹ This is, of course, assuming that the idea of troops being ‘sent-down’ and the Cilician meeting point preclude Anatolian troops going east to join it. In 343 Artaxerxes’ land-army for the invasion of Egypt, apart from Greek contributions, assembled in Babylon; yet we know Ariarathes’ brother (from Cappadocia) was in Egypt (Diod. 31.19.3), as was the satrap of Lydia/Ionia (Diod. 16.47). But a royal army for an invasion of Egypt may be a different matter.

The upshot is that fighting Datis' army at Marathon probably *was* primarily a matter of fighting men in 'Median clothing' – the men in 'bags' who epitomize the enemy in Aristophanes' *Wasps* (1087). So, what reactions should this clothing have provoked?

Normal associations of Persian clothing were with luxury or effeminacy (Plutarch's version of Marathon includes rich clothing in the booty recovered after the battle, Alexander historians contrasted the golden Persian army with the plain Macedonians, a trope that is already found in the *Annals* of Sennacherib,⁴² and Simonides or 'Simonides' spoke of the defeat of the *khrusophoroi Mēdoi*)⁴³ or military inefficiency. Within the pages of Herodotus the reference to *Mēdikos esthēs* resonates with several other passages: Aristagoras encourages Spartans and Athenians with the inadequacy of Persian troops who fight with bows and short spears (5.49) and do not use shields or *doru* (5.97); at Thermopylae the Spartans provoke Xerxes' ill-placed derision by exercising naked and combing their hair (while their arms and armour lie on the ground beside them), and the Persians are later at a disadvantage in battle because of their shorter spears (7.211); and at Plataea (9.62-3), Greek hoplites fight with inevitable success against the 'unarmed' (*anhoplos*) Persians.⁴⁴ Aristagoras may at the time be cast to some degree as an unreliable witness – but his view is actually validated later, so it turns out that putative Greek inability to look upon Median clothing was rather misplaced. This may make the Athenians' achievement in overcoming what was actually an irrational fear seem less splendid. But it also means that Herodotus may be claiming to provide evidence for a state of affairs that existed before 490 but did not exist by the time he was writing the *Histories* – a time when the barbaric and alien costume of the Iranians seemed scary, not absurd, self-indulgent, or inefficient.

Is there any other way we can get a handle on early reactions to Median clothing?

Herodotus incorporates something other than the later stereotype in Sandanis' good advice to Croesus not to fight men in trousers who know nothing of luxury (1.71). The combination of the Lydians' own reputation for both luxury and military excellence with their actual defeat by Cyrus certainly cast Median clothing here as a marker of startling military prowess. Nor was it only Lydians who displayed sartorial opulence: Ionian Greeks (under Lydian influence) affected dress which Cleidemus (323 F13) would in due course describe as recalling that of Persians, Syrians, and Carthaginians; and even Athenians of the Marathon generation were later seen as having followed this Ionian manner.⁴⁵ Of course, playing with stereotypes like this is somewhat remote from the battlefield, but at any rate it

⁴² ARAB 2.253-254. Sennacherib has coat of mail, helmet, bow, javelin. The Elamite king's general and nobles wear a golden girdle dagger, and have heavy rings of gold on their hands (wrists) 'like fat steers who have hobbles on them'. Later Sennacherib records that he took away their rings and golden daggers (as well as, e.g., cutting off their testicles).

⁴³ Plutarch: *Arist.* 5, cf. 16. Alexander: Curt. 3.3.26, cf., e.g., 3.2.12, 10.9, 11.20; Diod. 17.35; Plut. *Alex.* 20, 24; Just. 11.13.11. Simonides: 21 Page = 90 Bergk = 88 Diehl, cf. Diod. 10.34.12.

⁴⁴ The sort of comment Herodotus makes about the superiority of Greek to Persian weapons is actually rather unusual in Greek sources, according to F. E. Rey, 'Technological determinism and ancient warfare', in *New perspectives on ancient warfare*, ed. G. Fagan and M. Trundle (Leiden 2010) 21-56, at 25; compare Polybius on the Celtic sword or Asclepiodotus on the Macedonian shield.

⁴⁵ Thuc. 1.6; Ar. *Vesp.* 1333. Cf. Markantonatos in this volume pp. 69-77.

does seem that Median dress need not always have been thought somehow effete or inadequate.

Nor did the earliest visual reflections of the Persian Wars obviously seek so to present it: pre-460 depictions of Greco-Persian fighting do not demonize the Persians,⁴⁶ but they do not really demean them either, even if they *are* keen to show them as thoroughly defeated.⁴⁷ Things only changed later (certainly by the time Herodotus was putatively reading his *Histories* to Athenian audiences), as painters started to domesticate and even parody Persian figures. But is there any handle we can get by going to pre-490 images? There are two possible categories of pre-490 Persian images in Attic ceramic art.

First, there are figures at symposia wearing what one naturally sees as Persian head-dress.⁴⁸ The date range is variously stated, but they certainly began before 500. Explanations vary: either some Athenians did wear a foreign hat when drinking (and drinking perhaps from quasi-Persian vessels), this being merely a matter of upper-class fashion; or the hat symbolized the symposiarch. Either way, we seem to have a late-archaic version of that domestication of Median dress which is also found in the mid-fifth century. It is not the same species of domestication (though it may have more reality) and it only stretches to hat-wearing, but it is striking nonetheless. How frightened of a category of dress can one be if one is prepared to wear part of it at a party? For British readers that question may evoke Prince Harry's 2005 appearance at a party wearing German desert uniform and a swastika arm-band – but that is a case which, *mutatis mutandis*, makes my point.

More numerous, and less easy to handle, are the many images of what have conventionally been called Scythians encountered from 570-470, but especially 530-490 and even more especially 520-500. In these latter periods the repertoire is dominated by scenes

⁴⁶ There is no special 'iconography of force' for these scenes. Fights with Persians are simply a special type of the hoplite combat, represent only a modest proportion of the totality of depictions of violence, and fit in with the general trends in the character of such depictions: S. Muth, *Gewalt im Bild: Das Phänomen der medialen Gewalt in Athen des 6. und 5. Jahrhunderts* (New York 2008) 240, 254, 265, etc.

⁴⁷ The face-frontal warrior on Raek, *Zum Barbarenbild in der Kunst Athens* (n. 35 above) no.552 = Basel BS 480, might be an example: so Muth, *Gewalt im Bild* (n. 46 above) 261-63; but contrast M. C. Miller, 'Imaging Persians in the age of Herodotus', in *Herodotus and the Persian empire*, ed. R. Rollinger *et al.* (Wiesbaden 2011) 123-57, for whom the figure's posture makes him weak, not terrifying. On Attic ceramic representations of Persians see A. Bovon, 'La représentation des guerriers perses et la notion de barbare dans la première moitié du cinquième siècle', *BCH* 87 (1963) 579-602; T. Hölscher, *Griechische Historienbilder des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v.C.* (Würzburg 1973); S. Muth, *Gewalt im Bild*; Miller, 'Imaging Persians', and *Representing and misrepresenting: imag(in)ing Persians in ancient Athens* (in preparation). Away from the pot-painter's art, the Persian soldier sketched on an ostrakon cast against Callias (S. Brenne, "'Portraits" auf Ostraka', *AM* 107 [1992] 161-85, at 173f., fig. 7 and pl. 39.4) is, if anything, languidly elegant rather than threatening.

⁴⁸ On this material see M. C. Miller, 'Foreigners at the Greek symposium', in *Dining in a classical context*, ed. W. J. Slater (Ann Arbor 1991) 59-81; B. Cohen, 'Ethnic identity in democratic Athens and the visual vocabulary of male costume', in *Ancient perceptions of Greek ethnicity*, ed. I. Malkin (Harvard 2001) 235-74; A. I. Ivantchik, "'Scythian archers" in archaic Attic vases: problems of interpretation', *ACCS* 12 (2006) 197-271.

associating ‘Scythian’ archers with Greek hoplites, and doing so co-operatively not confrontationally. A recent very thorough treatment by Askold Ivantchik argues that:

- the crucial thing about the so-called Scythian archer is that he is an archer and of lower status; nothing in iconography or nomenclature makes him specifically Scythian;
- his dress is the dress appropriate to an archer, and the stimulus for ascribing such dress to archers was Medo-Persian, not Scythian – or, put another way, Anatolian not North Pontic. The great majority of items belong well after the arrival of Cyrus in western Asia Minor; the few earlier items (3% of the corpus, the earliest *c.* 570) reflect intermittent Lydo-Median clashes;
- the appearance of such archers on Attic vases is not due to there being actual oriental archers based in Athens but is simply an exercise in symbolic iconographic *alterité*.⁴⁹

This last claim is not easy, and many may prefer to believe there *were* at least some ‘orientally’-dressed archers in sixth-century Athens. Peter Krentz has presumed as much recently,⁵⁰ when arguing that a special example of the hoplite-plus-Scythian genre in which the archer carries a spear, not a bow, represents hoplites and archers running into battle at Marathon. For him those wearing oriental archer dress would actually be Athenians – a possibility also, I think, implicit in symbolic interpretations of hoplite-archer scenes, which presumably imagine the archers to be put in oriental costume for iconographic purposes, when in reality they were clad in some other fashion.

Either way, Ivantchik’s claim that the archer-dress is Medo-Persian makes Herodotus’ idea of *Mēdikos esthēs* being hard to look at without fear begin to seem rather awkward. If the images are primarily symbolic, they at least enshrine a notion of superiority – hoplite over oriental archer – that actually prefigures post-Persian Wars clichés and hardly seems consistent with fear of oriental garb as such. If, on the other hand, the images reveal that Athenians actually dressed thus, and did so for military purposes (not simply to go to parties), the inconsistency becomes even more pronounced. The jury is perhaps out on Ivantchik’s claims.⁵¹ But even if he is wrong we should perhaps conclude that the ‘Scythian’ vases were always something of a problem for 6.112: by any reckoning they show that a version of what is meant by Median dress was already well embedded in Athenian consciousness – and with demeaning associations. And, if he is right, it poses a big difficulty.

⁴⁹ Ivantchik, “‘Scythian archers’” (n. 48 above).

⁵⁰ P. Krentz, ‘A cup by Douris and the battle of Marathon’, in *New perspectives on ancient warfare*, ed. G. Fagan and M. Trundle (Leiden 2010) 183-205.

⁵¹ I note incidentally, though I am not sure how they should fit into the discussion, occasional Spartan and Corinthian archers from the seventh and sixth centuries with pointed hats of potentially Scythian aspect. Cf. A. J. B. Wace, ‘The lead figurines’, in *The sanctuary of Artemis Orthia*, ed. R. M. Dawkins (London 1929) 249-84, 262, 269, 276; H. van Wees, *Greek warfare: myths and realities* (London 2004) 171 fig. 18.

Conclusion

Discussion of the Median name revealed a certain tension between inferences from a lexical phenomenon and the absence of any upfront, consistent, and demonizing narrative about the arrival of Iranian military power in the Greek world. One could resolve that either by saying that post-Persian Wars accounts chose to play it cool (that it is not the classical manner to luxuriate in brutality and nastiness) – this would be, as one might say, a historiographical explanation – or perhaps by claiming that the lexical phenomenon is more about the Medes as *alien* invaders than necessarily as a source of fear. But the latter approach would take a lot of the sting out of the headline claim that even the name caused fear.

Discussion of Median clothing turns out also to produce a tension – and one that cannot perhaps so easily be resolved by saying we are comparing realities of 490 and before with narratives from a later date. One might try another approach and say that Athenians found it possible to distinguish the Median dress about which they had been psychologically robust for some time from the Median dress worn by people actually trying to do them harm: Herodotus does, after all, say ‘Median clothing *and the people wearing it*’.⁵² But that is perhaps just another way of saying that the headline reference to the clothing is misleading.⁵³

I have no doubt that the Athenians at Marathon (and the Plataeans – let us not forget them) were decently afraid; the enemy was more numerous and no one could think of a precedent for Greek success in any comparable situation – for there *was* no precedent, though we might also say that there had not been many comparable situations: it is hard to know, for example, how many of the sieges of Greek cities were preceded by unsuccessful field-battles. It is understandable that Herodotus wanted to mark the watershed that Marathon certainly represented. But we may have to conclude that he overdid it just a little – an extra and distinctive small contribution by a foreigner to the *alazoneia* that, for Theopompus (115 F153), characterized the Athenian representation of Marathon.

⁵² The idea would be that the symbolic icon (characteristically imagined in isolated and controlled contexts) had become so commonplace that it was possible to (re)discover fear when massed ranks of hostile wearers of the clothing actually appeared on Attic soil intent on causing harm. The general interplay of similarity and difference in Attic ceramic iconography between archaic ‘Scythian’ and post-490 ‘Persian’ clothing (consistent both with Ivantchik’s view and the more conventional reading) does show that the garb of the Persian attackers was viewed in its own right, not just seen as a continuation of an existing Medo-Persian model (to take Ivantchik’s view) or constructed artificially as a variant on ‘Scythian’ clothing (to take the conventional view). What Athenians thought about ‘foreign archer’ costume was re-evaluated visually, so may also have been re-evaluated ideologically. But the extent of continuity, even in a sharply ideological context, is shown by the Persian figure on the Callias ostrakon (*cf.* n. 47 above).

⁵³ Other allusions to the fearful appearance of Persian armies focus on physical appearance or size (Curt. 4.13.5, 7.4.6; Just. 11.13). Diodorus’ description of the Persians at Mycale as *diaskeuasmēnoi kataplēktikōs* (11.36.3) is of uncertain precise reference; the Ephoran original was presumably more specific – and *might* even have had Hdt. 6.112 in mind.

Appendix

Most references to Medes in Egyptian texts actually come from post-Achaemenid era texts. One can distinguish the following categories: historical references in pseudo-prophetic texts and elsewhere to the Persian era as involving ‘Medes’;⁵⁴ references to individuals who because of their fiscal standing are labelled variously (in demotic) as ‘Medes’⁵⁵ or ‘Medes born in Egypt’⁵⁶ or (in Greek) ‘Mede of the *epigonē*’;⁵⁷ references to ‘soldiers’ that *apparently* use the demotic word for Mede to mean ‘soldier’;⁵⁸ and a couple of items from the Inaros Epic cycle that are hard to classify in the absence of full publication – though in one case we have a narrative about Persians and Medes, so the latter term is presumably actually being used in something like a literal sense.⁵⁹ Other examples of ‘Persians’ in post-Alexander texts include a substantial number of individuals labelled in Greek as *Persai* or *Persai tēs epigonēs* (a tax-category again), as well an allusion to the theft of religious objects by Persians during the Achaemenid era⁶⁰ and an individual called Pyrrhias who is

⁵⁴ Pseudo-prophetic texts. Demotic Chronicle: W. Spiegelberg, *Die sogenannte Demotische Chronik des pap.215 der Bibliothèque Nationale zu Paris* (Berlin 1914); *P.Vindobon.* 10,000: K.-Th. Zauzich, ‘Das Lamm des Bokchoris’, in *Festschrift zum 100-jährigen Bestehen der Papyrussammlung der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek. Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer (P.Rainer Cent.)* (Vienna 1983) 165-74; BM 10661: C. A. R. Andrews, ‘Unpublished demotic papyri in the British Museum’, in *Acta Demotica* (Pisa 1993) 29-37. Other historic (or ‘historic’) items. Raphia decree: H.-J. Thissen, *Studien zum Raphiadekret* (Meisenheim am Glan 1966); cf. Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ (n. 11 above) 141, 156: ‘Medes’ steal religious objects from Egypt. Elephantine graffito: E. Lüdekkens, ‘Das demotische Graffito vom Tempel der Satet auf Elephantine’, *MDAI(K)* 27 (1971) 203-06; U. Kaplony-Heckel, ‘Zum demotischen Baugruben-graffito vom Satis-Tempel auf Elephantine’, *MDAI(K)* 43 (1987) 155-69; E. Bresciani, ‘Ancora sull’iscrizione demotica di Elephantine’, *EVO* 26 (2003) 33-39: the arrival of ‘Medes’ in Egypt (variously taken to refer to Artaxerxes III and Antiochus IV; cf. Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ 157). H.-J. Thissen, ‘Demotische Graffiti des Paneions im Wadi Hammamat’, *Enchoria* 9 (1979) 63-92, at 63-64 (Nr.1): a stonemason who ‘inspiziert von der Zeit vor dem Pharao Nechtharmis, den Medern und den Griechen ohne das Min einen Vorwurf gegen ihn finden liess’.

⁵⁵ Budapest E 56.58 I x+5 (unpublished: Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ (n. 11 above) 156); *P.Count.* 2.458, 506, 48.4, 53.3, 54.17 (Clarysse and Thompson, *Counting the people in Hellenistic Egypt* [n. 11 above]); O.IFAO Edfu 1001 (I BC) = D. Devauchelle, ‘Lettre de réclamation à Edfou’, *BIFAO* 89 (1989) 81-88; *P.Lille* 98 verso IV 4 = F. de Cenival, ‘Deux papyrus inédits de Lille, avec une révision de P.dem.Lille 31’, *Enchoria* 7 (1977) 1-49, at 18-21.

⁵⁶ *P.Dem.Lille* 1: H. Sottas, *Papyrus démotiques de Lille I* (Paris 1921); 35+44, 43: F. de Cenival, *Cautionnements démotiques du début de l’époque ptolémaïque (P.dém.Lille 34-98)* (Paris 1973).

⁵⁷ *P.Tebt.* 815 fr.2 R iii 53-54.

⁵⁸ *P.Krall* XIX 16, 18: Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ (n. 11 above) 142-43; *Temple d’Edfou* VI 214-215 (Chassinat); perhaps the Chahap Stele (Berlin 2118; cf. D. J. Thompson, *Memphis under the Ptolemies* [Princeton 1988] 91f.).

⁵⁹ Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ (n. 11 above) 135, 143, 147. On the Inaros Epic see already above p. 226 n. 15.

⁶⁰ Canopus decree = OGIS 56 (A 3: B12; (hieroglyph) C 6). Compare n. 54 above for the same activity ascribed to ‘Medes’.

described in demotic as a Persian man: the date is early (287 BC), which may apparently tell against this being a tax-category usage.⁶¹

Apart from the retrospective references to the Achaemenid era foreign rulers as Medes, much of this material is hard to handle. There is still no clear explanation of why ‘Persian’ or ‘Mede’ defines a tax-category or why ‘Mede’ can come to mean ‘soldier’: it is at least possible that the two phenomena are not unconnected, though some have maintained that there had always been a native demotic word for ‘soldier’ that just happened to look like the word for ‘Mede’.⁶² It is notable that ‘Mede’ is *very* much rarer than ‘Persian’ in the tax-category group and is associated with people with Egyptian names. By contrast the normal demotic equivalent of *Persēs tēs epigonēs* is a phrase meaning ‘Greek born in Egypt’ – which coheres with the fact that most of the people described as *Persai tēs epigonēs* have Greek names (as does the one person described, in Greek, as *Mēdos tēs epigonēs*).⁶³ There seems to be a sort of pattern here, but whether it helps to validate the conclusion that ‘Mede’ was, historically, a standard Egyptian word for ‘Persian’ remains a moot point.

If we look to the period before Alexander, the picture is mixed. The term ‘Persian’ is used of Persian officials in several of the hieroglyphic texts in Posener 1936 (nos. 24-31, 33-34), of a Persian weight-standard (TADAE I A6.2) and a type of sandal in Elephantine papyri (TADAE II B3.8), and in a highly fragmentary narrative from Saqqara which may also mention the fourth-century pharaoh Tachos and was conceivably dealing with his failed invasion of the Levant at the end of the 360s.⁶⁴ On the other hand, we have two texts that *can* be taken to refer to individuals of specifically Median nationality (though one, from the reign of Achoris, may be rather uncertain),⁶⁵ a Saqqara papyrus listing quantities of cereal for Carians, Arabs, men of Peqer, men of Daphne, and Medes (which again *may* be using the term strictly),⁶⁶ another Saqqara papyrus (fifth century, but extremely fragmentary) mentioning an army commander, pharaoh, and Medes,⁶⁷ and a fourth-century letter from Elephantine containing the phrase ‘if the Medes do not kill us’.⁶⁸

This letter admits of some further comment. It is a lengthy missive from one Osoroeris, complaining that he has been ousted as the representative of a *lesonis*-priest as a result of intrigues and expatiating on the question of how many loaves of bread should be made from an *artabe* of emmer; and the remark about the Medes is part of something Osoroeris’ addressee had written to him previously: ‘If the Medes do not kill us, you will discover the shamefulfulness of this behaviour by the priests (*lit.* ‘things of the priests’).’ The letter as a

⁶¹ *P.Cairo* JE 68567: cf. D. Devauchelle, ‘Un perse dans l’Égypte ptolémaïque’, *RdE* 39 (1988) 208.

⁶² Cf. J. Tavernier, *Iranica in the Achaemenid period* (Leuven 2007) 73.

⁶³ *P.Tebt.* 815 fr.2 R iii 53-54.

⁶⁴ *P.Saqq.* I 22.5. Cf. H. S. Smith and W. J. Tait, *Saqqara demotic papyri* (London 1983).

⁶⁵ *P.Cairo* 50099. Cf. Vittmann, ‘Iranische Sprachgut’ (n. 11 above) 155; TADAE II B3.6.

⁶⁶ Saqqara S.71/2 DP-31 = H. S. Smith and C. Martin, ‘Demotic papyri from the sacred animal necropolis of North Saqqara certainly or possibly of Achaemenid date’, in *Organisation des pouvoirs et contacts culturels dans les pays de l’empire achéménide*, ed. P. Briant and M. Chauveau (Paris 2010) 23-78, no. 18.

⁶⁷ Saqqara S.H5-490 = Smith and Martin, ‘Demotic papyri’ (n. 66 above) no.5.

⁶⁸ *P.Berlin* 13633 rev. 11. Cf. K.-Th. Zauzich, *Papyri von der Insel Elephantine* III (Berlin 1993).

whole and the element relating to the Medes are thus both firmly embedded in the real and contemporary world, even if Osoroeris' take on that real world may (for all we can tell) have elements of paranoia in it. Moreover, the letter is dated 26 Mechir in the eighteenth year of an unnamed king. It is highly tempting to identify the king as Nectanebo I or II, giving dates of 16 May 363 or 11 May 343. At both dates conflict with Persia was a live issue, and the possibility of death in Egypt at 'Median' hands may seem particularly fitting to the second date which, on conventional views, is precisely the time of Artaxerxes III's reconquest of the country.⁶⁹ Of course, other less high-profile locations are theoretically possible; if palaeography does not preclude it (and on that I have no clear information), we could look to the eighteenth year of Darius I (504), Xerxes (468), Artaxerxes I (447), or Darius II (406) and postulate some otherwise unknown internal trouble in Egypt or specifically in the Elephantine region – and the last of these dates is actually close to the era at which Egypt broke free from Persian rule for over six decades, so it could even be local trouble with larger ramifications. But, the important thing for now is that it would be straining plausibility to claim that 'Medes' in this letter simply refers to people who are ethnic Medes as distinct from other sorts of Iranian: Osoroeris' correspondent was clearly using the term to designate the foreign power that ruled or threatened his country.

There is one final item to mention, not from Egypt but with an Egyptian connection – an inscription from Southern Arabia in which some traders commemorate a commercial journey to 'Egypt, Transeuphratene and Assyria' during which they had escaped safely from the dangers occasioned by a 'revolt between the Medes and the Egyptians', a phrase variously taken to refer to the rebellion of 404 or the reconquest of 343.⁷⁰ The text is Arabian, but the terminology might reflect Egyptian usage.

Abbreviations

- ABC A. K. Grayson, *Assyrian and Babylonian chronicles* (Locust Valley, NY 1975).
 ARAB D. D. Luckenbill, *Ancient records of Assyria and Babylonia I-II* (Chicago 1927).
 GCCI R. P. Dougherty, *Goucher College cuneiform inscriptions* (New Haven 1933).
 OGIS W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graecae inscriptiones selectae* (Leipzig 1903-05).
 PFUTS siglum for seals on uninscribed Persepolis Fortification Uninscribed Tablets: the seals are currently largely unpublished.
 TADAE B. Porten and A. Yardeni, *Textbook of Aramaic documents from Ancient Egypt I-IV* (Jerusalem 1986-99).
P.Tebt. B. P. Grenfell *et al.*, *The Tebtunis papyri* (London 1902-76).
 PTS siglum for Persepolis Treasury seals: for publication see E. F. Schmidt, *Persepolis II* (Chicago 1957).
 RES *Répertoire d' épigraphie sémitique* (Paris 1900-50).

⁶⁹ In the late 360s, by contrast, the Egyptians were carrying out an invasion of Persian imperial space (the Levant), so fear of death in Elephantine would be presuming a successful Persian counter-invasion – something which, as it happens, did not occur.

⁷⁰ RES 3022. See A. Lemaire, 'La fin de la première période perse en Égypte et la chronologie judéenne', *Trans* 9 (1995) 51-61, at 51f.; G. Vittmann, *Ägypten und die Fremden im ersten vorchristlichen Jahrhundert* (Mainz 2003) 186.

MARATHON IN THE GREEK CULTURE OF THE SECOND CENTURY AD

EWEN BOWIE

The great battles of the early fifth-century Persian Wars were remembered and discussed in many different contexts by the Greek *πεπαιδευμένοι* of the Roman empire. Doubtless some could say more about them than others, and according to Dio of Prusa there were those who held that Salamis was fought later than Plataea.¹ But whether one was a man from mainland Greece or western Asia Minor, a man from Tarsus or Naucratis or the Roman province Syria, or even not quite a man from Arelate in the Rhone valley, like Favorinus, the names Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, and sometimes the names Artemisium, Thermopylae, Mycale, and Eurymedon, could be used to decorate one's discourse and flaunt one's philhellenism.

Part of my purpose in this paper is to give an idea of the range of contexts in which such name-dropping might occur. But I also suggest that by the 150s AD we find Marathon cited much more often, proportionately, than in earlier years, and that this pre-eminence may be due to the most influential citizen of the Attic deme Marathon in the period, L. Vibullius Hipparchus Ti. Claudius Atticus Herodes – simply Herodes to his friends and pupils. It may of course be doubted whether we have enough evidence to do a poll of the relative popularity of Persian War battles in the first and second centuries AD: often particular reasons can be found in the literary context for the mention of one battle rather than another. So my idea that Marathon became the leader of the pack from around AD 150 may be a mirage. But the interest of Herodes Atticus, with which I shall conclude, is hard to deny.

First, some pre-history: in the later first century BC, we can see a relatively even-handed treatment, as befits a historian, in the account of Diodorus of Agyrrhium in Sicily: Marathon ends his Book 10, then Artemisium, Thermopylae, Salamis, Plataea, Mycale, and Eurymedon are narrated in his Book 11. Later in the same century Dionysius of Halicarnassus' only primary citation mentions all four Athenian battles, Marathon, Artemisium, Salamis, and Plataea, this in his discussion of whether *λόγοι ἐπιτάφιοι* can be traced earlier in Greece or in Rome.² Dionysius' omission of Thermopylae is simply because Athenians were not involved.

With Strabo of Amaseia's *Geography* we come nearer to a work that might give us a glimpse of a plain but hard-thinking man's priorities. Marathon gets only one mention: listing Attic demes as one sails up the north-east coast of Attica, Strabo notes Marathon as the place 'where Miltiades utterly destroyed the forces with Datis the Persian without

¹ D. Chr. Or. 11 (*Trojan*).145.

² *Ant. Rom.* 5.17.4.

waiting for the Spartans, who were late because of the full moon'.³ By contrast Salamis gets two mentions – later in book 9, where the temple of Aphrodite Koliai is noted as the place the wrecked ships of the Persian fleet washed up, and earlier in book 8 when Strabo notes that Aegina contested with Athens the prize for fighting at Salamis.⁴ Plataea also gets two mentions, first a general statement about war damage in 479 BC,⁵ then a more detailed statement (Strabo 9.2.31):

ἐνταῦθα Μαρδόνιον καὶ τὰς τριάκοντα μυριάδας Περσῶν αἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων δυνάμεις ἄρδην ἠφάνισαν· ἰδρύσαντό τε ἐλευθερίου Διὸς ἱερὸν καὶ ἀγῶνα γυμνικὸν στεφανίτην ἀπέδειξαν, Ἐλευθέρια προσαγορεύσαντες· ταφή τε δέικνται δημοσία τῶν τελευτησάντων ἐν τῇ μάχῃ.

Here the Greek forces utterly annihilated Mardonius and his 300,000 Persians; and they established a sanctuary of Zeus Eleutherios and declared a stephanitic athletic competition, calling it the Eleutheria. And there is displayed the public tomb of those who died in the battle.

This is more than Strabo tells us about Marathon, where we know from other sources, but not from Strabo, that Athenian ephebes brought ritual offerings.

Finally in Strabo Thermopylae merits three mentions. The importance of geographical knowledge is illustrated by the treachery of Ephialtes;⁶ the elegiac couplet on one of the five inscribed στήλαι by the πολυάνδριον at Thermopylae is quoted for the status of Opous;⁷ and finally Strabo contrives to introduce the story of Leonidas' Spartans combing their hair into a digression about men wearing women's clothes and giving attention to their hairstyle.⁸ Strabo does not mention the battles at Artemisium or Eurymedon, and of Mycale he says only that the mountain is εὐθρον καὶ εὐδενδρον, 'well-forested and good for hunting'.⁹

The next decades are not ones for which surviving and dated Greek texts are numerous. But courtesy of the *Garland of Philip* we have some relevant poems from Lollius Bassus, active perhaps around AD 19, and Tullius Geminus, *consul suffectus* in AD 46 and *legatus Augusti* of Moesia in the early 50s. Of Lollius Bassus' dozen poems in the *Garland of Philip* two handle Thermopylae,¹⁰ while from Tullius Geminus we have an

³ Str. 9.1.22: ὅπου Μιλτιάδης τὰς μετὰ Δάτιος τοῦ Πέρσου δυνάμεις ἄρδην διέφθειρεν οὐ περιμείνας ὑστερίζοντας Λακεδαιμονίους διὰ τὴν πανσέληνον.

⁴ 8.6.16, 9.1.21.

⁵ 9.2.5.

⁶ 1.1.1.

⁷ 9.4.2.

⁸ 10.3.8.

⁹ 14.1.12.

¹⁰ Lollius Bassus G-P 2 = AP 7.243 and (also showing knowledge of the Spartan battle in the Thyreatis c. 545 BC [cf. Paus. 2.38.5]) G-P 7 = AP 9.279. For the Hellenism of the surviving epigrams from the *Garland of Philip* see E. L. Bowie, 'Luxury cruisers? Philip's epigrammatists between Greece and Rome', *Aevum Antiquum* 8 (2008) [2010] 223-59.

epitaph for Themistocles in which he is the speaker and names Hellas, Persians, Xerxes, and Salamis as well as himself,¹¹ and a poem ostensibly for a monument to the battle of Chaeronea which into *its* speech packs Cecrops, Philip, Marathon, Salamis, Macedonia, and Demosthenes.¹²

This even-handedness between Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis also emerges in two utterances by characters in Chariton's *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, a work known by the early 60s AD.¹³ First play is made by Callirhoe, seeing off the eunuch Artaxates, with Chaereas' city Syracuse having defeated Athens, the victor of Marathon and Salamis (Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 6.7.10):

Χαιρέας εὐγενής ἐστι, πόλεως πρῶτος ἦν οὐκ ἐνίκησαν οὐδὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ ἐν
Μαραθῶνι καὶ Σαλαμῖνι νικήσαντες τὸν μέγαν σου βασιλέα.

Chaereas is of noble birth, the first citizen in a city which was not even defeated by the Athenians, who defeated your Great King at Marathon and Salamis.

Later, when Chaereas himself gathers precisely 300 Greeks to storm Tyre, he underlines the numerical allusion to Thermopylae for any slow-witted reader (Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 7.3.9):

καὶ γὰρ δυνατὴν εὐρήσομεν καὶ ῥαδίαν, δόξη μᾶλλον ἢ πείρα δύσκολον. Ἕλληνες
ἐν Θερμοπύλαις τοσοῦτοι Ξέρξην ὑπέστησαν. Τύριοι δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ πεντακόσιαι
μυριάδες.

For we shall find it to be possible and easy, more difficult in expectation than in experience. This was the number of Greeks who resisted Xerxes at Thermopylae – but the Tyrians do not number five million.

Dio and Plutarch

The decades from the 60s AD to the early second century are much richer, being those during which Dio of Prusa and Plutarch of Chaeronea composed.

In *Oration* 73 (*de fide*), tackling the subject of the Athenians' harsh treatment of Themistocles, Miltiades, and Cimon despite their achievements fighting Athens' enemies, Dio succeeds in referring unambiguously to the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Eurymedon without using these toponyms.¹⁴ In *Oration* 56 (*Agamemnon*) he sets out Sparta's comparable ill-treatment of Pausanias, again without naming Plataea.¹⁵ In a more playful mood, in his *Oration* 11 (*Trojan*), Dio alleges disputes over the relative chronology

¹¹ Tullius Geminus G-P 1 = AP 7.73.

¹² Tullius Geminus G-P 2 = AP 9.288.

¹³ For a date in the early 60s for Chariton see E. L. Bowie, 'The chronology of the earlier Greek novels since B. E. Perry: revisions and precisions', *Ancient Narrative* 2 (2002) 47-63. For a date slightly later in the 60s see S. Tilg, *Chariton of Aphrodisias and the invention of the Greek novel* (Oxford 2010).

¹⁴ *Or.* 73.5-6.

¹⁵ *Or.* 56.6.

of Salamis and Plataea and offers a version he claimed to have heard from a Mede:¹⁶ Datis was sent to deal with Naxos and Eretria, and was returning, mission accomplished, when some of their ships, no more than twenty, drifted towards Attica and there was a skirmish with the natives. Then in his expedition against Greece Xerxes defeated the Spartans at Thermopylae and killed their king Leonidas, destroyed Athens, and enslaved any Athenians who had not fled. End of story.

For Plutarch the Persian Wars furnished important episodes for his fifth-century Athenian *Lives*. As John Marincola pointed out in a recent paper which he has generously allowed me to see,¹⁷ Plutarch is especially interested in showing the benefits of harmony and concession-making between the leading Greek politicians, and the extent to which personality and oratorical skills were able to help them persuade the *dēmos*. These targets, and that of showing off each leader's personal capacities in the best possible light, make a major contribution to Plutarch's trimming and slanting of episodes. Nothing emerges that would allow us to decide which battle, if any, Plutarch thought most important. Since Plutarch wrote no *Miltiades* there is no full account of Marathon: that battle appears chiefly in the *Aristides*, with most attention to Aristides the στρατηγός giving up his day of supreme command to Miltiades and thus persuading the other στρατηγοί to do the same; to his fighting alongside Themistocles, each at the head of their φυλή; and to his scrupulous guarding of the captured Persian treasure.¹⁸ Marathon turns up elsewhere as iconic: Themistocles' ambition is fired by Miltiades' achievement;¹⁹ the Athenian forces at Plataea recall Marathon and Salamis;²⁰ people mention Marathon to encourage the rising Cimon.²¹ When we turn to the Roman lives, in his *Camillus* Plutarch shows interest in the battle's exact date (6 Boedromion) and in his *Flamininus* he notes it as among the few great battles of Greek history that were not internecine. The other such battles were indeed all fought in the Persian Wars – Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, Eurymedon, and Cimon's Cypriot campaign (in that order).²² Finally in the *Theseus* we get a detail that would doubtless have enhanced a *Life of Miltiades* had one been written: during the battle a φάσμα of Theseus was seen hurling itself against the βάρβαροι.²³

It is clear, however, from his other works that Plutarch had more material that he *could* have offered on Marathon had he so decided. In the *On the ill-will of Herodotus*, for example, unpicking Herodotus' account, Plutarch castigates his silence on the establishment of the festival of Artemis Agrotera, a ritual still performed in his day, ἔτι νῦν;²⁴ he also pretends to

¹⁶ *Or.* 11.145, 147-48.

¹⁷ Now published as, J. Marincola, 'The fairest victor: Plutarch, Aristides, and the Persian Wars', *Histos* 6 (2012) 91-113.

¹⁸ *Plut. Arist.* 5.

¹⁹ *Plut. Them.* 3.

²⁰ *Plut. Arist.* 16.

²¹ *Plut. Cim.* 5.

²² *Plut. Cam.* 19, *Flam.* 11.

²³ *Plut. Thes.* 35.

²⁴ *Plut. de mal. Hdt.* 862A.

doubt, and attempts to demolish, the story of the Spartans waiting for full moon – rather, he suggests, the Athenians did not send for them until they had won their victory;²⁵ moreover he rubbishes the shield story, claiming that it is an attempt by Herodotus to discredit the Alcmaeonids.²⁶ There are also more details in *de gloria Atheniensium*: for example, again a mention of the festival of Artemis Agrotera (unless a different commemoration is meant).²⁷ Both these works, however, mention most other battles too – *de gloria Atheniensium* Artemisium, Salamis, Mycale, and Plataea at one point, Salamis and Eurymedon alongside Marathon at another.²⁸ The comparison of Aristides and Cato notes that Aristides was in all three of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea.²⁹ *Non posse suaviter* is unusual in mentioning Marathon twice, once together with Plataea, once with together Salamis.³⁰

For Salamis Plutarch naturally grasps the opportunity for a very full narrative in the *Themistocles*.³¹ But Salamis appears repeatedly elsewhere too, especially of course in the *Aristides*, with Aristides sailing from Aegina through the Persian fleet and going to Themistocles' tent to urge cooperation, and with his effective military action on the island of Psyttaleia.³² In other contexts Plutarch tells of the alleged sacrifice of young Persian princes to Dionysos Ὀμησῆς before the battle,³³ and shows interest and apparently indecision on its date – around 20 Boedromion according to the *Camillus*, 16 Mounichion according to the *Lysander*.³⁴ In his *Cimon* Plutarch has a nice anecdote about Cimon's response to Themistocles' Salamis decree having been to dedicate a horse-bridle on the Acropolis, and in his account of Eurymedon he judges that this victory trumps both Salamis and Plataea because on one day Cimon was victorious both in a sea and in a land battle.³⁵ Finally the participation of Phayllus of Croton, known from Herodotus (8.47) and, as I have recently argued,³⁶ remembered by Alexander the Great, who sent a share of his spoils to Croton.³⁷ To say nothing of the dog – the famous story of Xanthippus' swimming dog.³⁸

²⁵ Plut. *de mal. Hdt.* 861F.

²⁶ Plut. *de mal. Hdt.* 862-63.

²⁷ At 349E: ἀλλ' ἔκτη μὲν ἱσταμένου Βοηδρομιῶνος ἐσέτι νῦν τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι νίκην ἢ πόλις ἐορτάζει.

²⁸ Plut. *De gloria Ath.* 350a, 349d.

²⁹ Plut. *Comp. Arist. et Cat.* 5.

³⁰ Plut. *non posse suaviter* 1098a, 1099e.

³¹ Plut. *Them.* 10-15.

³² Plut. *Arist.* 8-9.

³³ Plut. *Pel.* 21.

³⁴ Plut. *Cam.* 19, *Lys.* 15.

³⁵ Plut. *Cim.* 5 and 13.

³⁶ On the basis of *IG* i³ 503/4. On *IG* i³ 503/4 = Simonides' Epigram δ Petrovics see E. L. Bowie, 'Marathon in fifth-century epigram' in *Marathon: the ancient deme and the battle*, ed. K. Buraselis and K. Meidani (Athens 2010) 203-19, at 209-10.

³⁷ Plut. *Alex.* 34.

³⁸ Plut. *Cat.* 5. My reference is to *Three men in a boat (to say nothing of the dog)* 1889 by Jerome K. Jerome (1859-1927).

Plataea too is given a full account. It constitutes the major military panel of the *Aristides*, starting with Aristides leading 8000 Athenian hoplites to Plataea and continuing for ten chapters, with a later reference back in the context of Pausanias' recall.³⁹ It is not surprising that this is the battle where the Boeotian Plutarch shows greatest interest in local topography, and indeed some delicacy in blaming the 'medism' of some Boeotians on their leaders. He repeats the tradition that Plataea was fought on the same day as Mycale,⁴⁰ a day he takes to be 3 Boedromion.⁴¹

This reference in the *Aemilius Paullus* and that already noted in *de gloria Atheniensium*⁴² are, I think, Plutarch's only mentions of Mycale: this seems to be the first battle to drop off any list. Artemisium too is given rather little space: it is mentioned in the *Themistocles* 7-9 and receives a glance in the *Alcibiades* where we learn that Clinias fought there in a trireme he had equipped himself.⁴³ Eurymedon fares somewhat better, with a predictably adequate account in the *Cimon* and inclusion in the great battles picked out in the *Flamininus* as not internecine.⁴⁴ It is also one of the three battles whose inflammatory evocation Plutarch's πολιτικά παραγγέλματα recommend banishing from political oratory and confining to the schools of the sophist, the other two being Marathon and Plataea.⁴⁵ It may be that in this work Eurymedon is mentioned partly because its addressee was Menemachus of Sardis and so Plutarch was temporarily adopting an Anatolian mind-set. But Eurymedon is also one of three Persian War battles, alongside Marathon and Artemisium, in *de sera numinis vindicta*.⁴⁶

The loser in Plutarch's overall presentation is perhaps Thermopylae. But then, even if it was a moral victory, it was a military defeat, as Plutarch, narrating the arrival of the bad news at Artemisium in the *Themistocles*, has to admit.⁴⁷

Some second-century writers

For the quarter century after the latest works of Dio and Plutarch the appearances of Marathon and other battles are too scant to allow useful inferences. The *rhetor* Theon, if he really belongs around now,⁴⁸ has no mention of Thermopylae or Mycale, but twice

³⁹ Plut. *Arist.* 11-20, 23.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Aem.* 25.

⁴¹ Plut. *Cam.* 19.

⁴² Plut. *de glor. Ath.* 350A.

⁴³ Plut. *Them.* 7-9, *Alc.* 1.

⁴⁴ Plut. *Cim.* 12, *Flam.* 11.

⁴⁵ Plut. *praec. reip. ger.* 824.

⁴⁶ Plut. *de sera numinis vindicta* 552B6-8.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Them.* 9.

⁴⁸ G. A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek textbooks of prose composition and rhetoric. Writings from the Greco-Roman world* (Atlanta 2003), opts for a date before Quintilian because of two references in *Inst. Or.* to a rhetorical Theon; but if he is the Aelius Theon of the Suda he is most likely to post-date AD 117, though one might of course envisage him receiving citizenship from

mentions the battle of Plataea in connection with the siege of Thucydides Book 2, and twice mentions Themistocles,⁴⁹ without naming Salamis, though in the second case the mention of Artemisia's name guarantees that context. He has two very different references to Marathon: in one he envisages the speech that Datis made on his return to Dareius,⁵⁰ and in the other he quotes the *Philippica* of Theopompus as reporting some to have questioned the historicity of the battle of Marathon: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην οὐχ ἅμα πάντες ὑμνοῦσι γεγενημένην.⁵¹

Longinus touches on the Persian War battles only in relation to Demosthenes' invocation of Marathon, Salamis, Artemisium, and Plataea – only, of course, ones in which Athens was involved.⁵²

I move on, therefore, to writers in the second half of the second century. First, Appian of Alexandria has only one reference to the Persian Wars in his *Roman History*, when in his Hannibalic book he refers to the small city of Plataea aiding Athens, a reference to their aid in the battle of Marathon.⁵³ Second, the rhetor Hermogenes of Tarsus, writing around AD 180, has five references to Marathon. In one of these Marathon is part of a threesome – Marathon, Plataea, and Salamis.⁵⁴ This is Hermogenes' only reference to Plataea and Salamis. Hermogenes' other four references (admittedly three of these in a single sequence, and all involving citation of Demosthenes' oath: 'by our ancestors who faced danger for their city at Marathon') are to Marathon alone.⁵⁵ This is perhaps striking for a boy from Tarsus, even if he is working in an Athenian environment. Again in Maximus of Tyre Marathon gets several mentions, the other battles each either one or none.⁵⁶ What has happened to promote Marathon to this extent? Has indeed Marathon been promoted? Some figures from intervening years suggest that it has.

Aelius Aristides

First, Aelius Aristides' apportionment of his always copious rhetoric in his *Panathenaicus* of AD 155. The main section dealing with the battle of Marathon (104-10) is shorter than that dealing with Salamis (135-72). Neither is straight narrative: rather it is an argumentative meta-narrative which assumes that the audience knows all the basic facts. But in these two meta-narratives the shadow of Marathon is longer. We initially encounter

Hadrian before his accession. He is given a date very much later, in fifth century AD Alexandria, by M. Heath, 'Theon and the history of the progymnasmata', *GRBS* 43 (2002/03) 129-60.

⁴⁹ Theon 68.30 (quoting Dem. in *Lept.* 71-74), 114.21.

⁵⁰ Theon 115.19.

⁵¹ Theon 67.28-29: 'and furthermore that not everybody celebrates the battle of Marathon as something that happened'.

⁵² Longin. 16.

⁵³ App. *Hannib.* 168-69.

⁵⁴ Hermog. *Id.* 1.6.82-83.

⁵⁵ Hermog. *Id.* 1.9, 2.3: μὰ τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων.

⁵⁶ Marathon in Max. Tyr. 23.6, 24.6 (twice), 33.4, 34.9; Salamis and Plataea together at 20.7; Thermopylae 23.2; Artemisium, Mycale, and Eurymedon not at all.

Marathon at 13: here was the first Persian landing. At 63 a brief comment about the Marathonian τετράπολις being given to the Heraclidae says nothing of the battle. After the section pirouetting around the battle itself, 104-10, we hear at 114 that Dareius was at a loss, became enraged, and collapsed, dying before a second invasion could be launched. Xerxes then demanded expiation for Marathon (117) where, we are reminded (126), Athens stood alone – a point repeated at 167: in neither case are the Plataeans mentioned at all. Shortly Aristides compares Thermopylae disparagingly with Marathon: at Thermopylae some fled, others who stayed perished ineffectively (131). Much later we hear that the exiles at Phyle almost surpassed the fighters at Marathon, implying that the latter constitute the gold standard. Finally at 347 Aristides awards his prizes: Athens' top land battle, Marathon; Athens' top sea battle, Salamis; Athens' top cavalry battle, Mantinea.

The battle of Salamis does indeed do well in the *Panathenaicus*, with a long close-up from 135 to 172. But there are fewer other mentions: 347 (just cited), 128, 180, 231. Artemisium and Plataea tie for third position: Artemisium is mentioned at 128 and 160, and its outcome is contrasted with the failure at Thermopylae at 167; Plataea is mentioned at 172 and 190, and a very short account of the battle itself is offered at 182-83. Mycale (198) and Eurymedon (202-03) each get only one mention.

The proportions are similar in *Oration 3, On behalf of the four*, but the fact that Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon are three of the four naturally requires special attention to Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, and Eurymedon. The Marathon sequence here includes references to the aid of Pan and Heracles (191), the establishment of Pan's cult (191) and the arrangements for the burial of the fallen (196).

Other witnesses

My next witness, with more substance and humour, is Lucian. Only once does Lucian mention Artemisium, Thermopylae, and Plataea: giving advice on declaiming in Athens in *Teacher of rhetors* the speaker says (Luc. *Rh. Pr.* 18):

ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ ὁ Μαραθῶν καὶ ὁ Κυνέγειρος, ὧν οὐκ ἄν τι ἄνευ γένοιτο. καὶ αἰεὶ ὁ Ἄθως πλείσθω καὶ ὁ Ἑλλησποντος πεζετέσθω καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὑπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν βελῶν σκεπέσθω καὶ Ξέρξης φευγέτω καὶ Λεωνίδας θαυμαζέσθω καὶ τὰ Ὀθρυάδου γράμματα ἀναγινωσκέσθω, καὶ ἡ Σαλαμὶς καὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον καὶ αἱ Πλαταιαὶ πολλὰ ταῦτα καὶ πυκνά.

On every occasion bring in Marathon and Cynegirus – without them nothing would be successful. Always have Athos being sailed through and the Hellespont crossed on foot and the sunlight cut off by Median missiles and Xerxes fleeing and Leonidas being admired and the letter of Othyradas being read,⁵⁷ and Salamis and Artemisium and Plataea – many of these events and often.

⁵⁷ Lucian seems here to confuse the much-cited incident from the sixth-century BC battle in Thyrea (Hdt. 1.82) with a Persian War story; cf. N. M. Kennell, *The gymnasium of virtue: education and culture in ancient Sparta* (Chapel Hill, NC 1995) 96 with n.148. Lucian may have been misled by the juxtaposition of Othyradas and Cynegirus in Crinagoras G-P 21 = *AP* 7.741.

Note that here Marathon heads the teacher's catalogue. Apart from this mention of Salamis there are only two others in Lucian. One is indeed not *nominatim* to Salamis, but to Themistocles and Miltiades 'suspected of betraying Greece after such great victories'.⁵⁸ The second is in his *Tragic Zeus*: Zeus observes that it is predictable that men pay no attention to gods since there have been ambiguous oracles like that to Croesus (concerning the Halys) and (Luc. *JTr.* 31):

ὦ θεΐη Σαλαμῖς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν

O divine Salamis! You will destroy the children of women.

A little later in the dialogue Zeus' rejection of Heracles' proposal to zap the Epicurean Damis brings in the battle of Marathon (Luc. *JTr.* 32):

ΖΕΥΣ: Ἡράκλεις, ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἄγροικον τοῦτο εἶρηκας καὶ δεινῶς Βοιωτίον, συναπολέσαι ἐνὶ πονηρῷ τοσοῦτους χρηστούς, καὶ προσέτι τὴν στοὰν αὐτῷ Μαραθῶνι καὶ Μιλτιάδῃ καὶ Κυνεγείρῳ. καὶ πῶς ἂν τούτων συνεμπесόντων οἱ ῥήτορες ἔτι ῥήτορεύοιεν, τὴν μεγίστην εἰς τοὺς λόγους ὑπόθεσιν ἀφηρημένοι;

ZEUS: Heracles, by Heracles, this is peasant talk, terribly Boeotian, to destroy so many good men along with a scoundrel, and in addition the Stoa, along with Marathon and Miltiades and Cynegirus. With their collateral destruction how could the *rhetors* perform their rhetoric any longer, once deprived of the most important theme for their speeches.

This is an interesting if jocular testimony to the prominence of Marathon in epideictic oratory in Athens, something corroborated by a detail in Philostratus' *Lives of the sophists*: Ptolemy of Naucratis, a pupil of Herodes, had the nickname Marathon, either, Philostratus suggests, because he was enrolled in that deme, or because in his epideictic performances with an Athenian setting he often mentioned those who had risked their lives at Marathon.⁵⁹

Marathon, as we have begun to see, is also prominent in Lucian's own work. The tradition of Pan's assistance appears three times. Perhaps it could hardly be avoided in *Dialogues of the gods* – what else would an Attic Pan say (Luc. *DDeor.* 2.3)?

ἄρχω δὲ καὶ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἀπάσης· πρῶην δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις συμμαχήσας οὕτως ἡρίστευσα Μαραθῶνι, ὥστε καὶ ἀριστεῖον ἡρέθη μοι τὸ ὑπὸ τῇ ἀκροπόλει σπήλαιον.

I also rule over all Arcadia: and the other day I also fought alongside the Athenians at Marathon and was so far the best fighter that the cave under the Acropolis was actually chosen for me as my prize.

This tradition of Pan's help is also brought in by Hermes speaking in *Twice accused* (probably written around AD 166) and mocked by Tychiades in *Lovers of fictions* 3.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Luc. *Cal.* 29, cf. also 27.

⁵⁹ Philostr. *VS* 2.15.

⁶⁰ Luc. *Bis Acc.* 13, *Philops.* 3.

Finally in a latish work, *In defence of a mistake in greeting*, Lucian retells the story of (in this version) Philippides running from Marathon to bring news of the victory to the ἄρχοντες and dying as he uttered the word χαίρε<τε>.⁶¹

My last witness is Pausanias. Pausanias indeed mentions all the battles of the Persian Wars, often of course in connection with dedications by the Greek victors, but also in his review of great men whose military actions had benefited Greece as a whole. That list includes Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, and Plataea. It also mentions Mycale and Cimon's eastern campaigns. But it is headed by Miltiades (Paus. 8.52.1-3):

Μιλτιάδης μὲν γὰρ ὁ Κίμωνος τοὺς τε ἐς Μαραθῶνα ἀποβάντας τῶν βαρβάρων κρατήσας μάχῃ καὶ τοῦ πρόσω τὸν Μήδων ἐπισχῶν στόλον ἐγένετο εὐεργέτης πρώτος κοινῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδος.

For Miltiades the son of Cimon defeated in battle those of the barbarians who had landed at Marathon and halted the Median expedition from advancing further: he was the first common benefactor of Greece.

Book 10 has some mentions of Thermopylae, but all these are *comparanda* embedded in the narrative of the Gallic invasion on which Pausanias here lavishes his writing skills. Books 9 and 10 offer several details about Plataea and consequent dedications, but Artemisium, Mycale, and Eurymedon *only* figure in connection with dedications, and even Salamis gets only cursory mention, *e.g.* when Themistocles is said to have been αἴτιος of the victory or when Pausanias' tour takes him to Psyttaleia, though with no mention of Aristides.⁶² But neither get the close focus that Marathon receives in Pausanias' description of the paintings in the Stoa Poikile,⁶³ or that the battlefield and *soros* receive a little later in Book 1.⁶⁴ Indeed Pausanias seems to share the privileging of Marathon he attributes to the Athenians, noting that despite also fighting at Artemisium and Salamis Aeschylus only mentioned Marathon in his sepulchral epigram (Paus. 1.14.5):

ἔτι δὲ ἀπωτέρω ναὸς Εὐκλείας, ἀνάθημα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπὸ Μήδων, οἱ τῆς χώρας Μαραθῶν ἔσχον. φρονήσαι δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τῇ νίκῃ ταύτῃ μάλιστα εἰκάζω· καὶ δὴ καὶ Αἰσχύλος, ὥς οἱ τοῦ βίου προσεδοκᾶτο ἡ τελευταίη, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐμνημόνευσεν οὐδενός, δόξης ἐς τοῦτο ἦκων ἐπὶ ποιήσει καὶ πρὸ Ἀρτεμισίου καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσας· ὁ δὲ τό τε ὄνομα πατρόθεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔγραψε καὶ ὥς τῆς ἀνδρείας μάρτυρας ἔχοι τὸ Μαραθῶνι ἄλσος καὶ Μήδων τοὺς ἐς αὐτὸ ἀποβάντας.

And still further on is a temple of Eucleia, it too a dedication from the Medes who attacked the country at Marathon. And I reckon that the Athenians feel the greatest pride in this victory. Indeed Aeschylus, when the end of his life was expected, recalled none of his other achievements, despite having acquired such a reputation for his poetry and having fought at Artemisium and at Salamis: he wrote his name,

⁶¹ Luc. *Laps.* 3.

⁶² Paus. 1.36.1-2.

⁶³ Paus. 1.15.3 (*cf.* 1.21.2).

⁶⁴ Paus. 1.32.3-5.

and his father's and that of his city, and that he had as witnesses of his bravery the grove at Marathon and those of the Medes who landed there.

A wind of change?

Has there, then, been a change during the second century in the relative importance of the Persian War battles? By the AD 150s, I think, Marathon has become discernibly more prominent. This may be due to the number of our sources that reflect the priorities of epideictic rhetoric, together with the Attic focus, or *mis-en-scène*, of these sources. Sophistic performances in Sparta or Pamphylia may have privileged Thermopylae and Eurymedon respectively, just as we may be confident that when P. Anteiou Antiochus of Aegeae was honoured at Argos his performances there invoked Argive victories and not those of Athenians or Spartans in the Persian Wars.⁶⁵ We must also recall that already before his death c. AD 150 the great sophist M. Antonius Polemo devoted a pair of declamations to Callimachus and Cynegirus.

But, as I have said, I think another factor is at work – Herodes Atticus' interest in his own deme Marathon.⁶⁶ That interest is attested archaeologically by the inscriptions from the gate of the villa he developed jointly with his Italian wife Regilla, the sculptures of the couple and the imperial family still visible in the museum, and the temple of the Egyptian gods down by the shore – Philostratus' τὸ τοῦ Κανώβου ἱερόν ('the sanctuary of Canopus') – where, like Lucius at Cenchreae in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, Herodes could see the moon rise over the sea to the east and fancy that she was Isis.⁶⁷ Herodes enjoyed spending time at Marathon, and Philostratus narrates how his pupils would escort him around Cephisia and Marathon, much as certain modern professors move about surrounded by beives of graduate students (Philostr. *VS* 2.1.562):

μετὰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ Παιονίᾳ διητᾶτο μὲν ὁ Ἡρώδης ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ περὶ τοὺς φιλάτους ἑαυτῷ δῆμους Μαραθῶνα καὶ Κηφισίαν ἐξηρημένης αὐτοῦ τῆς πανταχόθεν νεότητος, οἱ κατ' ἔρωτα τῶν ἐκείνου λόγων ἐφοίτων Ἀθήναζε.

For after the events in Pannonia Herodes spent his time in Attica in his favourite demes, Marathon and Cephisia, escorted by young men from all over, who would come to Athens out of desire for his eloquence.

It is Marathon whose delight at Herodes' return is asserted by the long elegiac poem composed to welcome him on his return from exile after the emperor Marcus had brokered a deal with his enemies in Athens.⁶⁸ It was on the hill route between Cephisia

⁶⁵ For the honours to P. Anteiou Antiochus at Argos see B. Puech, *Orateurs et sophistes grecs dans les inscriptions d'époque impériale*. Avec préface de L. Pernot (Paris 2002).

⁶⁶ Not that Herodes wholly neglected other Persian war sites: his claim to descent from the Aeacidae is linked by Philostratus with Salamis (Philostr. *VS* 2.1.545), and he built iambic swimming pools at Thermopylae (*ibid.* 551).

⁶⁷ Philostr. *VS* 2.1.554; Apul. *Met.* 11.1.

⁶⁸ *IG* ii² 3606, opening ὀλβιος, ὦ Μαραθῶν, νῦν ἔπλεο ... φαίδιμον Ἀλκαῖδην νοστήσαντ' ἑσορῶν ('Blessed, Marathon, have you now become ... seeing the glorious descendant of Heracles restored to his home').

and Marathon across the slopes of Pentelicon that he seems to have had his encounters with the unspoilt, Atticizing child of nature, Heracles-Agathion. It was in Marathon that Herodes wanted to be buried.⁶⁹ Moreover Herodes claimed descent from Miltiades and Cimon, calling one of his own daughters Elpinice.⁷⁰

Now we know that even away from Attica Herodes remembered Marathon. At his villa at Loukou he had there at least one *stèle* relating to Marathon. The *stèle* that survives almost complete, published in 2009 by Giorgos Spyropoulos, bears across the top the name of the Athenian tribe Erechtheis, next a four-line elegiac epigram, then below twenty-two names – the names of ‘these men’ (τῶνδ’ ἀνδρῶν) invoked at the beginning of the epigram’s second line – all in early fifth-century letters. Further work has been done on the text of the epigram by Steinhauer.⁷¹ I remain unconvinced that the first line has been solved, but this chapter is not the appropriate place to discuss possible readings. What is important is that there are also fragments of a second similar *stèle*, not from parts that would have been inscribed. This suggests, or at least raises the possibility, that in the display hall from which they and some pieces of sculpture seem to have come Herodes had on show a complete set of ten *stelai*, *phyle* by *phyle*, bearing epigrams commemorating the Marathon dead. It is hard not to think that these are the *stelai* that Pausanias saw encircling the *soros*, also commemorating the Marathon dead *phyle* by *phyle*.⁷² I do not doubt this claim of Pausanias, and it does not conflict with the discovery of the *stelai* at Loukou. Pausanias’ account of the *soros* is in his earliest book, Book 1, written in the later 150s.⁷³ Herodes still had more than a decade of active life in which he could have decided to move the *stelai* from the plain of Marathon, much of which he owned, to his Cynourian villa. It is also possible, of course, that the *stelai* at Loukou are copies: some petrological work on the stone might help to resolve that question. In either case Herodes’ attachment to his deme Marathon is further demonstrated.

Let me return very briefly to two sophistic witnesses in whose eyes Marathon seems pre-eminent, Aelius Aristides of Hadrianoutherae and Ptolemy of Naucratis. Both these sophists are said by Philostratus to have studied with Herodes.⁷⁴ It is not surprising if Herodes’ preferences are reflected in theirs. Herodes was also important in a different way for Lucian: some of Lucian’s cynic satire seems to have Herodes in its sights, in particular the juxtaposition of property-holding in Marathon and in Cynuria in his *Icaromenippus*

⁶⁹ Philostr. *VS* 2.1.566.

⁷⁰ Philostr. *VS* 2.1.546, 558.

⁷¹ G. Spyropoulos, *Οι στήλες των πεσόντων στην μάχη του Μαραθώνα από την έπαυλη του Ηρώδη Αττικού στην Εύα Κυνουρίας* (Athens 2009); and G. Steinhauer, ‘Οι steles ton Marathonomachon apo ten epaule tou Herode Attikou sti Loukou Kynourias’, in *Marathon*, ed. K. Buraselis and K. Meidani (n. 35 above) 99-108: for their texts of the epigram see the Appendix.

⁷² Paus. 1.32.3.

⁷³ Completed before the death of Regilla c. AD 160, cf. Pausanias 7.20.6. See further E. L. Bowie, ‘Pausanias: inspiration and aspiration’ in *Pausanias. Travel and memory in Roman Greece*, ed. S. Alcock, J. Cherry, and J. Elsner (Oxford and New York 2001) 21-32, at 21.

⁷⁴ Philostr. *VS* 2.1, 15.

18.⁷⁵ I suggest that Marathon's lead over other Athenian Persian War victories in the years after AD 150 reflects the preferences of a man who was Onassis, Leventis, and Niarchos all rolled into one, L. Vibullius Hipparchus Ti. Claudius Atticus Herodes.

Appendix: the Marathon stelai from Loukou

1. Text of the epigram as in Spyropoulos 30:

Φέμις ἄρ' ἥος κι[χαν']αίει εὐφραοῦς || ἔσχατα γαίης
 Τῶνδ' ἀνδρῶν ἀρετέν πεύσεται ἥος ἔθανον
 [μ]αρνάμενοι Μέδοισι καὶ ἐσστεφάνοσαν Ἀθένα[ς]
 [π]αυρότεροι πολλῶν δεχσάμενοι πόλεμον.

2. Text of the *stele* as in Steinhauer:

Ε ρ ε χ θ ε ῖ [ς]

Φεμις ἄρ' | ἥος κιχ[ά|ν]<ει> αἰεὶ || εὐφραος | ἡέσχατα | γαί [ες]
 Τῶνδ' ἀνδρῶν ἀρε|τέν || πεύσεται, | ἥος ἔθανον
 [μ]αρνάμενοι Μέ|δοισι || καὶ ἐσστεφά|νοσαν Ἀ|θένα[ς]
 [π]αυρότε|ροι πο|λλον || δεχσάμε|νοι πόλε|μον

Δρακοντίδες Ἀντιφον Ἀφσέφες Χσένον
 (10) Γλαυκιάδες Τιμόχσενος Θεόγνις Διόδορος Εὐχσίας
 (15) Εὐφρονιάδες Εὐκτέμον Καλλίας Ἀραιθίδες Ἀντίας
 (20) Τόλμις Θοκυδίδες Δῖος Ἀμυνόμαχος Λεπτίνες
 (25) Αἰσχροῖος Πέρον Φαι[δ]ρίας

⁷⁵ Luc. *Icar.* 18.

MARATHON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSIAN WARS IN ANTIQUITY AND MODERN TIMES. PART I: ANTIQUITY

MICHAEL JUNG

In the fourth century BC the Greek historian Theopompus had a clear idea of how the battle of Marathon should be understood: it had, namely, not happened as described in the Athenians' panegyrics. As the historian explained in his own words, 'But also in this regard, the city of the Athenians puffed itself up and deceived the Hellenes'.¹ There is good reason to believe that Theopompus, whose complete work has not come down to us, went even further: the battle of Marathon, he claimed elsewhere, was merely an 'insignificant, brief skirmish on the beach'.² Theopompus was largely alone in this drastic relativizing of the battle of Marathon, and he can also be suspected of a certain partiality since, in the fourth century, he was writing very much under the influence of the great expanding power of Macedonia.³ But there were other critical statements in antiquity concerning the battle of Marathon as well, even as early as the fifth century. The Spartans, according to Herodotus' account, accused the Athenians of something quite different during the Persian Wars: the Persians' incursion into Greece ten years later under Xerxes, went the criticism, had been instigated by the Athenians. If there had been no battle of Marathon, then all of Greece would not now be forced to ward off the Persian invasion. It was thus Athens who had been the warmonger.⁴ These two examples may suffice to demonstrate that – for Greek contemporaries as well as in the period that followed – the battle of Marathon was evidently not an event that was evaluated in an unreservedly positive way. The memory of the battle seems to have thoroughly polarized the controversy. Marathon possessed the power to provoke.⁵ This is indeed astonishing, for the actual significance of the battle was relatively limited.

¹ Theopomp. *FrGrH* 115.153 (= Theon. *Progym.* 2).

² Plut. *de mal. Hdt.* 26 (*Mor.* 862D).

³ For Theopompus' account cf. C. Habicht, 'Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege', *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1-35, at 13f.; P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai* (Munich 1972, = *Vestigia* 16, zugleich Diss. Munich 1970) 14-18; K. Meister, *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen* (Wiesbaden 1982 = *Palingenesia* 18) 59-63.

⁴ Hdt. 8.142.2 (the Spartans' oration before the Battle of Plataea), cf. A. E. Raubitschek, 'The speech of the Athenians in Sparta', in *The speeches in Thucydides. A collection of original studies with a bibliography*, ed. P. A. Stadter (Chapel Hill 1973) 32-48, at 36f.

⁵ W. C. West, 'Saviors of Greece', *GRBS* 11 (1970) 271-82, at 280-82, pointed out how Sparta created the past of the Persian Wars as a counterpart of Athens.

As a whole – to summarize briefly at this point – the entire Persian expedition of 490 BC is surely considered more of a strategically limited punitive expedition against the supporters of the Ionian uprising, thus against powers that had challenged the Persian king.⁶ Darius wanted to hold Eretria and Athens in particular accountable for helping the rebels;⁷ in Athens itself he aimed for a restoration of Hippias' rule,⁸ unlike under Xerxes, the establishment of lasting Persian rule in the Greek homeland was not the goal in 490. The very different intention of the two expeditions and their clearly different scope also indicate that in the late summer of 490 Datis had been charged with only a limited strategic and political commission. Ten years later, in contrast, Xerxes was clearly pursuing the goal of bringing the entire southern Balkan peninsula under his political and military control. In the latter case, the very existence of all the Greek *poleis* was challenged; and, as is well known, the responses to this challenge varied greatly. Only the *poleis* that had a great deal to lose forged the alliance that programmatically identified them as 'Hellenes':⁹ Athens, whose previous experiences gave it little to hope for but much to fear; Corinth, whose economic importance would certainly have been diminished by a Persian expansion; and finally and predominantly Sparta, whose recently consolidated power on the Peloponnese would have been threatened. In the period following the victories of 480 and 479 great new power-political and economic opportunities became available to these powers. In comparison with these experiences, Marathon receded in importance. The existential threat of the Xerxes expedition led initially to a discourse on the part of the victors in which the Battle of Marathon was scarcely mentioned. This discourse was concerned first and foremost with clarifying the question of who had played the most decisive role in the victory they had achieved together. Behind this political debate about interpreting past history, of course, stood the thinly veiled question of who was allowed to assert a historically legitimate claim to leadership in the world of the Greek *poleis*. Or, to put it more pointedly, the historical question of who had had the greatest glory in the victory over the Persians was the political question of hegemony in Hellas.

Consequently, a dispute arose already over the question of a common victory offering in the sanctuary of Delphi – Sparta was forced to remove the self-confident inscription of their own general Pausanias from the serpentine column erected there and replace it with a listing of all the *poleis* participating in the Hellenic League.¹⁰ But Sparta nonetheless made quite clear who had played the decisive role in the victory of Plataea and thus had assumed the leadership role in the anti-Persian alliance. Some years ago it was possible to salvage a text from papyrus fragments that documents this clearly: the poet Simonides was

⁶ Hdt. 6.96.98. The Persian expedition was also directed against Naxos, but this city-state was also considered as subordinated to the Persian king.

⁷ Hdt. 6.100-02.

⁸ Hdt. 6.107.

⁹ For the Hellenic League see P. A. Brunt, 'The Hellenic league against Persia', *Historia* 2 (1953/54) 135-63; A. Tronson, 'The Hellenic League of 480 B.C. – fact or ideological fiction?', *Acta Classica* 34 (1991) 93-110; D. Kienast, 'Der Hellenenbund von 481 v. Chr.', *Chiron* 33 (2003) 43-77.

¹⁰ Hdt. 9.81; Paus. 10.13.9.

commissioned to commemorate Sparta's merit with an elegy. He strikingly compared the defence against the Persians to the mythical war against Troy. In doing so he remembered how the Spartan army set out from their homeland against the Persians, and that this was the beginning of the story of the real resistance and the expulsion of the Persians from Greece.¹¹ In the internal Greek conflicts of the following decades as well, Sparta continued to lay claim to being the predominant power in Greece, consistently standing up for the autonomy and freedom of the individual *poleis* against servitude and oppression.¹² Athens, in contrast, sought to enhance its own glory and merit in the defence against Persia by continuing the fight after the battle of Plataea in the Aegean islands and in Ionia. The preferred means of accomplishing this was the new alliance, the Delian League, which was swiftly transformed from an anti-Persian alliance into a hegemonic instrument of Athenian power interests. In this, Athens wanted by all means to retain the legitimizing power of the memory of the Persian Wars, and thus the naval victory at Salamis was seen as the decisive event of the past, upon whose basis Athens laid claim to leadership in the continuation of the fight against the Persians, as well as to Aegean hegemony.¹³ There was little mention of the battle of Marathon in these contexts: after the experience of Xerxes' military campaign ten years later, the Greek states had every reason to remember these events of the great 'Persian War'; Sparta gloried in its own role in the war, and Athens extolled its own merits in the Battle of Salamis, thus justifying its claim to naval supremacy.

Marathon as well was definitely remembered in Athens during these decades, but this took place predominantly with regard to its own *polis* community: the Athenians saw in Marathon the self-assertion of their own new constitution, a resistance against an attempt to restore tyranny, and celebrated the battle as the success of the new civic and legal equality. In doing so, individual politicians such as Cimon singled out in particular individual fighters like the strategist Miltiades: by praising his own father Cimon sought as well to enhance his own recognition and authority in the city. In addition the fallen were honoured, sacrifices and celebrations were carried out; these emphasized one thing

¹¹ The *editio princeps* was published by P. J. Parsons, 'New poetic texts', in *The Oxyrhynchus papyri. Volume LIX*, ed. E. W. Handley, H. G. Ioannidou, P. J. Parsons *et al.* (London 1992) 1-50, at 4-50; the first reconstruction of the whole poem was by M. L. West, *Sim. frag. eleg.* (1992) 10-17. For the first accounts of modern scholarship see D. Boedeker, 'Simonides on Plataea: narrative elegy, mythodid history', *ZPE* 107 (1995) 217-29; I. Rutherford, 'The new Simonides: towards a commentary', *Arethusa* 29 (1996) 167-92; A. Aloni, 'The proem of the Simonides elegy on the battle of Plataea (Sim. frs. 10-18 W²) and the circumstances of its performance', in *Poet, public and performance in ancient Greece*, ed. L. Edmunds and R. W. Wallace (Baltimore and London 1997) 8-28; D. Boedeker and D. Sider, ed., *The new Simonides. Contexts of praise and desire* (Oxford 2001).

¹² Thuc. 2.72.1, 3.63.3. The Persian War was a fight against servitude and oppression, and it was continued by the leading power Sparta against new enemies like Athens, whose hegemony took away the freedom and autonomy of other Greek city-states, see C. W. Kalkavage, *The past on trial. The Plataean episodes in Thucydides* (Diss. Baltimore 1988) 294-96; C. W. Macleod, 'Thucydides' Plataean debate', *GRBS* 18 (1977) 227-46, at 240; M. Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai. Zwei Perserschlachten als „lieux de mémoire“ im antiken Griechenland* (Göttingen 2006, = *Hypomnemata* 164) 286-95.

¹³ Lys. 2.31f., 42f.; Isoc. 4.98-100, 12.51. Isoc. 4.72 points out that Salamis was the beginning of the naval hegemony.

above all, that it was the phalanx, in which all men stood beside one another equally, that had achieved this outstanding success of self-assertion.¹⁴ There is much evidence that, at the beginning of the great military conflict with Sparta and especially the Peloponnesian War, but certainly by the beginning of the fourth century, the tone of these recollections had become much more shrill.

Each year the *polis* of Athens interred the fallen of that war year together, and on this occasion speeches were held that placed the recent events of the war within the context of Athenian history. At the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth, for the first time, a completely new view of the battle of Marathon can be discerned in these speeches. In the memorial tradition of these Athenian speeches, those who had fallen at Marathon were soon monumentalized into outstanding examples. Their small number (192 fallen citizens) was contrasted with an increasingly massive number of dead Persians: as early as the second half of the fifth century Herodotus reported their number as 6,400;¹⁵ soon after there were already ‘tens of thousands’.¹⁶ And added to this was another theme that, in light of the historical facts, must be considered astonishing: the Athenians believed that they had fought alone in the battle of Marathon.¹⁷ The support of a thousand men from Plataea is no longer worthy of mention – more important to the Athenians was the fact that no other great Greek power, and especially not Sparta, had participated in the battle.¹⁸ The Athenians had achieved victory all alone without outside help – this at least was the story told again year after year before thousands of citizens. But the solitariness of the fighters did not lead to despondency or despair: they are characterized instead by their iron resolve and dynamic speed.¹⁹ In their recollection, the strategist Miltiades overcame the laggards and roused their resolve for battle, whereupon, according to the legend, the Athenians lunged into an all-out assault and could scarcely wait to slay the Persians.²⁰ With all of these qualities, the fighters at Marathon embodied

¹⁴ Concerning the monuments, festivals, and literary sources of this stage of the commemoration of the Battle of Marathon cf. Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai* (n. 12 above) 27-125.

¹⁵ Hdt. 6.117.1; see also W. F. Wyatt, ‘Persian dead at Marathon’, *Historia* 25 (1976) 483-84, at 483.

¹⁶ Duris, *FrGrH* 76.13; cf. Isoc. 4.86; Lys. 2.21; see N. Loraux, “‘Marathon’ ou l’histoire idéologique”, *REA* 75 (1973) 13-42, at 19-20; M. Nouhaud, *L’utilisation de l’histoire par les orateurs attiques* (Paris 1982) 150-51; M. Flashar, ‘Die Sieger von Marathon – zwischen Mythisierung und Vorbildlichkeit’, in *Retrospektive. Konzepte von Vergangenheit in der griechisch-römischen Antike*, ed. M. Flashar, H.-J. Gehrke, and E. Heinrich (München 1996) 63-85, at 72-73.

¹⁷ The first mention of this *topos* is in Hdt. 9.27.5; cf. Thuc. 1.73.4; Lys. 2.20; Dem. 60.10; Heracleides Pont. *FrGrH* 328.71 (= Athen. 512C); Simon. frg. 86 West (= Schol. Aristoph. *Pax* 736).

¹⁸ See Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai* (n. 12 above) 133 n. 25; the opinions of B. Kartes, *Der Epitaphios des Lysias* (Diss. Saarbrücken 2000) 60 (‘attische Mogelpackung schlechtin’) and of K. R. Walters, “‘We fought alone at Marathon’: historical falsification in the Attic funeral oration”, *RhM* 124 (1981) 204-11, at 208-11, do not point out the important message.

¹⁹ Hdt. 6.112, but cf. J. A. S. Evans, ‘Herodotus and Marathon’, *Florilegium* 6 (1984) 1-26, at 5.

²⁰ The most important example is the famous decree of Miltiades (Arist. *Rhet.* 3, 1411a9; Dem. 19.303; Plut. *Mor.* 628E); cf. Habicht, ‘Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens’ (n. 3 above)

everything that made up a good citizen of the *polis* and thus attained the status of exemplars for the subsequent period as well: it was their *aretē* that made the victory possible. This theme is made clear in the motif of the few against the many, rhetorically developed time and time again.²¹ At Marathon, quality defeated quantity, and as early as the beginning of the fourth century Lysias captured it for the first time in a geographic metaphor that would prove immensely influential in the subsequent time period and go on to become a fixed constituent of the rhetorical tradition: not only was it a victory of the few against the many, but also a victory of Europe against Asia.²² Europe becomes equated with Greece, and Athens in particular. Here it is individual character, personal quality that matters – pitted against a Persian army pursuing, through the power of sheer numbers, the goal of enslaving the entire continent. But it is nonetheless possible to avert this fate through personal achievement. This theme would become influential in later reception. In the Athens of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC it emphasized the will to self-assertion and Athens' citizen-army's confidence that it could withstand even extreme challenges. In this aspect, the interpretation was still quite traditional. But the speeches also show how the interpretation of the battle was further developed during this time period.

Already in monuments of the middle of the fifth century such as the Stoa Poikile in the centre of Athens,²³ but also in speeches recounted by Herodotus²⁴ and then in the works of the Attic Orators of the fourth century, Marathon is integrated into the larger continuity of Athenian history and, to some degree, given historical analogies. In this, two narrative threads were important.²⁵ In the first, Marathon was placed in a series of mythical defensive successes against unfamiliar and foreign invaders, which were said to have threatened Athens and the region around it. This was formulated especially tellingly in the example of the Amazons – the parallels drawn between the overpowering of the exotic female warriors and the resistance against the Persians must have begun quite early on.²⁶ But there were also the popular themes of resistance against the Thracian enemies from the north,²⁷ resistance against an invasion from the Peloponnese, and the defence of the

12-20; Meister, *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens* (n. 3 above) 63; but see H. Y. McCulloch jr., 'Herodotus, Marathon, and Athens', *Symbolae Osloenses* 57 (1982) 35-55, at 43-44.

²¹ Lys. 2.24; Plat. *Mx.* 240d, 241a; Isoc. 4.86, 91; And. *Myst.* 107; Lyc. *Leocr.* 108; Hyp. 6.19.

²² Lys. 2.21.

²³ The description of the Stoa Poikile can be found in Paus. 1.15.1-3; the impact of the battle of Marathon is discussed by Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai* (n. 12 above) 190-211.

²⁴ Hdt. 9.27.4.

²⁵ See the scheme of E. Buchner, *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates. Eine historisch-philologische Untersuchung* (Wiesbaden 1958 = *Historia Einzelschriften* 2) 65.

²⁶ Hdt. 9.27.4; Lys. 2.4-6; Isoc. 4.68-69, 12.193; Plat. *Mx.* 239b; Dem. 60.8. See Buchner, *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates* (n. 25 above) 71-75; R. Stupperich, *Staatsbegräbnis und Privatgrabmal im Klassischen Athen* (Diss. Münster 1977) 46; Kartes, *Der Epitaphios des Lysias* (n. 18 above) 40-41; M. A. Flower and J. Maricola, *Herodotus, Histories book IX* (Cambridge 2002) 155-56; esp. W. B. Tyrell, *Amazons. A study in Athenian mythmaking* (Baltimore and London 1984).

²⁷ This story is absent from the works of Herodotus and Lysias and seems to be added later: Plat. *Mx.* 239b; Isoc. 4.66, 12.193; Dem. 60.8; see Buchner, *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates* (n. 25 above)

children of Heracles who had fled and sought refuge in Athens.²⁸ Parallels were repeatedly drawn to Marathon and it was placed within a continuity of mythical narratives in which the Athenians, selflessly and without regard for their own difficulties, stood up for other, less powerful groups. The children of Heracles just mentioned are an example of this; and the history of the Seven against Thebes²⁹ – in which it was only by means of massive threats that the Athenians were able to give the fallen the burials to which they were entitled and which had been denied them by the Thebans – portrays this image. Not only did the Athenians resolutely defend their own land against foreign enemies, they also stood up unreservedly for the weak and defenceless. Each year, in the representation of these mythical events in the speeches, it was the battle of Marathon that was mentioned as the first historical event.³⁰ Here too, as was represented implicitly and explicitly, it was just the same: Athens had bloodily repelled the Persians, an enemy who until then had been completely unknown in the Greek homeland. They seldom forgot to mention the fact that they had stood completely alone, just as they had against the legendary Amazons. The Attic Orators also shared with their listeners the certainty that if the Athenians had failed, the other Greek cities would also have been enslaved by the Persians.³¹ Thus the victory at Marathon came to be constructed as a success that – in contrast to the actual historical facts – Athens had achieved as a representative of Hellas.³² In the Athenians' portrayal of their own past, they had selflessly confronted danger and had taken action against the Persians, not only for their own sake but especially for the sake of all the other less courageous and more defenceless *poleis*, which of course also included Sparta. The essence of the discourse, which became reinforced increasingly strongly, was that not just any Greek city acted in this way: only a just Hegemon did so. These were the actions of a city deserving of the highest position in the world of the Greek states. The other states, seen as weaker, had hesitated in the face of danger, but not Athens, which had taken upon itself the risk for all the others and – due to the outstanding bravery of its citizen-soldiers – in the end, of course, averted danger from all of Greece.

This connection between the idea of a leading position for Athens within the world of the Greek states and references to the battle of Marathon can be found early on. Already in Herodotus, the strategist Miltiades promises the lagging commander Callimachus before the battle that if Athens is victorious, it will become the first of the Greek states.³³ This connection, which can thus be documented in Athens as early as just after the middle of the fifth century, would be constantly further developed in the subsequent centuries.

71-74; W. Kierdorf, *Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege. Studien zu Simonides, Pindar, Aischylos und den attischen Rednern* (Göttingen 1966 = Hypomnemata 16) 90-91.

²⁸ Hdt. 9.27.2; Lys. 2.11-16; Plat. *Mx.* 239b; Isoc. 4.65; Dem. 60.8.

²⁹ Hdt. 9.27.3; Lys. 2.7-11; Plat. *Mx.* 239b; Isoc. 4.55; Dem. 60.8; see W. B. Tyrrell and F. S. Brown, *Athenian myths and institutions: words in action* (New York 1991) 201-02.

³⁰ See Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai* (n. 12 above) 146-69.

³¹ Cf. Lys. 2.24.

³² The first mention of this idea can be found And. *Myst.* 107; then also Lys. 2.20; Isoc. 4.86; cf. Plat. *Mx.* 240d-e; Dem. 60.10; Hyp. 6.37.

³³ Hdt. 6.109.3.

But this idea of Athenian pre-eminence would not have been very convincing to the rest of the Greek cities if they continued to regard Marathon as what it was in terms of the historical facts of 490: the defeat of a Persian expedition corps that had landed with a very limited political commission. The Athenian claim was only convincing when the events were represented not only as the salvation of Athens, but actually of all of Greece, when the threat, that is, was represented as actually having been much greater. This could only succeed when Marathon became part of an entire complex of the 'Persian Wars'. Work on this discourse continued a long time and several stages can be reconstructed on the basis of our sources.

In the most important literary sources of the fifth century Marathon is not yet part of the great conflict with the Persians under Xerxes ten years later. Herodotus composed his representation of history in nine books – six of them describe the events preceding the great conflict between East and West. At the beginning of the fourth book, Herodotus describes the Persians' first campaigns of expansion against the barbarian Scythians;³⁴ at the start of the seventh he finally begins with the decision by the aged king of kings Darius to equip a large army to invade Greece.³⁵ The battle of Marathon is recounted in a few chapters at the end of the sixth book,³⁶ and is thus still clearly a part of the prehistory of an aggressive Persian policy but not yet of the incipient great conflict with the states of the Greek homeland, which is described beginning only in the seventh book. Herodotus closes his account of Marathon tellingly by pointing out that for the first time the Athenians were able to display dead Persians – a kind of foreshadowing of the conclusion of the conflict that was just beginning. But it is clear from the whole structure of the material's composition that although for Herodotus Marathon was fundamental to the prehistory of a complex of events that was the 'Persian Wars', it was not yet part of that complex. That Herodotus was not alone in this assessment can be seen by glancing at Aeschylus' tragedy *The Persians*. There too Marathon is previous history, mentioned briefly and almost incidentally, but it is not part of the great conflict.

But there is already a cautious hint of Marathon's inclusion in the events of Xerxes' campaign ten years later – tellingly in a speech the historian puts into the mouths of the Athenians before the battle of Plataea.³⁷ This may be an indication that the Athenian assessment of Marathon was beginning to diverge from the assessment throughout the rest of Greece. In this speech, with regard to the merit earned at Marathon, Herodotus' Athenians demand the place of honour on the right flank of the battle formation. As they saw it, they had already confronted danger and were the first to have done so, thus engaging in battle before all the others. And here the direction of the argument with its hegemonic claims also becomes immediately clear.

The first evidence that Marathon is now seen as part of the larger event of the 'Persian Wars' comes from the end of the fifth century. Even if there are two places in which – in keeping with the traditional interpretation – Thucydides still sees Marathon as a prehistory

³⁴ Hdt. 4.1-4, 83-144.

³⁵ Hdt. 7.1-4.

³⁶ Hdt. 6.103-31.

³⁷ Hdt. 9.27.

to the Xerxes campaign.³⁸ Its equality is hinted at here for the first time when Thucydides depicts the Persian Wars as four great battles, two on land and two at sea. The battles are not mentioned explicitly: Artemisium/Salamis and Mycale are certainly clear, Plataea as a land battle equally so; it is possible to identify the fourth, land battle, as Marathon, or possibly Thermopylae. Here is a first piece of evidence for including Marathon in the series of events of the later battles.³⁹ In an intensification of Herodotus' account, the funeral orations of Lysias at the beginning of the fourth century depict Marathon as the one and only catalyst for Xerxes' campaign;⁴⁰ when Plato's *Menexenus* from the middle of the fourth century (also a funeral oration and oriented along the lines of those rhetorical *topoi*) compares Salamis and Marathon in terms of their significance for Greece, the full inclusion of Marathon in the 'Persian Wars' is already self-evident.⁴¹ In Athenian rhetoric and history-writing of the fourth century Marathon is consistently the beginning and also a part of the 'Persian Wars'. The orator Isocrates, for example, interpreted the relationship of the battles to one another as an *agonales*: challenged by the fame won by Athens at Marathon, Sparta did not want to be outdone in the other battles.⁴² Demosthenes later spoke briefly and succinctly of two Persian campaigns against Greece, both of whose goals were seen as being quite clearly the conquest of all of Greece.⁴³ For the historian Xenophon Marathon is a self-evident part of the 'Persian Wars'.

Just like Marathon's placement within the context of the mythical references mentioned above and the monumentalization of the fighters' exemplary character, it is clear from this brief analysis of the sources that Marathon's inclusion in the nexus of battles of the Xerxes campaign ten years later also had its origins in Athenian rhetoric and especially the officially commissioned funeral orations held each year. Seeing Marathon as a part of the 'Persian Wars', which were acknowledged throughout Greece as a crucial part of its own history, was a decisive precondition for being able to legitimate hegemonic ambitions with reference to Marathon. The Spartan allusion to their own outstanding merits at the decisive battle of Plataea, the fact that in all the battles of the Xerxes campaign the Spartans had the high command, even over the Athenians, all of this could only be effectively refuted by pointing out that, ten years before the Spartans, the Athenians had been the first and only ones (a fact they never tired of emphasizing) decisively to defeat the Persians, thus saving Greece. Back then, the Athenians had stood up to danger alone (1,000 Plataeans did not count and Sparta was far away); back then, the Athenians had sacrificed themselves for everyone. The fact that ten years later Sparta had also had some share in the success – although of course as a naval victory Salamis was also claimed by the Athenians alone – counted for little against this, since the preliminary battle, the prelude, had been fought by Athens alone. Of all of Greece, making Marathon into part of the 'Persian Wars' was in the interests only of the Athenians. Connecting it to the events of Xerxes' campaign served the historical

³⁸ Thuc. 1.18, 73.4.

³⁹ Thuc. 1.23.1.

⁴⁰ Lys. 2.20-26.

⁴¹ Plat. *Mx.* 240c-241c; cf. also *Leg.* 698a-699d.

⁴² Isoc. 4.85.

⁴³ Dem. 60.10.

legitimization of Athens' hegemonic interests within the world of the Greek states. Against this background it is not especially surprising that there were evidently other competing powers who were just as eager to downplay the significance of Marathon and strictly rejected this connection. When Theopompus, who viewed the Macedonians amicably, shrugged off the battle of 490 as an insignificant skirmish on the beach,⁴⁴ he was surely much closer to the historical truth than was the elaborate Athenian rhetorical tradition, but on the other hand he was also mostly interested in rejecting the Athenian claim to supremacy that had been based on Marathon – and this becomes clear as well when accusations are made of deceiving the Hellenes. And when in Herodotus the Spartans counter the Athenians' reference to Marathon and point out that, at the time, Athens had already demonstrated its role as warmonger in Greece and, at Marathon, had in fact first drawn the Persians into the country, endangering all the Greeks,⁴⁵ here the Athenian eulogy is virtually turned on its head and used against Athens. Marathon is not the glorious prelude to the 'Persian Wars' and an act of selfless sacrifice for Greece, rather Marathon is much more evidence of the Athenians' permanent warmongering. The memory was contested in Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries BC – and Marathon was a provocation. The instrumentalization of the battle for the establishment of hegemonic interests was too clear and too one-sided for competing *poleis* to be able recognize the battle as an event of the Hellenes' shared history. Sparta and other *poleis* thought quite differently about Marathon, had to think differently if they did not wish to surrender to Athens in an arena as important as the interpretation of the political past.

During the classical period the memory of Marathon was thus disputed and contested, but over time the Athenian portrayal of history and the interpretation of the Persian Wars it represented were able to develop a normative and canonical power even beyond the boundaries of the *polis*. This process was carried on above all in the period of late Hellenism and in Greece under Roman rule. Consistent with an understanding of language and culture concentrated in many ways upon Athens and Atticism there developed a selective transmission of extant sources but also a broadly conceived reception above all of Athenian texts and monuments. For those who were now the provincial elite of the Imperium Romanum, the fifth and fourth centuries BC came to be considered the normative and authoritative period of reference, in which Greek culture and education had been realized in an exemplary manner.⁴⁶

In the diverse historical reflections and lines of continuity quoted above, the Battle of Marathon always represented the earliest and first available historical example.⁴⁷ The epoch considered normative and exemplary by the Second Sophistic closes with Alexander: the very same period thus that also would later seem 'classical' to the Philhellenes. During the period of Roman rule in Greece those who were now the provincial elite created the image capable of being transferred to later centuries. But in the

⁴⁴ Theopomp. *FrGrH* 115.153 (= Theon. *Progym.* 2).

⁴⁵ Hdt. 8.142.2.

⁴⁶ See G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic. A cultural phenomenon in the Roman empire* (London and New York 1993) 103-05; E. L. Bowie, 'Greeks and their past in the Second Sophistic', in *Studies in ancient society*, ed. M. I. Finley (London and Boston 1974) 166-209.

⁴⁷ Anderson, *The Second Sophistic* (n. 46 above) 103.

process, they added distinct and very political accents. These can be traced exemplarily in the works of two authors: Aelius Aristides and the rhetor Polemon, who composed two orations put into the mouths of the Marathon hero Cynaigeiros and the polemarch Callimachus.

In his *Panathenaicus* Aelius Aristides is indebted to the Athenian rhetorical tradition of the fourth century BC and draws from its fund of historical interpretation. He thus understands Marathon as an event of the greatest significance for all of Greece and thus also places the event at the beginning of his account of the past, directly following upon legendary prehistory.⁴⁸ For him, Marathon even becomes the ‘origin of the Hellenes’.⁴⁹ It is worth noting that he speaks of the battle almost exclusively in metaphors that compare the event with the childhood of a man or that mark the beginning of a great development: Through the battle, Athens becomes the ‘mother city of Hellas’; the battle becomes the origin of all further glorious acts by the Hellenes. Such formulae surpass the older Athenian traditions, which had claimed that the battle had been the beginning of the saving of Hellas. In Aelius Aristides’ work Marathon is singled out from the overall context of the real chain of events and monumentalized. In the process new continuities are created: Marathon becomes the starting point of a phase of a particular history, understood as classical and exemplary.

In these images of the past painted by the Second Sophistic, the Athenian orators of the fourth century BC scored their late victory over their former opponents. The position of historical socrage described in the orations is that of Hellenes against Barbarians,⁵⁰ of culture against savagery. Marathon comes to be seen as the earliest evidence of superiority in a confrontation that culminates in the Xerxes campaign, but most importantly is seen as enduring. Marathon is a triumph of Greek valour, the result of positive qualities that are seen as permanent and immutable. For this reason the Second Sophistic describes the battle in ethnically tinted terms of superiority,⁵¹ which become verifiable for the first time through the battle of 490 BC. During a time in which the Panhellenion demanded an ethnically based proof of Greek identity, the rhetoric, in recourse to Marathon, supplied a historical justification of this shared identity – in this way it was possible to draft the idea of identity within the larger world of the Roman imperial era.

In the representation of the past another, new feature is striking: individual protagonists shift into the centre of the narrative of the past; history becomes personalized. Whereas in the tradition of the classical period the battle is a victory of the entire *polis* community, it acquires a different tone in the Second Sophistic. Individual fighters such as

⁴⁸ Ael. Arist. 1.110f., cf. also 1.145 or 2.12.

⁴⁹ Ael. Arist. 1.111.

⁵⁰ Ael. Arist. 1.93, 95, 101; cf. the commentary of C. A. Behr, *P. Aelius Aristides. The complete works, volume II: orations XVII-LIII. Translated into English* (Leiden 1981) 512, 522, 525; P. Veyne, ‘L’identité grecque devant Rome l’empereur’, *REG* 112 (1999) 510-67, at 523-40.

⁵¹ Ael. Arist. 1.109 (Persians) and 1.107-08 (Greeks); for more examples see Jung, *Marathon und Plataiai* (n. 12 above) 211 n. 26.

Cynaigeiros or Callimachus (in Polemon)⁵² or Miltiades (in Aelius Aristides)⁵³ are seen to embody the ideal of *paideia*;⁵⁴ the ethnic superiority of the Greeks as a whole is concentrated in these figures in an exemplary manner. The entire accolade is focused upon the commanders. Polemon's pair of orations, which compare the merits of the common soldiers with those of the polemarchs, represent the deeds of the latter distinctly more advantageously. These outstanding leading figures embody the entire *polis*,⁵⁵ they represent a 'koinon sōma' of the entire community.⁵⁶ That which is characteristic of the *polis*, or of the Greeks as a whole, is expressed in these figures in an exemplary fashion: by means of their superior attainments and culture, the outstanding qualities of their character, and their selfless dedication to the community, these figures are qualified to exercise the responsibilities of leadership. This social type of the outstanding individual figure to which the victory at Marathon can be ascribed is ultimately a role model that was in demand in the world of the *poleis* during the Roman period. In the figures of Callimachus and Miltiades it is possible to discern the idealized self-image of the leading provincial elite, who filled the magistracies and received the honours of their cities for their achievements. The memory of Marathon in this way had an immediately stabilizing effect upon the system: the evocation of a great past with the outstanding achievements of individual persons allowed the Persian victories of the past to be merged into a unity with the provincial present. By means of ethnically coloured metaphors of superiority it was possible to some degree for the entire *polis* community to participate.

In this context Marathon became the heroic prelude to an epoch in which Greek culture and the Greek way of life had prevailed in an exemplary manner against 'barbarian' threats. Understood in this way, Marathon was an integral component of the resistance against the Persians in which the quality of a few men had prevailed against massive numbers. The construction of an epoch seen as 'classical', to which Marathon presented the fanfare-like prelude, was constitutive of this image of history. The time of great men and their heroic deeds, the victory of culture over barbarism – this was an image of the past that was pacifying for the provincial leadership elite in terms of domestic politics and was similarly acceptable to Rome in terms of imperial politics. The few Roman emperors who pursued an active policy with regard to Greece, above all Nero and Hadrian, gladly adopted this image by representing their own fights against the Parthians as a rematch of the fight of culture against barbarism (as Nero did)⁵⁷ or by using this image of the heroic past in order to implement new political approaches to the establishment of identity on the provincial level (like Hadrian with the Panhellenion,

⁵² Polem. 2.18-20.

⁵³ Ael. Arist. 3.156, 159.

⁵⁴ See T. Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht. Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (Munich 1997 = Zetemata 97) 67.

⁵⁵ Ael. Arist. 3.199.

⁵⁶ Polem. 2.15.

⁵⁷ Cf. IG II², 3277; see A. Spawforth, 'Symbol of unity? The Persian-wars tradition in the Roman empire', in *Greek historiography*, ed. S. Hornblower (Oxford 1994) 233-47.

which was intended in particular as an offer of integration to the eastern half of the empire, which was less strongly represented among the senatorial leadership).⁵⁸

A coherent historical image was thus available by the end of antiquity: the selective privileging of Athenian sources had successfully displaced other interpretations of the battle of Marathon. Marathon was the historic prelude to the ‘Persian Wars’ and thus conceptually an integral component of the underlying historical interpretation. At Marathon quality had prevailed in an exemplary manner over quantity, culture over barbarism. And at that moment, Greece, even all of Europe, had been saved from the massive numbers and the ‘barbarian’ slavery of Asia. The Second Sophistic had added a new element: Marathon was the victory of great men, the success of the individual merit of born leaders against an anonymous horde. The figures of Miltiades and Callimachus were thus available as exemplary identification figures adopted only too willingly by the liberal, ‘classically’ educated elite of a philhellenic century in modern Europe. Through the Second Sophistic, the image of Marathon acquired in antiquity first became capable of transfer – only here could be found the additional crucial elements that would make the surprising nineteenth-century renaissance of this interpretation possible. It was in antiquity that, by means of a long discourse, an initially ‘insignificant skirmish on the beach’ had been transformed into an undisputed triumph of civilization over barbarism, of class over mass, and of Europe over Asia.

⁵⁸ See C. P. Jones, ‘The Panhellenion’, *Chiron* 26 (1996) 29-56; P. Kuhlmann, *Religion und Erinnerung. Die Religionspolitik Kaiser Hadrians und ihre Rezeption in der antiken Literatur* (Göttingen 2002 = Formen der Erinnerung 12) 88-89.

MARATHON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSIAN WARS IN POST-ANTIQUE TIMES

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In his contribution,¹ Michael Jung has demonstrated how in ancient historiography the battle of Marathon was more and more closely connected to the Greco-Persian confrontations of the years 480/79, until eventually a coherent conception of history had developed: Marathon had become an integral part of a series of events that was summed up under the term of the ‘Persian Wars’ and from then on only perceived as a single entity. The explanations of Michael Jung have also shown that the construction of the Persian Wars was not simply about the combination of historio-political facts and events. The image of the Persian Wars was much rather ideologically charged from the very beginning. The epigram found on a *stele* recording the citizens of the *phyle* Erechtheis who had fallen at Marathon, which originally seems to have been set up at the grave mound in Marathon and much later in the villa of Herodes Atticus in Loukou, already bears witness to this. This text, being the oldest surviving written document concerning the battle of Marathon, celebrates the victory over the Persians as a successful battle of ‘the few against the many’.² This battle of the few against the many very soon turned into a battle defending the liberty of the Hellenes against enslavement and despotism by the barbarians, to be then – also following closely upon the actual events – in the real sense of the word ‘located’ as an east-west conflict between Asia and Europe. In this way a consistent concept of interpretation had formed at the end of antiquity which was transferable also to later centuries.

The reception of ancient literature and historiography in the Middle Ages and modern times allowed these notions of the Persian Wars to become an integral part of Byzantine and European education. However, the availability of such knowledge does not simultaneously mean its ideological instrumentalization. Only the existence of a comparability – often merely alleged – makes the use of a historical example as an interpretive pattern for each period possible. With the end of antiquity the battle of Marathon for a long time lost its function as a point of reference in *living* memory. A political recollection of the

¹ M. Jung, ‘Marathon and the construction of the Persian Wars in antiquity’, in this volume pp. 255-66; a shortened version of the following remarks can be found in P. Funke and M. Jung, ‘Marathon’, in *Europäische Erinnerungsorte*, ed. P. den Boer, H. Duchhardt, G. Kreis, and W. Schmale (Munich 2012) II 57-63.

² G. Steinhauer, ‘Σστίγη πεσόντων τῆς Ερεχθίδος’, *Horos* 17-21 (2004-09) 679-92; G. Spyropoulos, *Οι Στίγες των πεσόντων στη μάχη του Μαραθώνα από την έπαυλη του Ηρώδη Αττικού στην Εθα Κοινοβρίας* (Athens 2009); W. Ameling, ‘Die Gefallenen der Phyle Erechtheis im Jahre 490 v. Chr.’, *ZPE* 176 (2011) 10-23; cf. also the contribution of A. Petrovic in this volume, pp. 45-61.

Persian Wars arising from the prevailing circumstances occurred only at a surprisingly late time. Therefore the reactivation of the interpretation of these events which was already laid out in ancient transmission was not at all part of an undiminished and constant tradition since antiquity.

The Byzantines considered themselves above all as the direct successors of the Romans and thought of themselves not as ‘Hellenes’ but as ‘Rhom(a)ioi’ / ‘Romans’.³ Nevertheless ancient Greek history in its entirety was present in educated thought. But although ancient Greece was a topic of discussion in academic discourse, it had next to no effect on contemporary political debates. Even concerning the time of the dramatic breakdown of the Byzantine Empire’s power since the end of the eleventh century there are hardly any attempts to politically instrumentalize ancient Greek history. The desperate battles against the attacks of the Ottomans were also no incentive to use the Persian Wars above all as a historical comparison. What seems obvious now was strange to Byzantine political thought. The history of ancient Greece including the Persian Wars remained historical reminiscences, which, although vivid and omnipresent, were only rudimentarily used as historical argument in dealing with the political problems of each time. If used, it was in a manner of surrender rather than resistance.⁴ No sign of the offensive and aggressive character that marks the use of the motif of the Persian Wars in nineteenth century philhellenism can be found yet.

The works of Michael Choniates clarify this exemplarily.⁵ In about the mid-twelfth century he had completed an academic education by his teacher Eustathios, who had awakened in him a great enthusiasm for Greek antiquity. When Michael Choniates assumed the office of metropolitan bishop of Athens in 1182 his expectations were accordingly high. In his inaugural speech he therefore reported with great excitement that many had envied him for becoming the metropolitan bishop of much-praised and golden Athens.⁶ However, he came to realize very quickly that nothing was left of the old splendour of classical Athens. During the following twenty years he complained bitterly in many speeches about the decline of the city. The city, he said, was merely a heap of rubble with no signs of her former glory. Time had campaigned against the good things of the city more barbarically than the Persians. In his address of 1183 to the *Praitor*, the Byzantine administrator of Hellas and the Peloponnese, Michael Choniates gives Athens herself a voice and has her ask for help:

³ Cf. A. Garzya, ‘Byzantium’, in *Perceptions of the ancient Greeks*, ed. K. J. Dover (Oxford 1992) 29-53.

⁴ A. Rhoby, *Reminiszenzen an antike Stätten in der mittel- und spätbyzantinischen Literatur. Eine Untersuchung zur Antikenrezeption in Byzanz*, Göttinger Studien zur byzantinischen und neugriechischen Philologie 1 (Göttingen 2003).

⁵ On the following see Rhoby, *Reminiszenzen* (n. 4 above) 24-72; cf. also F. Kolovou, ed., *Michaelis Choniatae Epistulae*, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 41 (Berlin 2001) 3-10; A. Kaldellis, ‘Historicism in Byzantine thought and literature’, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 61 (2007) 1-24, at 11-13.

⁶ *Ed. Lampros* 1.93-106; cf. A. Rhoby, ‘Studien zur Antrittsrede des Michael Choniates in Athen’, *Göttinger Beiträge zur byzantinischen und neugriechischen Philologie* 2 (2002) 83-111.

Ἦδε ἐγὼ ἡ τλήμων, ἡ πάλαι μὲν μήτηρ σοφίας καὶ παντοδαπῆς καὶ πάσης καθεγεμὼν ἀρετῆς, ἡ πεζομαχίαις καὶ ναυμαχίαις Πέρσας πολλακίς καταστρατηγήσασα, νῦν δὲ σκαφιδίοις ὀλίγοις πειρατικοῖς καταπολεμουμένη καὶ ληϊζομένη τὰ ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ πάντα· [...] Ἄγε γοῦν δός μοι χεῖρα χαμαὶ κειμένη, κινδυνεύουσα βοήθησον, νεκρουμένην ἀναζωπύρωσον, ἵνα ττ Θεμιστοκλεῖ καὶ Μιλτιάδῃ καὶ ττ δικαίῳ Ἀριστείδῃ ἐγγράψω σε, [...].

Here I am, miserable one, once mother of all wisdom and leader of all virtues, I, who have often conquered the Persians on land and sea, but now I am being maltreated by pirates and robbed of all that lies by the sea... Offer your hand to me who lies on the ground, help me, who is faced by such danger, revive me, who is already dead, so that I can rank you among Themistokles, Miltiades, and the just Aristides...⁷

In another oration Michael Choniates complains that Dareios, Xerxes, and Mardonios could not have conquered the city. The Athenian soldiers fighting on sea and land could not have barred the Persians from Europe, he said, but they had succeeded in forcing the Persians back to Asia and their own tribes. But this Athens of old did not exist anymore.⁸

A good hundred years later Demetrios Pepagmenos must have been moved by similar emotions when at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries he came to Athens and his hopes were disappointed in just the same way that Michael Choniates had experienced.⁹ The scholar Johannes Chortasmenos subsequently tried to console him in a letter:

Καὶ πρὸ τῆς σῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἠπιστάμην, ὅτι τὰς ἱερὰς Ἀθήνας εὐρήσεις οὐδὲν ἀμείνους, ἢ ὅτε ταύτας ἐνεπύρισε Ξέρξης ἐν ττ πολέμῳ λαβὼν [...]. καὶ Ἀθηναίων τὰ σεμνὰ ἐκεῖνα καὶ φοβερὰ διηγήματα εἰς τὸ μηδὲν περιέστη τανῦν, καὶ εἰ μὴ δι' Ἀριστείδην καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς Παναθηναίοις ποιηθέντα λόγον ἐκεῖνον οὐδόλως ἂν ἦν ἐν μνήμῃ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ πόλις. οὕτω κατωρχήσατο καὶ ταύτης ὁ χρόνος, ὡς εἶναι νῦν θέαμα ἔλεεινόν, εἰ τις εἰς αὐτὴν ἀφορῶν Μιλτιάδου καὶ Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ καταλόγου τρωφίμων αὐτῆς μεμνημένος.

Even before your letter I knew that you would encounter holy Athens in a state no better than when Xerxes captured it and destroyed it by fire... The only reason why the city of Athens remains in the memory of men is Aristides and his Panathenaic Oration. Time has mocked her also to such an extent that today she offers a pitiful spectacle for him who upon seeing her thinks of Miltiades, Themistocles, and the other leading men.¹⁰

⁷ Ed. Lampros 1.147.17-148; quoted according to Rhoby, *Reminiszenzen* (n. 4 above) 44-45.

⁸ Ed. Lampros 1.316.8-16; quoted according to Rhoby, *Reminiszenzen* (n. 4 above) 65.

⁹ G. Pfeiffer, *Studien zur Frühphase des europäischen Philhellenismus (1453-1750)* (Diss. Erlangen 1969) 43-45; cf. also Rhoby, *Reminiszenzen* (n. 4 above) 243-46.

¹⁰ Quoted according to Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 43; cf. H. Hunger, *Johannes Chortasmenos (ca. 1370 - ca. 1436/37). Briefe, Gedichte und kleine Schriften. Einleitung, Regesten, Prosopographie, Text*, Wiener Byzantinische Studien 7 (Wien 1969) 200 [Letter No. 44, 2-12].

Chortasmenos then goes on to say that Constantinople had received an inheritance from Athens, therefore there was no need to despair at Athens. Athens would be at the side of Byzantium, if Byzantium took the leading men of Athens as teachers. Chortasmenos calls upon his friend: ‘Therefore you too leave Athens that is now visible only in her foundations... and quickly come to the second Athens’.¹¹ A significant turning point is reflected in these words. Consciously the ‘recollection of Athens as spiritual home (was sought)... The connection to Hellenic tradition becomes the concern of the last Byzantines while the last remains of the Roman Empire fall apart before their eyes’.¹² Through the increasing community and national awareness among the Greeks, Constantinople turned from a second Rome to a second Athens.¹³

This makes the fact even more surprising that the final fall of Constantinople in 1453 also failed to provoke a comparison with the ancient Persian Wars. On the contrary, the Byzantine historian Kritobulos of Imbros dedicated his historical work to the conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmet II, and honoured him explicitly as a ‘philhellene’ who had distinguished himself by his great interest in the ancient Greek inheritance.¹⁴ This point of view is at first sight surprising. However, it corresponds with a perception entirely strange to us now, namely that the Turks were thought of as the direct descendants of the Trojans. The ‘Turci’ were identified with the ‘Teuceri’ of Vergil.¹⁵ Thus the sack of Constantinople seemed to be a late and above all just revenge for the destruction of Troy with which the Occident felt closely connected in many ways.¹⁶ This notion was deeply rooted in the thought of that time. The humanist Silvio Piccolomini, later Pope Pius II, therefore had little success in his efforts to call for a new crusade against the Turks. With great emphasis he opposed the image of the Turks as descendants of the Trojans. Instead, he stylized the Turks as progeny of the Scythians and gave them every barbaric character trait imaginable.¹⁷ In doing so Silvio Piccolomini took up reminiscences of the Persian

¹¹ Quoted according to Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 44; cf. Hunger, *Johannes Chortasmenos* (n. 10 above) 200 [Letter No. 44].

¹² Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 44.

¹³ Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 46; Rhoby, *Reminiszenzen* (n. 4 above) 246–47.

¹⁴ D. R. Reinsch, ed., *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 22 (Berlin 1989) 3–9 [Letter to Mehmet]; 128 [*Hist.* 3.9.6]; cf. also Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 47–48.

¹⁵ M. Meserve, ‘Medieval sources for Renaissance theories on the origins of the Ottoman Turks’, in *Europa und die Türken in der Renaissance*, ed. B. Guthmüller and W. Kühlmann (Tübingen 2000) 409–36; M. Borgolte, ‘Europas Geschichte und Troia. Der Mythos im Mittelalter’, in *Troia. Traum und Wirklichkeit*, ed. Archäologisches Landesmuseum Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart 2001) 190–203; H.-J. Gehrke, ‘Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man intentionale Geschichte? Marathon und Troja als fundierende Mythen’, in *Gründungsmythen, Genealogien, Memorialzeichen. Beiträge zur institutionellen Konstruktion von Kontinuität*, ed. G. Melville and K. S. Rehberg (Cologne 2004) 21–36, at 30–35.

¹⁶ Kritoboulos of Imbros has Mehmet II justify the conquest of Constantinople with the destruction of Troy by the Hellenes, Macedonians, Thessalians, and Peloponnesians; he had now punished their descendants for this outrage. See Reinsch (ed.), *Critobuli* (n. 14 above) 170 (*Hist.* 4.11.6); cf. Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 50.

¹⁷ Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 50–56.

Wars but only to cast the Persians in an even more negative light. He claimed that the Turks were much worse than the Persians. All conquerors of Greece so far had not been enemies, but rather admirers of literature: 'Xerxes and Darius who once afflicted Greece with great defeats, waged war against men not books'.¹⁸ The Turks, however, would burn all books and in this way destroy the ancient inheritance of the Occident.

Neither in the context of the sack of Constantinople nor in the following era of the Turkish Wars in Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can a noteworthy instrumentalization of the Persian Wars be recorded. However, this picture changes gradually in the course of the seventeenth century. The historical examples of Greek antiquity and especially of the Persian Wars increasingly became an argument in contemporary political discourse and did not remain merely academic reminiscences. An early and little-known example is a poem by Johannes Wülfer of the year 1669. The capture of Crete by the Turks may have been an occasion for this poem written by Wülfer when he was eighteen.¹⁹ He dedicated long passages to naming the achievements of ancient Greece, from whom the whole world had profited, he claims, in the areas of language, philosophy, legislation, medicine, and natural sciences. All this matches older poetry and still corresponds with the traditional canon of education. What is new is the subsequent turning into a concrete political demand directed at the 'Kings of the West' actively to support Hellas in the battle for the recovery of liberty. Here antiquity is again called upon: the Greeks, he claims, were always ready for a battle, just like in the era of Miltiades and Themistocles, Kimon and Konon.

However, the poetry of Johannes Wülfer found little resonance.²⁰ Nevertheless, with his demands he was an early representative of a philhellenism beginning in the seventeenth century that in subsequent times became the driving force for a political recollection of Greek antiquity and especially of the Persian Wars. The European enlightenment of the eighteenth century, which reinforced the propagation of the new ideal of liberty with a strong backwards reference to Greek antiquity, was a decisive precursor for this *volte-face* into the political sphere. The essential requirements were here created so that at the beginning of the nineteenth century a trans-European philhellenic movement was able to instrumentalize the ancient Persian Wars politically to such an extent that they turned into the decisive historical reference point for the Greek war of liberation.²¹ The philosophy of the enlightenment took up again the dichotomic notion

¹⁸ 'Xerxes et Darius qui quondam magnis cladibus Graeciam afflixere, bellum viris non literis intulerunt'. Enea Silvio Piccolomini in a letter to Nikolaus of Cues; quoted according to Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 54.

¹⁹ For the complete text see Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 243-55.

²⁰ Pfeiffer, *Studien* (n. 9 above) 210-17, who examined this poem in-depth, therefore comes to the conclusion: 'Wir sehen deutlich, wie wenig ernst man diesen deutlichen Ausdruck des Philhellenismus im 17. Jahrhundert nahm. Man war gelehrt, man „besaß“ die Griechen in seinen Büchern, Enthusiasmus war nicht am Platz. Es waren und blieben Einzelne, die den humanistischen Gedanken der Dankesschuld gegen die Antike mit dem Schicksal des modernen Griechenland konfrontierten' (217).

²¹ Fundamental on this is F. Löbker, *Antike Topoi in der deutschen Philhellenenliteratur. Untersuchungen zur Antikenrezeption in der Zeit des griechischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges (1821-1829)*, Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 106 (Munich 2000).

already developed in antiquity of the Persian Wars as a battle between liberty and despotism and intensified it, so that in the early nineteenth century Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in his *Philosophie der Geschichte* could get to the heart of this body of thought. During the Persian Wars ‘the interest of world history [...] was lying on the scale. Oriental despotism, a world united under one ruler, and on the opposite side a set of states, divided as well as inferior in size and resources, but animated by free individuality, were confronting each other’.²² Therefore the Greek victories were ‘world historical victories: they saved the education and the intellectual force and deprived the Asiatic concept of all power’.²³

Inspired by the thought of the enlightenment, ancient models were eagerly taken up also during the French Revolution, and the Persian Wars above all were drawn upon to provide a historical example. One illustration out of plenty may here suffice. When in 1793 a movement of dechristianization spread in France, the citizens of the town of Saint-Maximin brought forward a motion to change their town’s name to ‘Marathon’. They justified their motion in this way:

Représentants,

Vous avez décrété que les villes qui portent des noms superstitieux doivent en changer. Les sans-culottes de Saint-Maximin ont toujours saisi avec avidité tout ce qui peut contribuer à la ruine des préjugés religieux et royalistes.... Marathon est le nom que nous avons pris: ce nom sacré nous rappelle la plaine athénienne qui devint le tombeau de cent mille satellites; mais il nous rappelle avec encore plus de douceur la mémoire de l’ami du peuple. Marat est tombé victime des fédéralistes et des intrigants. Puisse le nom que nous prenons contribuer à éterniser ses vertus et son civisme.²⁴

Representatives,

You have decreed that cities with superstitious names have to change them. The sans-culottes of Saint-Maximin have always seized anything with avidity that could contribute to the ruin of religious or royalist prejudices [...]. Marathon is the name which we have chosen: that sacred name will remind us of the Athenian plain which became the tomb of a hundred thousand satellites; but it will remind us with even more sweetness of the friend of the people. Marat has fallen victim to the federalists and intriguers. May the name that we take on contribute to immortalize his virtue and his public spirit.

²² ‘hat das Interesse der Weltgeschichte ... auf der Waagschale gelegen. Es standen gegeneinander der orientalische Despotismus, also eine unter einem Herrn vereinigte Welt, und auf der anderen Seite geteilte und an Umfang und Mitteln geringe Staaten, welche aber von freier Individualität belebt waren’. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (Frankfurt 1986) 315.

²³ ‘welthistorische Siege: sie haben die Bildung und die geistige Macht gerettet und dem asiatischen Prinzip alle Kraft entzogen’. Hegel, *Vorlesungen* (n. 22 above) 314.

²⁴ Quoted from C. Mossé, *L’antiquité dans la révolution française* (Paris 1989) 133-34.

Marat, who had fallen victim to a political murder, was in this way supposed to be stylized into a new Miltiades and the town's name was to remind people of his merit.²⁵ Marathon and the Persian Wars had become the memorial site of a new European liberation movement. The dictum of John Stuart Mill is distinctive: 'The Battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings. If the issue of that day had been different, the Britons and the Saxons might still have been wandering in the woods'.²⁶

This idealization of the Persian Wars as historical example for a struggle for freedom to be waged anew was consistent with the ancient tradition. It created the main preconditions for the Persian Wars to be instrumentalized by the trans-European philhellenic movement to such an extent that they became the principal historical reference point for the Greek war of liberation and Marathon was made a *lieu de mémoire* far beyond the borders of Greece.²⁷ At the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a flood of writings and books that were shaped by always the same philhellenic mindset and sought to surpass each other with their comparisons regarding the Persian Wars. Johann Gottfried Heynig composed already in 1801 a piece of writing with the title *Europa's Pflicht, die Türken wieder nach Asien zu treiben und Griechenland mit unserer christlichen Welt zu vereinigen*.²⁸ In this piece of work, which was reprinted in 1821,²⁹ not only was the contrast of Christianity and Islam, freedom and despotism addressed, but at the same time the Persian Wars and ancient Greece were also referred to with the purpose of reinforcing the demand that Greece as the cradle of European culture not be lost to the Greeks.³⁰ The same theme can also be found in contemporary literary work: Friedrich Hölderlin sought in the Greeks of his time the successors of the victors of Marathon and Salamis;³¹ Percy Bysshe Shelley composed his lyrical drama *Hellas* about

²⁵ Cf. Mossé, *L'antiquité* (n. 24 above) 133-40; H. R. Goette and Th. M. Weber, *Marathon. Siedlungskammer und Schlachtfeld – Sommerfrische und olympische Wettkampfstätte* (Mainz 2004) 3-4.

²⁶ J. S. Mill, 'Grote's History of Greece I', in *Essays on philosophy and the classics*, ed. J. M. Robson, with intro. by F. E. Sparshott, *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* 11 (Toronto and London 1978 [1846]) 271-96, at 271.

²⁷ Löbker, *Antike Topoi* (n. 21 above) 92-156; David Roessel, *In Byron's shadow: modern Greece in the English and American imagination* (Oxford 2002); M. Flashar, 'Die Sieger von Marathon – Zwischen Mythisierung und Vorbildlichkeit', in *Retrospektive. Konzepte von Vergangenheit in der griechisch-römischen Antike*, ed. M. Flashar, H.-J. Gehrke, and E. Heinrich (Munich 1996) 63-85, at 74-78; H.-J. Gehrke, 'Marathon. A European charter myth', *Palamedes* 2 (2007) 93-108.

²⁸ J. G. Heynig, *Europa's Pflicht, die Türken wieder nach Asien zu treiben, und Griechenland mit dem Occident zu vereinigen* (Leipzig 1801).

²⁹ Tellingly under the slightly altered title: J. G. Heynig, *Europa's Pflicht, die Türken wieder nach Asien zu treiben, und Griechenland mit unserer christlichen Welt zu vereinigen. Zum zweiten Mal dargestellt* (Dessau 1821).

³⁰ Heynig, *Europa's Pflicht* (n. 29 above) esp. 35-39; cf. Löbker, *Antike Topoi* (n. 21 above) 100-17.

³¹ C. M. Güthenke, *Placing modern Greece. The dynamics of Romantic Hellenism, 1770-1840* (Oxford 2008); cf. also K. Theile, *Historizität und Utopie. Quellenkritische und konzeptionell-strukturelle Aspekte des Griechenbildes in Hölderlins Hyperion* (Frankfurt etc. 1997); A. Honold, *Nach Olympia*.

the Greek battle of liberation as ‘a sort of imitation of the Persae of Aeschylus’,³² and Lord Byron’s poetry is crowded with memories of the battle of Marathon and the Persian Wars.³³ The political philhellenism of the nineteenth century played a key role in the breakthrough of the modern adaptation of the Persian Wars’ ancient construction.³⁴

The political connotations that were associated with the battle of Marathon particularly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shape the lasting conception of history until today. However, the rigid dichotomic image already laid out in ancient tradition obstructs the view of the true historical relevance of the Persian Wars and especially the Battle of Marathon. This battle, although not the ‘birth cry of Europe’ as John F. C. Fuller called it,³⁵ was not merely an ‘insignificant little skirmish on the beach’³⁶ of Marathon, as Theopompos already in the 4th century BC tried to make us believe,³⁷ and as today is once more claimed by those who attempt to deconstruct the traditions about the battle of Marathon by every means.

In the text of the epigram on the grave *stèle* found in Loukou mentioned above the real importance of this battle is tangible. For the Athenians, this unexpected victory of ‘the few against the many’ meant a substantial strengthening of their civic self-confidence, shortly after the Athenian civic state had been put on a new basis by the reforms of Cleisthenes, which enabled the elaboration of a democratic constitution. In this way the battle of Marathon was at the same time also a decisive step for the ‘Greek discovery of politics’.³⁸ Viewed from this perspective the battle of Marathon may after all denote one of the roots of modern Europe.

Hölderlin und die Erfindung der Antike (Berlin 2002); M. J. Schäfer, *Szenischer Materialismus. Dionysische Theatralität zwischen Hölderlin und Hegel* (Vienna 2003).

³² ‘... I am just finishing a dramatic poem, called Hellas, upon the contest now raging in Greece, a sort of imitation of the Persae of Aeschylus, full of lyrical poetry’ (Letter to John Gisborne, dated 22 October 1821, quoted in P. B. Shelley, *Hellas. A lyrical drama*. With the author’s prologue and notes by Dr Garnett and Mary W. Shelley, ed. Th. J. Wise [London 1886], xii.) Cf. E. Hall, ‘Aeschylus’ *Persians* via the Ottoman Empire to Saddam Hussein’, in *Cultural responses to the Persian Wars. Antiquity to the third millennium*, ed. E. Bridges, E. Hall, and P. J. Rhodes (Oxford 2007) 167-99, at 180-84.

³³ T. Rood, ‘From Marathon to Waterloo. Byron, battle monuments, and the Persian Wars’, in *Cultural responses*, ed. Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes (n. 32 above) 267-97, at 285-93.

³⁴ The lines of development right up until the present are excellently described in A. Albertz, *Exemplarisches Heldentum. Die Rezeptionsgeschichte der Schlacht an den Thermopylen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit 17 (München 2006) 124-362 (with further literature).

³⁵ J. F. C. Fuller, *The decisive battles of the western world, and their influence upon history*, 3 vols (London 1954-56), I (1954) 25.

³⁶ Plut. *Mor.* 862D.

³⁷ Cf. Jung, ‘Marathon’ (n. 1 above).

³⁸ Chr. Meier, *The Greek discovery of politics* (Cambridge, MA 1990); cf. also P. Funke, ‘Wendezeit und Zeitenwende: Athens Aufbruch zur Demokratie’, in *Gab es das griechische Wunder? Griechenland zwischen dem Ende des 6. und der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Tagungsbeiträge des 16. Fachsymposiums der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung vom 5. bis 9. April 1999 in Freiburg im Breisgau*, ed. D. Papenfuß and V. M. Strocka (Mainz 2001) 1-20.

MOVING TARGETS, MODERN CONTESTS: MARATHON AND CULTURAL MEMORY

LORNA HARDWICK

The main aim of this paper is to examine in what guises Marathon entered the Athenian cultural memory and the patterns that it inscribed into future perspectives in Greece and the wider world, especially those concerning the ‘ownership’ and emblematic significance of past events. Within antiquity Marathon is one among several significant examples of how generational distance progressively brings together several phases in the construction of memory and its social, political, and cultural use.¹ Post-antiquity Marathon has continued to provide a major strand in constructions of strongly charged narratives of identity and value. Here, my emphasis will be on historiography and especially on the problematic aspects of Marathon and its situation in Athenian history. These frame ways of reading the ‘idea of Marathon’ and associated aspects of its modern reception.

The associations between Marathon and victory against invaders have made it a seductive image for appropriation in other contexts, for example to promote and eulogize civic values, military solidarity, and communal heroism, to say nothing of justifying cultural and political hegemonies or providing a basis for polarization between different ethnic or national groups. However, the ancient sources also suggest that, within a few years of the battle, Marathon was recognized not only as a field constructed by political manipulation and exploited by subsequent leaders but also as a rich vein for community memory – pliable and liable to parody as well as to eulogy.

I have selected some twentieth-century examples of the persistence and transferability of the image of Marathon in west European cultures. These contribute some particularly interesting elements to models of classical receptions that are based on ‘thickness’, that is on concepts of the braiding of accretions, repressions, and transformations contributed by the different contexts and forms through which the ancient events have been mediated.

I also suggest that the ‘critical distance’ offered by analysis of Marathon and of the lenses through which it is seen also provides insights into the processes through which events that take place in ‘history’ are assimilated, first to subjective and experiential memory, then collectively into social memory and then mediated into political and cultural memories which can then mutate into mythologies of the past.² This in turn raises questions about the insights that emerge, especially into the relationships between ancient texts and modern hermeneutics. How is the ‘truth value’ to be negotiated and renegotiated in the face of the ‘symbolic’ value? What difference is made by this kind of shift?

¹ For Roman examples see C. Walde, ‘Lucans *Bellum Civile*: a specimen of a Roman “Literature of Trauma”’, ch. 14 in *Brill’s companion to Lucan*, ed. P. Asso (Leiden and Boston 2011) 283-302.

² See A. Assmann, ‘Memory, individual and collective’, in *The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis*, ed. R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly (Oxford 2006) 210-24.

Introduction: the contexts to 2010/11

The years 2010 and 2011 are my starting point because they provide a snapshot of the sometimes contradictory ways in which Marathon sits in the modern consciousness. How Marathon has been used in Anglophone culture in the period that marks the 2,500th anniversary of the battle is sometimes as revealing of modern sensibilities and aspirations as it is of the ancient. Nevertheless, it is true that there has also been a renewed interest in the historical details of the battle, together with some attempts at reconstructions. Some of these have focussed on military history and in particular on the battle practices of hoplite formations; others have privileged the importance of place, not only in terms of topography and in debates about the precise location of the battle (coastal or inland) but also in associations with cultural memory. Some new semi-popular accounts have been published. These have tended to pick up, in various ways, on earlier treatments that situated Marathon in a foundational narrative of western European power and disseminated this into the public imagination. An example from the late twentieth-century is Louis L. Snyder's 1971 book *Great turning points in history*.³ This devoted five pages to the battle of Marathon, situating it alongside twenty-four other examples, including 'The Crucifixion of Jesus'; 'The Flight of Muhammed from Mecca to Medina'; 'Magna Carta 1215'; 'The Fall of the Bastille'; 'Stanley meets Livingstone 1871'; 'The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima 1945' (the last entry). The entries were arranged chronologically so that they not only provided iconic examples but also welded these into some kind of implied narrative. Snyder explained his approach: 'a turning point in history is an event, happening on stage, which thrusts the course of historical development into a different direction ... by definition a turning point is a great event ... with the explosive impact of altering the trend of man's life on this planet'.⁴ However, the list was not confined to physical 'events'. It also included 'The Invention of Printing and the Communist Manifesto (1847-8)'. Snyder's view was that 'objective' history should be presented as a chronicle and that discussion of causation or interpretation 'sacrifices impartiality'.⁵ His account of the battle of Marathon was based on Herodotus' version, from which he quoted. Although Snyder recognized 'turning points' in the histories of early Egypt and Mesopotamia, he asserted that as the result of the battle of Marathon, 'civilization moved westward instead of toward the Near Orient' and that 'the Persian Wars resulted in the triumph of Greek civilization over the oriental, in the development of Greek unity and in the spread through western Europe of the free Greek spirit as opposed to oriental authoritarianism. This was truly a major turning point in the history of civilization'.⁶ Snyder also pointed out that '[f]or the Greeks the glory of the Marathon warriors never faded', citing the epitaph of Aeschylus as an example of a major figure who wanted to be remembered for his participation in the battle.⁷

The organizing principles of Snyder's approach may have been superseded by changes in the approach to historiography (both ancient and modern) as well as by a more cautious

³ L. L. Snyder, *Great turning points in history* (New York 1971).

⁴ Snyder, *Great turning points* (n. 3 above) 1.

⁵ Snyder, *Great turning points* (n. 3 above) 3.

⁶ Snyder, *Great turning points* (n. 3 above) 9.

⁷ Snyder, *Great turning points* (n. 3 above) 9.

attitude towards western triumphalism, but the main perspectives that he used have persisted into more recent popular histories as well as providing material for academic debates. What is interesting is the extent and the manner in which the Marathon literature of 2010/11 challenges the simplistic polarities of Western/Eastern identity and history that were so prominent in Snyder. Although these can be shown to recur in ways that are fundamentally vindicatory of 'western civilization' (even in discussions that appear to take a more open view), there are some significant shifts in perspective.⁸

2010 saw the publication of further books intended for the general reader, notably Richard A Billows' *Marathon: how one battle changed western civilization*.⁹ The title is a significant aspect of the book, perhaps indicating assumptions about the world view of the target readership. The actual discussion, however, locates the battle in a broad swathe of Greek history and includes detailed discussion of the battle itself, the disagreements among the generals and the aftermath, with quite extensive reference to the ancient sources. In reviewing Billows' book and the more academic focus in Peter Krentz's *The battle of Marathon*, which was published in the Yale Library of Military History,¹⁰ P. J. Rhodes drew attention to the fact that '[b]oth books end by asking "What if?"' He contrasted Billows' itemization of Athenian achievements that might not have occurred if the Persians had conquered Greece with Krentz's perspectives on an Athens under the domination of Persian-backed tyrants (including Pericles) and, provocatively, an alternative scenario in which the Athenians held back from fighting until the arrival of the Spartans.¹¹

Diverse perspectives on Marathon I: modern scholarship and society

The formulation of different forms of the 'What if?' question that is now increasingly prevalent in modern discussion of the past, is significant. It underlay discussion in the *Forum: Marathon 2500* section published by the journal *Arion* in 2011.¹² This included essays by the academics Herbert Golder, Paul Cartledge, and Loren J. Samons II as well as a meditation by Stamatis N. Astra on his experiences in participating in 'My Marathon Journey' and the impact on him of the route taken (psychological as well as physical). He ran the race to 'Save the Classics' and raise money for *Arion* and other classical causes. Astra recorded, 'At the 5th kilometre I found my past'¹³ ... then at the tenth 'I found the immigrants'. At the thirtieth 'my sense of humour'; at the thirty-fifth 'I found friendship', and at the fortieth 'I found my culture' – an allusion perhaps to the cultural dimension of the Greek diaspora's participation in the construction of the idea of the modern Greek

⁸ C. Prendergast, 'The price of the modern: Walter Benjamin and counterfactuals', in *Tradition, translation, trauma: the classic and the modern*, ed. J. Parker and T. Mathews (Oxford 2011) 143-53.

⁹ Richard A. Billows, *Marathon: how one battle changed western civilization* (New York 2010).

¹⁰ Peter Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (New Haven 2010).

¹¹ P. J. Rhodes, review of: Billows, *Marathon* (n. 8 above) and Krentz, *The battle of Marathon* (n. 9 above), in *The Anglo-Hellenic Review* 43 (2011) 20.

¹² *Forum: Marathon 2500*, in *Arion* 3rd series, 18.3 (2011).

¹³ Stamatis N. Astra, 'My Marathon journey', in *Forum: Marathon 2500* (n. 11 above) 159.

state.¹⁴ The sequence of the *Arion* papers neatly communicates a kind of ring composition, which starts from a position of love of classical culture and aspirations for its future survival, then reconceptualizes it to include those ‘liberal’ elements and affective associations that domesticate it to his present and then on reaching the goal at the end of the ‘run’ elides past and present histories into an energizing concept of foundational culture, associated with place and Greek heritage but communicated through a lens of present awareness.

Thus Astra’s experience gave an experiential validation to the essay by Golder that opens the sequence.¹⁵ Golder initially set out the vindictory framework that ‘[i]n both substance and symbol, this victory was and is one of freedom over tyranny. Had the Persians ... won the day, the world we now inhabit might never have come to be. Athens would have been another subject territory of Persia and not the birthplace of the liberal habits of mind from which Western Civilization arose’.¹⁶ Golder’s ‘twist’ was not, however, confined to the ‘liberal values’ accretion. He pointed out that it is in Plutarch that Pheidippides’ run is from the battlefield to Athens, but that in Herodotus he runs to Sparta for help. According to Golder, the real achievement was the run by Athenian soldiers, ‘still in amour and some wounded’ who made their way back to Athens to protect the city – ‘the ordinary men who performed a miracle at Marathon and then brought home and saved a dream called Athens’.¹⁷ Thus Golder locates in the past the ‘dream’ that he has himself redefined in terms of modern liberal western values and thus turns it into a historical sanction for the present.

The messiness of the fifth-century historical context is explored in Samons’ essay. This emphasizes the lack of united opposition to Persia, and points out that many subject allies of Persia were Greek and that the later collaboration of, e.g., Thebes and Argos was a touchy subject in inter-*poleis* relations.¹⁸ This leads to another problematic aspect which, according to Samons, was the divisions of opinion within individual *poleis* as to whether Persia should be resisted, assisted, or accommodated. Even though Marathon left the Athenians with the reputation of being the first mainland Greeks to meet and defeat the Persians, both before and after the battle some Athenians ‘flirted’ with the idea of peace with Persia. Ostraca from the time show that being thought to be too powerful could be conflated with being ‘pro-Persian’, with candidates for ostracism being described as ‘the Mede’ or represented in Persian clothing.¹⁹ Samons interprets the internal tensions among the Athenians (and especially the alliance between tyrants and common people against aristocrats) as a cause of Miltiades’ suggestion that the Athenians should resist at Marathon in case the city’s gates might be opened to the Persians, as was the case with

¹⁴ S.ourgouris, *Dream nation: enlightenment, colonization and the institution of modern Greece* (Stanford 1996) 1-3.

¹⁵ Herbert Golder, ‘The Other Marathon’, in *Forum: Marathon 2500* (n. 11 above) 151-55.

¹⁶ Golder, ‘The Other Marathon’ (n. 14 above) 151.

¹⁷ Golder, ‘The Other Marathon’ (n. 14 above) 152.

¹⁸ Loren J. Samons II, ‘Marathon and Athenian “collaboration”’, *Forum: Marathon 2500* (n. 11 above) 155-58, at 155.

¹⁹ E. Hall, *Inventing the barbarian: Greek self-definition through tragedy* (Oxford 1989) 59.

Eretria. Samons assumes that the number and prominence of Athenians who wanted to accommodate the Persians was 'not negligible' and that Marathon was therefore crucial in stiffening resolve.²⁰ These points also suggest another perspective on the hoplites' run back to defend the city that so inspired Golder. Samons provides an alternative view of the position of Pericles, an Alcmaeonid on his mother's side and who by c. 449, when hostilities against Persia had ceased, was leader in Athens. Samons cites Plutarch as a source for the claim that the Athenians compared Pericles' voice to that of the tyrant Peisistratus and recalls that the comic poets called his associates 'the new Peisistratids'. The essay ends by suggesting that the key question is not so much what would have happened if the battle of Marathon had been lost but rather what would have happened if the Athenians had decided not to fight. A short answer to that in terms of the views put forward in the *Arion* Forum is that it would have been hard for constructs of modern liberal democracy to be grounded in Athenian precedent, however tenuous that might be historically.

The problems of the 'What if?' approach to history were analysed in Cartledge's essay.²¹ He distinguished between absolute rejection and conditional acceptance of the 'What if?' genre of historical speculation and adopted the latter on the grounds that a complex notion of causality is important for the historical explanation that is the main task of the historian. Attention to causality can thus lead to what Cartledge described as 'useful thought-experiments'. Cartledge made two main points in his scenario. The first is that if the Persians had won at Marathon, Athenian democracy would have been cut off before it could fully develop (especially from 450-320 BCE) and that its mediation via Roman, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and later political thought would not have occurred. Cartledge is careful to point out that Athenian democracy was neither representative nor inclusive and therefore not liberal in the modern sense. Nevertheless, the point about the future generation of further democratic practices and their refinement after Marathon, together with their subsequent transmission both in practice and in theory, is important, as are the indirect effects in the development of intellectual history and political philosophy. The use in the history of political thought of the image of Athenian democracy as a spur to and a justification of the elevation of the modern western variants has been analysed by many scholars.²² Many of these discussions do not directly address the complexities of Marathon but refer to how the 'vision' of Athens as a 'prosperous, liberal, imperial, naval power capable of offering examples to the growing power of Britain in the years of prosperity after the Glorious Revolution' came into conflict with the counter-arguments of the American War of Independence and, in terms of traditional thought, with conservative political thought in Britain itself, when the French Revolution caused some historians to identify Athens as a dangerously radical model and to promote identification with Sparta as an alternative.²³ The pendulum swung the other way among the progressive historians

²⁰ Samons, 'Marathon and Athenian "collaboration"' (n. 17 above) 157.

²¹ P. A. Cartledge, "'Marathon-lost! What if...'", *Forum: Marathon 2500* (n. 11 above) 153-54.

²² See, for example, the discussion and bibliography in O. Murray, 'Ancient history in the eighteenth century', in *The western time of ancient history: historical encounters with the Greek and Roman past*, ed. A. Lianeri (Cambridge 2011) 301-06.

²³ Murray, 'Ancient history in the eighteenth century' (n. 21 above) 305.

of the nineteenth century, encapsulated in John Stuart Mill's famous opening to his review of the first two volumes of George Grote's *History of Greece*:

The Battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the Battle of Hastings. If the issue of that day had been different, the Britons and the Saxons might still have been wandering in the woods.²⁴

The point to take from this is that in the western political tradition, Marathon is more likely to be invoked when a 'comforting' aspect of the dream of democracy is being communicated. It is less likely to appear when democracy is being demonized and the allusions rarely focus on the problems of intra-Hellenic relations.

A second and closely related point made by Cartledge opens a window onto interpretation by subsequent ancient writers (and modern scholars) of the events surrounding Marathon. Cartledge argues that Marathon was not an end but a beginning. His argument does, however, take a Spartan turn. After the Spartan defeat at Thermopylae in 480, the Greek resisters had to win at Salamis to avoid the Persians occupying the Greek mainland, so Herodotus thought that it was Salamis that was vital and that therefore it was the Athenians rather than the Spartans who did most overall to defeat the Persians in 480/79. However, Cartledge argued that although Salamis was crucial for the development of Athenian democracy it was not final and decisive in the defeat of Persia. That role is given by Cartledge to Plataea, won by the Spartans who were the only Greeks capable of a substantial land battle. Cartledge concludes that ironically it was therefore the Spartans who made possible the much-vaunted 'Greek legacy' to the west (his 2007 book *Thermopylae* was subtitled 'The battle that changed the world').²⁵

The events surrounding Marathon and the ways in which they were used to construct ancient and modern narratives and ideologies are not, therefore, limited to an assertion of Greek/Persian polarity, with all that this entails for twenty-first century readings of cultural and political conflict. Marathon also opens up two further fields of arguments that are closely related and sometimes fiercely contested, both in terms of scholarship and in terms of political identities. The first problematizes the perspectives on Marathon taken at the time and in the immediate aftermath. The second deals with how the image of Marathon, including its contested contexts, was transmitted and manipulated subsequently.

Diverse perspectives on Marathon 2: antiquity

In addition to Herodotus' foundational treatment, two ancient authors are especially significant for study of those questions: Plutarch and Thucydides. I shall break with chronology by discussing first some relevant features of Plutarch's incorporation of Marathon in his discussions of the Persian Wars and the *Lives* of the Greeks most closely associated with them. In the *Flaminius* (11.6), the Greeks are made to recall their past history:

ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ Μαραθώνιον τις ἔργον ἀφέλοι καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν καὶ Πλαταιὰς καὶ Θερμοπύλας καὶ τὰ πρὸς Εὐρυμέδοντι καὶ τὰ περὶ Κύπρον Κίμωνος

²⁴ J. S. Mill, review of G. Grote, *History of Greece*, vols 1-2, in *Edinburgh Review* (October 1846).

²⁵ P. A. Cartledge, *Thermopylae: the battle that changed the world* (Basingstoke 2007).

ἔργα, πάσας τὰς μάχας ἢ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ μεμάχεται πρὸς αὐτήν, καὶ πᾶν τρόπαιον αὐτῆς συμφορὰ καὶ ὄνειδος ἐπ' αὐτήν ἔστηκε, τὰ πλεῖστα κακία καὶ φιλονεικία τῶν ἡγουμένων περιτραπίσης.

But with the exception of the battles of Marathon and Salamis and Plataea and Thermopylae and the deeds of Cimon and the Eurymedon and around Cyprus, all her other battles Greece fought against herself and for her own enslavement, and every trophy stands as her misfortune and reproach, since she was subdued for the most part by the wickedness and love of strife of her leading men. (trans. Marincola)²⁶

Thus Plutarch locates Marathon, not only in a sequence of battles against the Persians but also in a line of events that tend to pan-Hellenic unity, in contrast to the devastating and seemingly endemic *stasis* within and between the Greek *poleis*. Discussion of Marathon itself does not, however, occupy a prominent place in his work, with the exception of his life of *Aristides*. In the *Aristides*, Plutarch locates Aristides and Miltiades among the ten generals sent to the battle and then focuses on the strategy before the battle. He goes against Herodotus in putting Aristides in the centre of the line fighting brilliantly (Herodotus says that the centre was defeated: Hdt. 6.113). Marathon is also mentioned in the life of *Themistocles* 3.4, but there the emphasis is on how Marathon motivated Themistocles and not on the context of the battle itself. Plutarch suggests (*Them.* 3.4-5) that Themistocles was obsessed with Miltiades' credit for the triumph at Marathon and that he saw Marathon as the beginning of a more protracted conflict, not the end, as some thought. This passage encapsulates the significance of Marathon for Plutarch, both in the line of battles that he enumerates and in the need that he demonstrates to show harmony and concord among the Greeks, mainly by focussing on battles other than Marathon and on more abstract qualities. The brief references to Marathon in the *Themistocles* may suggest that Marathon was problematic in its potential to reveal strife among the Greeks, including among the Athenians themselves, so while its position in the line of significant battles had to be recognized, others might be accorded more status.

John Marincola has discussed how already in the fourth century the 'negative' aspects of Herodotus' narrative that suggested internal conflict among the Greeks and within Athens itself were beginning to be smoothed over, or at least attributed to the *dēmos*, and that this technique allowed the upper class to retain credit for nobility of action.²⁷ Thus by the time of Plutarch, themes in the accounts of the key battles included foresight shown by the leaders; a strong relationship between leaders and the ordinary people, whom they used oratory to persuade; and a tendency to cooperation among the leaders themselves (e.g. *Cimon* 17.9: 'Even ambition (*philotimia*), that most dominating passion, yielded to the needs of one's country'). Plutarch's aspirational construction of this aspect of the narrative is surely shaped by his need to have internal harmony as a pre-requisite of pan-Hellenic cooperation. Marincola argues that the pan-Hellenic strand is already evident

²⁶ J. Marincola, 'Plutarch, parallelism and the Persian-War Lives', in *Plutarch's Lives: parallelism and purpose*, ed. N. Humble (Swansea 2010) 121-43, at 122.

²⁷ Marincola, 'Plutarch, parallelism and the Persian-War Lives' (n. 25 above) 137 and 'The Persian Wars in fourth-century oratory and historiography', in *Cultural responses to the Persian Wars*, ed. E. Bridges, E. Hall, and P. J. Rhodes (Oxford 2007) 105-25, at 119.

in Diodorus and may even go back to Ephorus but that the insistence on harmony among the leaders is Plutarch's own.²⁸ He also points to Plutarch's reference to Pericles' sharing of power with Cimon (with Pericles ruling in the city and Cimon taking the ships to fight the Persians: *Pol. Pres.* 15.812ff.).

This leads me to Thucydides and to the representation in the *Epitaphios* of the speech attributed to Pericles. The *Epitaphios* in Thucydides provides significant comparisons with other examples of the genre in the way that it invokes associations with the dead of Marathon as a context for Pericles' address to mark the public funeral of those killed during the first year of the war between Athenians and Spartans (Thuc. 2.34-46). Thucydides' narrative context (2.34) refers to traditions in the burial of the war dead, with Marathon providing an exception; since the achievement of the dead was considered exceptional, they were buried where they fell. Reference could have been made to similar practices after Salamis and Plataea.²⁹ That it was not suggests that Marathon not only had a special significance in public consciousness at the time,³⁰ but also that its connotations could potentially be divisive. However, Pericles does implicitly include the memory of the Marathon dead in the section in which he invokes the courage and virtue of the ancestors of the present citizens and especially their role in preserving the freedom of the *polis* and by extension permitting the development of the *archē* of the current time (431 BCE).

Much has been written about the assimilation of Marathon both into the ceremonies of mourning and into the cultural memory that brings together mythical heroism and the deeds of the recent past, suggesting counterparts to the passage in Herodotus in which the Athenians include Marathon in the catalogue of their great deeds that is used to justify their arguments with the Tegeans about battle formations in the prelude to Plataea (after Salamis: Hdt. 9.25.2-3). In the *Epitaphios* in Thucydides the sub-text of Marathon similarly furnishes a nexus between the present and the mythical genealogy. However, too much can be made of this aspect and the historian's direct allusions to Marathon at other points in his text show that he assumes that Marathon formed part of his readers' understanding of the dynamics of political claims and counter-claims in the immediate Athenian context. In 1.18 he refers to Marathon as part of his historical overview of the expulsion of the tyrants (although he gives the Spartans the main credit). In 1.73 he records a speech by the Athenians to the Spartans in which the Athenians claim they alone dared to give battle against the barbarians and in 6.59 he refers to Hippias' campaign with the Medes. The overall implication is that Thucydides was well aware of the significance of Marathon as an index of political divisions within Athens and between Athenians and Spartans. Marathon was part of a propaganda battle fought on the field of history as well as in the field of myth. Thomas Harrison uses the term 'battle of the battles' and in that context draws attention to the debates about the relative dates of the epigrams for Marathon and Salamis.³¹ In the Periclean *Epitaphios*, the Persian Wars/Marathon-

²⁸ Marincola, 'Plutarch, parallelism and the Persian-War Lives' (n. 25 above) 138.

²⁹ S. Hornblower, *A commentary on Thucydides*, 3 vols (Oxford 1991-2008) I (1991) 294.

³⁰ N. Loraux, *The invention of Athens: the funeral oration in the classical city*, trans. from the original 1973 edn by A. Sheridan (Cambridge Mass. 1986).

³¹ T. Harrison, *The emptiness of Asia* (London 2000) 36 n. 37.

validated invocation of the virtues of ancestors is needed to justify the current war with Sparta, especially in the light of the losses of the first year, the evacuation and ravaging of the Attic countryside, and the opposition to Pericles' policy (Thuc. 2.13-17, 65). The reverse side of the coin of the reading of the Periclean *Epitaphios* as foundational to the ideal of the democratic *polis* (argued by Loraux and others) is that the rhetoric in the speech also aimed to have an immediate and urgent practical role in reconciling divided factions and social groups in Athens,³² and the generalized references to the values, sacrifices, and achievements of the preceding generations supported that aim of creating unity without drawing attention to past (and present) divisions.

Nevertheless, outside the charged occasion of the *Epitaphios*, images of Marathon had an important place in public sculpture and began to be represented as a counterpart to the mythological heroism of the Trojan Wars and as an emblem of Athenian *monomachia* and *autochthony* – Pausanias 1.15 refers to:

ἐνταῦθα καὶ Μαραθὼν γεγραμμένος ἐστὶν ἥρωες, ἅφ' οὗ τὸ πεδῖον ὠνόμασται, καὶ Θησεὺς ἀνίστη ἐκ γῆς εἰκασμένος Ἀθηνᾶ τε καὶ Ἡρακλῆς ... τῶν μαχομένων δὲ δῆλοι μάλιστα εἰσιν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ Καλλιμάχος τε, δὲ Ἀθηναῖοις πολεμαρχεῖν ἤρητο, καὶ Μιλτιάδης τῶν στρατηγούντων.

The hero Marathon, from whom the level ground got its name, is standing there, with Theseus rising out of the earth and Athena and Herakles ... In the picture of the fighting you can most clearly make out Kallimachos, who was chosen to be the chief Athenian general, and general Miltiades.

He also refers to the Marathon group at Delphi (Paus. 10.10.1-2). The association between Marathon and Theseus, noted by Pausanias, was important from the early fifth century when a founder's cult to Theseus was established in the city and played a symbolic role in the rebuilding of the city centre and in Themistocles' establishment of the naval centre in the Piraeus.³³ Public sculpture was matched by poetry as a means of elaboration and transmission of the associations of the different battles (for instance, in Bacchylides 18 and Simonides' treatment of Plataea).³⁴ The persistence of Marathon as a touchstone in the complexities of public memory of recent history is also in evidence in a number of later fifth- and early fourth-century sources. Aristophanes invokes the 'men of Marathon' cliché in his treatment of the *Acharnians* (*Ach.* 692-702), while in the *Menexenus* attributed to Plato there is an interesting combination of satire of the *epitaphios* genre and allusion to Marathon as first in the numerical ranking of Persian War battles not just because it was the first but because it showed that the Persians could be beaten (239d-241a). Whether or not that particular passage is also satirical is not the point since satire can in any case only be effective if it resonates with public awareness. As

³² L. Hardwick, 'Philomel and Pericles: silence in the funeral speech', *Greece and Rome* 40.2 (October 1993) 147-62.

³³ C. Dougherty, 'Athens' tale of two cities: Themistocles, Theseus and the construction of "place" in fifth-century Athens', in *When worlds elide: classics, politics, culture*, ed. K. Bassi and J. P. Euben (Lanham 2010) 137-60.

³⁴ D. Boedeker and D. Sider, ed., *The new Simonides. Contexts of praise and desire* (Oxford 2001).

experience passes into memory and then into constructions of collective memory, different modes of memory come to be aligned with different uses of the past.³⁵ In the case of Marathon, tradition and continuity were instrumental in the creation of an Athenian civic identity that combined notions of freedom from external threat with genealogies that linked it to the past and developmental energies that linked it to the *archē*. Marathon also provided an *exemplum* from the past that was associated with pride in the present (perhaps overdone, hence the satire in Aristophanes). It also became a *topos* in the *epitaphios* genre as a whole, for instance in the *epitaphios logos* of Lysias in which the battles of the Persian Wars are assimilated into a narrative of myth that includes the Amazonomachy and the Heraclidae, from which he moves to the historical past of the Persian Wars. Grethlein points out how Lysias uses that particular move to add the value of fighting for justice. This gives Athens a status that is both transhistorical and democratic, based on values of freedom, justice, and unity.³⁶

Diverse perspectives on Marathon 3: accretions and appropriations

Such processes of accretion and recontextualization underlie some of the most important modern receptions of Marathon. The two-hour speech made by the President of Harvard, Edward Everett, at the inauguration of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg in the American Civil War on 19 November 1863 (following the battle in the preceding July) is usually overshadowed by President Lincoln's address, which followed it. However, a substantial section of the first part of Everett's speech drew directly on the Periclean *Epitaphios* in Thucydides as a source of civic values and added direct reference to the dead of Marathon:

As the battle fought upon that immortal field was distinguished from all others in Grecian history for its influence over the fortunes of Hellas, – as it depended upon the event of that day whether Greece should live, a glory and a light to all in coming time, or should expire like the meteor of a moment; so the honors awarded to its martyr-heroes were such as were bestowed by Athens on no other occasion.³⁷

Everett went on to describe visiting Greece and gazing 'with respectful emotion upon the mound which still protects the dust of those who rolled back the tide of Persian invasion, and rescued the land of popular liberty, of letters, and of arts, from the ruthless foe'. That experience was transferred to the battle ground of Gettysburg:

And shall I, fellow citizens ... stand unmoved over the graves of our dear brethren, who so lately, on three of those all-important days that decide a nation's history, – days on whose issue it depended whether this august republican Union, founded by some of the wisest statesmen that ever lived, cemented with the blood of some of the purest patriots that ever died, should perish or endure, – rolled back the tide of an

³⁵ J. Grethlein, *The Greeks and their past: poetry, oratory and history in the fifth century BCE* (Cambridge 2010) 11.

³⁶ Lysias 2.4-21; Grethlein, *The Greeks and their past* (n. 34 above) 109-10.

³⁷ G. Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: the words that remade America* (New York 1992) 213-16.

invasion not less unprovoked, not less ruthless, than that which came to plant the dark banner of Asiatic despotism and slavery on the free soil of Greece?

The elision of past, present, and aspiration for the future provides the framework for the rhetoric and was carried into the invention of a new tradition. An important feature in Everett's speech was the attribution of Persian characteristics to the enemy in a situation of civil war. This is in contrast to twentieth-century assimilations of Marathon in European contexts that were more concerned with rival value systems between Greek *poleis* than with Greek and Persian oppositions. In these situations, Marathon provided an agency in cultural and political experience that provided a further set of variations on the ancient dynamics.

The association of Marathon with victories of values as well as force took a new turn in European cultural politics in the nineteenth century. The association between images of Marathon and the English victory over the French at Waterloo brought together strands of poetic inspiration, travel literature, attraction to monuments, painting, sculpture, and popular culture.³⁸ However, aspects of the association sometimes pulled in different directions in the sea of nineteenth-century politics. On the one hand, it reflected a more overt admiration for (democratic) Athens rather than Sparta, an admiration reflected in the tone of Grote's *History*, which aligned Athenian democracy with Victorian liberalism. On the other hand, Marathon provided underpinning for a patriotism that could equally well appeal to the more conservative. Both aspects came together in the vision of a sea empire. However, as Byron pointed out in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, none of the comparisons, whether of politics or of persons, was exact. So while E. S. Creasy's book *Fifteen decisive battles of the world from Marathon to Waterloo* (1851) became a best seller and ran to forty editions, Byron's lines provided an injection of Marathon into the imaginations of his readers and of those who would aspire to follow him as poets:

The mountains look on Marathon –
And Marathon looks on the sea;
And musing there an hour alone,
I dream'd that Greece might still be free.

In the early twentieth century a mixture of poetic idealism and belief in the moral value of empire came together in soldier poets of the First World War. These were mainly (but not exclusively) young men who had been educated in public and grammar schools in the shade of the Hellenists Shelley and Byron and the texts of Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides. Their perceptions of Marathon were, however, mixed with the accretions of Homeric heroism, as had happened in fifth-century Athens. Elizabeth Vandiver's study of classical receptions analysed a very broad range of First World War poetry, thus permitting a balance to be struck between 'ordinary' poetry that accepted the war and sought only to vindicate the participants and the critical treatment found in exceptional poets such as Wilfred Owen. She located work that was unpublished or self-published (sometimes by grieving parents) and it is often this less-accomplished poetry that provides evidence for how Marathon had become embedded in the consciousness of a generation. Marathon appears in several contexts. First

³⁸ T. Rood, 'From Marathon to Waterloo: Byron, battle monuments and the Persian Wars', in *Cultural responses*, ed. Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes (n. 26 above) 267-97.

there is the public school background of most of the young officer volunteers in the early part of the war. Vandiver shows how the poetry published by their schoolmasters reflected the ways in which Greek texts and values had been taught.³⁹ This pedagogy was reflected in the world-view of the young officers: Patrick Shaw-Stewart took Herodotus as a guide book; Simonides recurred in the make-shift epitaphs placed at the graves of the dead. Nevertheless, in a Marathon-derived counter-text, a traumatic image that challenged the sanitized memorials associated with the Marathon mound shaped the soldier Ivor Gurney's gaze on the remains of his dead friend ('To his Love', 1919).⁴⁰

Classics education had placed Marathon alongside Thermopylae as part of a generalized Hellenic inheritance and there are some indications that it was also used as an emblem the defeat of barbarism (for example, in R. C. K. Ensor's 'Ode on the European War', 1917, which coupled Marathon with Tours – where the medieval Franks fought against Islamic invaders).⁴¹ However, in the mythologized history of Greek warfare that surfaces in the poetry dating from the early years of the war, Marathon is more associated with liberty and Athenian culture and Thermopylae with endurance and self-sacrifice. Both were overshadowed by the assimilation of the soldiers into the heroic associations of the Trojan war, especially though the lens of Gallipoli, in which the Homeric *aristeia* became a feature of the poetics that honoured the dead. This grafting together of different types of war experience past and present with the idealization of the Greek past in order to provide a sense of unity in death and an aspiration for *kleos* in the future, mirrors the process that developed in antiquity after Marathon.⁴² A rather different view of a parallel process in modern Greece has been described by David Ricks as 'klefing'.⁴³ The original 'klefts' were bandits who attacked the Ottomans and then joined the war of Independence. Their assimilation via folk songs into a Homeric heroism that in turn underlay the psychology of modern Greece shares some features with the transformation of the British First World War dead through association both with Homer and with the liberal democracy that grew from the new mythologies grafted onto the images of Marathon. The fluid but pervasive assimilation of the *kudos* and *kleos* of Homer's heroes into a democratic and imperial mindset can perhaps be described as a western liberal example of the cultural dynamics of 'klefing'. It also involved a reinscription of the subjective and social aspects of (modern) war experience into the political and cultural manifestations of memory associated with Marathon.

Affiliation with different Greek forerunners increasingly marked differences between European states. Association with Sparta and its values was more prominent in Germany, which associated itself with Thermopylae and Plataea, rather than with Marathon. This had strong roots in the nineteenth century when K. O. Müller's book *Die Dorier* (1824) had

³⁹ E. Vandiver, *Stand in the trench, Achilles: Classical receptions in British poetry of the Great War* (Oxford 2010) ch. 1, 'Sed miles, sed pro patria: Classics and public school culture'.

⁴⁰ L. Hardwick, 'Convergence and divergence in reading Homer', in *Homer: readings and images*, ed. C. Emlyn-Jones, L. Hardwick, and J. Purkis (London 1992) 227-48, at 241.

⁴¹ Vandiver, *Stand in the trench* (n. 38 above) 168.

⁴² Hardwick, 'Convergence and divergence' (n. 39 above) 228-35.

⁴³ D. Ricks, *The shade of Homer: a study in modern Greek poetry* (Cambridge 1989) 41-43.

provided the Spartans as models for the Prussians and later for the Imperial German military virtues. By the 1920s the experiences of Germany in the aftermath of defeat prompted nostalgia for the values of Leonidas and the Three Hundred of Thermopylae.⁴⁴ In the 1930s analogies between Sparta and Germany were exploited by the Nazis not only in terms of eugenics but also in the education of the future elite.⁴⁵ The Sparta-Nazi analogy was also exploited by politicians and writers in Britain, both in the context of the 1930s and in the years of the Second World War and beyond.⁴⁶ This both stimulated a British self-identification with the Athenians and Marathon and also demonstrates how analogies with the ancient ‘battle of the battles’ fed into intra-European conflicts and ideology in ways that sometimes modelled the differences between the Greeks in the fifth century.

Some provisional conclusions

Herodotus’ account of the disputes in the run up to Marathon provides a crucible for the variations on the theme that are evident in subsequent receptions. This is not to say that Herodotus’ version is a yardstick in the sense of providing an accurate account of historical events. Like subsequent historians and rhetoricians he was writing both with the advantage of hindsight and the disadvantage of contemporary pressures. Herodotus has been said to offer a ‘repertoire of possibilities’ for discussions of the Persian Wars.⁴⁷ The phrase could also be applied to the possibilities provided by Marathon, in practice and in metaphor, for the builders of future attitudes, in the modern world as much as in antiquity.

Herodotus’ treatment set out a dynamics in which the struggle against the Persians was complicated by conflicts among the Greeks and within Athens and also by the ensuing competition for the credit arising from the eventual defeat of the Persians. It precludes simplistic models that deal with the subject and the Other (whether or not that Other is orientalized). In 6.109 Herodotus presents the speech of Miltiades to Callimachus, the war archon who had a vote additional to those of the generals in deciding strategy. Callimachus’ vote was decisive in the decision to fight. Herodotus reports that Miltiades’ rhetoric was shaped by appeal to freedom (*vs* slavery), appeal to honour (in the creation of a glorious reputation in the future), and desire for aggrandizement (pre-eminence among the Greek *poies*) – ‘Our country will be free – yes, and the first city of Greece’. Read with hindsight, this looks like a quasi-Thucydidean perspective on the motivation for political action. It sounds like an anticipation of the arguments for the Athenian *archē* (and of Pericles’ apology in his Last Speech: Thuc. 2.65). The inscription of the appeal to

⁴⁴ S. Hodkinson, ‘Sparta and Nazi Germany in British thought’, in *Sparta: the body politic*, ed. A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (Swansea 2010) 298–342, at 298–99.

⁴⁵ H. Roche, “‘Brave German boys, it is your duty to live as Spartans!’: appropriations of Sparta in the elite schools of the Third Reich (a case study on Napola Naumburg)”, Institute of Classical Studies seminar, 10 December 2010. See further Roche, “‘Spartanische Pimpfe’: the importance of Sparta in the educational ideology of the Adolf Hitler schools”, in *Sparta in modern thought*, ed. S. Hodkinson and I. MacGregor Morris (Swansea 2012) 315–42.

⁴⁶ Hodkinson, ‘Sparta and Nazi Germany’ (n. 43 above).

⁴⁷ C. Pelling, ‘*De malignitate Plutarchi*: Plutarch, Herodotus and the Persian Wars’, in *Cultural responses*, ed. Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes (n. 26 above) 145–64, at 155.

fear, honour, and greed reflects Herodotus' mid-fifth-century analysis. It is comparable with Thucydides 1.75-77, which has specific references to fear, prestige, and the pursuit of interests as spurs to action. The models in Herodotus and in Thucydides underpin Thucydides' offer of the concept of synchronicity to future societies.⁴⁸ Herodotus' account of Marathon thus contained in itself an explanation of how Marathon could become both an icon of aspiration and a metaphor for the justification of empire. The precise extent to which his account was shaped by mid-fifth-century perspectives and the extent to which Thucydides' analysis of the war between the Greeks was shaped by relations between the Greeks in the Persian Wars is a matter for debate, both in terms of fifth-century history and in terms of the temporalities of historiography.⁴⁹ However, the general issue about ways in which aspects of particular conflicts are subject to historiographic and political reconstruction and re-reading is at the centre of the reception of Marathon.

From antiquity to the modern world Marathon has provided a nexus between the writing and rewriting of social, political, and cultural memory and the repairing of holes in the political fabric. On that basis, the history of the reception of Marathon provides alternative ways of thinking about the construction of east/west polarities and a constant reminder that internal strife and rivalry is as important as external. The ancient sources provide a map of the process of transformation of the experiences of the individuals to the social memory of a generation and its successors. The ensuing political and cultural narratives were transgenerational over many centuries and were selective, contested, and open to re-grounding through the agency of events, ideas, literary and political rhetoric, and association with place. In terms of the history of classical receptions and their analyses, it also follows that the formal structures and conventions of ancient texts – in this case the speeches and the narrative framework setting out the interdependency of concepts such as fear, honour, and greed – may carry forward into subsequent receptions the patterns of recognition embedded in the ancient texts. The receptions of Marathon also illuminate the range of explanatory models that can be invoked for the processes involved – *exemplum*, parallelism, klefting, poetic imagination – as well as the contests for appropriation in politics and in the forging of national identities. It is said that from the second century BCE a rhetorical *agōn* was held at the site of Marathon. That might be said to continue into the modern age, with the proviso that the site of the battle Marathon is as important metaphorically as it was materially.

⁴⁸ E. Greenwood, *Thucydides and the reshaping of history* (London 2006) ch. 3.

⁴⁹ K. Raaflaub, *The discovery of freedom in ancient Greece*, trans. R. Franciscono (Chicago and London 2004) 63.

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